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THE U.S.-ISRAELI CLANDESTINE END-USER AGREEMENT AND THE
SECOND LEBANON WAR: LESSONS FOR THE CONVENTION ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
EITAN BARAK*
Israel's extensive cluster munitions (CMs) use in the 2006 Second Lebanon War
served as a major impetus for the 2008 Convention on CMs (CCM). It also led to
an extensive U.S.-Israeli diplomatic entanglement over Israel's supposed
violations of U.S. legislation, specifically the 1976 classified BilateralEnd-User
Agreement detailing Israel's use of US.-made CMs. The Article first tracks the
Agreement's inception and the diplomatic crises caused by Israel's alleged breach
since then. The second section provides a detail account of the 2006 crisis while
the third analyzes if US. legislation was violated The Article concludes, using a
flexible interpretation,that in effect US. legislation was not violated and argues
that given its out-dated stipulations the Agreement was doomed to be violated
under aformal interpretation.More importantly, given the restrictionsimposed on
Israel by the Agreement, this case provides a unique opportunity to assess the
rationalebehind the refusal of CCM supporters to accept anything but a total ban
on CMs.
Only after the war did we, Amir [Amir Peretz, Israel's 2006 Wartime Minister of
Defense] and I, first learn about the use of cluster bombs . . . the responsible
echelons in the IDF [Israel Defense Force] refused to provide me with the maps
[of the strike locations]. They wanted to hide the fact that we had fired this
problematic weapon . .. without any higher authorization and in an uncontrolled
manner, although they were old munitions which the Americans had provided us
following assurance that we would use it only in case our very survival was at
stake.'

* Lecturer (U.S. Assistant Professor), Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. I am indebted to John Borrie, Guy Harpaz, Milton Leitenberg, Richard Moyes, Eric
Prokosch, Jullian Perry Robinson, Robbie Sabel, and Dan Yakir for their comments and suggestions.
Special thanks are due to Brian Rappert, Yael Ronen and Yuval Shany. I also thank participants of the
International Law Forum, the Hebrew University, in which an earlier draft of this article was discussed
in March 2008. I am also grateful to Yaccov Verzberger for sharing his views on specific issues with
me. Last but not least, I am indebted to Lior Avni, Yeela Porat and Roee Ariav for outstanding research
assistance. Any remaining errors are mine alone.
1. See Akiva Eldar, Capturedin Conception, HAARETZ, Friday Supplement, July 18, 2008, at 21,
24 (recollection of Hagai Alon, a former political adviser of Peretz).
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I. INTRODUCTION

In summer 2006, amidst intense fighting, accusations appeared in the
international media claiming Israel's use of cluster munitions (CMs) 2 in Lebanon
was illegal.3 Yet the world's outcry was raised in the war's aftermath, with Israel
suddenly finding itself under heavy attack.4
However, while the government's initial formal response stressed that
"strenuous efforts were made to ensure that these [IDF operations] were carried out
in complete accordance with international law, both with regard to method and
weaponry,"' on November 19, 2006 the then IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan
Halutz surprisingly chose a completely different response stating that the use of
cluster bombs often constituted a clear violation of his explicit order not to fire
into populatedzones.6
As expected, Halutz's announcement took the Israeli public by surprise and
caused bitterness among Israeli war veterans who felt that they had followed all
orders when firing.7 An artillery officer (reservist) was quoted saying: "Did he
[Halutz] really say that .... We fired not a single rocket on our own initiative. No
one would have ever considered firing at any target without explicit orders to do
so."
The queries over Halutz's statement given its unequivocal connotation (i.e.,
the IDF was an unruly army which did not follow orders) as reflected in the Israeli
press became more frequent and vocal. However, neither the Israeli public nor the
international community was aware that Halutz's admission was made in an
attempt to appease the U.S.; the U.S. State Department had already begun an

2. See generally Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an Instrument on
Cluster Munitions, 12 J. OF CONFLICT AND SEC. L. 447, 450-54 (2007) (defining cluster bombs as
"weapon[s] comprising multiple explosive submunitions [i.e., bomblets] which are dispensed from a
container" and are "munition[s] designed to be dispensed in multiple quantities from a container and to
detonate prior to, on, or after impact.").
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Israeli Cluster Munitions Hit Civilians
in Lebanon (July 24, 2006) (available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/24/isrlpal3798 txt.htm);
Robert Pear, Rally Near White House Protests Violence In Mideast,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at A22.
4. See Marvin Kalb & Carol Saivetz, The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006. The Media as a
Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict, 12 THE INT'L J. OF PRESS/POLITICS. 43, 51 (2007) (noting that some
leading U.S. newspapers portrayed Israel as the aggressor).
5. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Behind the Headlines: Legal and Operational
Aspects of the Use of Cluster Bombs (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Legal+and+operational+aspects+of+the+use+of+cluster+b
ombs+5-Sep-2006.htm.
6. See, e.g., Nir Hason & Meron Rapoport, Chief of Staff is to Appoint a Major General to
Inquire into Use of Cluster Rockets, HAARETZ, Nov. 20, 2006, at Al; Yossi Joshua, IDF Fired Cluster
Bombs Contrary to the Chief of Staffs Order, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Nov. 20, 2006, at 2 (referring to
Halutz's announcement, which was reported on November 19 via the major Israeli TV evening news
programs and appeared the day after in daily national newspapers).
7. See, e.g., Meron Rapoport, Peretz's Office Admits 'Irregularities' in Use of Cluster Bombs
During War, HAARETZ, Nov. 21, 2006, at 2.
8. See Meron Rapoport, A Barrage ofAccusations, HAARETZ, Dec. 8, 2006, at B2.
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inquiry into Israel's use of U.S.-made cluster bombs prior to his admission.9
Israel's concern was not due to the seemingly pertinent U.S. legislation: The 1952
U.S.-Israeli Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (hereinafter the 1952
Agreement) under which Israel may employ U.S.-made weapons if they are "'used
solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense . . ."a and the

1976 U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which governs use of U.S.-made
defense equipment and services by foreign nations and under which the U.S. may
stop aid to countries that use U.S. military assistance for purposes other than
"'legitimate self defense."11
On December 16, 1976 a bilateral end-use agreement specifying conditions
for the use of U.S.-made cluster bombs by Israel was concluded between the two
allies. 12 The agreement is so highly classified that even 30 years later the two states
continue to keep its exact terms secret:"[O]ftentimes it [the end use agreement]
gets into rules of engagement for specific countries and those themselves are
usually classified or tightly held by the foreign national government." 13
Today, with the crisis behind us and the participants (the Olmert Government
and the Bush Administration) leaving center stage, it is a good time to explore this
affair within its current context. In December 2008, 94 states signed the
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Oslo, Norway, 14 which prohibits the
9. David S. Cloud, Inquiry Opened Into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006,
at 1.
10. Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the United States of America and
Israel Relating to Mutual Defense Assistance, U.S.-Isr., art. 2, July 1-23, 1952, 1953 U.N.T.S. 2363,

(providing participation in U.N. collective security agreements as a third allowed purpose but not
defining terms such as "internal security," "legitimate self-defense," or "act of aggression") (emphasis
added).
11. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (1976). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2753 (1976)
(outlining presidential and Congressional response options to violations under this act); see RICHARD F.
GRIMMETT, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 30982, U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES
SUPPLIED To FOREIGN RECIPIENTS: RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR USE, (Mar. 14, 2005), CRS 1-4 (providing

a brief overview of the act); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 502,
75 Stat. 424 (authorizing the provision of defense articles and services on a government-to-government
grant basis in provisions virtually identical to those in the AECA).
12. See CONG. REC., 12030 (May 1, 1978), cited in WILLIAM ESPINOSA & LES JANKA, DEFENSE
OR AGGRESSION? U.S. ARMS EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON 16

(American Educational Trust Rep., 1982) (citing a letter dated April 20, 1978 and written by Israel's
Ambassador to the U.S., Simcha Dinitz (1973-79) during the 1978 crisis over the use of U.S.-made
CMs in Lebanon that was later introduced into the Congressional Record by Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. of
California).
13. Sean McCormack, U.S. Dep't. of State Daily Press Briefing (Jan. 29, 2007), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/jan/79467.htm
(justification provided by Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs and the State Department spokesperson at the time).
14. ClusterConvention.org, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference (2008),
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages iv/iv signingconferece.html (noting that four states also
ratified the CCM at the same time: The Holy See, Ireland, Norway and Sierra Leone); see generally
ClusterConvention.org, Ratifications and Signatures (2008), http://www.clusterconvention.org/
pages/pages i/i statessigning.html (listing the signatories to the CCM). As of Nov. 1, 2009 103 states
have signed the the Convention from which 24 states have already ratified it. An updated list of
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use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of CMs." The CCM
represents the culmination of the Oslo Process which spearheaded five
international conferences between February 2007 (Oslo, Norway) and May 2008
(Dublin, Ireland).16
In contrast, due to the total ban adopted by the CCM in 2007, several major
countries that stock and/or use CMs, led by the U.S., initiated another multilateral
process. The new process called for the regulation of, rather than a complete ban
of, CMs thorough a series of legally binding restrictions initiated under the
auspices of the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
In the face of international outcries over the absence of any legal restrictions on
CMs, various restrictions were proposed in the (sixth) draft Protocol on CMs; these
were believed to adequately address the need to dramatically minimize the likely
post-conflict harm associated with such weapons. 8
At the time of its extensive use of CMs in the 2006 War, Israel was actually
subject to legal restrictions far more stringent than those proposed by the current
draft protocol ("Draft Protocol"). The source of these restrictions was, however,
quite different: a bilateral end-user agreement (with subsequent assurances and
clarifications)1 9 and not a multilateral agreement.

Ratifications and Signatures is available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)
/67DC5063EB530E02C 12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument).
15. See Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, U.N. Doc.
CCM/77 (May 30, 2008) (will be ratified six months after its ratification by 30 States ratification),
available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/ccm77_english.pdf (comprising
separate articles that refer to assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas, and destruction of
stockpiles) [hereinafter, CCM]; see generally Priya Pillai, Adoption of the Convention on Cluster
Munitions, 12 ASIL Insights (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights081001.cfm (providing a brief
overview of the CCM's provisions).
16. ClusterConvention.org, Calendar of Events, http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/
pages iii /iii calendar.html (last visited September 18, 2009) (indicating the other three conferences
were held at Lima, Peru (May 2007), Vienna, Austria (December 2007), and Wellington, New Zealand
(February 2008) in addition to a large number of regional meetings that were held to promote signing of
the CCM between March 2007 (South East Asia) and November 2008 (Beirut, Lebanon)). For the most
comprehensive and updated overview and analysis of this process see John Borrie, Unacceptable
Harm: A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won (United Nations, 2009.
forthcoming).
17. See United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523; see generally
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C]257180004B]B30?
OpenDocument (referring to the CCW as the Inhumane Weapons Convention and noting that there are
currently 110 parties to the CCW, some of which have not ratified all the protocols, and five
signatories).
18. See Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, Oct. 21, 2009, CCW Doc. CCW/MSP/2009/WP.1.
The draft was presented by Gustavo Ainchil, Chairperson of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) for the consideration of the issue in the 2009 Meeting of the States Parties (Geneva, 12-13 Nov.
2009), item 10 of the provisional agenda, under his personal responsibility available at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF4E78AA321C4B4EC12573CF005D136?Ope
nDocument [hereinafter, Draft Protocol].
19. THOMAS NASH, FORESEEABLE HARM 4 (Richard Moyes ed., Land Mine Action 2006).
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This Article is divided into three parts. Part One briefly sketches the
background of the 1976 Agreement and its history leading up to the 2006 War.
Since Israel used CMs in all of its post 1976 large-scale conflicts (i.e., 1978, 1982,
2006), the Article explores U.S. attempts to strengthen the Agreement following
Israel's first round of CM use in Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon, by adding an
additional, more detailed classified legal instrument. An overview of the sanction
(suspension) imposed on Israel, following its second round of CM use in the 1982
Lebanon War, concludes this part.
In Part Two, the Article focuses on the U.S.-Israel entanglement following
Israel's extensive CM usage in 2006. It begins with an account of the IDF's
unprecedented response to U.S. criticism analyzing the U.S. State Department's
inquiry and the manner in which the Bush Administration managed the crisis by
successfully concluding it despite escalating pressure from Human Rights NGOs
and the international media.
The first two parts provide the background necessary for the Article's main
thrust: an in-depth legal analysis of whether U.S. legislation in general and the
bilateral agreement in particular were violated during the Second Lebanon War.
Furthermore, given the similarity between International Humanitarian Law's (IHL)
requirements and U.S. demands vis-iA-vis Israel, an inquiry into the aggregated
stipulations of all pertinent U.S. instruments addressed by Israel implies
addressing, in part, whether Israel's extensive CM use complies with international
law in general and IHL in particular. This analysis in Part Three suggests that in
applying flexible interpretation, Israel did not likely violate the 1976 Agreement.
In contrast, under formal and strict methods of interpretation, such an agreement,
given its outdated stipulations and clarifications was doomed to be violated.In fact,
had Israel escaped its ever-growing dependency on the U.S., it could have invoked
the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.20
Moreover, the restrictions imposed on Israel by the bilateral end-user
agreement are similar to those introduced in the newly proposed CCW Protocol.
Thus, regardless of the outcome of the U.S. initiative (creating a new CM
protocol), the 2006 Israeli use in the context of the 1976 Agreement provides a
unique opportunity to assess the rationale behind the refusal of CCM supporters to
accept anything less than a complete ban on CMs. Salient conclusions as to the
CCM's importance, beyond the legal issues, close the Article.
II. A

HISTORY OF THE
SECOND LEBANON WAR)

1976

U.S.-MADE

CLUSTER AGREEMENT

(UP To

THE

A. Origins of the 1976 US.-Made ClusterAgreement
In the 1950s, Israel began developing an aerial-dropped CM. In fact the first

20. See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 459, 470-71 (2004-2005) (discussing the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as
recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
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casualty (March 1954) suffered in EMET 21 resulted from a live CM test and the
improper care of a dud's fuse. 22 Yet no mass production line was established at the
time.
In the face of mounting incidents on the Israeli-Egyptian front in the wake of
the 1967 Six Day War, Israel repeatedly requested that the U.S. provide it with the
modem U.S.-made CMs used during the Vietnam War. Its efforts were, however,
to no avail.23 When the intensity of armed incidents reached the level justifying
their formal classification as a War of Attrition, Israel's need for CMs became
more urgent.24 Because the U.S. refused to provide Israel with this "sensitive
weapon"-as the U.S. defined CMs-despite its necessity to attack the Egyptian
anti-aircraft batteries that were limiting Israeli Air Force (IAF) freedom of
operation, Israel was left with no choice but to begin master production of modem
CMs. 25 Israel therefore initiated a crash program 26 in 1970, which resulted in the
remarkable development of a highly advanced aerial-dropped CM known as Tal-1
(a 5501b bomb containing 279 bomblets).27 However, because the War of Attrition
ended on August 7, 1970, shortly after the first-"highly successful"-use of the
weapon on June 8, 1970 (Operation Baldness 75), this indigenous CM was barely
used in this war.28
While technical problems prevented Israel from mass-producing this weapon,
the mere realization that Israel could establish an indigenous CM manufacturing
industry was sufficient to convince the Nixon Administration to drop its objections
and provide CMs to its ally. The first shipments of U.S.-made CMs (such as the
CBU-7/A, which contains 1200 bomblets) to Israel arrived in the War's aftermath

21. See Munya Mardor (A), RAFAEL 57-160 (1981) for a discussion by EMET's chief
administrator and the founding director of RAFAEL regarding EMET's short history (1952-1958) and
the transformation of EMET (a Hebrew acronym for Division of Research and Planning) into RAFAEL
(a subdivision of the Ministry of Defense, in Hebrew, Armament Development Authority Advanced
Defense Systems Ltd.).
22. See Munya Mardor (B), RAFAEL, in THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT
AND DEFENSE PRODUCTION 1, 26-28 (Nathan Roee ed., 1982) for a detailed description of this incident;
see Mardor (A), RAFAEL, Id, 143-5 (explaining that the bomb was known as Z-15, for the seventh letter
in the Hebrew alphabet).
23. See Danny Shalom, Phantoms Over Cairo - Israeli Air Force In The War Of Attrition (19671970) 838 (Bavir Aviation & Space Publications 2007).
24. See Mardor (A), RAFAEL, supra note 21, at 215-16 (noting that the War of Attrition officially
began in March 1969 and ended in August 1970, although intensive incidents occurred already in late
1967, and that the intensive use of armament, especially aerial arms, resulted in, for example, a ten-fold
jump in some types of ammunition, such as 100kg gravity bombs: 4000 during 1969 to 40,000 in 1970).
25. See Shalom, supra note 23, at 837-38.
26. See Alan Hayman, Bombs and Unguided Rockets: Low-Cost-Ordnance for Aerial Warfare, 41
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (1982), cited in Kevin Danaher, Israel's Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon, 12
J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 48, 51 (1982).
27. See Shalom, supra note 23, at 837 (providing a detailed specification of Tal-I); see Mardor
(B), RAFAEL, supra note 22, at 76 (noting that at that time, this was a remarkable achievement which
even won its development team the 1971 prestigious IsraelDefense Prize for exceptional technological
breakthroughs).
28. See Shalom, supra note 23, at 1141.
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and during the 1973 War, additional urgent shipments of CMs were requested and
approved. 29 By 1975, Israel had received approximately 22,000 U.S. CBU units.P
Although Israel used US-made CMs against Palestinian bases in Lebanon
during March-April 1974, the only reported restriction imposed by the U.S. was
that "the weapons not be used against civilian populations."3 1 Even the January
1975 Ford Administration decision to sell 200 Lance cluster warheads missiles
32
(MGM-52) to Israel had no effect on this slack restriction. However, in October
1976, President Ford granted Israel's request for "a small number" of CBU-72 33
that, although listed as CMs, attracted considerable attention because they were in
fact Fuel-Air Explosive [FAE] bombs, referred to as "enhanced blast munitions"
by some experts3 4 but more often as simply "concussion bombs." 35 Interestingly,
under both the CCM and the Draft Protocol, CBU-72s are not considered CMs. 3 6
Concussion bombs disperse an aerosol cloud of fuel that, once ignited, produces a
highly destructive shock wave. Those in the explosion area face being crushed by
the blast or killed by having air sucked out of their lungs due to the vacuum created
by the explosion.37 Because of its potential severe collateral damage and its
devastating impact on combatants, this weapon caused much concern in the
international community, reflected in the 1976 proposal to ban "anti-personnel use
of weapons which for their effects rely exclusively on shock waves in the air."38

29. See Leslie H. Gelb, Arms Aid to IsraelMay Cost $2-Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1973, at 97
(noting the urgent supply obtained during the 1973 War).
30. See Don Oberdorfer, Cluster Bomb Curbs Sought in Mideast, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1978, at
Al.

31. ADAM ARNON, LAND OF LEBANON 312 (2005) (discussing Israel's CM use in March-April
1974); see Lee Lescaze, U.S. to Give IsraelDevastating Bombs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1976, at Bl5
(discussing the loose restrictions prior to December 1976).
32. See CHRISTOPHER CHANT, A COMPENDIUM OF ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY HARDWARE 5012 (Routledge & Kegan Paul Inc.) (1987) (explaining that lance missiles had only cluster warheads
containing 836 bomblets each in their non-nuclear version); John W. Finney, Israelto Receive 200 U.S.
Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1975, at 6 for a discussion of Ford's decision after nearly four years of
Israeli lobbying; YIGAL LEv, ARTILLERY CORPS 143 (1981) for Israeli accounts of their reception;
William Beecher, U.S. Said to Weigh Sending Israel Short-Range Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1971, at 3 for a discussion of Israel's request as early as 1971.
33. See David Binder, PresidentCancels IsraeliBomb Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1977, at 11; see
also Diplomacy: Time to Meet the Players, TIME, Feb. 21, 1977.
34. See, e.g., Erich Prokosch & Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Antipersonnel Weapons, in 65 WAR OR
HEALTH? A READER 75 (Ilkka Taipale et al., eds., 2002).
35. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Ford Move on New Arms to IsraelIs Termed Political,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1976, at 3.
36. Draft Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 2, 2(d)(i) (requiring at least ten "explosive submunitions"); CCM, supra note 15, at art.2,
2(c)(i) (also requiring at least ten "explosive submunitions").
37. For more on the first generation of FAE weapons see, e.g., SIPRI, ANTI-PERSONNEL
WEAPONS 171-175 (1978). For reasons to ban this weapon see, e.g., Ove Bring, Regulating
Conventional Weapons in the Future - Humanitarian Law or Arms Control?, 24 J. OF PEACE
RESEARCH, 275, 278-280 (1987).
38. See International committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons, Annex A. 1, 167 (1976), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
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Despite Israel's declaration that the FAE bombs were needed for "destroying
minefields, neutralizing ground-to-air missiles site, and smashing concrete fighter
plane revetments" 39 the Ford Administration sought a concrete commitment that
this weapon, then considered an advanced CM, would not be used against civilians
and some military targets.40 The IDF would thus have to pledge "to drop them only
in certain cases."4 1 On December 5, 1976, Shimon Peres, then Israel's Minister of
Defense, flew to Washington to secure advance weapons, including CMs. 42 On
December 16, 1976 the cited classified end-use agreement was secretly signed.43
Formally, other than the fact that it contains "stipulations and conditions on
the use of CBU's,"44 the agreement's exact terms remain classified. 4 5 However,
various U.S. officials have suggested that in addition to the basic requirement
(grounded in the AECA and the 1952 Agreement) of "legitimate self defense,"
Israel is required to meet three additional criteria before resorting to using U.S.made CMs: (a) a war must be in progress; (b) the weapon is to be used against
"military, fortified targets"; 4 6 and (c) these targets are to be Arab armies. 47
Although President Ford promised Peres that he would advise the newly
elected President Carter to confirm the weapons supply to Israel, 48 two months
later, on February 17, 1977, Carter canceled his predecessor's decision and
declared that the CBU-72 bombs might even be withdrawn from U.S. arsenals.49
Israel's statement that "it had committed itself late last year not to employ the
bombs as anti-personnel weapons" did not dissuade Carter, whose position was
final.o
B. Israeli Use of CMs in the 1978 Litani Operation and the U.S. Response:
Clarifications
In March 1978, the first diplomatic crisis over the use of CMs materialized
MilitaryLaw/ pdf/RC-conf-experts-1976.pdf.
39. Binder, supranote 33.
40. Finney, supra note 32.
41. See Nissim Kiviti, U.S. Will Limit the Use of Shock Bombs, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Oct. 17,
1976, at 1, 8 (in Hebrew). It should be noted that Kiviti's sources are U.S. Congress members.
42. See Dan Margalit, Rumsfeld to Peres: The Pentagon Has Ended its Examination of the
Weapons Deal, HAARETZ, Dec. 16, 1976, at 1 for Israeli press reports on the visit.
43. See ESPINOSA & JANKA, supranote 12, for the date of signing.
44. RicHARD MoYEs & THOMAS NASH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 7 (Simon Conway
ed., Landmine Action 2005) (quoting a letter sent by Ezer Weizman, Israel's Minister of Defense, to
congressional leaders in May 1978); David Wood, Israel Said to Violate Rules on Bombs' Use, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 1982, at Al.
45. See McCormack, supranote 13.
46. See Oberdorfer, supranote 30.
47. Bernard Gwertzman, Israelis Renew Pledge to Curb Cluster Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1978, at 1. See Cloud, supranote 9, at Al, for the stipulations; MOYES & NASH supranote 44, at 9.
48. See Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, Minister of Defense Upon His Return from Washington: The
Motion in the Pentagon: Favorable to Israel, YEDIOT AHARONOT, FRIDAY MAGAZINE, Dec. 17, 1976,
at 1. It should be noted that Ford's decision was perceived as politically motivated. See, e.g., Binder,
supranote 33; Gwertzman, supra note 35.
49. Binder, supranote 33.
50. See id., for Israel's Embassy Spokesman response.
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within less than 15 months of the signing of the agreement when Israel invaded
South Lebanon (the Litani Operation) following a deadly terrorist attack.5 1 A
March 20, 1976 media report about Israel's aerial attack using CMs lead
Congressman Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-CA) to call President Carter inquiring if
the 1952 Agreement had been violated.52
Faced with the press reports and CIA confirmation of Israel's CM use, which
was delivered to the members of Congress on April 5, the Carter Administration
had no choice but to report that Israeli violations of the 1952 Agreement "may
have occurred." 53 A U.S. State Department spokesperson later explained that
discussions were being held with Israel "to assur[e] that those restrictions .

.

. be

observed in the future."5 4 According to Israeli press reports, the then-U.S.
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, sent a clear message to Moshe Dayan, Israel's
Minister of Foreign Affairs, demanding "a renewed and clear commitment not to
use cluster bombs save in a war in which Israel was attacked."5 5 A week later,
Israel was forced to consent to "'new and tighter restrictions" through an exchange
of notes dated April 10 and 11, 1978 (hereinafter the 1978 Notes).56
Nevertheless, the 1978 terms were, in essence, similar to the 1976 Agreement:
Israel was permitted to employ the weapon against "regular forces of a sovereign
nation" and in "special wartime conditions."57 Yet, in a clear response to that
current crisis, the 1978 Notes defined the terms of use. "Special wartime
conditions" were defined "as equal to or exceeding the level of conflict during the
1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars, when Israel was fighting two or more nations."
Furthermore and most importantly given the 2006 entanglement, the 1978 Notes
stipulated that "cluster bombs cannot be used in or adjacent to areas of civilian
populations." 5 9 Finally, Israel provided assurance "that Israel[i] field commanders
will not employ these weapons without a decision by politically responsible

51. BackgroundNote: Lebanon, Jan. 2009, Dep't St. Publ'n, available at http://www.state.gove/r
/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (last visited October 11, 2009).
52. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Says Israelis in Lebanon Used Cluster Bombs, Breaking Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1978, at 1, 4. The Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
Douglas J. Bennet, was forced to admit that it was "... a use contrary to previous assurances given to
us." See Gwertzman, supranote 47, at 4.
53. MICHAEL F. BROWN, ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT: ISRAELI BREACHES & U.S. INDULGENCE
RESULT IN PALESTINIAN & LEBANESE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 6 (The Palestine Center 2008), available

at http://thejerusalemfund.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/3061;
ESPINOSA & JANKA, supra note 12, at 16.

Grimmett, supra note 11, at 6;

54. Oberdorfer, supra note 30, at A17.

55. U.S. Demands Israel ProvideAssurances to Restrict Dropping Cluster Bombs, DAVAR, Apr.
14, 1978, at Al.
56. MOYES & NASH, supra note 44; Oberdorfer, supranote 30.
57. MoYEs & NASH, supranote 44, at 9 (quoting George Skelton, Cluster Bombs for Israel Held
Back, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 20, 1982, at 1).

58. Id.
59. See Wood, supra note 44, at 10; Charles Mohr, '78 Pact Said to Limit Israeli Use of Cluster
Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1982, at A12.
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superiors [Israel's Minister of Defense]."60 With such clarifications and specific
stipulations the 1978 Notes were far from a mere Israeli reaffirmation of its 1976
commitment.
With that said, the strain in the bilateral relations dissipated within weeks and,
in fact, in his report to Congress, Vance stated that "no action was contemplated to
deprive Israel of further military equipment."61 The reasons for this Israeli
diplomatic success would become relevant to the 2006 crisis.
Israel, in addition to admitting to a breach of the 1976 Agreement, issued a
formal apology and promised no further violations would occur.62 It was later
revealed that Ezer Weizman, Israel's then-Minister of Defense, pleaded ignorance
of the use of CM weapons as well as the existence of the 1976 Agreement; he
blamed the entire incident on the failure of the IDF Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur
to update him appropriately. 63 To the Israeli press, Weizman claimed: "They have
a case and I told them so. Had I known about the existence of the letter of
commitment, I would have considered the matter differently .... In such a case,
truth is the best thing."64 Consequently, as the Administration informed Paul N.
McCloskey, Jr. regarding its request for renewed Israeli assurances, the State
Department had expressed "strong concern . . . that effective procedures be
instituted to ensure that the assurances given . . . are known and effective in the

context of Israeli decision-making." 65 Nonetheless, realpolitikplayed an important
role in the U.S. consent, as Vance clearly stated in his report: Israel's promise to
withdraw from Lebanon (in compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution
425)66 and its efforts "to restore movement in the peace negotiation" were behind
67
the decision not "to deprive Israel of further military equipment."

Within a year, on August 7, 1979, the Carter Administration again reported to
Congress that Israel may have violated U.S. law by using U.S.-supplied arms
during its raids into Lebanon. 68 This time, the weapons in question were U.S.made aircraft and artillery, which were deployed inside South Lebanon.69 Israel
60. Oberdorfer, supranote 30. The source of this sensitive information - leaked as background of
the 1982 crisis over the same issue - seems to have been Paul N. McCloskey, a frequent critic of Israel.
Nevertheless, the Israeli press reported that the U.S had requested that "Israel undertake to avoid using
cluster bombs in a non real war cases." Avner Tavori, Israel to Promise the U.S. to Limit the Use of
ClusterBombs to A Real War, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Apr. 17, 1978, at 2.
61. Gwertzman, supra note 52, at 4.
62. Id. at 1; Danaher, supranote 26, at 52.
63. Weizman's explanation was made known from a letter which had been sent approximately one
month following the U.S. letter, i.e., mid May. MOYES & NASH, supra note 44, at 8; Danaher, supra
note 26, at 52.
64. Eitan Haber, Weisman: Hoping to Return to Cairo in the Next Days [interview], YEDIOT
AHARONOT, Apr. 21, 1978, at 1, 4.

65. The Letter was sent by Bennett to McCloskey, who made it available to the N.Y. Times. See
Gwertzman, supra note 47, at 4.
66. S.C. Res. 425, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978).
67. Gwertzman, supra note 52, at 4.
68. Bernard Gwertzman, Vance Asserts Israel May Violate Pact by Using U.S. Jets in Air Raids,
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 8, 1979, at Al.
6 9. Id.

2009

DOOMED TO BE VIOLATED?

11

announced that its use was in self-defense; future use and use of American
weapons would be more carefully supervised.70 Although CMs were not involved
on this occasion, it was clear that this incident, coupled with the April 1978
reassurances, meant that should the CM issue arise once more, mediating the likely
ensuing strain in relations would be much harder.
C. Israel's Use of CMs in the 1982 Lebanon War and the U.S. Response:
Suspension
The 1982 crisis over the use of U.S.-made Cluster bombs seemed almost
inevitable given the scope and intensity of fighting that broke out between Israel
and the Palestinian militias and between the IDF and the Syrian army during the
1982 First Lebanon War. Subsequent to a July 2 news report from Beirut on
Israeli use of U.S.-made CMs (confirmed by the technical data and serial numbers
on the duds found),72 it was almost impossible for the U.S. Administration to
restrain from applying sanctions to Israel.73
On July 15, as a CIA report on Israeli CM was being circulated in Congress,
the Reagan Administration delivered a confidential letter to Congressional leaders
reporting that a "'substantial violation"' by Israel of the AECA "'may have
occurred." 74 The letter, while mentioning specific U.S. weapons, did not explicitly
note the CMs because no Israeli clarifications had been received despite repeated
State Department "requests."7 5
Israel's response, delivered later that day,
acknowledged CM use but stated that its use was "within the conditions laid down
70. See, e.g., id; Oberdorfer, supra note 30; Ron Ben-Yeshi, Vance, We May Take Measures If
IsraelKeeps Operating Weapons from U.S. in Lebanon, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Aug. 8, 1979, at 3, for
more on this incident.
71. Indeed, Israeli CMs mainly targeted Syrian infantry and armored forces in the area of the
Beirut-Damascus highway and Palestinian camps in the southern outskirts of Beirut. See David B.
Ottaway, IsraelSaid to Deny Misuse ofBombs, WASH. POST, July 19, 1982, at Al, Al9.
72. The reporter was the famous London Times Middle East correspondent, Robert Fisk. For
Fisk's reflections on his intensive efforts to collect as much evidence as possible on Israel's use of U.S.made CMs, see ROBERT FISK, PITY THE NATION 277-78 (Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books 2002)
(1990). Already in June 30, 1982, however, President Reagan voiced concern over reports on Israeli use
of CMs, saying that the U.S. "is reviewing the question" whether its law were violated. See Jack
Nelson, Reagan Denies Giving Israelisa 'Green Light, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1982, at Bl.
73. During a Congressional hearing on June 21, 1982, Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) warned
Israel of a harsh response. See Bernard Weinraub, Senate PanelIncreasesLebanese Aid Proposal,N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1982, at A8. The then Israeli P.M. Menachem Begin received a testy lecture by the
Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Clement Zablocki, on this subject. William
Chapman, Zablocki Says Arms Pledge Broken in IsraeliAttack, WASH. POST, June 22, 1982, at A14.
For news reports affecting congressmen at that time, see William Branigin, 'DirtyWar' in Lebanon Is
Causing a BacklashAgainst U.S, WASH. POST, June 21, 1982, at Al9.
74. Ottaway, supra note 71, at Al; Hedrick Smith, U.S. is Holding up Shipment ofArms Ordered
by Israel,N Y. TIMES, July 17, 1982, at A4. It is important to note that besides CMs, the entire question
of U.S.-supplied arms used by Israel was raised due to the 1952 Agreement and the AEAC's conditions.
Id. at 4. As Zablocki was quoted in Smith, Id: "I can't by any stretch of the imagination see how using
planes, tanks and artillery deep in the territory of another country is defensive."
75. Eleanor Randolph, IsraelAnswers U.S. on Use of Cluster Bombs, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1982,
at Al, A7.
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in the sale of U.S. arms": i.e., only for defensive purposes and against military
targets solely. 76 Moreover, Syria's intervention had turned the confrontation into a
"full-scale war."77
Nevertheless, on July 19, after succumbing to pressure from Congress and the
Pentagon at a time when Senator Charles H. Percy, then Chair of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, described bilateral relations as "at an all-time
low," 7 ' Reagan suspended the shipment of artillery-delivered CMs to Israel,
scheduled for that same day. 79 The suspension-for which Israel blamed U.S.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger-troubled Israel, which publicly
announced its concern over ". . . this trend of punishing Israel whenever

disagreements between the two states arise."o
On July 28, Reagan extended this suspension "indefinitely";8 1 the move was
criticized by some congressmen as a "minimal" or "inadequate" response to the
violation.8 2 Israel found some comfort in the fact that Reagan's decision was
political rather than legal,83 but given the importance it ascribed to securing a
continuous supply of CMs, high priority was given to indigenous production of
artillery-delivered CMs: firing tests were conducted already in 1982 and by 1984 a
sufficient arsenal had been built.84
Yet, in the summer of 1986, eight senior Israeli officials were subpoenaed by
a Federal Grand Jury investigating an illegal attempt to export American
technology for manufacturing artillery-delivered CM.85 After the affair subsided,
76. Ottaway, supranote 71, at Al.
77. Report of Israel's government-run radio, as cited in id. See also Bernard Gwertzman, Israelis
Concede and Defend Use of Cluster Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1982, at Al, A7. For the text of this
governmental announcement, delivered on July 18, 1982, in the Israeli press, see Arie Zimoki & Joshua
Halmis, Jerusalem is Waitingfor Reagan's Moves, YEDIOT AHARONOT, July 18, 1982, at 1, 7.
78. Gwertzman, supra note 77, at A7.
79. See Michael Getler, President Halts Shipment Of 'Cluster'Shells to Israel,WASH. POST, July
20, 1982, at Al; George Skelton, Cluster Bombsfor IsraelHeldBack, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1982, at Bi.
80. Zeev Barak, Jerusalem: Suspension of Cluster Bombs-The Victory of Weinberger's
Approach, YEDIOT AHARONOT, July 20, 1982, at 1, 6.
81. Formally, the July 28th State Department statement mentioned only artillery-delivered CMs
and indeed the shipment contained 4,000, 155mm CM shells for Israel's 155mm howitzers. However, as
Israel by that time had manufactured its own air-delivered CM, it was tantamount to a total ban on CMs
supplied to Israel. See Judith Miller, U.S. Bars Cluster Shells for Israel Indefinitely, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1982, at A16; GRIMMETT, supra note 11, at 5.
82. See Eleanor Randolph, U.S. Halts All Cluster Bomb Aid to Israelis,L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1982,
at Bl.
83. As Israel stressed, this implied that "Reagan is refraining from blaming Israel in breaching its
commitment - which would have required a total suspension of weapons shipment." See Zeev Barak,
"Until FurtherNotice ", Reagan Suspends Supply of Cluster Bombs to Israel,YEDIOT AHARONOT, July
28, 1982, at 3.
84. Dan Fisher, Israel Denies Smuggling Cluster Bomb Technology From US, L.A. TIMES, July
10, 1986, at 9. Fisher relied on the statement made at the time to Israeli television by Yitzhak Rabin, the
Minister of Defense.
85. The eight officials were part of Israel's military procurement office stationed in New York.
Stephen Engelberg, U.S. Investigates Possible Plot to Send Bomb Technology to Israel,N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 1986, at A14. Senior Israeli officials denied the suspicions, arguing that Israel was producing
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Israel bought the needed equipment in Europe.

13

Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's then-

Minister of Defense, clarified in an interview that "[y]ou can buy . . . (such

technologies) freely, without any government complications."86 Only in December
1988, following a prolonged Israeli campaign, was an understanding reached and
the ban revoked.
III.

THE

2006 LEBANON

WAR AND THE USE OF U.S.-MADE CLUSTER BOMBS

A. Israel's UnprecedentedResponse to Criticism over Its Extensive Use of CMs
Considering the 2006 Second Lebanon War's limited geographic boundaries
and short duration (34 days), an unprecedented quantity of CMs were fired by
Israel.88 In addition to the small-scale use of indigenous M85 bomblets, 89 there
was extensive use of U.S.-made CMs delivered by U.S.-made 155mm artillery
shells, Multiple Launch Rocket System's (MLRS) M26 rockets, and-albeit on a
limited scale-Vietnam-era aerially delivered bombs (CBU-58B). 90 As more than
1,800 rockets were fired at Lebanon-each rocket containing 644 bomblets-more

the weapon in its own facilities and according to its own designs. As Rabin clarified: "Whoever looks at
the Israeli bomblet next to the American bomblet will immediately see that there is no similarity" See
Dan Fisher, supra note 84. For the affair, see also Phil Shenon, Israelis Contest U.S. Subpoenas in
Inquiry on Bomb Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1986, at Al.
86. See Dan Fisher, Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews Its Arms Industry, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1986, at Al7.
87. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, US Lifts Ban on Cluster Bombsfor Israel,FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 8,
1988, at 4; Yoav Kami, The U.S. Lifts the 1982 Embargo on Selling Israel Cluster Bombs, HAARETZ,
Dec. 6, 1988, at 1. It should be noted that in the domestic arena, Israeli officials attempted to underrate
this by pointing to Israel's own CM production. See Aral Ginai, U.S. Removes ClusterBombs Supply
Ban to Israel,YEDIOT AHARONOT, Dec. 7, 1988, at 5.
88. Kalb & Saivetz, supra note 4, at 43; Meron Rapoport, When Rockets and Phosphorous
Cluster, HAARETZ, Sept. 13, 2006, at 3 (an interview with MLRS's battalion commander). For a brief
overview of the complex historical predicates to the 2006 War (Operation Change Direction) from 1978
onwards, see Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the
International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 130-34 (2008), available at
http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v29n2-schmitt.pdf.
89. Each M395 and M396 155mm artillery shells contain 63 bomblets each. Some 130 Israelimade Trajectory Correction System (TCS) rockets, first operational in this war (see Press Release,
Ramat Hasharon, Israel Military Industries, IMI's Trajectory Corrected Rocket Operated and Combat
Proven in the 2nd Lebanon War (May 15, 2007), available at http://www.imi-israel.com/news.aspx?
FolderlD=13&doclD=662) have nothing to do with the rocket's content (644 M77 bomblets). Data
presented to the author at the IMI exhibit marking Israel's 60th anniversary, Rishon LeZion, 16-23
Sept. 2008; see also Amnon Barzilai, A Precise Rocket for 40 kIn for IDF Use, HAARETZ, Aug. 17,
2004, at 6.
90. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON: ISRAEL'S USE OF CLUSTER

MUNITIONS IN LEBANON IN JULY AND AUGUST 2006 32 (Human Rights Watch 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/02/16/flooding-south-lebanon?print. No exact data are available
for the number of air-dropped CMs (CBU-58B with 650 bomblets each) used, but as of mid-January
2008, 28,136 duds BLU-63 bomblets from the 2006 War were found; these constitute 20% of the total
number of duds destroyed by the deminers. It was argued that CBU-71 cluster bombs were used as well,
but so far no related duds (BLU-68/B bomblets) have been found. See WILLIAM M. ARKIN, DIviNING
VICTORY: AIRPOWER IN THE 2006 ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH WAR 64 (Air University Press 2007).
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than 1.1 million cluster bombs were dispersed from this weapon system alone. 91
Nevertheless, while even amidst intense fighting, few accusations in the
international media claimed Israel's use of CMs illegal.92 The world outcry against
Israel was raised only in the war's aftermath. 93 Even then-U.N. Secretary General
(UNSG) Kofi Annan condemned Israel, 94 while Annan's aide, the Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General Jan
Egeland, focused his criticism on the "shocking and completely immoral" fact that
"90 percent of the cluster-bomb strikes occurred in the last 72 hours of the conflict,
when everybody knew there would be an end to hostilities." 95
The international outcry against Israel's extensive use of CMs during the War
was quickly reflected in Israel's open media but with surprisingly intense
aftershocks. "The cluster bomb," argued the influential Israeli newspaper Haaretz,
"is not a banned weapon, but it is described as an 'indiscriminate' weapon, which
should not be used against targets in civilian areas because, [among other things],
it continues to kill once the war is over." 9 6 Haaretz went on to publish numerous
articles on this issue; all were harshly critical of the weapon's use.97 On September
4, 2006, a legal response was initiated by The Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI) which appealed to Israel's Attorney General Meni Mazuz to commence
the investigation into circumstances behind the decision to use CMs. 98 A similar
appeal was made that same month to Israel's Inquiry Commission into the Second
Lebanon War (Winograd Commission), which has since reviewed Israel's use of
CMs and its legality.99

91. See Rapoport, supranote 88. See also Amir Rapaport, FRIENDLY FIRE 344 (2007).
92. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 3.
93. See Kalb & Saivetz, supra note 4, at 46-47.

94. Yoav Stem & News Agency (AP), Annan Condemns IDF Use of Cluster Bombs, HAARETZ,
Sept. 1, 2006, at 3.
95. This information was provided by UNIFIL observers. See Emergency Relief Coordinator, Press
Conference (Aug. 30, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060830
Egeland.doc.htm. It led many Lebanese to believe that Israel's intention was " . . .to litter the south with
unexploded cluster bombs as a strategy to keep people from returning right away." See Michael
Slackman, IsraeliBomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A10. For a criticism of IDF
policy, see, e.g., Yoav Stem & News Agency (AP), supra note 94; Todd Pitman, Unexploded Israeli
Bombs Menace Lebanese, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Aug. 31, 2006.
96. Editorial, Shooting Without a Target, HAARETZ, Sept. 14, 2006, at 5.
97. See, e.g., Rapoport, supra note 88; Meron Rapoport, Lebanese Child is Killed by an Israeli
ClusterBomb, HAARETZ, Sept. 28, 2006, at A2; Rapoport, supra note 8.
98. Mazuz was also requested to "examine the level of personal responsibility for all those
involved in the firing of these weapons, including the political echelons, in the event that they
authorized their use." Letter from Sonia Boulos, Adv., ACRI to Meni Mazuz, AG, Ministry of Justice,
10(a) (Sept. 4, 2006), available at http://www.acri.org.il/eng/story.aspx?id=327.
99. The report- released in Jan. 2008- is known as the Winograd Commission after its chair,
Justice (Ret.) Dr. Eliyahu Winograd. Other members include Law Professor Ruth Gavison, Political
Science Professor Yehezkel Dror, and IDF Reserve Generals Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel. See
The Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006, The Second Lebanon War, FinalRep.
[unclassified version], [hereinafter, Winograd Final Rep.]; see also ACRI's appeal to the Winograd
Commission Letter from Sonia Boulos, Adv., ACRI to Dr. Eliyahu, Judge (Ret.), Winograd, (Sept. 26,
2006), available at http://www.acri.org.il/eng/story.aspx?id=340.
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Israel was no doubt surprised by the barrage. These attacks were, however, of
little comparison to past incidents in which Israel was criticized for using "dubious
weapons" such as flechette armor rounds in the Gaza Strip since 2001.100
Moreover, the traditional IDF response to the NGO's complaints, "[w]e use all
munitions within the confines of international humanitarian law

. .

."1o1 was no

longer accepted by the international community.
However, while the government's initial formal response stressed that
"strenuous efforts were made to ensure that these [IDF operations] were carried out
in complete accordance with international law, both with regard to method and
weaponry,"1 02 on November 19, 2006, Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz, took a surprisingly
different line of defense stating that the use of CMs often constituted a clear
violation of his explicit order not to fire intopopulatedzones. 103
Halutz's response was apparently due to a preliminary IDF "operational
inquiry into the use of cluster munitions throughout the Israeli-Lebanese conflict,"
conducted by Brig. Gen. Michel Ben-Baruch, of the IDF's Ground Forces
Command, at Halutz's request. 104 Ben-Baruch's probe-which, unlike previous
IDF internal inquiries, was classified prior to the moment Halutz issued his
statement-found that while the IDF had complied with Halutz's order, the same
order was ignored by the Artillery Corps, which fired thousands of cluster bombs
"mainly in the War's last days." 105 More importantly, as part of his statement,
Halutz assigned the Commander of the IDF Military College, Maj. Gen. Gershon
HaCohen, "to look into the implementation of all orders and instructions regarding
the use of cluster type munitions, in the course of the conflict."1 06 The statement's
text, however, raised doubts whether a further inquiry was needed. 0 7
As expected, Halutz's announcement astonished the Israeli public and caused
resentment among Israeli war veterans who felt that they had followed IDF orders
when firing. This bitterness became open on the following day, in press reports
100. See SIPRI, THE LAW OF WAR AND DuBious WEAPONS 70-72 (1976) (discussing the dubious
nature of the flechette weapon). For an overview into Israel's use of flechette weapons as well as a
history of the weapon, see EITAN BARAK, DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGALITY OF FLECHETTE
WEAPONS ININTERNATIONAL LAW: A Reappraisal Following Israel's Use Of Flechette Rounds In The
Gaza Strip (2001-Present), (forthcoming 2009), (on file with the author).
101. For such a response see, e.g., News Release, Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Israeli Cluster
Munitions Threaten Civilians (Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/08/17/
lebanon-israeli-cluster-munitions-threaten-civilians.
102. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 5.
103. See Hason & Rapoport, supra note 6; Joshua, supranote 6.
104. IDF Spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Ha'cohen Appointed to Inquire the Circumstances of the Use of
Cluster Munitions During the Israeli-Lebanese Conflict (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://thehague
.mfa.gov.iI/mfm/Data/104928.pdf.
105. Hason & Rapoport, supra note 6.
106. See IDF Spokesperson, supranote 104; Greg Myre, Israel Orders Investigation of Bomb Use
in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A8 (discussing international repercussions).
107. After emphasizing the weapon's legality per se, it stated "safety warnings were given by the
IDF to the civilian population, ... the firing of cluster munitions was directed only at legitimate military
targets... " (emphasis added). Id.
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effectively contradicting Halutz's claim. 108
Queries over Halutz's statement in light of its meaning-i.e., the ground
forces were disobedient and did not follow orders-were reflected daily in the
Israeli press for two full weeks and has only gained in strength. Surprisingly, while
news reports were citing war veterans' testimonies that the CMs' deployment
throughout the war was maximally regulated, the IDF preferred being presented as
an unruly army. Instead of supporting these frontline testimonies, military sources
were cited as saying that "this story only demonstrates the scope of the army's
mess,"' apparently to expose Halutz's lack of control over the army. 109 Given the
fact that the IDF is highly sensitive to allegations of internal disorder, especially
due to the repeated NGO allegations about unlawful actions of soldiers and officers
in the Occupied Territories,110 this is quite surprising. Furthermore, a week
following Halutz's November 19t announcement, reporters had already been
informed of the identity of the army officer suspected of using CMs in populated
areas during the war's last days "[i]n direct opposition to an order": Officer
Commanding (O.C.) Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam. 1 This easily
available scapegoat had resigned his post two months earlier: September 13,
2006.112 The unexpected refusal of "[h]igh-ranking sources" in the Northern
Command to deny this charge only intensified the public's image of an army out of
control. 113
However, although given the secrecy over the 1976 Agreement no official
documentation will be available for some time, the key to understanding the IDF's
seemingly counterproductive admission-severe internal disorder-is found in
Israel's relationship with the U.S at the time.

B. Israel's2006 CM Use and the Bush Administration
In late August 2006, the U.S. State Department Office of Defense Trade
Controls Compliance (DTCC) launched an inquiry into Israel's use of U.S.-made
CMs11 4 and-to the satisfaction of numerous NGOs"-a shipment of additional

108. See, e.g., Rapoport, supra note 7, at 2. One MLRS battery commander even testified that all
targets north of the Litani River-those targets massively bombarded in the last 72 hours - were
described at the time as "General Staff targets." See Meron Rapoport, A Testimony: The GeneralStaff
Had Authorized All Cluster Bomb FiringsNorth of the Litani, HAARETZ, Nov. 21, 2006, at A4; Yossi
Joshua, All Knew That We are FiringCluster Bombs, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Nov. 21, 2006, at 2.
109. See Joshua, supranote 6.
110. See, e.g., Yael Stein, B'tselem, Case Study No. 17, Soldiers' Abuse Of Palestinians In Hebron
3 (2002).
111. See Yaakov Katz, N. Command OrderedCluster Bombing, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 28, 2006,
available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1162378506069&pagename=JPost%2FJP
Article%2FShowFul.
112. Jonathan Lis, MK Ayalon Calls on Peretz to Resign as Defense Minister, HAARETZ, Sept. 13,
2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/762240.html.
113. As Haaretz journalist and columnist Uzi Benziman wrote the following day: "In the General
Staff, the core of security policy, failures have been exposed that appear to be a symptom of the
defective work of a culture of fudging. The Chief of Staff [sic] reveals that his explicit orders to avoid
firing cluster bombs were not followed." Uzi Benziman, It's All Shoddy, HAARETZ, Nov. 29, 2006, at 5.
114. See Cloud, supra note 9 (erroneously, Cloud refers to DTCC by its previous name); Pitman,
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CMs (M-26 rockets for the MLRS), which Israel had asked the U.S. to send during
the war to offset the depletion of its own stocks, was immediately held up. 116 More
importantly, as part of its inquiry the U.S. demanded clarifications from Israel,
which created a weighty predicament for Israel. 117
Apparently, as U.S. officials interpreted the events, "in view of [former]
President Bush's publicly announced support for Israel's action," 18 Israeli
clarifications regarding its campaign against Hezbollah as legitimate self-defense
(i.e., the CM's use complied with both the AECA and the 1952 Agreement) should
not encounter many obstacles in terms of the Administration.1 19 However, not only
were none of these legal instruments the DTCC's focus (rather, the 1976 End-Use
Agreement, as discussed in this Article, was the focus), it was the third time that
CM use in Lebanon was responsible for straining Israeli-U.S. relations within the
last three decades.
Therefore, given the 1978 and 1982 crises and the possible U.S. sanctions
(ranging from a repeat of the 1982 CM supply moratorium to a total U.S. arms
sales ban, as suggested in April 1978 by Rep. McCloskey), 120 Halutz's
unprecedented admission seems more than plausible. In fact, in light of the April
1978 crisis and the subsequent Israeli pledge to assimilate the restrictions placed
on CMs by Israel's senior military and government officials, low-ranking nonobedience was one of the few explanations at Israel's disposal. Indeed, this account
caused Israel great discomfort, as noted previously, but it did provide Israel with a
valuable asset once the U.S. inquiry began: time.
Halutz's announcement of HaCohen's appointment provided an additional

supra note 95. For an excellent, albeit highly one-sided, overview of various cases in which such an
inquiry was initiated in regard to Israel, see BROWN, supranote 53.
115. See Open Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Stephen J.
Hadley, U S. National Security Advisor (Aug. 11, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
news/2006/08/1 1/letter-national-security-advisor-hadley-requested-us-cluster-munition-transfer-israe.
116. See Cloud, supra note 9. For Israel's request in early August, see David S. Cloud, Weapons:
IsraelAsks U.S. to Ship Rockets with Wide Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at Al. A license for the
sale of 1,300 M26 was approved in Fiscal Year 2005. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.:
Deny Israeli Request for Cluster Munitions, (Aug. 11, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/
en/news/2006/08/1 1/us-deny-israeli-request-cluster-munitions.
117. Journalists were informed that the State Department was "seeking more information on Israel's
alleged improper use" which it takes "very seriously." E-mail from Patricia Peterson, Department of
State spokesperson, to Arms Control Today (Sept. 14, 2006), cited in Wade Boese, Cluster
MunitionsUnder New Scrutiny, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2006, at 38; see also Cloud, supranote 9.
118. Cloud, supra note 9.
119. See, e.g., JEREMY M. SHARP ET AL., U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33566, LEBANON: THE

ISRAEL-HAMAS-HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT (Aug. 14, 2006) (discussing For Bush Administration's
repeatedly "unequivocal support for Israel" during the 2006 War). Nonetheless, explaining the massive
use of the CM in the last 72 hours of the war could have been more problematic.
120. McCloskey had sent a letter to all House members as well as to President Carter and Israeli
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, proposing an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Bill calling for
termination of all arms deliveries to Israel in the event of any future CM use against civilian targets. See
Oberdorfer, supranote 30, at A17.
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pause, necessary for the entire process to come to an end: the IDF's Military
Advocate General (MAG) Brig. Gen. Avihai Mendelblit, who Halutz had assigned
to review the HaCohen inquiry's findings, now had time to decide further
actions. 121 Hence, when the DDTC inquiry was completed on January 29, 2007
and a classified preliminary report1 22 concluding that first, U.S.-made CMs were
"'misused in civilian areas"' and second, Israel had breached a clandestine bilateral
"Use Agreement," was forwarded to Congress, the IDF spokesman was able to
"decline comment until after that [the internal inquiry] was complete[d]." 23
Concurrently NGO attempts to take advantage of this report and prevent more
U.S.-made CM weapons from reaching Israel only reinforced the view that Israel's
time-gaining maneuver had proven itself.124
Shortly before the DTCC submitted its preliminary findings to Congress,
Israel submitted a short 12-page report to the State Department.125 In an
accompanying note, a senior U.S official commended its authors for their "great
cooperation" in the investigation. 126 While acknowledging the firing of "thousands
of American cluster munitions,"1 27 Israel denied violating the 1976 Agreement and
stressed its leafleting warning practices prior to employing CMs in populated areas
and the fact that "many of the villages were deserted because civilians had fled the
fighting."1 28 As a U.S. official stated, "From their perspective, use of the munitions
was clearly done within the agreements." 129 The atmosphere was such that Israel
felt it had almost settled the issue with the Bush Administration-undoubtedly one
of the friendlier administrations from Israel's perspective,130 and the January 17,
2007 resignation of wartime Chief of Staff Halutz only contributed to this
rapprochement as U.S. officials joined their Israeli counterparts in an effort to
mitigate the entanglement. 131 Israel's CM use, stressed the U.S. Embassy

121. See IDF Spokesperson, supranote 104.
122. The AECA requires Congressional notification of even preliminary findings regarding
possible violations. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c)(2) (1976).
123. News Agencies, U.S.: Israel May Have Breached Cluster Bomb Agreement During War,
HAARETZ, Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/819096.html; see Andrew
Buncombe, U.S. Attacks Israel's Cluster Bomb Use, THE INDEPENDENT (London) Jan. 29, 2007, at 28;
David S. Cloud & Greg Myre, Israel May Have Violated Arms Pact, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2007, at Al.
124. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, United States: Cut off Cluster Munition Sales
to Israel (Jan. 29, 2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/29/usintl5212.htm. For an explanation of
the aftershocks caused see News Release, supranote 101.
125. Cloud & Myre, supranote 123.
126. Id. The official was the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the bureau until that month,
John Hillen.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. See also, Yitzhak Benhorin, Report: Bush may Fault Israel on Cluster Bomb Claim,
YNETNEWS, Jan. 28, 2007, availableat http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3357638,00.html.
130. As Brown had complained about U.S. non-action regarding "misuse of American weaponry":
"President Bush failed to express impatience and dissatisfaction with Israeli military action at the height
of the summer carnage in Lebanon and in fact was a cheerleader for the Israeli action-as was almost
the entire U.S. Congress." BROWN, supra note 53, at 7.7.
131. AP, IsraeliArmy ChiefofStaffResigns Over Lebanon Failures,INDEPENDENT (London), Jan.
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spokesman in Tel Aviv, "isn't going to undermine our ironclad commitment to
Israel's security or hamper our excellent bilateral cooperation in many areas." 32
"A chiding from Washington, but nothing more," was the outcome predicted by
the late Zeev Schiff, one of Israel's leading military analysts. 133
Only in September 2007 was Israel's ongoing investigation officially
concluded by the MAG; 134 although the Winograd Commission's Final Report
suggests that already on January 17, 2007-when HaCohen testified before the
Winograd Commission-he could already provide conclusive findings. 135 By that
time, however, the necessity of this puzzling investigation was understood as well
as its usefulness to the U.S. State Department in repelling questions over its own

inquiry. 136
Furthermore, the completion of Mendelblit's review in September 2007 was
kept a secret until December 24, when the threat of sanctions was completely
dispelled. On that day, the IDF spokesman issued a statement, intentionally
targeted for worldwide publication, that the MAG had "recently concluded his
evaluation." 3 7 The statement stressed the MAG's declaration that the IDF's use of
CMs accorded with IHL; that "the IDF had complied with the Chief of Staff's

17, 2007, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israeli-army-chief-ofstaff-resigns-over-lebanon-failures-432475.html.
132. Stewart Tuttle, U.S. Embassy spokesman. Israeli security officials anonymously stated "that
they didn't expect sanctions." See Amy Teibel (AP), U.S. Faults Israeli Use of Cluster Bombs But
Report Unlikely to Harm Relations, Americans Say, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 31, 2007,
available at http://www.seattlepi.com/national/301777_israel3 1.html.
133. Amy Teibel (AP), US-Israeli Relations Unlikely to be Hurt by Israeli Cluster Bomb Use,
Analysts Say, Jan. 30, 2007 (no longer available, on file with author). On February 1, 2007, in another
unprecedented move, Israel's deputy prime minister at the time, Shimon Peres, told an Al Jazeera
reporter referring to the use of CMs: "To be short and clear, we committed a mistake, regrettably." He
made sure to add, however, that it was done "apparently ... without the knowledge even of the Chiefof-Staff." See Peres: Cluster Bombs A Mistake, ALJAZEERA, Feb. 1, 2007, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/01/2008525 12206640997.html.
134. See MAG, Brig. Gen. Avihai Mendelblit Main Points of MAG's Legal Opinion for Inquiring
Officer Over the Circumstance of Employing Cluster Munitions during the Second Lebanon War, June
18, 2008 (in Hebrew), cited in Eitan Barak, Association for Israel Studies Annual Conference, Israel in
2009: Center and Periphery, June 1-3, 2009, None to be Trusted: Israel's Use of Cluster Munitions in
the Second Lebanon War and the Case for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, available at
http://www.aisisraelstudies.org/Conferences/2009_Sapir/2009Papers/Barak2009.pdf.
135. See Winograd Final Rep., supra note 99. It is still unknown as to when these findings were
submitted to the MAG.
136. See, e.g., Sean McCormack, Assistant Sec'y of State for Pub. Affairs, U.S. State Dep't., State
Department Regular News Briefing (Feb. 23, 2007). In response to a question, Sean McCormack said
"[w]e are still gathering some information from the Israeli side. They still have an investigation that is
ongoing." Id. Indeed, in September 2007, the Israeli press reported a request by a State Department
senior official, during a visit to Israel, for data on CM used in the 2006 War. See Barak Ravid, The US
to Israel:Stop Flights in Lebanon, HAARETZ, Sept. 20, 2007, at A4.
137. The secrecy over the date of the MAG's review reached such a level that even the Winograd
Commission, which was about to conclude its final report, promptly requested a copy for review after
hearing the spokesman's statement. See Winograd Final Rep., supranote 99, at 496, 14.
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orders forbidding the firing of cluster munitions at built-up areas"; 138 and that
precautions had been taken in all cases excluding one in which CMs were indeed
"fired at residential areas/neighborhoods." 39
As expected, the statement attracted considerable attention as well as criticism
in Israel1 40 and abroad. 14 1 In Israel, however, it was welcomed by the IDF artillery
veterans who had fought in the 2006 War because it vindicated their claims that
they had strictly obeyed orders from day one and that they were neither
uncontrolled nor irresponsible. 142 The Bush Administration's spokesperson then
abruptly announced that the State Department's 2007 report "does not draw
conclusions on Israel's use of cluster munitions"1 43 while adding that the U.S.
government will "continue discussions" with Israel over "the findings of its
internal investigation." 144
In May 2008, it had become clear that the crisis was effectively and officially
over. During a briefing on the U.S. CM Policy, Stephen D. Mull, the U.S. Acting
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, was forced to address this
subject. After pointing out Israel's "strict internal review," Assistant Secretary
Mull stated that "very intensive" bilateral consultations were under way and
revealed that "[w]e just had a team in Israel."145 When asked about future CM
supplies to Israel, he first pointed to the new U.S. domestic legislation forbidding
the export of CMs having less than a 99% reliability rate.146 He also remarked that
given the unavailability of such U.S.-made CMs for export, "we are not providing
cluster munitions to foreign partners anymore." 47 Nevertheless, when asked about

138. IDF Spokesperson, Opinion of the Military Advocate General Regarding Use of Cluster
Munitions in Second Lebanon War (Dec. 24, 2007) (Eng. Version), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings.
139. The announcement also explained the need to use CMs and referred to cases where
"commanders deviated from orders." In the latter case, it was stated that given the circumstances and
the fact that even then, their use "was [still] in accordance with international law..." the MAG decided
not to take legal measures in response to the deviations. Id.
140. See, e.g., Amos Harel & Yuval Azoulay, IDF Won't Take Legal Action against Officers for
FiringClusterBombs in Lebanon, HAARETZ, Dec. 25, 2007, at 2; Yaakov Katz, Cluster Bomb Use Was
Legal in Lebanon IDF Judge Rules, FiringThem Was A Concrete Military Necessity, THE JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at 3; Meron Rapoport, The Post-War Bombings, HAARETZ, Jan. 1, 2008, at 5
(harshly criticizing IDF CM use against Lebanese civilian populations).
141. See, e.g., Josef Federman, Israeli Cluster Bombing Ruled within the Law: Military Ends Probe
of Strikes on Lebanon, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at Al 8; Isabel Kershner, Israel Won't Prosecutefor
Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 25, 2007, at A4. For a harsh criticism, see, e.g.,
Editorial, Cluster Bombs: It's Still Not OK, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 26, 2007, at B6.

142. See Hanan Greenberg, Soldiers who Fired Cluster Bombs: We Knew We were Following the
Law, YNET, Dec. 25, 2007, available at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3486339,00.html.
143. Email from Department of State spokesperson, to Arms Control Today [ACT] (Jan. 4, 2008),
cited in Wade Boese, IsraelDefends PastCluster Arms Use, 38 ACT 14 (Jan.-Feb. 2008).
144. Id.
145. See Stephen D. Mull, Acting Asst. Sec'y for Political-Military Affairs Ambassador, On-theRecord Briefing: On U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy (May 21, 2008), available at
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-%/o20english/2008/May/2008052216310leaifas0.8921015.html.
146. Id.; see Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 646 (b), 1844 Stat. (2008).
147. Mull, supra note 145.
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potential available U.S.-made CMs with negligible Hazardous Dud Rate (HDR),
he answered: "If there were a future request from Israel to purchase it . . . we'd
look at it at the time . . . We'd want to know-I know they're still looking at this

internally ... what restrictions that they would have in place on its use, what sort
of controls ...

148

Indeed, as of February 2009, no final determination has been made.
Irrespective of the new U.S. administration under President Obama, one may
assume that when it comes to the U.S.-Israel relationship, whether Israel's
extensive use of CMs in the 2006 Lebanon War violated U.S. legislation is a nonissue. However, as we soon detail, in the wake of an absence of sanctions imposed
on Israel, its critics claimed that "the AECA application gap between the Reagan
and Bush II administrations suggests a United States increasingly prepared to look
the other way on Israeli human rights violations and the breaking of American
law" may occur too easily. 149
IV. DOOMED To BE VIOLATED? LESSONS FOR THE CCM

A. Legal Analysis: Israeland US. Legislation: Formalvs. Flexible Interpretation
In contrast to the above-mentioned claim by Israel's critics, looking closely at
the 2006 case, it seems that Israel breached neither the AECA nor the 1952
Agreement requiring that Israel use U.S.-made CMs only in the event of
"legitimate self defense." Furthermore, Israel's violations of the 1976 End-Use
Clandestine Agreement and the 1978 Notes-which rightly explains the focus of
the DTCC's inquiry-are not gross violations.
1. Legitimate self-defense?

According to Israel-as stated in identical letters sent to the UNSG and the
Security Council following the Hezbollah's deadly attacks on July 12, 2006-the
law of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides a legal basis for
Israel's military operation,150 and that in relaying these letters on the very day that
Israel's military operation began, Israel complied with the stipulation that a State
acting in self-defense immediately notify the Security Council.
Naturally, as the operation was perceived as "post-modem conflict involving
a 'state-like apparatus inside a State,"'"" the question of whether Israel's actions
complied with jus ad bellum has already attracted jurists' interests. 15 2 Therefore,
148. Id.
149. See BROWN, supra note 53, at 18.
150. As Israel notified, while exercising its right of self-defense "The State of Israel will take
appropriate actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to the shelling that
terrorizes our citizens." See U.N. GASC, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2006/515,A/60/937 (July 12, 2006)
[hereinafter July 12, 2006 Letters]. For an overview on Israel's detailed legal justification, see Schmitt,
supranote 88, at 136-41.
151. Jonathan Somer, Acts ofNon-State Armed Groups and the Law GoverningArmed Conflict, 10
Asil Insight (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights060824.cfin.
152. See, e.g., id; Schmitt, supranote 88, at 163-64; Yael Ronen, Israel,Hizbollah, and the Second
Lebanon War, 9 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMAN. L. 362, 391-93 (2006).
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given the purpose of the Article, it is sufficient to point out that a recent in-depth
legal analysis, dedicated entirely to this question, concluded that "there is relative
agreement that Israel had the right to respond to the Hezbollah attacks pursuant to
the law of self-defense."153 Hence, we can focus on the U.S. perspective on this
issue by means of the AECA and 1952 Agreements.
As one may expect given the above-mentioned conclusion, a 2008
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report found that the Bush Administration
and the Congress "supported Israel's 2006 military campaigns against Hezbollah
and Hamas as acts of self-defense."1 54 On July 18, 2006, the Senate unanimously
passed a bipartisan resolution, which, inter alia, "urges the President to continue
fully supporting Israel as Israel exercises its right of self-defense in Lebanon and
Gaza."15 ' Two days later, the House of Representatives, in a vote of 410 to 8,
expressed unconditional support for "Israel's right to . . . defend itself."15 6 As The
Washington Post reported: "Democratic and Republican congressional leaders are
rushing to offer unalloyed support for Israel's offensive against Hezbollah fighters
.*.."1.
Israel enjoyed such overwhelming and bipartisan support in the Congress
that even the Republican descendent of Lebanese family, Darrell Issa, a California
Representative who co-sponsored an alternative resolution, justified his intention
to eventually support the majority bill as follows: "I want to show support for
Israel's right to defend itself"
Even at the end of the War, on August 14, 2006
when the Lebanese civilian suffering was known, former President Bush clearly
stated that "we recognize that responsibility for this suffering [civilians on both
sides] lies with Hezbollah. It was an unprovoked attack by Hezbollah on Israel
that started this conflict. Hezbollah terrorists targeted Israeli civilians with daily
rocket attacks." 59
Indeed, some jurists have raised reservations of this blanket support on the
grounds that necessity and, mainly, proportionality (two out of the three accepted

153. Schmitt, supranote 88, at 163. Prof Schmitt even claimed that Israel's 2006 operation "serves
as further evidence of an operational code extending the reach of self-defense to armed attacks
conducted by non-State actors." Id. at 164.
154. Carol Migdalovitz, U.S. Cong. Research Serv., RL 33222, Israel: Background and Relations
With the United States (2008) (emphasis added).
155. S. Res. 534, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c109:S.RES.534:. Cong. S. Res. 534 was passed by a roll call vote. "Condemning Hezbollah
and Hamas and their state sponsors and supporting Israel's exercise of its right to self-defense." Id.
156. H. Res. 921, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted). See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 391, Clerk of
the United States House of Representatives (July 20, 2006), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/
2006/roll391.xml. The text is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:18:./temp/~c
109Zv19Nn.
157. Jim VandeHei, Congress is Giving Israel Vote of Confidence, WASH. POST, July 19, 2006, at
A5.
158. Melissa McNamard, House Passes Pro-Israel Resolution, July 20, 2006 (emphasis added),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/20/politics/mainl820193.shtml.
159. Press Release, White House, President Discusses Foreign Policy During Visit to State
Department (Aug. 14, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases
/2006/08/20060814-3.html.
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criteria of self-defense) 160 were breached. 161 Nevertheless, it seems fair to
conclude that in the context of Israel-U.S. bilateral relations, Israel's CM use, in
and of itself is likely to comply with the legitimate self-defense requirement
appearing in the AECA and the 1952 Agreement. 162
Once the basic demand of legitimate "self-defense" was addressed, we are left
with the 1976 Agreement (including the 1978 Notes), which contains three main
criteria to be met: use (a) "in a war"; (b) against "military, fortified targets" and (c)
"against Arab armies."163
2. Did the Second Lebanon War fall under the first criteria "in a war" orusing the 1978 wording-"special wartime conditions"? 164
First and foremost, it should be noted that even within the legal realm, as
Professor Yoram Dinstein has pointed out, "the term 'war' gives rise to more than
a handful of definitional problems." 65 In the absence of an agreed definition,
serviceable for all purposes, the term currently has little meaning as a legal matter.
We are therefore confined to focusing on the assumed meaning as it evolved
within the context of the end-user agreement.
As the 1978 Notes clarify, the main intention of the American authors of the
document was an InternationalArmed Conflict (IAC) exhibiting high levels of
violence. 166 In fact, great levels of violence or-in the words of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic decision on
jurisdiction-"protracted armed violence" is required in order to initiate the
application of IHL in Non-IAC (NIAC).167

160. The third requirement is immediacy. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 103, 194 (June 27) (Merits); Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 245, 144 (July 8).
161. See Ronen, supra note 152, at 393; STUART MASLEN & VIRGIL WIEBE, CLUSTER MUNITIONS:
A SURVEY OF LEGAL RESPONSES 22-23 (Landmine Action 2008). In contrast, according to Schmitt's
analysis, for instance, "it is self-evident therefore, that, at least vis-d-vis operations designed to stop
rocket attacks, Israeli actions were proportionate (indeed, arguably insufficient)." Schmitt, supra note
88, at 154.
162. See Cloud & Myre, supranote 123.
163. Gwertzman, supra note 47, at 1. It should be noted that NGO reports on Israel's use of CMs
claim that Israel violated the 1976 End-Use Agreement through its widespread and indiscriminate use
of the weapon. See NASH, supra note 19, at 42; MASLEN & WIEBE, supra note 161, at 23. In fact,
Maslen & Wiebe even questioned Israel's compliance with the AECA given the criteria of necessity and
proportionality with respect to "legitimate self-defense." Id. at 22-23.
164. MoYES & NASH, supra note 44, at 9.
165. YoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 15 (Cambridge University Press
2005) (1988).
166. Relying on various Israeli statements during the 1978 crisis, there is a possibility that
following the crisis the 1978 Notes recognized Non-State Arm Groups (NSAG) as regular armies under
certain circumstances but none of the known open sources refers to that. For such a statement by the
then IDF Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur Stated during an interview with the Israeli Press Corps upon his
retirement see Elyeho Agres et al., The Retired Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. "Mota" Gur - Exclusive
Interview to Davar, DAVAR, Apr. 21, 1978, at 19.
167. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
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While the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701168 contains no reference to
the armed conflict qualification, the special U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI)
established by the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) following the four
Rapporteurs reports on their September 2006 fact-finding mission to Lebanon and
Israel 69 was forced to discuss this issue.170 However, due to the issue's sensitivity,
it evaded giving a definitive decision of the conflict's legal classification. Instead,
it stated following:
It is the view of the Commission that hostilities were in actual fact and
in the main only between the IDF and Hezbollah. The fact that the
Lebanese Armed Forces did not take an active part in them neither
denies the character of the conflict as a legally cognizable international
armed conflict, nor does it negate that Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah
were parties to it."

When the war began, however, Israel viewed the Lebanese government
responsible for the unprovoked aggression against it. Within two days, however,
and apparently following U.S. pressure, Israel decided that Hezbollah alone was
responsible for making redundant any discussion of the requirements for
attributing acts of a Non-State Armed Group (NSAG) to states.172 However,
leaving aside the fact that both military and legal experts used the term "war" with
respect to the 2006 "hostilities,"1 73 the important point is the perspectives of the
parties, described in the following.
Israel clearly stated in its identical letters to the UNSG and the Security
Council on July 12, 2006: "Today's act is a clear declaration of war." 174 The IDF
even viewed its operations in Lebanon as an International Armed Conflict
Appeal on Jurisdiction, T70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
168. S.C. Res. 1701,
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006). The term to be used was
"hostilities."
169. See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston; the Special Rapporteur on the Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul
Hunt; the Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons,
Walter Kllin; and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an
Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari: Mission to Lebanon and Israel, 1 11, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/2/7 (Oct. 2, 2006), [hereinafter The Rapporteurs' Rep.]; see also UNHRC, Human rights in
Lebanon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, on his mission to
Lebanon, T 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/8 (Sept. 29, 2006).
170. See UNHRC, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights
Council Resolution S-2/1, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006) [hereinafter The COIs Rep.]. The
qualification was needed as an essential pre-condition for the application of IHL and the establishment
of applicable and governing rules.
171. The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 22, 155 (emphasis added).
172. See Ronen, supra note 152, at 377-79, for an account of Israel's approach regarding Lebanese
responsibility for the July 12 attack before and after the policy's change. See id at 379-84, for an
analysis of whether Lebanon can be held responsible for the attack. See Somer, supra note 151, for a
succinct discussion on requirements regarding the 2006 War.
173. See, e.g., Arkin, supra note 90, at xviii (discussing the military view); Schmitt, supra note 88,
at 157 (discussing the legal view).
174. See July 12, 2006 Letters, supra note 150.
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(IAC). 7 5 A similar view, at least regarding the hostilities' magnitude, seems to
have been shared by the U.S., as former President Bush stated on August 14: "In
Lebanon, Hezbollah declared war on Lebanon's neighbor, Israel, without the
knowledge of the elected government in Beirut."1 76 In fact, in response to a
provocative question on the very day the DTCC's preliminary report was sent to
Congress (January 29, 2007), over whether the U.S. "would allow an agreement
[e.g., the 1976 Agreement] with anybody to [allow use of] cluster bombs against
civilians,"177 State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack replied: ". . .
[O]bviously the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel was one between Hezbollah
and Hezbollah fighters which engaged in an act of aggression against Israel. They
crossed an internationalborder. They started a war. So clearly the conflict was
between those two parties." 7 s
Indeed, to the extent that the 1976 Agreement permitted CM use only in an
IAC, Israel's employment of these weapons can be regarded as permissible only if
Lebanon is regarded as a party to the conflict. However, if one applies a strict
interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, even Israel's use of force was
wrongful if Hezbollah's acts cannot be attributed to any state. 179 Nevertheless, as
held by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadid: "[A]n armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups ... "s
This test was recently interpreted by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Haradinajet al.,
where it focused on two criteria: "protracted armed violence" and
"organization."18
As to the latter criterion-the existence of an organizational structure-

Hezbollah meets this criterion, observed, for instance, in the existence of
headquarters, a command structure, and the ability to obtain access to weapons. 182
Protracted armed violence has been interpreted "as referring more to the intensity
of the armed violence than to its duration."1 83 Reviewing the indicators for
"intensity" as outlined in Haradinaj-suchas the number and caliber of munitions
fired or the extent of material destruction-it is clear that the 2006 War fits this

175. See, e.g., The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 62.
176. Press Release, supranote 159.
177. McCormack, supranote 13.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. U.N. Charter art. 51.
180. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1 at 70 (emphasis added).
181. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment,
37-40, 50-51 (Apr. 3,
2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf.
182. Haradinaj,Case No. IT-04-84-T at 53. See, e.g., HALA JABER, HEZBOLLAH: BORN WITH A
VENGEANCE 38 (1997), for an overview on the Hezbollah's command structure. For an inside account
on its emergence, training, installations and other aspects raised by the Trial Chamber in the case of
Haradinajet al., see NAIM QASSEM, HIZBULLAH: THE STORY FROM WITHIN 70-71 (Dalia Khalil trans.,

2005).
183. Haradinaj,Case No. IT-04-84-T at

149.
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criterion as well. 184
However, it is exactly this preference for the existence of substance (assessing
the conflict's intensity in practice) over a strictly formal approach (the belligerent's
legal status) that characterized Israel's traditional interpretation of the 1976 EndUser Agreement. Within this context, the preference for substance brings us to the
Agreement's implicit requirement for high levels of violence (especially if the 1967
and 1973 Wars serve as precedents).
First and foremost, 3,917 rockets, averaging 100 rockets daily within a 34-day
period, hit Israel's civilian population; on the other side, 173,293 Israeli artillery
projectiles and rockets were fired into South Lebanon, mainly to prevent the
Hezbollah from firing first.85 In addition, the IAF conducted a higher number of
sorties than in the 1973 War-an average of 350 sorties per day. 18 6 Moreover, it is
perhaps sufficient to recall that in contrast to the heavy attacks on Israel's civilian
population in 2006 (resulting in 43 civilian casualties and thousands of
wounded), 1 7 the conduct of the 1956 Sinai War-undoubtedly a classic IACkept Israel's civilian population out of the war.188 Even the IDF's casualty rate,
approximately 50 soldiers, differentiates the two wars; in the 1956 War there were
fewer soldiers injured. 189 Both Israel's civilian and IDF casualties are, of course,
moderate in comparison to the extensive civilian harm caused to the Lebanese and
Hezbollah (1,191 deaths-with as many as 600 deaths of military personnel). 190
Moreover, almost one million Lebanese people were displaced. 191
In sum, while applying the ICTY's criterion for determining the existence of
an armed conflict to the 2006 War demonstrates that this was a classic armed
conflict, the large-scale firepower together with the high level of civilian harm and
casualties on both sides support the claim that the 2006 War was an JAC using a

184. It should be noted that none of the indicative factors is, in itself, essential to establish that the
criterion are satisfied. Id. at 60.
185. Brig. Gen. (Res.) Ya'acov Zigdon, Much Fire, Little Thinking, 420-421 MA'ARACHOT 44, 4546 [IDF's OFFICIAL JOURNAL], (Sept. 2008).
186. AMos HAREL & Avi ISSACHAROFF, 34 DAYS: ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH, AND THE WAR IN
LEBANON 292 (2008).

187. The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 178.
188. The then Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, recalled in his memoirs that Egypt's air force limited
its activity to the Sinai Peninsula and only in two cases carried out bombing sorties into Israel; these
resulted in no damage whatsoever. See MOSHE DAYAN,

AvNEI DEREKH

(MILESTONES - AN

AUTOBIOGRAPHY) 280 (1976). This episode is missing from the book's English version, MOSHE
DAYAN, MOSHE DAYAN: STORY OF MY LIFE (1976).

189. During the 1956 War, the IDF suffered 172 causalities; in the 2006 War, the IDF suffered 119
casualties. For data on the 1956 War see, e.g., AVNER YANIV, POLITICS AND STRATEGY IN ISRAEL 142
(1994). For data on the 2006 War see Winograd Final Rep., supranote 99, at 33.
190. The COI's Rep., supra note 170, at 11.
191. For the numbers of Lebanese killed or displaced as provided by the Lebanese authorities, see
id.; see also United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR], The HumanitarianImpact
of Cluster Munitions, 29, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/2008/1 (2008). For the high estimate regarding
Hezbollah's casualties, see Kalb & Saivetz, supra note 4, at 48-49 (relying on Israeli sources). The
Winograd Committee mentioned "hundreds" when referring to Hezbollah's casualties. See Winograd
Final Rep., supra note 99, at 33.
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flexible interpretation. As noted by Professor Antonio Cassese: "An armed conflict
which takes place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups whether or not they are terrorist in character-in occupied territory, amounts to an
international armed conflict." 192 Even Israel's Supreme Court, acting as the High
Court of Justice (HCJ), in the Targeted Killing case preferred such a flexible
interpretation when classifying the conflict with Palestinian organizations inside
the Occupied Territories as an IAC. 193
With respect to the second criterion (military, fortified targets), it is clear that
whenever the targets were bases, infrastructure or "'areas of dense vegetation, in
which the Hizbullah set up fortified infrastructures (known as 'Nature
Reserves')," 194 this criterion was met.
In contrast, whenever CMs were used against populated areas (e.g., villages)
or within their vicinity -even if deserted-the 1976 Agreement was breached. As
Halutz's statement vis-A-vis unruly ground troops indicates, this was Israel's
utmost concern. After all, the 1978 stipulation is quite clear: "cluster bombs
cannot be used in or adjacent to areas of civilian population." 195 However, given
South Lebanon's population density and Hezbollah's tactic of taking advantage on
the presence of civilian population, 196 it is hard to conceive how Israel could
employ CMs in future actions against Hezbollah while strictly following this
stipulation. In the 2006 War, the IDF organized a plan for evacuating 170
Lebanese villages and employing massive artillery barrages. As recently exposed
in one of the IDF's official journals, "[t]he firing was first directed to the villages'
periphery and after a short pause, to their center." 197 The fact is that CMs are
neither designated to nor capable of harming civilians hiding in bomb shelters.198
Indeed, much can be said on the legality of this act irrespective of its minimal
collateral damage to human life. However, for this Article's purposes, other than
providing an explanation for the gap between Israel's large-scale CM use and the
marginal collateral damage during its firing, it indicates Israel's efforts to bridge

192. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (2d. ed., 2005).

193. See HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of
Israel et al. [2006] IsrSC 53(4) 817, 16-21, translated at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/
690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf [hereinafter Targeted Killing case]. For a different approach calling for
"a mixed legal regime" (international human rights law and IHL) which incorporates features of
international human rights law, see David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists:ExtraJudicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 171, 174 (2005). For a
comprehensive analysis of targeted killing in general, see NILS MELzER, TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5 (2008).

194. See Opinion of the Military Advocate General Regarding Use of Cluster Munitions in Second
Lebanon War, supranote 134.
195. See Wood, supra note 44, at 10.
196. For recent demographic data on South Lebanon, see Lebanese Republic - PresidencyOf The
Council ofMinisters,2007 Stat. Y.B. (Cent. Admin. for Stats.) 9.
197. See Zigdon, supranote 185, at 48.
198. This is a result of the bomblet's low penetration capability given a standard shelter's thick
cement wells.
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the immense gap between the 1978 stipulation and the 2006 reality. 199 Israel's
explanation for its breach is already detailed in the MAG's legal opinion. 200 In a
nutshell, Israel's extensive use of CMs-which, as the MAG stressed, is "'a legal
weapon which does not inflict superfluous injury on the enemy [i.e., within the
principle of humanity]"- was legal as (1) a concrete military necessity to prevent
rockets being fired at Israel existed and (2) the principles of distinction and
proportionality were maintained because the CMs were fired exclusively at
military targets and then only when it was determined that the potential collateral
damage was not disproportionate to the military advantage gained.201 In practice,
the MAG held the view that excluding one clear deviation and an additional case in
which CMs were used to assist in evacuating forces, 202 CMs were used in
populated areas solely as an immediate defensive response to rocket attacks after
non-combatants were evacuated from these same targets.203 That is, all the uses,
save one, were lawful.
Within the Article's context (i.e., the bilateral end-use agreement), however, it
is important to note that the U.S, which itself has engaged in similar asymmetric
conflicts,204 did realize that following this condition strictly (e.g., not even
targeting "nature reserve" which were build next to populated areas) is tantamount
to depriving Israel from using CM in South Lebanon regardless of the CMs
chosen's HDR. As McCormack stated upon relating to the 1976 Agreement
(January 29, 2007): "It's a fact that they [Hezbollah fighters-EB] used human
shields, that they hid themselves among the civilian populations .

.

. no military

commander wants to be ... in the position of acting in self-defense and going after
those people who have committed aggressions against your country but are then
hiding among civilian populations." 205 Furthermore, there is a difference between
breaching a basic condition of the Agreement (i.e., employing under a situation far
from being amount to meaningful military conflicts) and breaching a secondary
199. As the Winograd Committee clearly stated: "We should note that we did not hear (sic) any
claims regarding civilian injuries from cluster bombs during the war." See Winograd Final Rep., supra
note 99, at 497. Indeed, even the HRW in its February 2008 comprehensive report counted very few
instances of "time of attack casualties" and therefore focused on 'civilian harm" in the chapter on postconflict effects. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 92, at 52. This is not to argue that there were
no civilian casualties from other weapons. For a list of these casualties and details on the incidents
leading to their deaths see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN
LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 62-178, Appendix 11 (2007).
200. See Opinion of the Military Advocate General Regarding Use of Cluster Munitions in Second
Lebanon War, supranote 134. For a concise English summary, see IDF Spokesperson, supranote 138.
201. See id. at 32-39. For a summary of this argument, see also Winograd Final Rep., supranote
99, at 10.
202. In this case, the IDF fired at the Lebanese village of Maroon-A-Ras on July 20th. Halutz
himself justified the use post facto. See Israel News Agency, Israel: Cluster Bombs Used Legally
Against Terrorist Targets (Dec. 26, 2007), http://www.israelnewsagency.com/lebanonwarhizbullah
hezbollahterrorattacksisraelidfclusterbombsdefensekatusha48122607.html.
203. See MAG's Legal Opinion, supranote 134, at IT 18-20.
204. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs And Their Use By The United
States In Afghanistan 21-24 (2002) (summarizing reports of cluster strikes in or near populated areas in
Afghanistan).
205. McCormack, supranote 13.
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stipulation within the Agreement's parameters once the use per se is already
permissible.
In sum, we hold the view that given the altered reality and the possibility of
dual use, a careful case-by-case examination is needed. Relying on NGOs' reports
it does seem that there were a few breaches-as Halutz himself admitted.206 It is
clear, however, that under a non-flexible interpretation of this clause-as the Bush
Administration demonstrated-the 1976 Agreement is doomed to be violated in
the next would-be large-scale military conflict in Lebanon.
As such, the third criteria, a "regular army" or "regular forces of a sovereign
nation" in its 1978 wording, becomes highly important. Hezbollah is not a regular
army, and as such, CM use against it apparently constitutes a breach of the 1976
Agreement regardless of its specific targets. However, according to flexible and
purpose-oriented interpretation, the agreements need to be understood "in the light
of present-day conditions."207 Professor Schmitt's comments regarding whether
Israel's 2006 military actions were consistent with criteria for lawful defensive
actions should be adopted, mutatis mutandis, to this case: "[I]nternational law is
dynamic, that if it is to survive, it has to reflect the context in which it is applied as
well as community expectations as to its prescriptive content." 2 08
Many jurists currently hold the view that the traditional distinction between "a
regular army" and a NSAG with respect to various applications ofjus ad bellum
andjus in bello should be reconsidered.Interestingly, this view finds much support
in the approach adopted by Israel's high command, when it was engaged in
warfare against NSAGs (armed Palestinian organizations) already during the first
diplomatic crisis (1978), as reflected in the following explanation to Israel's CMs
use by then-IDF Chief of Staff, Gur as follows: 209
Personally, I have no slight doubt that we have not violated the spirit of
the agreement with the Americans. We employed the bombs against
artillery guns, which are weapons of regular armies and not terrorists.
Therefore I haven't seen in the use of these bombs violation in our
agreement with the Americans. In my judgment if we had spoken with
them about artillery firing and Katyushas [Russian weapon which fires
rockets and was widespread among armed Palestinian organizations],
they would have agreed to include the responses to that [the firing] in

206. For such reports, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 90, at 107; NASH, supra note 19, at
36.
207. See Tyrer v. UK, 58 I.L.R. 339, 553 (Eur. Ct. H.R.1978) (wording of the European court of
Human Rights regarding the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222), cited in MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 938
(6th ed., 2009).
208. Schmitt, supranote 88, at 149.
209. For the implications of the NSAG in the current international system see Nicolas Florquin &
Elisabeth Decrey Warner, Engaging Non-State Armed Groups or Listing Terrorists?Implicationsfor
the Arms Control Community, 1 DISARMAMENT FORUM 17, 20 (2008).
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the parameters within we were allowed to employ cluster bombs. 210
Such a flexible interpretation was rendered during the 1982 crisis-even
though Syria's military involvement in the 1982 War was sufficient for Israel to
meet that demand-by presenting the Palestinian forces' large quantity and
sophisticated arms as evidence that supported the CM use criterion regarding
regular armies. As Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv clearly stated in a news conference:
"Cluster bombs and cluster shells were used only against organized resistance,
mainly the Syrians' armor and infantry." 211 Yet, in the 1982 case, it appears that
Israel felt that the military imperatives for employing CMs should override any
externally imposed restrictions. As Ariel Sharon, Israel's then-Minister of Defense
proclaimed: "In wartime it is necessary to interpret formal agreements differently
than in peacetime."212
It has since become much clearer that the distinction between "a regular
army" and an NSAG-perceived as a weaker military force-is superficial.
The implications are that banning some means of warfare by resting on the
formal definition of a national opponent's formal status (independent state or
NSAG) is completely obsolete. Indeed, some jurists do support the U.S.
perspective as recently formulated by a senior State Department official:
The United States hasn't used them [CMs] in the conflicts we're
involved in since 2003 . . . Since then, when you're fighting a

counterinsurgency, which is what's happening in both Afghanistan and
Iraq, I think our military planners would agree with you completely that
they 're not appropriateand wouldn't be very useful.213

Nevertheless, Hezbollah's conduct and capabilities-such as firing 3,917
rockets within 34 days of war 214-led many military experts to perceive its
campaign "as a major departure from the asymmetric methods of traditional
terrorists or guerrillas and as a shift toward the conventional military methods
normally associated with state actors." 215 As stated in the TargetedKilling ruling:
210. Stated during an interview with the Israeli Press Corps upon his retirement, see Agres et al.,
supra note 166. Gur explained to the foreign press on that occasion that CMs were used "only in a very
few cases, and then against artillery [positions], in accordance with the spirit of our agreement with the
US." See Milan J. Kubic, The Cluster Bomb Furor, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 1978, at 50. The issue's
sensibility is reflected in the total absence of Gur's (censored) memoirs regarding this period. See
MORDECHAI GUR, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (1974-1978) ch. 7 (1998).

211. Use of Cluster Bombs Is Confirmed by Israel,N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1982, at A8 (emphasis
added).
212. After being questioned on this issue during a meeting with a delegation of six Congressmen
headed by Nick Rahall (D-VA) during their ten-day visit to the region in late July 1982. See Nick J.
Rahall II, Lebanon and U.S. ForeignPolicy Toward The Middle East, 2 AM.-ARAB AFF. 40, 45 (Fall
1982).
213. Mull, supra note 145.
214. See Zigdon, supranote 185, at 46.
215. Stephen Biddle, & Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign And The Future Of
Warfare: Implications For Army And Defense Policy 5 (2008). As this study by the U.S. Army War
College concludes "[i]n all, then, Hezbollah's behavior in 2006 conformed to neither an ideal model of
'guerrilla' warfare nor one of 'conventional' war fighting, but its approach and proficiency nonetheless
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"Indeed, in today's reality, a terrorist organization is likely to have considerable
military capabilities. At times they have military capabilities that exceed those of
states."216 As a case in point, Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), proscribed as a terrorist organizationby 32 states, has its own air and
naval forces.217 Therefore, given the altered reality, this Article strongly suggests
that the distinction between "a regular army" and an NSAG vis-A-vis their
attributed military strength and the appropriate means to be used in combatshould be re-considered.
It should be noted, however, that while the 1976 Agreement's conditions
focusing on the adversaries' firepower justified addressing the 2006 War as an IAC
and Hezbollah as an organization akin to a regular army, the issue currently at
hand is whether Hezbollah's guerrilla tactics justify the employment of CMs
against them. Nevertheless, the 1978 clarifications give the impression that their
U.S. authors were preoccupied with the adversaries' firepower as a threat to
Israel's security. Hence, the open question regarding the adversaries' tactics
should have but a limited effect on the conclusion as to whether this End-User
Agreement was breached.
Because not all U.S. Administrations can be expected to be as favorably
inclined toward Israel as was the Bush Administration was it is likely that they
may confine themselves to a formal and strict approach to the Agreement's
interpretation. Therefore, it is interesting to assess whether Israel can invoke the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in light of a strict legal interpretation. It should be
emphasized, however, that the following discussion has no practical implication
given the rather intense patron-client relationship, such an Israeli move is unlikely,
a prior.2 18
As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the 1973 Fisheries
Jurisdictioncase:
place it well within a band that has characterized many past state militaries in interstate conflicts." Id. at

XV.
216. Targeted Killing case, supra note 193, at 21 (Decision written by Aharon Barak, then
President of the Israeli Supreme Court).
217. See, e.g., Sumantra Bose, CONTESTED LANDS: ISRAEL-PALESTINE, KASHMIR, BOSNIA,
CYPRUS, AND SRI LANKA 6, 27-28, 35, 41 (2007) (discussing the LTTE's military capabilities).
However, in January 2009 the Government initiated a major military offensive which forced the LTTE
to give up much of their territory. By January 25, the Sri Lankan army "had captured" the town of
Mullaitivu, the last major LTTE stronghold-a move which brings an increasing belief that the final
military defeat of the LTTE is near or, at least, "signal[s] the end of conventional battles." See, e.g.,
Somini Sengupta, Troops Take A Town HeldBy Rebels In Sri Lanka, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2009, at A9;
Emily Wax, Sri Lankan Leader Says Tamil Rebels Nearly Defeated,Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2009, at A10.
On February 21, despite the LTTE desperate military situation, its air force, the "Air Tigers" launched a
surprise air attack (its 10th since the first one in March 2007) on Sri Lanka's capital, Colombo, in what
observers described as "a defiant show of power." Emily Wax, Rebel Air Attack Kills 3 in Sri Lankan
Capital-OnePlane Crashes,2nd is Shot Down, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2009, at AO.
218. For the diplomatic and intellectual history of this doctrine, see David J. Bederman, The 1871
London Declaration,Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View on the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1, 2-4 (1988).
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International law admits that a fundamental change in the circumstances
which determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a
radical transformation of the extent of the obligations imposed by it,
may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for
invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty.219
While the observation that "this Convention has since its conclusion been the
source of much and angry discussion between the two Governments" referred to
the 1865 U.S.-Britain Clayton Bulwer Treaty in which the U.S. attempted to
revoke the doctrine, the same description could easily apply to the 1976 End-User
Agreement as well. 220 In addition, one may notice that Israel was forced to consent
to the treaty's stipulations. Historically, it should be remembered, the element of
coercion has been responsible for states resorting to this doctrine, especially
between the two world wars. 2 2 1
Nevertheless, Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,222 which represents the customary law on this issue, 223 includes strict
conditions which have to be met in order for such a radical claim be accepted.224
In fact, in the two cases this claim was raised before the ICJ, it was rejected.225
Clearly, the burden of proof is heavy, and rightly so given that the "doctrine is an
important but limited exception to the foundational principle of pacta sunt
servanda."226 Professor Vagts, in summarizing the doctrine's status as of 2005
notes: "rebus sic stantibus will not avail unless the change of circumstances is
clearly a drastic change from the circumstances anticipated by the parties."227
Given such a heavy burden, it is indeed difficult to determine how Israel
could invoke this doctrine, particularly because prior to the agreement's conclusion
in December 1976, but mainly in the subsequent period (i.e., up to the 1978 Litani
Operation), rockets were fired into Israel from South Lebanon by Palestinian
22
organizations.228 The 2006 Hezbollah rocket attacks were indeed much more
extensive and penetrating (rockets reached as far south as Haifa, Israel's third
219. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 19 (Feb. 2). The Court repeated this stance
following 25 years in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 63-4 (Sept. 25).
220. For the citation as well as a brief overview of this historic case, see Vagts, supra note 20, at
467 (quoting Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties 521 (1961)). It should be noted, however, that
following a strong Britain resistance the U.S. dropped its claim. Id.
221. See id. at 468.
222. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, art. 62, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
223. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction, supranote 219, at 18; see also SHAW, supra note 207, at 496.
224. For the five accumulated conditions, see Reports ofthe Commission to the GeneralAssembly,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 259, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1.
225. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1973 I.C.J. at 19; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 38-39.
226. Mark Bennett & Nicole Roughan, Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Treaty of Waitangi, 37
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 505, 513 (2006).

227. Vagts, supranote 20, at 475.
228. For such attacks, see, e.g., Raymond H. Anderson, Cairo Reports an Israeli Jet Hit, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1970, at 9; Chronologies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1973, at 3; Israeli Planes Strike 2
PalestinianAreas at Beirut After Theater Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1974, at 12.
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largest city). Yet, even these did not amount to meeting the requirement of "a
fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty." 229 Furthermore, the
"fundamental change of circumstances" must not be "foreseen by the
parties." 230 Gur, however, stated in the wake of the 1978 crisis: "In my judgment,
if we had spoken with them [the U.S.] about artillery and Katyushas, they would
have agreed to include responses to them." 231 However, the 1978 clarifications
indeed contained no revisions regarding the rocket threat imposed by NSAGs in
Lebanon, and as such it is hard to claim, given the opportunity to amend the
agreement in April 1978, that rocket attacks had not been foreseen by Israel.
In concluding this issue, a flexible and object-oriented method of
interpretation, according to which the formally classified End-User Agreement is
interpreted "in the light of present-day conditions,"232 enables us to claim that the
use of CMs in the 2006 War per se (as distinct from a few specific cases of
improper use) does not constitute the treaty's violation. As to the Bush
Administration, the January 2007 internal debate over whether Israel should be
penalized for using CMs "against towns and villages where Hezbollah had placed
its rocket launchers" perhaps indicates that many U.S. Administration officials
have adopted just such an interpretation.233 In the absence of a formal acceptance
of this stance, given Israel's inability-politically and legally-to invoke the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,the 1976 Agreement is doomed to be violated again
in the next large-scale military encounter with Hezbollah. For many Israelis, a
situation in which the entire northern part of the country is paralyzed due to the
threat of rockets is tantamount to or even worse than a Syrian limited offensive
operation designated to retake the Golan Heights.234 Although such a subjective
perception will not be upheld by any international court, it does explain why-as a
senior U.S. official stated regarding the 2006 employment of CMs-"[f]rom their
perspective, use of the munitions was clearly done within the agreements."235
B. PossibleLesssons for the CCM
In November 2006, when the CCW Third Review Conference convened, the
issue of CMs was not on the agenda, with most observers doubtful that it would
attract much attention.236 In the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War (July229. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supranote 222, at art. 62(1).
230. Id.
231. See Agres et al., supranote 166.
232. SHAW, supranote 207, at 348-49 (discussing Loizidou v. Turkey, 103 ILR 622).
233. While some U.S. officials contended that Israel violated U.S. prohibitions when using CMs
against populated areas, others argued that Israel used these arms in self-defense to stop Hezbollah's
rocket attacks, which would amount to a "technical violation" at most. See Buncombe, supra note 123;
Cloud & Myre, supranote 123; News Agencies, supra note 123.
234. For the heavy economic costs, see, e.g., Winograd Final Rep., supra note 99, at 5.
235. The official is John Hillen, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs in the
Bush administration (2005-2007), cited in Benhorin, supra note 129; Cloud & Myre, supra note 123.
236. John Borrie, The Road from Oslo: Emerging International Efforts on Cluster Munitions, 85
Disarmament Dipl., Summer 2007, at 85.
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August 2006), however, banning or heavily restricting the use of CMs-with
strong encouragement by the ICRC 237 and the Cluster Munition Coalition
(CMC) 238-secured a high place on the agenda.239 Nonetheless, a call by 25 states,
led by Norway, to ban CMs "that pose serious humanitarian hazards because they
are, for example, unreliable and/or inaccurate," 240 did not achieve a consensus. It
was ultimately decided to convene a meeting of experts in June 2007 to further
consider the application and implementation of existing IHL "to specific munitions
that may cause explosive remnants of war, with particular focus on cluster
munitions."241

And so in June 2007, four months after 46 states agreed to launch the "Oslo
Process" and endorse the Oslo Declaration, which committed them to conclude an
instrument to ban CMs by late 2008,242 Germany submitted a draft Protocol VI on
CMs. 24 3
The draft included prohibitions and restrictions on the storage,
destruction, and transfer of CMs between countries but fell far short of the
prohibitions contained in the CCM.24 4 In brief, the Draft Protocol sought to
prevent significant post-conflict civilian harm in future conflicts involving
employment of CMs due to the availability of new cluster bombs with a negligible

237. ICRC personnel were shocked by Israel's extensive use of CMs. As the ICRC's Director for
International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri, later (2007) stated, "[T]he density of cluster
submunition contamination may be unprecedented," cited in United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, supra note 191, at 30, 61.
238. The CMC-a group of about 300 NGOs from more than 80 countries-was formed after the
2003 Dublin Conference on ERW. For more on the CMC, see Cluster Munition Coalition,
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/.
239. For more details on the 2006 War's contribution to the CCM's emergence, see John Borrie,
The 'Long Year': Emerging InternationalEfforts to Address the Humanitarian Impacts of Cluster
Munitions, 2006-2007, 10 Y.B. OF INT'L. HUMANITARIAN L. 251, 258-60 (2007).

240. Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 7-17, 2006, Final Document, 41,
U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.III/1 1, Part III.
241. Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 7-17, 2006, Final Declaration,6,
U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.III/1 1, Part II.
242. Olso Conference on Cluster Munitions, Oslo, Nor., Feb. 22-23, 2007, Declaration, T 1,
available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/Oslo%/ 20DeclarationFeb07.pdf.
243. See Group of Gov'tl Experts of the States Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or
Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva, Switz., June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW Protocol on
Cluster Munitions, 1, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP. 1 (May 2007). The proposed Protocol joins three
initial protocols and two Protocols which were adopted later: Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
(Protocol I), Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, amended by 35
I.L.M. 1206 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1998); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Dec. 2, 1983, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171; Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF .i/7 (Oct. 12, 1995); and Protocol on
Explosive Remnants of War, May 16, 2006, U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2003/2.
244. See Draft Protocol, supranote 18, at art. 5-6.
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HDR (less than one percent).245 This state of affairs should, however, become
effective only after a long transition period (8 years, with the Protocol's optional
extension for an additional four years) after its entry into effect. 246 In the interim
period, use of "old-generation"' CMs was allowed due to a few loosely structured
conditions, such as approval by "[the] highest-ranking operational commander in
the area of operations or by the appropriate politically mandated operational
authority, in accordance with its national procedures."247
In November 2007, at the CCW State Parties annual meeting, a consensus
was achieved to "negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact
of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian
considerations."248 However, no agreed text on CMs was completed during the
five sessions held by the CCW's Group of Governmental Experts (GGE, the expert
subsidiary body of the CCW) on CMs in 2008. 249 Yet, the CCW State Parties, in
their November 2008 annual meeting, decided to continue work into 2009, while
setting aside two 2009 GGE sessions to address the CM weapons issue.250
Nonetheless, no agreed text was completed even in 2009 and in their November
2009 annual meeting, CCW State Parties decided to continue negotiation in2010.251
245. See id. at art. 4, 2(b). Alternatively, employing CM weapons under the proposed Draft
Protocol is permissible once they possess at least one effective safeguard "that must effectively ensure]
with a high degree of reliability that unexploded submunitions will no longer function as explosive
submunitions" such as self-destruction mechanisms, self-deactivating features or self-neutralization
mechanisms. Id. at T 2(a).
246. Id. at art. 4 3. As expected, this point which in the Protocol's earlier drafts ranged up to 15
years has drawn heavy criticism by CCM supporters who hold the view that "the 13-20 year deferral is
designed to permit continued use of the weapon during that time." Steve Goose, Co-Chair, CMC, CMC
Statement on Article 4, Gen. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions (Nov. 3, 2008), available at
www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/ 11/ccw-art-4-11308.pdf.
247. Draft Protocol, supranote 18, at art. 4, 4(a).
248. Meeting of the High Contract'g Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or Restrict'ns on the
Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have
Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 7-13, 2007 Report, 37, U.N. Doc CCW/MSP/2007/5 (Dec. 3,
2007). A draft mandate to begin negotiations on this Protocol was submitted by Germany on behalf of
the European Union in June 2007. See Group of Gov'tl Experts of the States Parties to the Convent'n on
Prohibit'ns or Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva, Switz., June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW
NegotiatingMandate on Cluster Munitions.
249. See Group of Gov'tl Experts of the States Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or
Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscrim. Effects, Procedural Report, 1 13, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE/2008-V/2
(Nov. 14, 2008).
250. Two sessions specifically addressing CMs were scheduled for 2009. See Meeting of the High
Contract'g Parties to the Convent'n on Prohibit'ns or Restrict'ns on the Use of Certain Convent'l
Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscrim. Effects, Geneva,
Switz., Nov. 13-14, 2008, Report 34, U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2008/4, (Jan. 23, 2009). See also Jeff
Abramson, CCWFailsto Reach ClusterMunitions Pact,ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec., 2008, at 48.
251. After prolonged futile discussions even on the point whether it is a protocol or a proposal for
protocol it was agreed that the GGE "will conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and report to
the next Meeting of the High Contracting Parties", while two sessions were scheduled (Apr. 12-16 and

36

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

Critics of this attempt to address CM use under the auspices of the CCW have
raised doubts whether such a protocol could ensure the prevention of a
humanitarian crisis similar to that witnessed in South Lebanon.252 Those critics,
mainly CCM supporters, view the attempt as a means to undermine the CCM 253
and forestall the weapon's nascent stigmatization, which they had hoped the CCM
would generate.254 Moreover, they are concerned that, while the CCM seeks to
delegitimize this weapon, the protocol's would-be effect can be expected to have
polar results. Hence, the extensive CM use in the Second Lebanon War appears to
provide an important lesson on what the preferable option in this still theoretical
dilemma between banning and regulating the weapon should be. As this Article
argues, a bilateral End-Use Agreement confronts Israel with severe restrictions visA-vis the use of CMs. Importantly, these restrictions are much more stringent and
specific than the general principles incorporated in the CM Draft Protocol for the
purpose of preventing future IHL violations associated with employment of
CMs. 255
On the one hand, approximately 4,000 thousand rockets descended on Israel's
civil population (an average of 100 rockets daily); on the other hand, more than
173,000 artillery projectiles and rockets were fired on South Lebanon, whatever
their aim. In retrospect, it was almost unavoidable that Israel would resort to CMs
despite the stringent restrictions of the 1976 End-User Agreement. As the 2006
War strongly suggests, despite Israel's unique bilateral and legally binding
commitment, when it comes to restraining the use of CM weapons in a bitter
Aug.30-Sept.3). See Katherine Harrison, Landmine Action Notes on CCW, Nov. 14, 2009 (unpublished
Note, on file with Author). As of late November no official report is available.
252. For a critical review, article by article, of an earlier, slightly modified version (July 2008) of
the CCW Draft Protocol, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH OBSERVATIONS ON THE
CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) DRAFT PROTOCOL ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS 1, 6
(2008) [hereinafter HRW, OBSERVATIONS ON WEAPONS], available at http://hrw.org/english/

docs/2008/09/02/globall9723.htm.
253. As 25 CCW State Parties, mainly strong supporters of the Oslo Process, stated during the
November 2008 session of the GGE upon objecting the proposed draft protocol, "...by allowing states
to choose from a menu of vaguely-worded options . . . it [the Chair's text] could be used as a
justification for the continued use of cluster munitions that have already proven over the past decades to
cause exactly the humanitarian consequences that we are trying to address. For these reasons, the
Chair's text as it stands is not acceptable to our delegations." For their joint statement see John Borrie,
CCW: The Wailing Wall, http://disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com/2008/11/ccw-wailing-wall.html
(Nov. 6, 2008) (as it was read into the record; no formal reference is available).
254. For a recent overview on this process with respect to a range of war instruments, see BRIAN
RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND THE CONVENTION: STIGMA, HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS AND THE

OSLO PROCESS 2-4 (Landmine Action 2008). See also, Michedl Martin, Ir. Foreign Minister, Closing
Ceremony at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions (May 30, 2008), available at
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/Ireland.pdf ("[Elven though we all know that there are
important states not present, I am also convinced that together we will have succeeded in stigmati[z]ing
any future use of cluster munitions.").
255. See Draft Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 3 (protecting civilians, civilian population and
civilian objects). As expected, the HRW who reviewed the July 2008 draft, which was detailed and
much harsher than the later
drafts, found "serious shortcomings with this article." HRW,
OBSERVATIONS ON WEAPONS, supranote 252, at 4. Eventually, all the paragraphs that represented new
law and were critiqued by HRW have been deleted and the latest draft simply reiterates existing IHL.
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conflict, no state is to be trusted, especially given the vague and loose restrictions
characterizing the current draft proposal.
Unlike anti-personnel mines, for instance,
militaries as an effective weapon: 25 6 "They ...
a range of targets . . . ."
Hence, if CMs
irrespective of the protocol's final stringency,
End-Use Agreement-to be violated.

CMs are still perceived by modem
provide distinct advantages against
remain part of an army's arsenal
it may be doomed-like the 1976

Given the large number of possessor states, massive use of CMs may just be a
matter of time, subject to a country's involvement in a bitter conflict. Only the
total elimination of CMs as legitimate weapons can prevent the recurrence of the
2006 tragedy.
Historically, banning a weapon has not ensured its total elimination.258
Regardless of the intrusiveness of the legal instrument applied, states can always
develop and/or maintain a hidden arsenal.259 Banning does guarantee, however,
that the banned weapon is, at minimum, outside the reach of regular combat units
when a bitter conflict does erupt, a restriction making it impossible for the alleged
arsenal to be used other than as a last resort. That being the case, the salient
question-underestimated by many CCM state supporters which are free from
grave security concerns-remains as to whether there are appropriate alternatives
to the military advantages offered by CMs.
V. CONCLUSION
While reading this Article, one may notice a sharp discrepancy between U.S.
expressions of the CM's unquestionable legitimacy and the heavy restrictions
imposed on Israel regarding its use. After all, notwithstanding U.S. practice
(resorting to this weapon in most of the conflicts in which it was involved), only in

256. For discussion on the limited military utility attributed to AP mines see, e.g., Robert G. Gard,
Jr., The Military Utility of Anti-PersonnelMines, in To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement To
Ban Landmines 136, 140-41, 143, 154 (Maxwell A. Cameron et al. eds., 1998).
257. Memorandum from Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, for Sec'ys of the Military Dep't
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Sec'y of Defense for Acquisition, Tech. and Logistics Under
Sec'y of Defense for Policy Commanders of the Combatant Commands Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of
Defense (June 19, 2008) (announcing a new U.S. policy on CMs), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf. In principle, the new policy (June 19, 2008)
sets the goal of using CMs with less than one percent HDR within the next ten years.
258. See Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin, Ir.,
May 19-30, 2008, Convention on Cluster Munitions, art. 1(b). Note that Article 3(6) permits possession
of a limited number of CMs and explosive sub-munitions for the development of and training in CM
and explosive sub-munition detection, clearance, or destruction, and development of CM
countermeasures. See id. at art. 3(6).
259. As Ken Alibek, a.k.a. Kanatjan Alibekov, former deputy head of Biopreparat, the Soviet
Union's bio-weapons program, and President of Advanced Biosystems, Inc., wrote in his book's
prologue, "[o]ver a twenty-year period that began, ironically, with Moscow's endorsement of the
Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] in 1972, the Soviet Union built the largest and most advanced
biological warfare establishment in the world." KEN ALIBEK WITH STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIOHAzARD

X (1999). It should be noted that the Soviet Union is one of the three BWC depository states.
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June 2008 did the U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates state that: "Cluster
munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They are effective
weapons ... an integral part of U.S... . capabilities." 260 Five months later, during
the November 2008 session of the GGE on CMs, after CCM supporters succeeded
to thwart the U.S. efforts to conclude a draft protocol at that session, it hurried to
clarify that: "On the 4th of December, after the signing ceremony of Oslo, cluster
munitions will still remain as lawful and legitimate weapons."261
Yet, if CMs are such "legitimate" and "lawful" weapons, why has the U.S.
chosen to single out this means of warfare for specific use restrictions from among
the vast variety of weapons it has supplied to Israel over the years? Why does the
general legislation that applies to all U.S.-made weapons (the 1952 Mutual
Agreement and the 1976 AECA) not apply to CMs? After all, albeit the 1976
Agreement's stipulations and its willingness to engage with Israel over this
weapon, the US. has singled out CMs as special weapons requiringhigh military
thresholds before they can be operated. CMs therefore appear to represent an
intermediate level between "regular" conventional weapons and WVMD.
Furthermore, while the 1976 Agreement's birth can be explained within the
context of the specific type of CM involved (i.e., FAEs, which continue to cause
much concern in the international community), it remains difficult to accounts for
the U.S.'s prolonged concern over Israel's use of CMs. Given its diplomatic battle
with CCM supporters' over stigmatization of the weapon, the U.S decision to
confront Israel over CMs use in the 2006 War was highly counterproductive.
As research on weapon stigmatized has shown, "[s]ingling out certain
weapons or classes of weapon from the rest" is the first step in "differentiating
them from other means of force that result in death and injury." 262
Sincere U.S. concern over possible harm to the Arab civilian population can
provide but a partial explanation in the face of numerous incidents where massive
collateral damage resulted from Israel's use of U.S.-made weapons other than
CMs. In many cases, the U.S. remained Israel's staunch ally, laboring to "protect"
Israel from possible sanctions by the international community. 263

260. Gates, supranote 257.
261. Stephen Mathias, Head of U.S. Delegation, U.S. Delegation Statement on Proposed Changes
by Group of 25 (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ccwtreaty.com/statements/1107Group25.html.
262. Rappert, supra note 254, at 18.
263. On November 8, 2006, for instance, 19 civilians were killed and 40 were wounded from
155mm HE U.S.-made shells fired by the IDF one day after the formal end of Operation Autumn
Clouds in Beit Hanoun, Gaza Strip. Three days later, the U.S. vetoed a draft resolution by Qatar
deploring, inter alia, Israel's military actions in Gaza and calling for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Gaza Strip. See S.C., U.N. SCOR 5565th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5565 (Nov. 11, 2006)
(10 in favor with 4 abstentions). It should be noted that after another six days, on November 17, a
similar draft resolution was adopted in a General Assembly emergency session, with a recorded vote of
156 in favor and 7 against, with 6 abstentions. See U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 10th emergency special
plen., U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.19, (Nov. 17, 2006). See also, Press Release, General Assembly, By Wide
Margin, General Assembly Emergency Session Adopts Text Deploying Israeli: Military Actions in
Gaza, Calling for Dispatch of UN Mission to Beit Hanoun, GA/10534 (Nov. 17, 2001).
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A better explanation was provided-indirectly-by the IDF Attach6 to the
U.S. during the 1976 Agreement's formulation. Brig. Gen. Abraham "Bren" Aden,
when referring to the sanctions imposed on Israel by the U.S. following Israel's
"use of cluster bombs against terrorists in Lebanon," preferred not to blame the
various U.S. administrations but, rather, "U.S. public opinion, which perceives it as
a 'dirty' weapon ....
Such an explanation could also account for the highly forgiving manner in
which the Bush Administration approached Israel's use in 2006 of U.S.-made CMs
despite its extensiveness, especially in contrast to its 1982 use, for which Israel,
too, was punished. First, if this explanation is correct, the Administration
realized-as reflected in the overwhelming support Israel rallied in Congress-that
US public opinion was much more inclined at the time to consent to Israeli
employment of U.S.-made CMs. A probable reason for this support was the
absence of Palestinians (especially Palestinian refugee camps) in the conflict as
opposed to those presented as Iran's Proxy: Hezbollah. Second, given the dearth
of significant domestic pressures to treat CM use seriously, the Administration
may have realize that against its diplomatic campaign to forestall CMS
stigmatization, any sanctions against Israel would be tantamount to admitting the
virtue of CCM supporters' claims.265
However, looking beyond U.S.-Israel bilateral relations, one may notice that
when Israel's top echelons underestimated U.S. sensitivity to its End-User
Agreement-as recent Israeli war literature indicates-they had good reason.266

264. See Abraham Aden, The US Assistance to IDF Arming, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND
ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY 1979-1988 129 (Zeev Klein ed. 1988) (emphasis added). Aden served as

the IDF Attach6 to the U.S during 1974-77. He himself questioned the pros and cons of Israel's
dependence in US military aid. Id.
265. For the intensive Bush Administration's diplomatic efforts to forestall the CCM's initiation,
see, e.g., Kim Murphy, Britain Deals a Setback to U.S.; Brown Overrules his Military and Joins in
Cluster Bomb Ban, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at Al. On the magnitude of the battle in which the Bush
Administration was forced to engage, see Editorial, ClusterBombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 2008, All. ("At least this treaty, like the land-mine ban, will stigmatize cluster munitions and make it
harder to use them.") (commenting on the Bush Administration's strong opposition to the CCM).
266. It turned out, for instance, that upon receiving the MLRSs in the late 1990s, Israel was
obligated to submit a quarterly report on their use, which was limited to war use. During the War,
however, former IDF Military Attach6 to the U.S., Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, was instructed to repel
possible U.S. queries over MLRS use by noting that Israel would submit a report on its 2006 use as
usual, in its year-end quarterly report-a clear indication that the IDF high command underestimated
the issue's effect on U.S.-Israel relations. See OFER SHELAH & YOAv LIMOR, CAPTIVES OF LEBANON
159 (2007). A second indication is the fact that wartime Minister of Defense, Amir Peres was not
informed on that use until the War ended as his political adviser's testimony indicates. See Eldar, supra
note 1, at 24. Indeed, this testimony contradicts a formal statement his office released on Nov. 22, 2006.
According to the Hebrew version Peretz himself stated that "during the fighting, Peretz had been
informed that the IDF used cluster bombs" and that-as the statement reads- he demanded an
explanation and was told that the IDF was abiding by all international agreements and treaties. See
Rapoport, Peretz's Office Admits 'Irregularities,supra note 7; Rapoport, A Testimony, supra note 108.
Nonetheless, as it was released a day after Halutz's surprising announcement its timing suggests that
Peretz's formal statement was meant to address the 1978 demand that field commanders not employ
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Given the reports on large-scale civilian harm in Iraq following heavy American
use of similar weapons during the 1993 Gulf War, it is doubtful that the U.S.
applied the same very strict limitations it imposed on Israel upon itself.267 Hence,
the U.S. persecution of Israel for its 2006 use of CM weapons is "somewhat
hypocritical." 268 "Ifyou look at the American use of force in Iraq against civilian
targets, Israel is a far cry from that," explained an Israeli scholar in his assessment
that no sanctions against Israel were expected in January 2007.269 Indeed, Israel's
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson has stressed that "if NATO countries stock these
weapons and have used them in recent conflicts-in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and
Iraq-the world has no reason to point a finger at Israel." 270
As a recent in-depth study of U.S. treaty behavior found, "[t]here is
bewilderment at the inconsistency and unreliability that seem to characterize the
United States' attitudes and actions toward international agreements." 27 1 U.S.
practices regarding employment of CMs in conflicts in which it has participated
during the last 27 years since the last crisis over this issue (1982)--e.g., Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq-have signaled anything but care and concern over the
improper use of the weapon.272

these weapons "without a decision by politically responsible superiors." Oberdorfer, supra note 30.
267. On the use in Iraq, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 5, 7 (2003). See also Karen Hulme, Of Questionable Legality: The
Military Use of Cluster Bombs in Iraq in 2003, 42 CAN. Y. INT'L L. 143, 144 (2004). The attack on
Nadir on Mar. 31, 2003, for instance, with CMs resulted in 38 civilians killed and 156 injuries. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 85-87.
268. See Meron Rapoport, What Lies Beneath, HAARETz, Sept. 8, 2006, at Bi.
269. Prof Eitan Gilboa, as quoted in Teibel, supranote 133.
270. The spokesman, Mark Regev, as cited in Ina Friedman, Deadly Remnants, THE JERUSALEM
REP. Nov. 13, 2006, at 20. In addition, Israeli officials view much of the criticism on Israel found in
NGO reports as biased and betraying dual standards. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch's, Cluster
Munitions Report: Under The Faqade (NGO Monitor Rep.) Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/hrw-s-cluster munitions report under the fa ade.
271. Antonia Chayes, How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security, 33 INT'L SEC.
45, 45 (2008).
272. A reflection of this can be found in a recent NGO's report over various incidents of CM use
since 1997. The report discussed the 2006 Lebanon case following a discussion of the NATO attack on
Nis, Serbia in May 1999, although it is unclear whether U.S. or Dutch planes dropped the CMs that
caused the civilian harm. See MASLEN & WIEBE, supra note 161, at 15-18. On cluster strikes in or near
populated areas in Afghanistan, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 204, at 1-4.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Israel commenced an aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip on December 27,
2008 in a military operation it dubbed "Operation Cast Lead."' Israel augmented
its attack with a ground invasion beginning on January 3, 2009.2 Israel initially
claimed that the assault was necessary to halt rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into
Southern Israel and was, therefore, an exercise of Israel's sovereign right of selfdefense.3 Israeli leaders apparently also sought to re-establish Israel's "deterrent
capacity," believed to have been diminished during the 2006 war on Lebanon. 4
Operation Cast Lead followed the breakdown of a truce that, from June 2008 to
early November of that same year, had brought substantial calm to the border areas
of Southern Israel and Gaza.'
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Israel's self-defense claim was soon challenged.6 Evidence surfaced in the
Israeli press that Israel had been planning the operation for at least six months,
casting doubt on the claim that the attack was primarily a response to the
breakdown of the truce.7 Indeed, it appeared that Israel had exploited the truce
period to gather intelligence regarding potential targets in the attack. During the
same period Israel had reportedly crafted a public relations campaign to defend its
planned operation, to which new military spokespeople were assigned.9 A number
were women officers-apparently selected "to project a feminine and softer image"
to Western media audiences.10
Allegations also arose that, regardless of Israel's justification for initiating the
attack, the conduct of its military in the operation violated international law in a
number of respects. Rapidly mounting casualties among Palestinian civilians raised
concerns that Israeli troops were failing to discriminate between military and
civilian targets, or were using disproportionate force." Reports also suggested that
Israeli troops had used white phosphorous shells in densely populated parts of
Gaza, leading to deaths and terrible wounds among Palestinian civilians. 12
On January 8, 2009, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
calling for an immediate halt to fire from both Israel and Hamas.13 Nonetheless, the
assault continued until January 18, when Israel and Hamas1 4 each instituted
unilateral ceasefires, finally ending active hostilities."
6. See, e.g. Israel's Bombardment of Gaza Is Not Self-defense - It's a War Crime, THE SUNDAY
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at 20, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article
5488380.ece (letter signed by twenty-nine international lawyers and legal academics).
7. Barak Ravid, Disinformation, Secrecy, and Lies: How the Gaza Offensive Came About,
HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050426.html (last visited Sept, 26, 2009) [hereinafter
Ravid].
8. See id.
9. Anshel Pfeffer, IsraelClaims Success in the PR War, THE JEWISH CHRONICLE, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.thejc.com/articles/israel-claims-success-pr-war.
10. Id; see also Yosefa Loshitzky, Israel's Blonde Bombshells and Real Bombs in Gaza, THE
ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, Jan. 5, 2009, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/articlel0119.shtml. The public
relations campaign to justify Israel's attack was launched in the days preceding the war, see Jack
Khoury & Barak Ravid, Israel Kicks Off Global PR Campaign to Recruit Support for Gaza Raids,
HAARETZ, Dec. 21, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1048606.html, and was intensified as
the assault continued, see Barak Ravid, Israelto Mount Emergency InternationalPR Effort in Wake of
Gaza Campaign, HAARETZ, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050402.html. On
the role gender images play in Israel's effort to win Western favor, see Aluf Benn, Bar Refaeli in Gaza,
HAARETZ, Feb.18, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1065135.html.
11. See, e.g., Press Briefing, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Plight of Civilians Traumatic in
'Full-blown Humanitarian Crisis' (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO
.nsf/ html/ palestine-press-briefing-060109?opendocument.
12. Ethan Bronner, Outcry Erupts Over Reports That Israel Used PhosphorousArms on Gazans,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/middleeast/
22phosphorus.html?scp=1&sq israel%20whiteo20phosphorous&st-cse.
13. S.C. Res. 23, U.N. Doc S/2009/23 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N09/204/26/PDF/N0920426.pdfOpenElement.
14. "Hamas" is the acronym of the "Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya" the "Movement of
Islamic Resistance," and also means "enthusiasm" or "zeal" in Arabic. Hamas party members were
elected to a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006, and took over complete governing
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This article considers the possible violations of international law entailed in
Israel's twenty-two day assault on the Gaza Strip. The main bodies of law
applicable to the Gaza invasion are international humanitarian law, the central
purpose of which is to minimize human suffering in times of armed conflict, 16 and
international criminal law, which establishes state and individual culpability for
grave violations of international law, including for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.17 There is substantial evidence that Israel committed numerous
violations of international law, in some cases amounting to war crimes or crimes
against humanity, and this evidence is sufficient, at a minimum, to justify further
investigation. If such evidence is further substantiated, Israel could bear state
responsibility and Israeli political and military leaders could bear personal criminal
liability. If so, they should be held accountable for their transgressions.
The primary focus of the article is on major violations of international law
and ones that appear systemic-in other words, those which stem from policy
decision-making and military doctrines." Although the names of various Israeli
officials appear in the article in contexts that may suggest culpability for criminal
offenses, we make no allegations of individual responsibility here. Linking
identified individuals to definite, specific offenses would involve complex issues
of intent, and we make no pretense of having established such linkages in the
article.
We further maintain that Hamas forces also likely committed war crimes
during the fighting, particularly by undertaking indiscriminate attacks against

authority in Gaza in June 2007 in bitter fighting with its principal rival party, Fatah. On Hamas
generally, see KHALED HROUB, HAMAS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2000). On Hamas's rise

to power in the Gaza Strip, see David Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2008,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804.
15. Isabel Kershner, Few Israelis Near Gaza Feel War Achieved Much, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
2009, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/world/middleeast/21israel.html?
r-1&scp=2&sq=gaza%20ceasefire&st-cse.
16. In the words of one commentator: "International humanitarian law in armed conflicts is a
compromise between military and humanitarian requirements. Its rules comply with both military
necessity and the dictates of humanity." Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal
Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 37 (Dieter Fleck ed., rev. ed.
2008).
17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE CONFLICT IN GAZA: A BRIEFING ON
APPLICABLE LAW, INVESTIGATIONS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (2009), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/gazabriefing.pdf (arguing international human rights law provides an
additional layer of protections) [hereinafter The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law,
Investigations, andAccountability].
18. In some cases it may be difficult to distinguish between systemic wrongs and acts of
individual misconduct by Israeli troops, of which there is also some evidence. For example, in advance
of the Gaza assault, some Israeli troops had received a booklet prepared by Israel's chief military rabbi,
Brigadier General Avichai Rontzki, declaring that mercy in battle is "terribly immoral." Amos Harel,
IDF Rabbinate PublicationDuring Gaza War: We Will Show No Mercy on the Cruel, HAARETZ, Jan.
16, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058758.html. If individual Israeli soldiers were
encouraged by the booklet to commit violations of laws of warfare, it is a difficult call as to whether
they would constitute systemic or simply individual wrongs.
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Israeli civilians. 19 But these offenses in no way justify or excuse Israel's violations,
which bore far more devastating consequences both for lives, for the prospects for
peace in the Middle East, and for the status of international law.20 Still, what is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and a fair course of action would entail
investigations of Hamas political and military leaders along with their Israeli
counterparts.
It is to be expected that combatants in a conflict would deny violations of
international law and would seek to justify their behavior by reference to legal
norms. 21 Thus, claims by any party about its wartime actions must be subjected to
critical and skeptical review. As noted above, Israel has invested substantial effort
in defending its actions before international public opinion.22 Having the advantage
of advance knowledge of the operation, not to mention greater resources and
familiarity with the sensibilities of Western audiences, Israel's public relations
campaign has far exceeded that of its opponent,221 including, even, teleconferences
on Twitter and videos made available by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) via
YouTube.24 While ascertaining facts through the proverbial "fog of war" is always
19. See infra Section XIII.
20. 1,440 Palestinians were killed by Israel during the fighting, and 5,380 were wounded, U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian
Coordinator (Feb. 3-5, 2009), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisis/admin/output/files/
ocha optgaza humanitarian situation report 2009 02 05 english.pdfwhile nine Israelissix
soldiers and three civilians - were killed by Palestinians (another four Israeli soldiers were killed by
"friendly fire"), Sebastian Rotella & Rushdi abu Alouf, Hamas Hints It's Open to Deal to End War,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A8. The impact of Israel's violations of international law on prospects for
peace in the region and on the stature of international law is addressed briefly in the Conclusion, infra
Section XV.
21. Indeed, it appears that Israeli military lawyers in the International Law Division of the office
of the Military Advocate General had carefully studied the possible justifications for Israel's military
actions, and also participated in briefings and operations planning during the assault itself. See Yotam
Feldman & Uri Blau, Consent and Advise, HAARETZ, February 5 2009, http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages/1059925.html [hereinafter Feldman & Blau].
22. Ethan Bronner of the New York Times further reported that members of the press, while
barred from entering Gaza, were provided with "full access to Israeli political and military
commentators eager to show them around southern Israel, where Hamas rockets have been terrorizing
civilians. A slew of private groups financed mostly by Americans are helping guide the press around
Israel." Ethan Bronner, Israel Keeping Reportersfrom Close Look at War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at
A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/middleeast/07media.html [hereinafter
Bronner].
23. A hint of such resources is offered in David Russell, Meet David Saranga, the Man Whose
Campaigns Are Rebranding Israel, THE JEWISH CHRONICLE, May 23, 2008, http://www.thejc.com

/articles/meet-david-saranga-man-whose-campaigns-are-rebranding-israel.
Hamas's outreach was
limited to several op-eds in Western newspapers including: Mousa Abu Marzook, Hamas Speaks; A
'Legacy of Suffering' Fuels PalestinianResistance, Says One of Its Leaders, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009,
at
Al5,
available
at
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-marzook62009janO6,0,7451769.story; Mousa Abu Marzook, A Decisive Loss for Israel,THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009
/jan/22/gaza-israel-palestine-hamas-obama;
Khalid Mish'al, This Brutality Will Never Break Our Will to be Free, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 6, 2009, at
26, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2009/jan/06/gaza-israel-hamas.
24. Noam Cohen, The Toughest Q's Answered in the Briefest Tweets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at
WK4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/weekinreview/04cohen.html.
The Israel
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difficult, the challenges are greater when this "fog" is carefully planned and
deliberately manufactured. The challenge is compounded by the fact that Israel
largely barred Western reporters from entering the Gaza Strip during most of the
fighting on the grounds of security-rendering independent verification of the
realities of the assault all but impossible.25
There is, moreover, reason to suspect that Israel's spokespeople were not
consistently truthful in representing the actions of the Israel Defense Forces. This
seemed evident, for example, in exchanges over allegations that the Israeli military
had used white phosphorous shells. In a sequence chronicled by the Times of
London, Israel initially denied that its troops had used white phosphorous.26
Confronted with evidence to the contrary, Israeli spokespeople eventually admitted
that white phosphorous had been used by Israeli troops and that an investigation
for illegality in at least one instance was underway.27 Remarkably, however, Israeli
spokespeople ended the exchange with the Times by denying their initial denial of
white phosphorous use! 28 Thus it has seemed prudent to this article's authors to
examine all of Israel's claims regarding the Gaza invasion with heightened
vigilance. 29 To repeat, however: such skepticism is always due, and examples of
other nations misrepresenting facts so as to justify the use of force are notably rife.
Israel, for its part, has accused Hamas of distorting figures concerning civilian
deaths due to the Gaza assault, and it would be naive not to consider that a real
possibility.30
The next section following this introduction explores the complex and
contentious issue of what law is applicable to Israel's recent invasion of the Gaza
Strip. Operation Cast Lead cannot be understood, either legally or politically, in a

historical vacuum. Thus, Section III will sketch the necessary backdrop to the
recent fighting, beginning with Israel's 2005 withdrawal of troops and settlers from
the Gaza Strip, and extending through the months directly preceding Israel's

Defense
Forces
Spokesperson's
Unit
Youtube
channel
can
be
viewed
at
http://www.youtube.com/user/idfnadesk (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
25. Bronner, supra note 22..
26. Sheera Frenkel & Philippe Naughton, UN Headquarters in Gaza Hit by Israeli 'White
Phosphorus' Shells, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
middle east/article5521925.ece.
27. James Hider & Sheera Frenkel, White Phosphorus Was Used in Gaza, Ministry Says, TIMES
OF LONDON, Jan. 24, 2009, at 50, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
middle east/article5575070.ece (offering a chronology of the exchange).
28. Id.
29. Indeed, this article concludes that another frequent claim by Israel's defenders - that Hamas
fighters used Palestinian civilians as "human shields" - is poorly substantiated in the factual record. On
the contrary, there is stronger evidence that this banned practice was employed by Israeli troops; see
infra Section VII. Israel's credibility is also questioned by Kenneth Roth, The Incendiary IDF,HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/incendiary-idfkenneth-roth.
30. Yaakov Katz, World Duped by Hanas Death Count, THE JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 15, 2009,
http://wwwjpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304788684&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticleo2FShow
Full.
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attack, during which a truce had prevailed. Section IV carefully examines Israel's
justification for launching its attack-that it was necessary to defend itself against
rocket fire emanating from the Gaza Strip-and ultimately rejects that claim.
Section V argues that, as Israel's assault was not justified by self-defense, in fact, it
may have constituted the crime of aggression. Section VI suggests that Israel
deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure and civilian individuals in acts that
constituted war crimes. Section VII examines the possibility that Israeli troops
used Palestinians as human shields and concludes that there is some evidence to
support such a charge. Section VIII reviews the question of proportionality and
finds that statements by Israeli leaders and facts of the battlefield strongly suggest
that Israel deliberately employed disproportionate force in its assault on Gaza.
Section IX reviews charges that Israel failed to meet its obligations to protect and
respect medical personnel and facilities, while Section X considers alleged Israeli
failures to allow treatment of the wounded and evacuation of the dead. Section XI
examines evidence that Israel used weapons illegally during the bombardment and
invasion. Section XII details the bottom line; that is, the deaths and destruction
caused by Operation Cast Lead. Section XIII looks at possible Hamas war crimes
and finds that Hamas likely launched indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians
in violation of the laws of war. Section XIV reviews state and individual liability,
and surveys possible venues for the prosecution of war crimes committed during
the Gaza invasion. Section XV offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE STATUS OF GAZA AND THE QUESTION OF APPLICABLE LAW

The international legal status of the Gaza Strip is currently contested. There is
no dispute that the Gaza Strip is not a sovereign state; rather, the main controversy
is whether or not, after Israel's 2005 "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip, the
territory remains subject to belligerent occupation within the meaning of
international law. Israel maintains that its evacuation from the Gaza Strip ended its
occupation,3 while other observers and commentators have maintained that the
occupation persists.32
31. The Disengagement Plan prepared by the government of Israel before the withdrawal, for
example, states: "Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of
Israel security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip . . . . As a result, there will be no
basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Disengagement Plan - General Outline (Apr. 18, 2004), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Disengagement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm[hereinafter
DisengagementPlan].
The Israeli High Court, in a case upholding the government's restrictions on the flow of electricity from
Israel to the Gaza Strip, has also held that the region is no longer occupied:
In this context, we note that since September 2005, Israel no longer has effective
control over what takes place within the territory of the Gaza Strip. The military
government that previously existed in that territory was abolished by means of a
decision of the government, and Israeli soldiers are not present in that area on a
permanent basis and do not direct what occurs there. In these circumstances,
under the international law of occupation, the State of Israel has no general
obligation to care for the welfare of the residents of the Strip or to maintain
public order within the Gaza Strip. Israel also does not have the effective
capability, in its current status, to maintain order and manage civilian life in the
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Whether Gaza is occupied or not is of considerable legal consequence. First,
international humanitarian law imposes affirmative duties on an occupier in its
treatment of the occupied civilian population. Israel, both before and during
Operation Cast Lead itself, failed its legal duties as an occupying authority.
Second, the law of occupation also restricts an occupier's right to use force in
maintaining public order in the territory it occupies. Israel, in unleashing its
powerful military against the Gaza Strip, vastly exceeded the limits of acceptable
legal force for an occupying authority. Third, if Israel continues to occupy the
Gaza Strip, it may not be able to plead self-defense as justification for Operation
Cast Lead. Arguably, a state cannot claim self-defense vis-A-vis a territory it has
already occupied. Finally, whether Israel's attack on the Gaza Strip constitutes the
crime of aggression may turn, in part, on the Strip's status, as that crime,
classically, involves an attack by one state against another state, rather than an
attack by a state on a non-state entity. For all these reasons, we must, as a
preliminary matter, clarify Gaza's current status in international law. The better
argument, in our view, is that the Gaza Strip continues to be occupied territory.
This section will lay out the arguments concerning the applicable law, while
subsequent sections will take up the factual record and detail the manners in which
Israel violated its legal obligations.
A. Israel's ContinuingOccupation of the Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip was formerly part of the British Mandate for Palestine.33
Under the United Nations partition plan for Palestine, Gaza was slated to become
part of a Palestinian Arab state.34 That state never came to fruition, and after the
first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian administration.3 5

Israel seized control of the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank, Golan Heights,
and Sinai Peninsula) in the June 1967 war, immediately establishing a military
government there. 36 Israel maintained that, because it had not displaced a
recognized sovereign state in taking control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
these territories were "administered" by Israel, but not "occupied" within the
meaning of international law. Israel's position was rejected by most authorities,
and in time, its status as an occupying power was confirmed by the International

Gaza Strip.
HCJ 9132/07 Gaber v. Prime Minister [2008] IsrSC 215, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR
/rdonlyres/938CCD2E-89C7-4E77-BO71-56772DFF79CC/O/HCJ Gazaelectricity.pdf
32. See infra notes 53, 63.
33. CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 106-07 (Katherine E.
Kurzman, Mary T. Stone, & Bridget Leahy eds., Bedford/St. Martin's 2001).
34. Id. at 192, 195, 202.

35. See id.at 203.
36. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government - The Initial
Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 1967-1980: THE
LEGAL ASPECTS 13, 21-22 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
37. This is sometimes referred to as the "missing reversioner" thesis. Yehuda Blum, The Missing

Reversioner:Reflections on the Status ofJudea andSamaria, 3 ISR. L. R. 279 (1968).
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Court of Justice,38 the Oslo Accords, 39 the Israeli Supreme Court, 40 the UN
Security Council, 41 the UN General Assembly, 42 and the U.S. State Department.43
Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew its forces from its permanent
military bases in Gaza in 2005. Though Israel maintains that its "withdrawal" from
Gaza ended its occupation of the Strip 44 and that, accordingly, it no longer has any
obligations to the population of Gaza,45 it is still widely accepted that Israel
continues to occupy the Gaza Strip as a matter of international law.46
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations sets forth the legal standard
defining occupation: "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised."47 The
38. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 166 (July 9).
39. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION - NEGOTIATIONS AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, THE
ISRAELI "DISENGAGEMENT" PLAN: GAZA STILL OCCUPIED (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.nadplo.org/inner.php?view-factsgaza GAZA STILL OCCUPIED (citing Agreement on Preparatory
Powers and Responsibilities (Aug. 9, 1994), Art. XIII, §§ 4-5) [hereinafter Palestinian Liberation
Organization- NegotiationsAffairs Department].
40. Id. (citing Ayub, et al. v. Minister ofDefense, et al, 606 II. H.C. 78; Adjuri v. IDF Commander,
7015 II. H.C. 02, 7019 II. H.C. 02 (2002); and 2056 II. H.C. 04 (2004)).
41. S.C. Res. 1544, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1544 (May 19, 2004), cited in Palestinian Liberation
Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supranote 39.
42. G.A. Res. 58/292, U.N. Doc. AIRES/58/292 (May 17, 2004), cited in Palestinian Liberation
Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39.
43. Palestinian Liberation Organization - Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39 (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm.
44. The Disengagement Plan prepared by the government of Israel before the withdrawal, for
example, states: "Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of
Israel security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of the Gaza Strip . . . As a result, there will be no
basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory." Disengagement Plan, supranote 31.
45. See, e.g., Israel's Revised Disengagement Plan, which states: "The completion of the plan will
serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip." Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Revised Disengagement Plan (June 6, 2004), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6June-2004.htm [hereinafter Revised DisengagementPlan].
46. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other
OccupiedArab Territories,T 11(d), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/17 (Jan. 21, 2008) (preparedby John Dugard)
(stating that the "fact that Gaza remains occupied territory means that Israel's actions toward Gaza must
be measured against the standards of international humanitarian law") [hereinafter Human Rights
Situation in Palestineand Other OccupiedArab Territories];see also Israel: Threatened Sanctions on
Gaza Violate Laws of War, Rocket Attacks Cannot Justify Collective Punishment, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/20/isrlpal6920.htm (stating
"Israel remains an occupying power in the Gaza Strip even though it withdrew its military forces and
illegal civilian settlers in August and September 2005") [hereinafter Rocket Attacks Cannot Justify
Collective Punishment]; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Sept. 24, 2009), available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html (stating the "West Bank
and Gaza Strip are Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; Israel removed settlers and
military personnel from the Gaza Strip in August 2005").
47. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539
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test to establish occupation under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations is that of
"effective control." 48
The test does not require the presence of permanent military personnel in the
occupied territory. 49 This principle was confirmed by the Nuremburg Tribunal in
USA v. Wilhelm List et al., in which the Tribunal determined that the German
occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia did not end with the withdraw of German
forces and the assertion of some degree of authority by indigenous groupings
because the German military could have reentered the territories and exercised
effective control at will.50
Israel maintains control over Gaza to a much greater degree than that
exercised by Germany over Yugoslavia and Greece, which it should be noted, are
significantly larger than the Gaza Strip. "The test for application of the legal
regime of occupation," the Tribunal stated in the List Case, "is not whether the
occupying power fails to exercise effective control over the territory, but whether it
has the ability to exercise such power."" Israel not only retains the ability to
exercise such power, but also continues actively to exercise such power. Israel, for
example, maintains authority over Gaza in accordance with its Revised
Disengagement Plan, which states: "Israel will guard and monitor the external land
perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza
airspace, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of
the Gaza Strip." 52
Indeed, Israel regularly patrols Gaza's airspace-legally, part of Gaza's
territory-with both manned and unmanned aircraft. Israeli naval ships, moreover,
daily patrol Gaza's territorial waters.54 Additionally, Israel regularly conducts
military operations within Gaza itself,Q5 and the withdrawal of its land troops has
had little effect on the frequency, scale, or destructiveness of Israeli military
activities in the Strip.56 Israeli military forces killed approximately 1,250
[hereinafter Hague IV].
48. lain Scobbie, An Intimate Disengagement: Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law of
Occupation andofSelf-Determination, 11 Y.B. ISLAMIC AND MID. EASTERN L. 3, 20-22 (2004-05).

49. Id.
50. U.S. v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Hostages Trial), 15 I.L.R. 646 (Nuremberg Military Tribunal
1948), quoted in Palestinian Liberation Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supranote 39.

5 1. Id.
52. Revised Disengagement Plan, supranote 45.
53. B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF THE AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF THE GAZA STRIP, available at http://www.btselem.org/english/gazastrip/control-on

air space and territorial waters.asp [hereinafter Israel's Control of the Airspace and Territorial
Waters of the Gaza Strip]; see also Jimmy Johnson, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Warfare of
Inequality Management, THE ELECTRONIC INTIFADA,
Feb.
17, 2009, availale at
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10312.shtml (discussing Israel's use of unmanned aircraft).
54. Israel's Control of the Airspace and Territorial Waters of the Gaza Strip, supra note 53.
55. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror in Gaza: Twelve Months Since the Hamas Takeover
(June 16, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/ Palestinian+
terror+since+2000/Terror+in+Gaza-+Two+months+since+the+Hamas +takeover+ 16-Aug-2007.htm.
56. In March of 2008, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai stated that Israeli forces "are
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Palestinians in the Gaza Strip between September 2005 and December 27, 2008.
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 112
Palestinians were killed in Gaza in 2005, 531 in 2006, 301 in 2007, and 389 in the
first ten months of 2008.
Finally, Israel exercises almost complete control over the movement of people
and goods into and out of the Strip.5 9 The Rafah Crossing with Egypt is operated in
accordance with an agreement concluded between the Palestinian Authority and
Israel, by which the Palestinian Authority and Egypt are authorized to administer
the crossing,60 but Israel is able to shut the crossing at will. 6 1 Israel also continues
to control Gaza's telecommunications network, electricity and sewage systems,
62
and population registry. Control of Gaza's population registry gives Israel the
authority to determine legal residency in Gaza, thus allowing the Israeli military
the power to prevent the entrance into the Strip of Palestinians it chooses not to
61
register.
The degree of control Israel retains over the Gaza Strip makes it clear that, in
the words of UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard, "statements by the government
of Israel that the withdrawal ended the occupation are grossly inaccurate."64
B. Israel's obligationsunder the Law of Occupation
International humanitarian law imposes specific obligations on occupying
powers, among them Israel in its continuing occupation of the Gaza Strip. These
obligations are spelled out in provisions of the Hague Convention (II) respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed regulations of 190765, the
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

permanently engaged in Gaza and what we are doing now is within the scope of such activities." Steven
Erlanger & Taghreed El-Khodary, Israel Takes Gaza Fight to Next Level in a Day of Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/middleeast/
02niideast.html?hp.
57. Victor Kattan, Gaza: Not a War of Self-Defense, JURIST (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/01/gaza-not-war-of-self-defense.php (citing information collected
by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory,
http://www.ochaopt.org/) [hereinafterKattan].
58. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Protection of Civilians: Casualties Database, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/poc/ (click Download
the Casualties Summary Statistics in Excel Format).
59. Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 46, at
11.
60. Palestinian Liberation Organization -Negotiations Affairs Department, supra note 39.
61. Rocket Attacks Cannot Justify Collective Punishment, supra note 46.
62. Gaza: Israel's Fuel and Power Cuts Violate Laws of War, Civilians Should Not be Penalized
for Rocket Attacks by Armed Groups, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 29, 2007, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/29/isrlpal7198 txt.htm.
63. Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, supra note 46, at
11.
64. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the PalestinianTerritoriesOccupiedSince 1967, 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/5 (Sept. 5, 2006).
65. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403
[hereinafter Hague Il].
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War of 194966, and customary norms of international law pertaining to belligerent
occupation. As a general matter, these regulations are designed to reduce the
impact of military occupation on civilian life to the maximum extent possible,
while preserving the freedom of the occupier to act according to military
necessity.67
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, for example, requires that an occupying
power "take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country." 68 The Fourth Geneva Convention describes civilians who fall
under the control of a foreign military authority as "protected persons,"69 and vests
the occupying forces with responsibility to ensure their basic welfare. Article 3 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that civilians must be treated humanely. 70
Occupying authorities may not willfully kill, ill-treat, or deport protected persons, 71
and may seize or destroy civilian property only if militarily necessary.72 Occupiers
must ensure supplies of food and medical supplies, 73 and facilitate the care and
education of children.74 In the event that food or other vital supplies in the territory
become inadequate, the occupier is obligated to permit the entry of relief
7

it

consignments.

All of these duties were incumbent upon Israel in its occupation of the Gaza
Strip. Subsequent sections will demonstrate that Israel violated many of its legal
obligations under the law of occupation, before and during Operation Cast Lead.
C. Law enforcement or "armedconflict"?
While an occupying force has a duty-and a right-to maintain public order in
an occupied territory, its obligation to protect the civilian population implies limits
on the amount of force that can be lawfully employed to fulfill that duty.
According to Amnesty International:
Under normal circumstances, the occupying power is bound by law
enforcement standards derived from human rights law when maintaining
order in occupied territory. For example, these would require the
66. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
67. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary to Article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention states that "regulations concerning occupation are based on the idea of the personal
freedom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired." International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600032?OpenDocument (last visited October 1, 2009).
68. Hague II, supra note 65, at art. 43.
69. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 4.
70. Id. at art. 3. This article is common to the four Geneva Conventions, and is often referred to
as "Common Article 3."
71. Id. at art. 49.
72. Id. at art. 53.
73. Id. at art. 55.
74. Id. at art. 50.

75. Id. at art. 60.
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occupying power to seek to arrest, rather than kill, members of armed
groups suspected of carrying out attacks, and to use the minimum
amount of force necessary in countering any security threat.76
Nonetheless, Israel has been pressing to shift the legal basis for its troops'
operations in the Occupied Territories since 2001 from a law enforcement model to
one of "armed conflict."
This move was necessary because some of Israel's
practices in suppressing the second Palestinian "intifada" ("uprising")-also called
the "al-Aksa Intifada" -clearly departed from a law enforcement model. The most
obvious of these practices was "targeted killings," in which Israel was
assassinating Palestinian leaders and other militants in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip without making any attempt to arrest them. 78 While Israel had engaged in
deliberate killings of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since the 1970s, it
had generally done so surreptitiously, by means of "death squads"-and had
typically denied the practice. 79 During the al-Aksa Intifada, however, the scale of
these killings greatly increased.o Moreover, Israel resorted, in some cases, to
highly public means of killings-including bombings by air-that often caused many
civilian casualties, and in which the absence of any attempt to arrest was patent.
In 2002, for example, an Israeli F-16 fighter-bomber dropped a one ton bomb on
an apartment building in Gaza, killing Hamas military wing leader Salah Shehadeh
and fourteen innocent bystanders.82 Israel had also resorted to massive violence in
suppressing riots, including the use of helicopter gunships, tanks, and F- 16 aircraft,
that did not square easily with a law enforcement model.83
Israeli representatives attempted to justify these actions by arguing that the
circumstances prevailing in the Occupied Territories constituted an "armed conflict

short of war." Israeli submissions to the "Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding
Committee" headed by former-U.S. Senator George Mitchell in April 2001
76. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supranote 17, at 6.
77. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
78. Id.
79. STEVEN R. DAVID, FATAL CHOICES: ISRAEL'S POLICY OF TARGETED KILLINGS 7 (The BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University: Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 51
2002), available at http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/david.pdf.
80. Id. See also Yossi Melman, Targeted Killings: A Retro Fashion Very Much in Vogue,
HAARETz, Mar. 15, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=407999&contrass
ID=2. According to Gal Luft, Israel committed at least eighty targeted killings in the first two years of
the al-Aqsa Intifada. Gal Luft, The Logic oflsrael's TargetedKillings, 10 MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY 1,
Winter 2003.
81. This does not mean, however, that Israel abandoned its use of death squads during the al-Aqsa
Intifada. See Donald Macintyre, Israel's Death Squads: A Soldier's Story, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 1,
2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israels-death-squads-asoldiers-story-1634774.html.
82. Gideon Levy, At the Salah Shehadeh Home in Gaza City, Znet, Aug. 2, 2002,
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/11823; see also Yuval Yoaz, State Commission to Examine
Civilian Deaths in 2002 Shahade Assassination, HAARETZ, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com
/hasen/spages/904552.html.
83. ZEEV MAOz, DEFENDING THE HOLY LAND: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY 265 (2006).
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claimed that Israel was facing "live fire attacks on a significant scale" carried out
by "a well-armed and organised militia." 84
While the phrase "armed conflict short of war" had no established meaning in
international law, the Mitchell committee report did not categorically repudiate it.
It noted that in the great majority of confrontations with the Israeli military during
the uprising-73 percent-Palestinians were, in fact, unarmed, and recommended
that "the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal
responses to unarmed demonstrators."" It also criticized the application of the
"armed conflict short of war" notion as "overly broad," and counseled against its
"blanket" use.8 6 But in doing so, the Report appeared to accept the possibility that
the categorization could be valid for some kinds of confrontations between the
Israeli military and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
Needless to say, the Mitchell Report pronounced the opinions of its authors,
not international law. Nonetheless, its tacit and partial acceptance of Israel's
"armed conflict" model opened the door for an adaptation of the law of occupation
that permitted war like tactics in occupied territories when fighting there reached a
requisite scale and level of intensity.
The question of which model should govern the Israeli military's actions in
the Occupied Territories-law enforcement or armed conflict-was squarely
confronted by the Israeli High Court in its 2006 judgment in a challenge to the
Israeli military's "targeted killings." The High Court held that: "The general,
principled starting point is that between Israel and the various terrorist
organizations active in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip (hereinafter "the area")
a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the first intjfada,"87and
that the applicable law, therefore, was that of international armed conflict.88 The

84. SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT FINDING COMMITTEE, THE MITCHELL REPORT 24 (Apr. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/ACF319
.pdf.
85. Id. at 24, 35.
86. Id. at 25.
87. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [2005] IsrSC 9, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf.
88. Id. at 11. The High Court also found that, where the law of international humanitarian law left
gaps, these gaps could be filled by reference to international human rights law. It further rejected the
relevance of the law of non-internationalarmed conflict International humanitarian law regulates both
international armed conflicts and non-international ones (that is, conflicts occurring within the borders
of a single state), but the sources of law for the two kinds of conflicts differ. The principal sources of
law governing international armed conflict are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (excluding
Common Article 3), and the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Non-international
armed conflicts, on the other hand, are governed by Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions,
and the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Rule of Law of Armed Conflicts Project, The
Qualificationof Conflicts, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS,http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification of armed conflict.php. The main difference
between these two branches of international humanitarian law is that, while the law of international
armed conflicts includes a clear definition of a "combatant," and thus, by contrast, a clear means of
identifying "non-combatants," the law of non-international conflict lacks such definitions. The Conflict
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court upheld the practice of targeted killings under limited circumstances, but
relied on principles from Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, even though Israel
has neither signed Protocol I nor has it enacted any legislation implementing the
Protocol. 89 The High Court thus acknowledged that Protocol I is part of customary
international law, including most critically, the protection in Article 51(3) for
civilians not taking "direct part in hostilities," and, as such, was binding on Israeli
troops operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 90
It can be inferred from the Israeli government's recent actions and statements
that it has treated Operation Cast Lead as if it were an international armed conflict.
Israel's attempted invocation of its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, and reporting its actions to the United Nations Security
Council, are practices consistent with an international armed conflict. 91 Israel's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has cited articles of Additional Protocol I - which
deals with international armed conflict - in accusing Hamas of war crimes during
the Gaza fighting.92
Neutral observers, such as Amnesty International, seem to have accepted the
Israeli view that at least some military operations in occupied territories should be
judged according to "armed conflict" standards. "However, if a situation arises in
which fighting inside the occupied territory reaches the requisite scale and
intensity, then international humanitarian law rules governing humane conduct in
warfare apply . . ."9

In Annesty's view, which model applies turns on the

particular circumstances. For example, facing a demonstration during a conflict an
occupier must revert to law enforcement, not armed conflict, standards.94
There is, of course, some appeal to treating different kinds of military
occupations according to flexible legal standards; arguably, Israel's powers and
responsibilities as an occupying power should be adjusted in some sense to reflect
the changed circumstances following its 2005 "disengagement" from the Gaza
Strip. In particular, Israel is no longer in charge of day-to-day administration of
Palestinian affairs and has no permanently stationed troops there, and these
changes would, presumably, limit Israel's capacity to meet its full obligations
under the established law of occupation. Indeed, Hebrew University law professor

in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability, supranote 17, at 11.
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id.
91. Identical Letters Dated 27 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, supra
note 3.
92. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAMAS'S ILLEGAL ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

AND OTHER UNLAWFUL METHODS OF WAR (2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Legal aspects of Hamas methods 7 Jan 2009.htm.
93. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing of Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supra note 17, at 7. In another view, Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip are subject both to international
humanitarian law concerning armed conflicts and the law of occupation. Geneva Academy of
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, Qualification of Armed
Conflicts (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification of armed conflict.php.
94. Id.
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Yuval Shany advises "the establishment of nuanced tests, which permit varying
levels of legal responsibilities commensurate with varying levels of physical
control" for the situation in Gaza and for other "post-modem" occupations.95 The
Israeli High Court has taken tentative steps in that direction in a case upholding the
legality of Israel's restrictions on the supply of industrial fuel and electricity to the
Gaza Strip. The High Court held that, while occupation of the Gaza Strip had
formally ended, Israel had ongoing responsibilities toward the Gaza Strip due to its
control of its borders and airspace, and by virtue of the Strip's dependence on
Israel resulting from 38 years of military occupation.96 The Court appeared to be
recognizing an intermediary position between the "all" of the full law of
occupation or the "nothing" of a military's responsibilities toward territories
outside of its boundaries.
Yet any movement toward flexible standards for belligerent occupants-either
in determining whether an occupation exists as a matter of international law, or in
judging which among the duties of the law of occupation should pertain in
particular circumstances or not-could initiate a significant erosion of the
protections afforded by international humanitarian law. We should, accordingly,
consider such shifts with extreme caution. It is by virtue of superior military
strength that occupiers become occupiers; it is to be expected, therefore, that they
would press for legal standards that permit them to exploit their military
advantage. It will be belligerent occupants who will choose when and where to
resort to the "armed conflict" model, and which of their duties under the law of
occupation they may suspend, and for how long. It is, moreover, comparatively
easy for any occupying power to manufacture circumstances that could be

95. Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex Reality: The Gaza Occupation Debate, 41 ISR.L.R.
68, 86 (2008).
96. In the words of the court:
In this context, we note that since September 2005, Israel no longer has effective
control over what takes place within the territory of the Gaza Strip. The military
government that previously existed in that territory was abolished by means of a
decision of the government, and Israeli soldiers are not present in that area on a
permanent basis and do not direct what occurs there. In these circumstances,
under the international law of occupation, the State of Israel has no general
obligation to care for the welfare of the residents of the Strip or to maintain
public order within the Gaza Strip. Israel also does not have the effective
capability, in its current status, to maintain order and manage civilian life in the
Gaza Strip. Under the circumstances that have developed, the primary obligations
imposed on the State of Israel regarding residents of the Gaza Strip are derived
from the state of warfare that currently ensues between Israel and the Hamas
organization which controls the Gaza Strip; these obligations also stem from the
degree of control that the State of Israel has at the border crossings between it
and the Gaza Strip; and also from the situation that was created between the State
of Israel and the territory of the Gaza Strip after years of Israeli military control
in the area, following which the Gaza Strip is now almost totally dependent on
Israel for its supply of electricity.
HCJ 9132/07 Gaber v. Prime Minister [2008] IsrSC 8, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/
rdonlyres/938CCD2E-89C7-4E77-BO71-56772DFF79CC/O/HCJGazaelectricity.pdf.
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presented to the outside world to justify the use of military force on a large scaleand to be judged according to the "armed conflict" standard. Cleaving to the law
enforcement standard, on the contrary, affords occupiers prospective clarity over
their responsibilities and allows others to retrospectively assess to what extent
those responsibilities have been met.
It should be noted that Israel's attempt to remake international humanitarian
law-in this and in other respects-is completely self-conscious and deliberate. As
Colonel Daniel Reisner, former head of the International Law Division of the
Israeli Military Advocate General, stated in a recent interview:
If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The
whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is
forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries. .
. International law progresses through violations. We invented the
targeted assassination thesis and we had to push it. At first there were
protrusions that made it hard to insert easily into the legal moulds. Eight
years later it is in the center of the bounds of legitimacy. 97
Permitting Israel to maintain its occupation through effective control of the
Gaza Strip, while freeing its military to use massive force against the residents of
the region, is fundamentally unfair. It is contrary to the aim of international
humanitarian law to minimize civilian suffering in times of war. It forces the
people of the Gaza Strip to face one of the most powerful militaries in the world
without the benefit either of its own military, or of any realistic means to acquire
the means to defend itself.98 Thus, we believe that Israel's attempt to transform
international humanitarian law in this respect should be firmly resisted, and that its
military's operations in the Gaza Strip should continue to be evaluated by law
enforcement standards.
At the same time, we cannot say that Israel's effort has failed; as we have
noted above, observers appear to have accepted Israel's position, and have
analyzed Operation Cast Lead as if it were an instance of "international armed
conflict." Therefore, we will consider Israel's actions during Operation Cast Lead
according to the law of occupation, where appropriate, and according to the law of
international armed conflict. Under either legal regime, however, Israel appears to
have committed massive violations.
III. PRELUDE To THE INVASION

In one sense, Israel's December 2008 attack on the Gaza Strip was not a
"war" in itself. Rather, it was an abrupt escalation in a conflict that had been
previously simmering for months, if not years. Placing the invasion in proper
context requires that we trace developments since 2005, when Israel withdrew its

97. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
98. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Military
Expenditures,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html?
countryName=Israel&countryCode=is&regionCode=me&rank=6#is (showing Israel spends 7.3% of
GDP on military).
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settlers and troops from the Gaza Strip, as we have seen, claiming to end its then
thirty-eight year military occupation of the region. 99 Day-to-day administration of
Gaza thereafter was left in the hands of the Palestinian Authority. 100
A. The 2006 Elections
In January 2006, members of the Hamas-affiliated "Change and Reform" list
won seventy-six of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, and with this
majority, earned the right to form the next cabinet in the Palestinian Authority.o
Israel and the United States quickly initiated sanctions against the Territories and
Hamas, demanding that they recognize Israel, renounce all violence, and agree to
honor previous agreements signed by Palestinian leaders. 102 Israel withheld $50
million in customs revenues it had collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority,
freezing assets while tightening restrictions and prohibitions on the movement of
people and goods into, out of, and within the Territories. 103 Meanwhile the United
States barred access to U.S. banking and foreign aid. 104 The election results spurred
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah to join Hamas officials in creating a
unity government that took office on March 17, 2007.105
The freezing of assets and the imposition of economic sanctions, even before
Hamas' formation of a government, set the stage for impending fissures in the
fragile coalition. The sanctions compelled the Palestinian Authority to suspend
salary payments to 160,000 civil servants in the Occupied Territories by the
following March. 106
B. The Hamas takeover and Israel'sresponse
By June 2007, tensions between Hamas and Fatah spilled over into armed
conflict in the streets of Gaza.1 0 7 By some reports, Hamas feared an impending
coup against it by followers of Fatah and attacked preemptively, routing Fatah
fighters within a matter of days and establishing Hamas as the sole ruling party in

99. See supra Section II.
100. The Palestinian Authority is an entity created by the "Oslo Accords," a series of agreements
between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization between 1993 and 1998.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has exercised limited powers of administration in parts of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip over the Palestinian residents of those regions. The PA is headed by an elected
president, and by a prime minister. The Palestinian Legislative Council acts as the PA parliament. See
generally GEOFFREY WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELIPALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000).
101. Scott Wilson, Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 27,2006, at Al.
102. ALJAZEERA.NET, Middle East News, Profile, Hamas, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2009/01/20091115216586178.html.
103. Israel to Impose Hamas Sanctions, BBC NEWS, February 19, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle east/4729000.stm.
104. Id.
105. WORLD BANK, WEST BANK & GAZA COUNTRY BRIEF (2008), available at http://go.
worldbank.org/Q80GMLXI40.
106. Id.
107. Id
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the Gaza Strip. 108 The schism occurred amidst ongoing clashes between Israel and
Hamas fighters, leading up to an Israeli ground incursion into the Strip on June
27.109

Israel responded to Hamas' ascension by imposing a blockade against the
Gaza Strip, tightly restricting the flow of goods and people into and out of the
Gaza Strip. 1 o The effects of the closure and the isolation of the Gazan population
were dire. Poverty reached exorbitant levels and unemployment approached 40
percent (some estimates were well above 50 percent)."' Just prior to Operation
Cast Lead, 60 percent of Gazans were living below the poverty line, 35 percent in
extreme poverty. 112 Over 80 percent of the population became dependent upon
some form of humanitarian aid. 113
By February 2008, the number of truckloads of aid allowed to enter the Strip
had declined by 86 percent from the year before the blockade. 114 Since those
figures were released, there have been even steeper cutoffs in aid, with nearcomplete closure of all crossings into and out of the Strip between November 5 and
16, 2008.115 During Operation Cast Lead, an average of thirty truckloads per day
bearing food, cargo, and basic necessities were allowed into Gaza by Israeli
authorities that went to support a dependent population of over one million.1 16 For
the trickle of supplies that managed to reach Palestinians inside Gaza during that
time, tons more spoiled under the sun at border crossings, barred passage by the
Israeli military. 17
Restrictions and closures along the coast and at the borders have had
108. David Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.vanityfair.com
/politics/features /2008/04/gaza2008O4.
109. Ian Fisher & Taghreed El-Khodary, Israelis Kill 11 Militants Inside Gaza; 2 Civilians Die,
NY TIMES, June 28, 2007, at AO.

110. Heather Sharp, Guide: Gaza Under Blockade, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7545636.stm [hereinafter Sharp].
111. INT'L MONETARY FUND AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE MEETING, MACROECONOMIC AND
FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 2, n. 1 (2007), available at http://domino.
un.org /pdfs/IMF AHLCrep240907.pdf.
112. Id.
113. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Special Focus: Occupied
Palestinian Territory, The Closure of the Gaza Strip: The Economic and Humanitarian Consequences,
at 1 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Gaza Special Focus
December_2007.pdf.
114. OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, THE GAZA STRIP: A HUMANITARIAN IMPLOSION 8 (Sept. 2008),
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/oxfam gaza lowres.pdf [hereinafter A
HumanitarianImplosion].
115. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interview with Katharina Ritz Head of Mission for the
Occupied Territories, Gaza: Responding to Urgent Medical Needs of Choked-off Strip,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-interview-181108.
116. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor:
Occupied Palestinian territory, No. 32 (Dec. 2008), available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/
db942872b9eae454852560f6005a76fb/204aadb8b6892b4a852575440067b032?OpenDocument.
117. Michael Slackman, At a Border Crossing, Drivers and Truckloads of Aid for Gaza Go
Nowhere,
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
Jan.
28,
2009,
at
A5,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/world/africa/28iht-egypt.1.19737976.html.
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oppressive and disastrous consequences on the general population. Fuel restrictions
and naval patrols have decreased the output of Gaza's fishing industries by 98
percent, exacerbating unemployment and the dependency on aid.11 8 Lack of
imports and raw materials have shut down private businesses and industrial
factories. 119 Reduced fuel and lack of spare parts have strained sewage treatment,
waste management, water supply, and hospitals. 120 B'Tselem, a human rights
group, described the humanitarian crisis in Gaza,
As a result of the [blockade], the stocks of imported food products in
Gaza are dwindling, driving their prices sky-high, while fruit and
vegetables that were intended for export are being sold in Gazan
markets at a loss. Many families cannot afford to buy them, however,
due to the high poverty rate in Gaza. 80 percent of Gazan households
now live below the poverty line, subsisting on less than 2,300 shekels a
month for a family of six. Households in deep poverty, living on less
than 1,837 shekels a month, currently comprise 66.7 percent of the
population. 80 percent of all Gazan families would literally starve
without food aid from international agencies. 121
Under customary international law, a blockade is an act of war. 122 It is
employed to cut off communications and supplies of an enemy. 123 While the
modem concept extends beyond its original and exclusive maritime roots to
include both land and technological blockades, the consistent feature is that a
blockade's purpose has been to deprive a military adversary of necessary
supplies. 124 A belligerent imposing a blockade upon a region consisting of a
civilian population must allow the free passage of relief consignments to the

civilian population. 125 In fact, the legality of a blockade under customary
international law hinges on the requirement that aid for the civilian population be
met with free passage. 126

118. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Monitor:
Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 23 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/
documents/HM Mar 2008.pdf.
119. A Humanitarian Implosion, supranote 114, at 4-5.
120. Sharp, supranote 110.
121. B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: TIGHTENED SIEGE AND INTENSIFIED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,

available at http://www.btselem.org/english/Gaza Strip/Siege Tightening.asp.
122. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. I, at 408 (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed.,
Max Planck Inst. for Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhardt
2000).
123. See id.
124.

INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE

1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949

2095 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski,

& Bruno Zimmermann eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987).
125. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. IV, at 1401 (Peter MacAlister-Smith
ed., Max Planck Inst. for Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf
Bernhardt 2000).
126. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Vol. II, at 1189 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2005) [hereinafter
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The reasons cited for Israel's refusal to allow passage of basic necessities are
untenable. Israel claimed that its restrictions were necessary to put pressure on
Hamas officials to halt or substantially hinder the firing of rockets into Southern
Israel. However, there is no reasonable relationship between depriving Gazan
civilians of subsistence items and the suppression of Hamas' rocket launchings
against Israeli towns. Israel's duties to "protected persons" as an occupier of the
Gaza Strip under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention require that it allow
the passage of all aid, foodstuffs, and water given the severity of the humanitarian
crisis. The blockade appears to have clearly violated this provision of the law of
occupation.
C. The blockade as Collective Punishment
Israel's blockade, which by the launching of Operation Cast Lead had
persisted for eighteen months, violated international law in another respect. Under
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "No protected person may be
punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism . . . against

protected persons and their property are prohibited."1 27
This article prohibits the use of collective punishment of protected persons,
the breach of which constitutes war crimes. 128 "Protected persons" are civilian
individuals who find themselves, in case of an armed conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a power of which they are not nationals. 129 The term has also been applied
more specifically to refugees and stateless persons. 130
A blockade against a civilian population inherently raises concerns of
collective punishment because of the effect that prohibiting food and other
essentials may have, particularly over the long run, on the survival of that
population. According to Amnesty International's Middle East and North Africa
program director, Malcolm Smart, Israel's action "appears calculated to make an
already dire humanitarian situation worse, one in which the most vulnerable-the
sick, the elderly, women and children-will bear the brunt, not those responsible
for the attacks against Israel."l 31
To reiterate: Israel instituted the blockade against the Gaza Strip not in
response to a violent attack, but rather in response to Hamas's ascension to
exclusive authority in the Gaza Strip, and earlier in response to the Hamas victory
in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Israel, in short, engaged in an act of war against
an occupied people, and violated its legal obligations to them long before
Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw Vol. Il].
127. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 33.
128. Id.
129. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw vol. III, at 1144 (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed.
Max Planck Inst. For Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhardt
2000).
130. Id. at 1146.
131. AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL CUTS ELECTRICITY AND FOOD SUPPLIES TO GAZA (Jan. 21, 2008),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israel-cuts-electricity-and-foodsupplies-gaza- 20080121.
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Operation Cast Lead had commenced.
D. The Truce
Hamas and Israel arrived at a truce agreement, which became effective on
June 19, 2008.132 Israel has consistently claimed that its military offensive in Gaza
came about as a result of Hamas' violation of this ceasefire. Foreign Minister
Livni, for example, stated the day after the commencement of Operation Cast Lead
that "the calm that was achieved through" the truce "worked for a few weeks, and
then Hamas deliberately violated the truce by targeting Israel on a daily basis" and
by taking other actions contrary to the truce agreement.13 Livni's assertion that
Hamas first violated the ceasefire, and the corresponding implication that Israel
abided by its terms, excludes important facts.
One such fact is the blockade described in the previous section. In addition to
providing for the cessation of Israeli military operations in the Strip and an ending
of Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel (the parties' adherence to these
provisions will be addressed below), the June agreement required Israel to ease its
blockade of Gaza. 134 Israel did not adequately abide by this obligation. On
November 29, 2008-five months after the truce went in to effect-Human Rights
Watch published a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressing "deep
concern about Israel's continuing blockade of the Gaza Strip, a measure that is
depriving its population of food, fuel, and basic services, and constitutes a form of
collective punishment."1 35 "The latest measures [taken by Israel]," the letter
continued, "are part of an ongoing policy by your government that has prevented
the normal flow of goods and people in and out of Gaza since January 2006. It has
contributed to a humanitarian crisis, deepened poverty and ruined the economy."l36
Referring specifically to the truce agreement, Human Rights watch noted: "Israel
made a commitment in June to ease some of these restrictions - but the movement
of goods into Gaza and people in and out of the territory remains a fraction of what
it was when borders were last opened for free trade."1 37
E. Israel'sNovember 4 Raids
Israel's primary justification for its invasion of Gaza was rocket attacks
launched from the Strip, attacks which Israel has repeatedly asserted were

132. Israel and Hamas 'Agree Truce', BBC NEWS, June 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle east/7459200.stm [hereinafter Israeland Hamas Agree Truce].
133. Tzipi Livni, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs, Briefing in Sderot - Opening Remarks (Dec.
28, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Govemment/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2008/
FM Livni briefingSderot Opening remarks 28-Dec-2008.htm [hereinafter Livni Briefing in Sderot].
134. Hamas FiresRockets at Israel After Airstrike, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A10
[hereinafter Hamas FiresRockets at IsraelAfter Airstrike]; Israel and Hamas Agree Truce, supra note
132.
135. Human Rights Watch, Letter to Olmert:
Stop the Blockade
of Gaza,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/11/20/letter-olmert-stop-blockade-gaza [hereinafter Letter to Olmert:
Stop the Blockade of Gaza].

136. Id.
137. Id.
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unprovoked violations of the ceasefire. 138 Indeed, rocket attacks from Gaza
increased in the weeks immediately preceding the offensive of December 27.139
But these attacks followed Israeli operations which killed six Palestinians in Gaza
on November 4. Before Israel's violation of the ceasefire in these raids, rocket
attacks from Gaza had stopped almost entirely, totaling only one a month in July,
September, and October and eight in the month of August. 140 It was not until after
the November 4 raids that rocket attacks from Gaza began increasing in number,
and indeed the Washington Postreported on November 5 that Hamas' assertion of
responsibility for the attacks in response to the Israeli operations was the "first
such announcement by the group since the Egyptian-brokered cease-fire went into
effect June 19.",141

Thus, Hamas was, according the Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, "careful to
maintain the ceasefire", and it "tried to enforce the terms of the arrangement on the
other terrorist organizations and to prevent them from violating it." 1 42 In regards to
stopping attacks on Israel, the ceasefire was, in the words of a study conducted by
MIT professor Nancy Kanwisher and others, "remarkably effective." 143 "After it
began in June 2008, the rate of rocket and mortar fire from Gaza dropped to almost
zero, and stayed there for months." 144 "The latest ceasefire," Kanwisher concludes,
"ended when Israel first killed Palestinians, and Palestinians then fired rockets into

Israel."1 45
138. Speaking before the United Nations Security Council on December 31, 2008, Israel's UN
Ambassador Gabriela Shalev reported that in the preceding weeks Israel had "witnessed a steep
escalation in the attacks of Hamas against Israel" and that Israel launched its military operation on
December 27 with the aim of "protecting Israelis living in Southern Israel from the incessant barrage of
rocket and mortar shell fire." Gabriela Shalev, Israel Ambassador to the UN, Statement by Amb Shalev
to UN Security Council (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Foreign+Relations/Israel+and+the+UN/Speeches+-+statements/Statement
Amb Shalev UN Security
Council 31-Dec-2008.htm? WBCMODE=PresentationUnpCredits.
139. Nancy Kanwisher, Johannes Haushofer & Anat Biletzki, Reigniting Violence: How Do
Ceasefires End?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/nancykanwisher/reigniting-violence-how-d b_155611 html [hereinafter How Do CeasefiresEnd?].
140. Id.
141. Hamas Fires Rockets At Israel After Airstrike, supranote 134.
142. Norman G. Finkelstein, Foiling Another Palestinian "Peace Offensive": Behind the
Bloodbath in Gaza, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, Jan.

19, 2009,

http://www.normanfinkelstein.conVfinkelstein-on-gaza-war-massacre (quoting THE SIX MONTHS OF
THE LULL ARRANGEMENT 2, 7 (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage & Commemoration Center, Dec. 2008)) [hereinafter Finkelstein].
143. How Do Ceasefires End?, supra note 139.
144. Id.
145. This pattern is not unusual. Examining all the periods of one or more days without a death on
either side from September 2000 until October 2008, Kanwisher has established that "it is
overwhelmingly Israel that kills first after a pause in the conflict: 79% of all conflict pauses were
interrupted when Israel killed a Palestinian, while only 8%were interrupted by Palestinian attacks (the
remaining 13% were interrupted by both sides on the same day)." The study continues:
In addition, we found that this pattern - in which Israel is more likely than
Palestine to kill first after a conflict pause - becomes more pronounced for longer
conflict pauses. Indeed, of the 25 periods of nonviolence lasting longer than a
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Israel's November 4 military operations in Gaza, which ended a four-month
period of relative calm, severely weaken Israel's claim of self-defense. Nothing in
international law allows a state to use armed force to provoke-whether
intentionally or not-an attack and then use that attack as a basis for a claim of selfdefense.146
IV. ISRAEL'S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE

Israel has characterized its latest operations in Gaza as actions taken in selfdefense. On the opening day of the offensive, Israel's UN Ambassador stated in a
letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations that "after a long period of
utmost restraint, the government of Israel has decided to exercise, as of this
morning, its right to self-defense."147 Echoing this claim the following day, Israeli
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated: "[T]he only way in which maybe we can
shorten the time of the military operation is by making it clear that Israel has the
right to defend itself, that the international community supports Israel as it
continues to work against Hamas." 148
The Charter of the United Nations explicitly preserves the right of states to act
in self-defense. 149 It is, however, a limited exception to the general obligation
established in the Charter that states resolve their disputes by pacific means.
Under Article 51, a state making a claim of self-defense must have been the target
of an "armed attack" by another state. 150 Moreover, the exercise of self-defense
must be both necessary and "proportional"-that is, limited in scope to redress the
week, Israel unilaterally interrupted 24, or 96%, and it unilaterally interrupted
100% of the 14 periods of nonviolence lasting longer than 9 days....The lessons
from these data are clear: First, Hamas can indeed control the rockets, when it is
in their interest. The data shows that ceasefires can work, reducing violence to
nearly zero for months at a time. Second, if Israel wants to reduce rocket fire
from Gaza, it should cherish and preserve the peace when it starts to break out,
not be the first to kill.
Id.
146. The fact that Hamas's rocket attacks may themselves constitute serious violations of the laws
of war does nothing to change this, for, as was stated at Nuremburg in regard to the Nazi occupation of
the Soviet Union, even
[i]f it is assumed that some of the resistance units in Russia or members of the
civilian population did commit acts which were in themselves unlawful under the
rules of war, it would still have to be shown that these acts were not in legitimate
defense against wrongs perpetrated upon them by the invader. Under
international law, as in domestic law, there can be no reprisal against reprisal.
The assassin who is being repulsed by his intended victim may not slay him and
then, in turn, plead self-defense.
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE NUERNBERG

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER CONTROL

COUNCIL LAwNo. 10 VOL. IV 493-94 (Oct. 1946 - Apr. 1949).
147. Kattan, supra note 57.
148. Livni Briefing in Sderot, supranote 133.
149. U.N. Charter art. 51.
150. This requirement comports with the common-sense proposition that one must be respondingto
the acts of another, acts which must be of a certain gravity, if one's actions are to qualify as selfdefense. Id.
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harm that the invoking state has suffered.1 5 1
We believe that Israel's claim of self-defense fails on at least four grounds.
First, we doubt that self-defense can be properly invoked by an occupier vis-A-vis a
territory that it has previously occupied. Second, Israel did not suffer an "armed
attack"-at least, not one that it had not provoked itself-in the months prior to its
invocation of the right of self-defense. Third, Israel could have preserved the
rightful security of its citizens through means other than force-by negotiating an
extension of the truce-and thus the exercise of force was not necessary. Fourth,
even assuming that all of the foregoing were not true, the scale of Israel's attack
vastly exceeded the scope of a permissible exercise of self-defense. We will
examine each argument individually.
A. "Self-defense" within an occupied territory?
The International Court of Justice has cast serious doubt on Israel's ability to
invoke a claim of self-defense against attacks emanating from Gaza. As noted
above, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Israel is entitled to act in
self-defense in response to armed attacks. 152 In its 2004 Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory decision,
however, the ICJ stated that Article 51 of the UN Charter "recognizes the existence
of an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed attack by one State against
another State."153 Noting that Israel "does not claim that the attacks against it are
imputable to a foreign state," the Court concluded that attacks launched from the
West Bank do not give rise to an Israeli right of self-defense. 154 The Wall decision
did not address attacks launched from Gaza, but the reasoning of the Court applies
with equal force to the Strip, which like the West Bank, is a non-state entity.
As Victor Kattan has observed: "[N]ot all defensive measures are measures
taken in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is because selfdefense is an exculpatory plea regarding resort to force in the first place, and not
for an offense taken during an armed conflict.",15 In other words, Israel is
employing a jus ad bellum (justifications for going to war) principle in a jus ad
bello (principles governing the conduct of war) context-citing a ground for
initiating conflict for its behavior in what is, legally and in fact, a continuing
conflict. This does not mean that Israel, in principle, cannot use force to suppress
violence emanating from either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, or act to protect
its own civilian population. But as a matter of law, it must do this as an exercise of

151. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW: TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM
THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/

taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
152. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 51. See
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9).
153. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9).
154. Id.
155. Kattan, supra note 57.
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its right to police the occupied territories, and not as an exercise of the right of selfdefense.
B. The "Armed Attack" requirement
We have already described the sequence of events leading to the breakdown
of the truce, and have suggested that Hamas rocket fire, which followed Israel's
November 4 raid, cannot be cited by Israel as having triggered its right of selfdefense. No state can launch an attack, and then point to the retaliation for that
attack as the trigger for a claim of self-defense-unless, for example, the retaliation
involved a significant escalation of violence over the initial attack. Here it should
be pointed out that the Hamas rocket fire between Israel's lethal November 4 raid
and its far more lethal invasion on December 27 had caused no Israeli deaths. 15 6 It
does not seem reasonable that Hamas' response to Israeli-initiated violence (which
continued after November 4 as well) was an escalation at all, at least judged by its
results.
Yet can Israel cite the rocket fire it suffered prior to the truce as the "armed
attack" justifying its use of force?1 57 We do not believe so. It does not comport
with the understanding of self-defense as a limited exception to the general
obligation that states resolve their disputes peacefully that a state be permitted to
"nurse" or "store" a claim of self-defense-then invoke it at a later time at its
convenience. 158 The more logical position is that a claim of self-defense, if not
exercised within a reasonable period of time, lapses. In this case, southern Israel
had enjoyed virtually complete calm for five months, before Israel's own acts
precipitated the breakdown of the truce and the resumption of rocket fire by Hamas
in November 2008.
It is further significant that during the pre-truce period, Israel's hands were
not clean. As noted above, Israel had instituted an illegal blockade against the
Gaza Strip, causing immense suffering to the Palestinian civilian population. 159
Furthermore, it had repeatedly raided and attacked the Gaza Strip, from September
2005 until the launch of Operation Cast Lead killing, as previously stated, 1,250
Palestinians. 160 Israeli violence in no way justified the rocket and mortar fire by
Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, which were indiscriminate, illegal, and
156. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROCKETS FROM GAZA: HARM TO CIVILIANS FROM PALESTINIAN
ARMED GROUPS' ROCKET ATTACKS 10-16 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/

reports/ioptqassam08O9webwcover.pdf.
157. We assume for the sake of argument that the earlier attacks, in the aggregate, were sufficient

to constitute an "armed attack." Yet this conclusion is not ineluctable. Not all uses of force constitute
armed attacks giving rise to a right of self-defense - a limitation designed to deprive states from
exploiting minor border incidents to justify broad-scale attacks. The ICJ has held, for example, that acts
of armed force carried out by "'armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries"' must be "'of such
gravity as to amount to,' inter alia, an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces." Military and

Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (citing G.A.
Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 3(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974)).
158. See U.N. Charter art. 5.
159. Letter to Olmert: Stop the Blockade of Gaza, supranote 135.
160. Kattan, supra note 57.
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caused much harm to Israeli civilians. But Israel's incessant attacks on the Gaza
Strip cannot be irrelevant in assessing whether the earlier rocket fire triggered
Israel's right of self-defense. We conclude that it did not.
C. The Necessity Requirement
In order for a claim of self-defense to be valid, the actions taken in
accordance with that claim must be necessary. As the ICJ has stated: "[I]n
customary international law 'whether the response to . . . [an] [armed] attack is

lawful depends upon observance of the criteria of the necessity and the
proportionality of the measures taken in self-defense."' 16 1 Even if it is assumed that
the rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip are sufficient to constitute an
armed attack, Operation Cast Lead was not necessary and thus cannot be justified
as a legitimate act of self-defense.
Most importantly, however, Israel had an alternative to violence in its quest to
stop rocket fire from the Gaza Strip; namely, to renegotiate the truce that had
brought the greatest calm to its southern residents in six years. This option
remained open even after the lapse of the formal truce on December 19, as Hamas
leaders offered to consider renewing the truce as long as Israel lifted its blockade
of the Gaza Strip.162
Israeli Foreign Minister Livni stated before Operation Cast Lead began that a
prolonged truce with Hamas "harms the Israeli strategic goal, empowers Hamas,
and gives the impression that Israel recognizes the movement." 163 In short, Israel
chose violence not because it was necessary, but because the peaceful alternative
of negotiations bore a political cost that Israel was unwilling to pay: enhanced
legitimacy for Hamas.
D. The ProportionalityRequirement
Military action undertaken in self-defense must be limited in scope, or
"proportional", to the harm to be redressed. A state purportedly acting in selfdefense uses only such force as is necessary to repel the attack against it or to
reestablish the status quo ante. 164 Thus, "[a]cts done in self-defense must not
exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them."1 65 In this context, had
Israel suffered an unprovoked "armed attack," the scope of its response would be
limited to targets necessary to stop rocket fire from Gaza-the harm that Israel was
claiming to redress. Attacks on military or civilian targets not tied to rocket fire, on
161. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 174 (Nov. 6) (quoting Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, T 194, (June 27). The question of
proportionality will be taken up in the next sub-section.
162. Hamas 'May Extend' Truce if Israel Ends Siege, Stops Attacks, THE DAILY STAR, Dec. 24,
2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition id=10&categid=2&article id=98679.
163. Finkelstein, supra note 142 (citing Saed Bannoura, Livni Calls For a Large Scale Military
Offensive in Gaza, INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST MEDIA CENTER, Dec. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.imemc.org/article/57960.
164. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 862 (Aspen Law & Business 2002).
165. Id. (quoting Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 138-39 (1986)).
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the other hand, would exceed the scope of legitimate self-defense. In fact,
Operation Cast Lead seemed calculated to achieve objectives considerably beyond
stopping rocket fire from Gaza-a fact reflected both in statements by Israeli
officials, and in Israel's choice of targets during the fighting.
In its decision in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms, the ICJ confirmed that
one aspect of the criteria of necessity and proportionality "is the nature of the
target of the force used avowedly in self-defense."166
Israel's choice of targets during Operation Cast Lead was incompatible with a
proper exercise of self-defense. Speaking of the latest invasion of Gaza, Major
Avital Liebowitz of the IDF Spokesperson's Office stated: "Anything affiliated
with Hamas is a legitimate target." 167 "We are hitting not only terrorists and
launchers," Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Dan Harel explained,
"but also the whole Hamas government and all its wings."1 68 "After this operation
there will not be one Hamas building left standing in Gaza."1 69
Israel has claimed that at least some of these targets harbored fighters or
military supplies, but the statements above seem more consistent with an intent to
disable if not destroy Hamas's capacity to govern.170 Moreover, the record of death
and destruction-detailed below1 7 1_is consistent with these pronouncements by
Israeli spokespeople. Thus, even if all the other requirements of a valid exercise of
the right of self-defense were present-and they were not-Israel's attack on the
Gaza Strip thus appears to have exceeded the scope of a valid exercise of that right.

V. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
There are only two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force in

international affairs-military action taken with the approval of the UN Security
Council and the use of force in self-defense. 172 The Security Council did not
authorize Israel's latest military campaign against the Gaza Strip, and as
demonstrated above, Operation Cast Lead does not qualify as self-defense.

166. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 74, 76. In that case, the Court rejected the assertion of the US
that its attacks on certain Iranian oil platforms constituted self-defense because there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of Iranian military presence on the platforms. The Court also rejected the
US' claim of self-defense because there was no evidence to prove that the United States made any
complaints to Iran about the alleged military use of the Iranian platforms.
167. Finkelstein, supra note 142 (citing B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: B'TSELEM TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL MAZUZ: CONCERN OVER ISRAEL TARGETING CIVILIAN OBJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP (Dec. 31,

2008)), available at http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza Strip/20081231 Gaza Letter to Mazuz.
asp.
168. Tova Dadon, Deputy Chief of Staff Worst Still Ahead, YNETNEWS.COM, Dec. 28, 2008,
available at http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3646462,00.html.
169. Id.
170. B'TSELEM, THE GAZA STRIP: B'TSELEM TO ATTORNEY GENERAL MAZUZ: CONCERN OVER
ISRAEL TARGETING CIVILIAN OBJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP (Dec. 31, 2008), available at

http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza Strip/20081231_GazaLetter to Mazuz.asp.
171. See infra Section VIII.
172. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 42 & 51.
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Without the authorization of the Security Council or the justification of selfdefense, Israel's invasion of Gaza arguably amounts to aggression. According to
the Nuremberg Tribunal, "[t]o initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an

international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." 7 3
"War on a major scale causes great suffering and almost invariably involves the
commission of atrocities." 74
There is little question that the scale and character of Israel's attack on Gaza
would be adequate to constitute aggression if it had been committed against
another state. As Antonio Cassese notes, despite some instability in current
definitions of aggression in international criminal law: "Customary international
law appears to consider as international crimes: the planning, or organizing, or
preparing, or participating in the first use of armed force by a state against another
state in contravention of the UN Charter, provided the acts of aggression
concerned have large-scale and serious consequences." 175 Israel's Gaza invasion
was of a massive scale, and clearly brought about extremely serious

consequences.176
But the charge of aggression may be inapposite for two other reasons: first, as
we have shown, Gaza is not a state, and it is not clear that aggression can be
committed against a non-state entity; second, whether or not Gaza is a state, as we
have also shown, it remains under Israeli occupation, and arguably, alleging
aggression-like Israel's claim to self-defense-improperly imports jus ad bellum
principles into a context of an ongoing conflict. In this view, aggression, in
essence, involves the unjustified initiation of war by one state against another state,

not its continuation.
As to the first of these concerns: we believe that customary international law
currently establishes that aggression may be committed against non-state entities
that, like the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, have been designated as "selfdetermination units" by the international community. The United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3314, which offers a "Definition of Aggression," states:
"Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charterof the United Nations . . ." (italics added). 177 Article
1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations recites as one of the purposes of the
organization: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for

173. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 267 (Cambridge University Press 2007).

174. Id.
175. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL Law 114 (Oxford University Press 2003).
The definition of aggression contained in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974, similarly
states: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or
political independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations." G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
176. See infra Section VIII.
177. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
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the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . .
As UN
General Assembly Resolution 2131 states, all states have a duty to "respect the
right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely
exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms." 179 The duty outlined in resolution 2131 is customary
international law.18 0 Furthermore, as General Assembly Resolution 2625 provides,
"Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples . . . of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence."1 8 1
The definition of aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 also
reaffirms "the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their
right to self-determination, freedom and independence ... 182
As the International Court of Justice observed in 2004, the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination is a well-established fact.183 And since at
least the mid-1970s, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination could
be implemented only if, inter alia, "Israel evacuated the Palestinian territory it had
occupied by force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions
... 184 The United Nations General Assembly recognized as early as 1984 that the
West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip were the locus for the
exercise of the Palestinian people's right of self-determination. 1 5 The same notion
was unanimously affirmed by the United Nations Security Council in its resolution
endorsing the "Roadmap for Peace."1 8 6 Accordingly, the objection to an allegation
of aggression on the ground of the Gaza Strip's status as a non-state entity is
without merit.
The second concern, that Israel cannot "aggress" against a territory that it
currently occupies, is more weighty. We agree that the crime of aggression
principally implicates jus ad bellum, notjus in bello, principles. Fairly speaking, if

178. U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
179. G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. AIRES/20/131 (Dec. 21, 1965).
180. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, THOMAS M. FRANCK, & DAVID M. MALONE, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 117-18 (Oxford University Press 2008).
181. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
182. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 177, at 143.
183. "As regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court observes that
the existence of a "Palestinian people" is no longer in issue. Such existence has moreover been
recognized by Israel. . ." Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 182 (July 9).
184. U.N. Comm. on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, The Right of
Self-Determination of the PalestinianPeople, 33, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/3 (Jan. 1, 1979), available
at http://domino.un.org/pdfs/STSGSERF3.pdf.
185. G.A. Res. 39/146, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/146 (Dec. 14, 1984).
186. S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003) (The resolution, by its terms, only
"Reaffirm(ed) its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within
secure and recognized borders," but, in referencing its earlier resolutions, 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973,
made clear that the site of the Palestinian state would be in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)
and the Gaza Strip.).
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the Gaza Strip remains occupied, as we have argued above,1 87 it is logically
consistent to hold that Israel's December-January attack did not constitute
aggression, and instead must be evaluated solely according to jus in bello
standards. Conversely, if for any reason, Israel's invocation of the right to selfdefense is considered timely (although not necessarily valid in all respects), the
only fair conclusion is that it may also have committed aggression against the Gaza
Strip.
We now turn from Israel's justification for launching its attack-failed, in legal
terms, as we have argued-to examine Israel's conduct during the fighting itself.
Here, as well, we find that Israel has committed serious violations of international
law.
VI. TARGETING CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION

In the preceding section, it was suggested that Israel had exceeded the scope
of a valid exercise of the right of self-defense because it attacked targets, many of
them civilian, that could not reasonably be linked to the objective of stopping
rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. Yet Israel's attacks on civilian targets also appear
to have violated another independent legal principle: the duty of distinction. These
failures seem to fall into three categories: 1) those stemming from Israel's
definition of all institutions and individuals associated with Hamas as legitimate
military targets-a definition that flies in the face of established international law;
2) those reflecting, perhaps, Israeli troops' employment of overly liberal rules of
engagement; 3) those involving indiscriminate uses of weapons.
A. The Duty ofDistinction
The duty of distinction is perhaps the most basic tenet of international
humanitarian law,"ss and stands for the proposition that "the parties to the conflict
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only
be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed at civilians."l 8 9 This
basic rule of war is codified in many international agreements and conventions,
including the 1863 Lieber Code, 1907 Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, as well as the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions.
The United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 2444 of 1969 outlined the
scope of the principle, which affirms "That the right of the parties to a conflict to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch
attacks against the civilian populations as such." 190 The companion rule regarding
targeting objects states that "the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish
between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed

187. See supra Section II.
188. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The PrincipleofDiscriminationin 21st Century Warfare, 2
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 148 (1999); Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of
Distinctionand the Realities of War, 39 INT'L LAW. 733 (2005); Mark David Maxwell & Richard V.
Meyer, The Principleof Distinction: Probing the Limits of its Customariness,2007 ARMY LAW. 1, 1
(2007).
189. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 3.
190. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII) at 50, U.N., Doc. A/7433 (Dec. 19, 1968).
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against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian
objects." 191 Israel's own Law of War booklet codifies this principle. It states that
"in principle, the IDF accepts and applies the principle of distinction."192
International law contains clear definitions of "armed forces" for the purposes
of armed conflict and maintains that civilians must still be protected. Under
customary international law, "armed forces of a party" include "all organized
armed forces, groups and units, which are under a command responsible to that
party for the conduct of its subordinates." 193 Even when the distinction of armed
forces is less clear, civilians retain their status: "All that can be said is that persons
[civilians] who do not take a direct part in the hostilities of a non-international
armed conflict enjoy protection against attack while persons who take a direct part
in hostilities are liable to lawful attack." 194 Taking direct part in the hostilities must
mean "acts which are intended to cause actual harm to enemy personnel and
materiel . . . supplying food and shelter to combatants, and generally speaking

sympathizing with them, is insufficient reason to deny civilians protections against
attack." 95
International criminal law makes individuals liable for serious violations of
this rule. Violations of the rule of distinction may be in the form of intentional
targeting of civilians and civilian areas as such, or attacks that are indiscriminate in
nature even if their stated targets are not civilian. The Geneva Convention
considers "grave breaches" to include "willful killing, torture or inhumane
treatment,... willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, .
. . and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." 196 Similarly, indiscriminate

attacks in which the attacker was aware of the danger posed to the civilians in the
targeted area are also war crimes under customary international law. 197
B. Israel's attacks on Gaza's civilian infrastructureandprivate sector
In the twenty-two day assault of the Gaza Strip, Israel struck numerous
civilian targets, among them schools, mosques, the UN headquarters, roads,
bridges, numerous govermment administrative buildings, courts, prisons, forty
police stations, fire houses, harbors, bird farms, and money changers. 198 Despite
191. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL. I: RULES 25 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts

& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw Vol. 1].
192. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supranote 126, at 6.
193. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 14; See also Geneva
Convention IV, supranote 66, at art. 3.
194. RED CROSS SYMPOSIUM:PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN 21ST-CENTURY WARFARE 13 (Mireille
Hector and Martine Jellema, eds., Wolf Legal Productions, 2001).
195. Id.
196. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3. See also Customary International
Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 601.
197. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 601.
198. Jonathan Cook, Devastation Has Always Been a Goal for Israel, THE NATIONAL, Jan. 18,
2009, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090118/FOREIGN/573500826/1011/SPORT;
see also Ben
White, Israel's Targets in Gaza, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.newstatesman.com/
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explicit protection under international law199, cultural sites came under direct fire,
such as the al-Nasr mosque which was built in 736 C.E.,200 and the Antiquities
Museum of Gaza.201 The Gaza zoo came under attack by Israeli forces, where
many animals were shot at point plank range.202
Israel ravaged the private sector of Gaza as well. A cattle farm was attacked
on January 3, killing twenty-one cattle.203 Palestinian industry has been crippled,
with more than 230 factories destroyed, including whole swaths of industrial zones
where factories produced goods such as cookies, wooden furniture, and ice
cream.204 As one reporter observes, "It's as if a tsunami of fire had roared through
Gaza's industrial district, leaving behind a tide of twisted metal and smashed
buildings."205
Israel claimed that many of these targets either housed weapon caches or were
sites from which Hamas fighters were returning fire on Israeli troops. This may
well have been the case as to some of the targets-although Israel's record of
dubious, if not false, claims regarding its war conduct should be recalled here.206
Yet a number of these targets were hit during the first surprise wave of bombings
on December 27, and thus could not have been struck by Israel in response to
return fire. This was true, for example, of the Gaza City police compound, where
sixty-five police recruits were killed as they attended graduation ceremonies.207
middle-east/2009/01/israel-targets-gaza-hamas.
199. Hague IV, supra note 47, at art. 23(g).
200. Gaza Prayer Turns Deadly as Israel Hits Mosques, AL ARABIYA, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/06/63609.html.
201. Lauren Gelfond Feldinger, FirstEvidence of Damage to Gaza's CulturalSites Emerges, THE
ART NEWSPAPER, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp?id=16827.
202. Ashraf Helmi, Israeli Troops Shot and Killed Zoo Animals, GULFNEWS, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://gulfnews.com/region/MiddleEast/10278858.html.
203. Press Release, Al-Mezan, Israeli Forces Bomb Schools and Mosque, THE ELECTRONIC
INTIFADA, Jan. 3, 2009, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/articlel0105.shtml.
204. Tim McGirk, The Devastation of Gaza: From Factories to Ice Cream, TIME, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874539,00.html [hereinafter McGirk].
205. Id.
206. See supra Introduction; see McGirk, supranote 204; see Ben Lynfield, 'My Daughters,Tthey
Killed Them': Doctor Shows IsraelisHorror of War, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 19, 2009, at 18, available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/my-daughters-they-killed-them-tv-doctorshows-israelis-horror-of-war-1419286.html; see The Street Smells of Death, SPIEGEL, Jan. 13, 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,601040-2,00.html; see Elliot D. Woods, Rebuilding
Gaza Beset by Hamas, U.S., Others Refuse to Deal with Rulers, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 22,
2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/22/rebuilding-gaza-besetby-hamas/; Ethan Bronner & Sabrina Tavernise, In ShatteredGaza Town, Roots of Seething Split, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world
/middleeast/04gaza.html; see Barak Ravid & Akiva Eldar, UN: IDF Officers Admitted There Was No
Gunfire From Gaza School Which Was Shelled, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages /1054009.html; see Ibrahim Barzak & Christopher Tochia, Israel Shells UN
Headquarters in Gaza, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/01/15/israel-shelles-un-headquar n 158078.html; see Jack Schenker, Chaos in Khoza'a, THE
NATIONAL, Jan.30, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/ article/20090130/REVIEW/158145792/ 1008.
207. Legal Aspects of Israel's Attacks on the Gaza Strip During Operation Cast Lead, AL-HAQ,
Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id-41 1.
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Others, including much of the industrial sector, were destroyed as Israeli troops
withdrew, after Hamas resistance had virtually ended.208 Moreover, the UN Office
of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has affirmed, "[i]n many instances, Israel
provided no explanation for why a civilian building was attacked."209 Amnesty
International has similarly documented several cases of destruction of a house, a
mosque and a school, which had been targeted by Israeli forces for supposedly
housing weapons caches. 210 In each building, Amnesty field workers found no
evidence of "secondary conflagration," which would be expected had weapons
been present, or signs of anything having been removed from the rubble.211 The
attacks, instead, seemed consistent with Israel's avowal to hit any target associated
in any way with Hamas, whether or not that target had a military value, as
evidenced in the pronouncements of Israeli military spokespeople adduced
above. 212
The Islamic University of Gaza was one of many educational centers targeted
by Israeli forces, being hit in six separate airstrikes, 2 13 destroying both the science
building and the women's college 214. Israeli officials claimed, on the one hand, that
the university housed a weapons research center,215 making it a legitimate military
target. This claim has not been substantiated,216 and Israeli officials have offered
an alternative justification, namely that the university was a cultural icon for
Hamas students and militants. Fox News reported that "senior military and security
experts in Israel say Islamic University is much more than an institution of higher
education. They say that universities historically have been breeding grounds for
radical thought, free speech and protest." 2 17 Similarly, an Israeli academic has

208. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conlfict,
Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, 349, 992, 997-1000, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/48 (Sep. 15, 2009) (preparedby Richard Goldstone) [hereinafter Report of the U.N. FactFindingMission on the Gaza Conflict].
209. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supranote 17, at 13, 14.
210. Amnesty International, Livewire, Widespread Destruction of Homes, http://livewire.amnesty.
org/ 2009/01/29/908/?lang=es#more-908 (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Widespread
DestructionofHomes].

211. Id.
212. See supra Section IV.
213. Neve Gordon & Jeff Halper, Where's the OutrageNow?, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUc., Jan.
9, 2009, available at http://chronicle.com/news/article/5725/opinion-wheres-the-academic-outrageover-the-bombing-of-a-university-in-gaza [hereinafter Gordon & Halper].
214. Statement from Association of World Citizens to the Secretary-General of the U.N., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/S-9/NGO/6 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf eed216406b50bf648
5256ce10072f637/eelc2482fec5033e8525753d00702825?OpenDocument.
215. Amos Harel & Avi Issacharoff, IAF Bombs 3 Gaza Government Buildings; Officials: 25
Wounded, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051305.html [hereinafter
Harel& Issacharoff].
216. An Israeli academic points out as well that even if they were, "Weapon development and even
manufacturing have, unfortunately, become major projects at universities worldwide - a fact that does
not justify bombing them." Gordon & Halper, supranote 213.
217. Stephanie L. Freid, Bombing of Islamic University: Strategic Target or War Crime?,
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affirmed that "[v]irtually all the commentators agree that the Islamic University
was attacked, in part, because it is a cultural symbol of Hamas."218 A civilian
object is not rendered a "military objective" because it supports or even teaches
political opinions that the attacking party finds offensive or dangerous.
Government buildings were heavily targeted in the bombing campaign,
including a court building,219 the education and transportation ministries, the
parliament building, and a seven-story building that housed the finance, foreign
and labor ministries.220 Israeli air force officials characterized the office of Hamas
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, which was hit twice, a "terror target;" IDF officials
explained that it was a "government target that also served as a planning, support,
and finance center for terrorist activity." 2 2 1 This targeting rationale flies in the face
of the criteria set up by international humanitarian law that limits attacks on dual
purpose buildings as only those that serve a fundamental military function.222
Buildings housing media outlets have also been targeted and damaged by
Israeli attacks. A building housing Iranian al-Alam and Press TV was hit by Israeli
fire, despite assurances from Israeli forces, who are reported to have been aware of
its coordinates, that it would not be attacked, and installing light projectors on the
roof to further identify it.2 23 In an attack that has been recognized as intentional,
Israeli forces also fired on the Al-Johara Tower in Gaza City, which houses over
twenty international news outlets. 224 In an Al-Jazeera interview Israeli Prime
Minister, Ehud Olmert, defended the strike, "saying that communications
equipment in the building could have been used by Hamas."225 The potential for
use of military communications certainly does not qualify a civilian building as a
military objective, and even if the suspicion were strong, the attacking force must
still assume it to be a non-military objective if there is doubt.226
FOXNEWS, Dec. 20, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,474084,00.html.
218. Gordon & Halper,supra note 213.
219. MSNBC.com, Israel Forces Storm Gaza Neighborhood, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
28633969/.
220. Harel & Issacharoff, supra note 215.
221. Id.
222. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
223. Reuters, IranianState TV Station Says IDF Strike Targeted Its Gaza Offices, HA'ARETZ, Jan.
9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1054228.html.
224. Out of Print, Digital Crossroads- Wake Up America, http://radioactivegavin.wordpress.
conV2009/01/14/digital-crossroads-gaza-wake-up-america/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
225. CPJ.org, Airstrike Hits Media Building in Gaza, http://cpj.org/2009/01/press-under-fire-ingaza-again.php.
226. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 48, 52(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9
feel4a77fdcl25641e0052b079 [hereinafter AdditionalProtocol ] (Only physical objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or
total destruction offers a definite military advantage may be legitimately targeted.); Customary
International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 29-32; see also International Committee of
the Red Cross, Commentary on the First Additional Protocol of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, para. 2002, n. 3 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds.,
1987). "In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes... is being
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C. Hamas as a "terroristorganization"
Israel's position that anything affiliated with Hamas is a valid military target
is not supported by international law. Hamas is an organization that has discrete
military and civilian wings.227 While Israel and a handful of other nations have
designated Hamas a "terrorist organization," this designation has only domestic
legal implications in the countries adopting it. The designation bears no
international legal import, and does nothing to relieve Israel of its obligation to
respect the civilian-combatant and civilian objects-military objectives
distinctions.228 Unless treated by the international community as legally binding
that is, as customary international law-the designation cannot be understood to
transform well-established norms of international law defining "civilians" and
"combatants" and requiring distinction between the two. There is no indication that
the designation of Hamas as a "terrorist organization" has become a binding
principle of international law. On the contrary, the fifty-six member Organization
of the Islamic Conference has adopted a declaration holding that violent resistance
to foreign military occupation or colonization cannot be considered terrorism. 22 9
D. Lax rules of engagement
News media also reported attacks on civilian population centers in Gaza that
killed dozens of civilians. These attacks, though not conclusive of war crimes,
suggest intentional targeting of civilians and civilian objects. It is unclear whether
apparently deliberate attacks on Palestinian individuals were the outgrowth of
individual misconduct by Israeli troops, possibly fueled by anti-Palestinian racial
animus, or were the product of lax rules of engagement. There is evidence to
support both inferences.
One of the most severe attacks on a densely populated civilian area happened
in the al-Zeitouna district of Gaza City in early January, where Israeli forces
"reduced the eastern Gaza City suburb to little more than rubble in a matter of
days." 23 0 These attacks were described at the time as "the single bloodiest incident

used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."
227. Some nations, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, recognize this distinction by
designating only Hamas's military wing, the Izz ed-Din al-Qassam brigades, as a "terrorist
organization."
See Australian National Security, Listing of Terrorist
Organisations,
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB57CA3DECF30CA2
56FABOO1F7FBD?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 26, 2009); see United Kingdom, Office for
Security and Counter Terrorism, Proscribed Terrorist Groups, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/
legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2000/proscribed-groups (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
228. Hamas has been designated a "terrorist organization" by the United States, Israel, Canada,
Japan, and the Council of the European Union (although not by its constituent members). The United
Kingdom and Australia additionally consider the armed wing of Hamas a "terrorist organization." Anita
Rice, War Crimes Convictions After Gaza?, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 23, 2009, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/01/20091229274380583.html; United Kingdom, supra note 227.
229. OIC Convention to Combat Terrorism, Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference on Combatting International Terrorism art. 2, July 1, 1999, available at
http://www.oicun.org/7/38/.
230. Sheera Frenkel, Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2009,
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of the Gaza conflict" 231 and UN officials called it "one of the gravest incidents"
yet.232 Graffiti in Hebrew left behind after the troops' withdrawal-"Death to
Arabs," "War on Arabs-Sounds Good to Me," "The Only Good Arab is a Dead
Arab," "I hate Arabs," and one in English "1 is down, 999,999 to go" 233-further
point to a potentially lethal animus toward the residents as a whole, not just
Hamas, and one that could easily lead to violations of proscriptions against
deliberately targeting civilians.
However, this graffiti and the racist animus behind it may not only be the
work of individual soldiers. Indeed, Israeli troops had been supplied with written
materials from both the army chief rabbinate and from Israeli settler or right wing
organizations that counseled against mercy toward "the cruel." One such writing
advised: "soldiers of Israel to spare your lives and the lives of your friends and not
to show concern for a population that surrounds us and harms us. We call on you. .
. to function according to the law 'kill the one who comes to kill you.' As for the
population, it is not innocent ... We call on you to ignore any strange doctrines
and orders that confuse the logical way of fighting the enemy." 23 4 The latter may
be read as an invitation to contravene international humanitarian law. Thus, it is
hard to ascertain whether the apparently indiscriminate attacks on civilians were
the consequences of individual misconduct, or of official incitement.
Some soldiers admitted to following extremely liberal rules of engagement,
revealing to journalists that their orders were to "fire on anything that moves in alZeitouna." 2 35 One soldier reported that, "We were to shoot first and ask questions

later." 236
At least twenty-nine members of the Samouni family were killed by Israeli
forces in al-Zeitouna.237 Family members recounted that a kinsman was killed in
front of his family after raising his hands when Israeli soldiers approached his
home. Israeli soldiers continued to fire on the rest of the family, killing the man's
four-year-old son.238 Other family members explained that 100 members of their
clan were herded by Israeli troops into one building, which later was directly and
repeatedly fired on. Many of the family members died instantly, while others died
over a period of four days while the Israeli forces refused entry of the Red Cross

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle-east/article5601177.ece
[hereinafter
Israeli
Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders].
231. Tim Butcher, Gaza Medics Describe Horror of Strike Which Killed 70, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 7,
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4162193/Gaza-medics-describehorror-of-strike-which-killed-70.html.
232. IsraelMaintains Gaza Assault Despite Cease-fire Resolution, THE DAILY STAR, Jan. 10, 2009,
available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition id=10&categid=2&article id=98922.
233. Rod
Nordland,
The
Smell
of Death,
NEWSWEEK,
Jan.
19,
2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/180483 [hereinafter Nordland].
234. Amos Harel, IDF Rabbinate on the War: We Will Show No Mercy on the Cruel, HAARETZ,
Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058758.html.
235. Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, supra note 230.
236. Id.
237. Nordland, supra note 233.
238. Id.
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into the area to evacuate the wounded.239 In all, reports indicate that around
seventy corpses of members of the same clan were pulled from the rubble after the
troops withdrew.240
In yet another attack on a town, this time in southern Gaza, reports indicate
that the village of Khuza'a was attacked by the Israeli army over a period of hours,
during which several women, children, and elderly people were killed. Residents
from the village contacted the Israeli human rights organization B'tselem early in
the attack to report that women had been shot by Israeli forces while waving a
white flag as well as several other residents exiting a house on soldiers' orders.241
Further reports indicate that during the attack, groups of civilians were shot at
indiscriminately after being told by Israeli troops to evacuate, homes and structures
were destroyed indiscriminately sometimes with the residents still inside, and that
several individual civilians were targeted by snipers and shot dead.242
E. Indiscriminateuse of weapons
A senior military analyst with Human Rights Watch has condemned the use
of certain weapons as amounting to indiscriminate attacks when directed at dense
population centers.243 Israeli airstrikes against Rafah refugee camp, even when
ostensibly targeting militants, have caused indiscriminate death and destruction to
the surrounding civilian population, including many women and children hit in

239. Jonathan Finer, At a Flash Point in Gaza, A Family's Deadly Ordeal, THE WASHINGTON
Jan.
27, 2009, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/26/AR2009012602481.html.; Nordland, supra note 233; Democracy Now,
Part II: Palestinian US College GradLoses 2 Brothers in Israeli Shooting; Father Watched Son Bleed
to Death After Israeli Troops Blocked Ambulances, (radio broadcast Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/22/part iipalestinian us college grad.
240. Butcher, supra note 231.
241. Press Release, B'tselem, Witness Reports that Israeli Soldiers Shot Woman Waving White
Flag in Gaza Strip (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.btselem.org/English/PressReleases/
20090113.asp; Ashraf Khalil, In Gaza town, A Bitter Aftermath; Witnesses Say White Flags Didn't
Keep Israeli Troopsfrom Firing. The Event Could be Key to any War Crimes Probe, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/mideasternail/la-fggaza-reconstructl5-2009feb15,0,6630449.story (identifying the murdered woman as Rawhiya Najar).
242. Fida Qishta & Peter Beaumont, IsraeliAccused of War Crimes Over 12-hour Assault on Gaza
Village, THE OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/18/israel-warcrimes-gaza-conflict; Jack Sheckner, Chaos in Khoza'a, THE NATIONAL, Jan. 30, 2009,
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090130/REVIEW/158145792/1008.
243. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL: STOP SHELLING IN CROWDED GAZA CITY, Jan. 16, 2009,
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/16/israel-stop-shelling-crowded-gaza-city.
("Firing
155mm shells into the center of Gaza City, whatever the target, will likely cause horrific civilian
casualties," said Marc Garlasco, Senior Military Analyst at Human Rights Watch. "By using this
weapon in such circumstances, Israel is committing indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of
war.") See also Ben Night, Amnesty InternationalAccuses Israel of War Crimes in Gaza, ABC.NET,
Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/01/20/2469609.htm?section=justin;
The
Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability, supra note 17
(stating that "Israel's firing of artillery into densely populated civilian areas in Gaza may amount to
indiscriminate attacks.").
POST,
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their own homes.2 " Researchers found evidence that Israeli troops had fired 155
millimeter howitzers into heavily populated areas.245 These shells have a margin of
error of thirty meters, and a blast radius of 300 meters.246 According to Fred
Abrahams of Human Rights Watch, Israel's choice of less precise weaponry raises
questions of intent: "When you have an alternative that is GPS-guided and very
accurate, why would you use a shell that is much less accurate and has a much
larger kill radius?" 247
F. Legal implications oflsrael's warnings to Palestiniancivilians
Israel made use of a variety of kinds of warnings to Palestinian residents of
the Gaza Strip, including leaflets dropped by air, and cell phone messages. 2 48 A
message typically claimed that a particular structure housed weapons and its
destruction was imminent, and any inhabitants should evacuate immediately.249
Israeli troops also employed a technique dubbed "knocking on the roof," whereby
artillery fire would be directed at comers of buildings to serve as a warning to
individuals inside to leave, before more powerful ordnance was aimed at more
vulnerable parts of the structure.250 Israeli military lawyers advised commanders
and troops that any Palestinian civilians who failed to head these warnings were
acting as "voluntary human shields," and therefore, were partaking in hostilities
and could be legally treated thereafter as "combatants." 251
Did these warnings in any way relax or alter Israel's duty of distinction in
Operation Cast Lead? The probable answer is: "no." In principle, such warnings
would tend to indicate an effort by a warring party to minimize civilian casualties,
and thus, to respect the principle of distinction. The difficulty in actual application,
however, is that civilians in the midst of battle often would not be aware of, or
actually have, safe routes of escape to a place of sanctuary. As a practical matter,
then, if there is no refuge, the warnings would only amplify the suffering of
civilians by adding to their fear and confusion.

244. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL/HAMAS: CIVILIANS MUST NOT BE TARGETS, Dec. 30,
2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/496321bb2c.html; AL MEZAN CENTER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, ISRAELI MASSACRES IN GAZA CONTINUE: 284 KILLED; INCLUDING 32 CHILDREN, AND
755 INJURED; GAZA'S SERVICE SYSTEMS PARALYZED UNDER SEVERE LACK OF MEDICINE, FOOD AND

POWER, Dec. 29, 2008, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EDIS7MSLBF?OpenDocument.
245. Ben Hubbard & Alfred de Montesquieu, Rights Groups Says Laws of War violated in Gaza,
THETHEASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2009, http://abcnews.go.conInternational/wireStory?id=6800758.
246. Id
247. Id.
248. Abraham Rabinovich, Israel warning civilians to flee, THE AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 30, 2008, at 7,
available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24853989-15084,00.html.
249. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF issues warnings to the civilians of Gaza, Jan. 7, 2009,
available
at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/IDF warns Gaza
population7-Jan-2009.htm; Report of the U.N. Fact-FindingMission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note
208.
250. Feldman & Blau, supra note 21.
251. Id
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In the particular case of Gaza, it should be recalled that Israel fenced the
entire region beginning in 1994,252 and that during the fighting, all exit points from
the Strip were virtually sealed.253 Thus the vast majority of its 1.5 million residents
was unable to flee outside the Strip, and with bombardments occurring throughout
it, had no effective refuge within it. Indeed, the Samouni clan, whose terrible
ordeal was described above, had obeyed orders by Israeli troops to assemble in a
family compound-and then was attacked despite its compliance.254
Apart from the ineffectuality of the warnings, it strikes us as particularly
egregious to argue that mere failure to adhere to an evacuation warning would,
ipso facto, render a civilian a combatant-a notion that rests on a severely twisted
understanding of "voluntariness."
VII. ISRAELI TROOPS AND THE USE OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS As HUMAN
SHIELDS

There is evidence to suggest that Israeli troops in some instances used
Palestinian civilians as human shields. This practice has something in common
with the offenses described in the prior section, in the sense that each unjustifiably
exposes civilians to injury and death. However, the practice is distinct, as it does
not involve the direct and deliberate targeting of civilians by the offending party,
and the practice is also governed by a distinct set of legal principles.
A. InternationalLaw Governing the Use ofHuman Shields
The use of human shields is prohibited by international law, and the violation
of the laws and customs prohibiting this practice constitutes a war crime. Common
Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel and Hamas are bound

by customary international law and Israel specifically as a signatory to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, states that "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely." 255 "Violence to life and person" 25 6 and
the "taking of hostages" 25 7 are strictly prohibited against the above mentioned class
of protected persons. Customary international law likewise proscribes the use of
human shields in non-international armed conflict,258 and violation of this norm is

252. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho
Area, Isr.-P.L.0, May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+Area.htm.
253. A small number of injured civilians was permitted to leave. See generally id. at Annex II.
254. Kershner & el-Khodary, supranote 2.
255. Geneva Convention IV, supranote 66, at art. 3(1). See also Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians
as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a DemocraticState
Against Terrorism?, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 445, 449-50 (2002).
256. Geneva Convention IV, supranote 66, at art. 3(1).
257. Id. at art. 3(1)(b).
258. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 3, 337 (specifically Rule
9, deriving from APII: 13(1) and the prohibition of taking hostages in foreign case law); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
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a war crime recognized under customary international law, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal
Court. 259
The use of human shields is generally defined as using the presence of
civilians or civilian objects to render military objects immune from attack; 2 60
accordingly, military objectives should be located outside civilian areas and away
from civilian persons to the extent possible.261 The mere presence of military
objects within civilian areas or near protected persons is not dispositive of the use
of human shields.262 Rather, the military objects must have been purposefully
placed within or in close proximity to the civilian persons or objects with the intent
of using this protected class to immunize the military objects from attack.263
B. Israel's Use ofPalestinianCivilians as Human Shields
There is increasing reason to suspect that Israeli forces used Palestinian
civilians as human shields in their ground offensive in Gaza. If so, this would be
consistent with long Israeli practice in the Occupied Territories; the IDF has
repeatedly been brought before the Israeli High Court and its well-documented
uses of human shields have been consistently criticized by that court. 264 Human
Rights Watch workers are reporting that consistent with previous practice by the
Israeli army,265 they have documented cases in which Israeli troops have entered

Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(c), Dec. 7. 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16
I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol Il]; Customary Intemaional Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note
191, at 334 (see the customary international law articulated in Rule 96). See also Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome
Statute] (classifying as a war crime the utilization of the presence of civilian or other protected person
to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations).
259. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 599 (Rule 156); Rome
Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
260. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 337 (Rule 97); Geneva
Convention IV, supranote 66, at art. 28; Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 51(7).
261. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 58(b). See also id at art. 44 (recognizing that
circumstances may arise in which combatants will mingle with the civilian population, and requiring
that in such cases they carry their arms openly).
262. Id. at art. 50(3).
263. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 340. See also KNUT
DORMANN,

ELEMENTS

OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE

OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT 32 (2003) (referencing the Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), and
quoting Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes Regulations, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Sept.
9, 2002), which states that elements of a "[w]ar crime of using protected persons as shields" include:
"(1) [t]he perpetrator moved or otherwise took advantage of the location of one or more civilians or
other persons protected under the international law of armed conflict" and "(2) [t]he perpetrator
intended to shield a military objective from attack or shield, favour or impede military objectives"). See
also Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 344-45 (explaining that the
travaux prdparatoriesmake it clear that the mens rea requirement for the war crime of human shielding
is specific intent).
264. See Israel Bans Use of Human Shields, Oct. 6, 2005, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle east/ 4314898.stm.
265. Chris McGreal, Demands Grow for Gaza War Crimes Investigation,THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 13,
2009, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/13/gaza-israel-war-crimes.
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civilian homes and forced the inhabitants to remain on the ground floor while the
rest of the house was used by Israeli military personnel as a base and a snipers'
266
position.
In a report from the ravaged southern Gazan village of Khuza'a, Israeli
snipers allegedly shot at civilians from inside a house, while holding the
Palestinian inhabitants hostage during the assault.267 In one of several reported
individual cases of Israelis practicing clear human shielding tactics, a Palestinian
resident of Jabalya recounted how he was taken from his home at gunpoint by
Israeli forces. He was detained for two days, sometimes in handcuffs, and was
made to accompany military personnel into heavy fighting, as well as used to
approach homes where there were known or suspected Hamas militants inside.268
A similar accusation has been made by another person from the same area, who
explained how he was rounded up with several other young men and forced to
approach homes where Hamas militants were suspected of being, in advance of the
Israeli troop approach.269
These incidents closely track humanitarian law's definition of human shields,
in which there is a clear and knowing use of civilian persons and areas with the
intent of immunizing the Israeli forces from attack or harm.
VIII.

DISPROPORTIONATE FORCE

This section examines Israel's disproportionate use of force against
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The proportionality principle is notoriously difficult
to apply in live battle circumstances, and proving violations of the principle is
similarly fraught.27 0 But in the case of Israel's Gaza invasion, Israeli military and
political leaders have repeatedly and explicitly pledged their intention of using
disproportionate force-and then appear to have fulfilled their promises.

266. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Gaza: Military Tactics of Both Sides Endangering Civilians,
Says Amnesty International (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/gazamilitary-tactics-both-sides-endangering-civilians-says-amnesty-inte.
267. Jack Shenker, Chaos in Khoza'a, THE NATION, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/
article/20090130/REVIEW/158145792/1008.
268. Donald Macintyre, My Terror as a Human Shield: The Story of Majdi Abed Rabbo, THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 30, 2009, at 30, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/my-terror-as-a-human-shield-the-story-of-majdi-abed-rabbo-1520420.html
269. Israel Accused of Using 'Human Shields' in Gaza, AL-JAZEERA, Feb. 8, 2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/02/2009291423652274.html.
270. See LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES AND PHILLIPE SANDS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 275-77 (1999). See also Karma Nabulsi:

Crimes of War A-Z Guide, Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/jus-adbellum.html. The analysis of proportionality as ajus in hello principle overlaps, but is distinct from, the
analysis of the proportionality requirement associated with the right of self-defense. First, the jus in
bello version of proportionality is binding on both parties to a conflict. Id. Second, there is a difference
in what proportionality of an attack is measuredagainst. Id. In the self-defense context, proportionality
of force is measured against the harm to which the state is responding. Id. In the jus in bello context,
the proportionality of force measures against the expected cost to civilian lives against the anticipated
military advantage to be gained. Id.
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A. The PrincipleofProportionality
The proportionality requirement can appear confusing and paradoxical. On
the one hand, it functions as a an exception to the principle of distinction, in that
proportionality recognizes that the legitimate use of force may sometimes
knowingly target civilian areas, as long as the military advantage conferred from
such an attack is greater than the harm to the civilians. On the other hand, the
principle of proportionality is often misunderstood to require that there be
equivalent damage caused to both sides for the hostilities to have been lawful. In
fact, the principle of proportionality merely dictates that any harm caused as a
result of the use of force cannot be disproportionate to the military advantage of
the act. Simply put, "the costs of war must not outweigh the benefits."271
The proportionality principle has been codified in international conventions,
such as the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,272 and is accepted as
a part of customary international law. 27 3 As a restraint on the use of force, it applies
throughout a conflict, both when a nation goes to war under presumably justifiable
circumstances (i.e. in situations of self-defense), jus ad bellum, and in the way a
war is conducted, regardless of the reasons for entering into the armed conflict, jus
in bello.274 Under customary international law, the principle of proportionality
states that "launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated, is prohibited."275
International criminal law imposes criminal liability on actors who violate the
principle. Customary international law explains, "launching ... an attack that in
the knowledge that it will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or
damage" constitutes a war crime as a violation of the principle of
proportionality.276 A similar criminal statute exists with the International Criminal

271. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391,
391 n. 1(1993).
272. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 51(5)(b) prohibited to launch "an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."
273. See Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 46, 58 (Rules 14 and
18); William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 539,

544 (1997);

JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW 62 (1985).). A spokesperson for the Executive Branch of the United States has
also endorsed proportionality as part of customary law: Gardam, supra note 271, at 408.
274. See Gardam, supra note 271, at 404-5 and n.3. The general principle of proportionality thus
applies more broadly than the requirement of proportionality attached to the right of self-defense (see
supra Section IV(4)). The measurement of proportionality also differs: for the general principle, the use
of force is delimited by the military advantage to be gained; in the context of self-defense, the use of
force is delimited by the nature of the harm to be redressed by the state that has suffered an "armed
attack."
275. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 46.
276. Id. at 568-60 (Rule 156).
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Court. 277

B. Measuringproportionality
"The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied." 2 78 Because intentionally
targeting civilians or civilian objects as such is prohibited under humanitarian law,
proportionality tends to focus instead on 1) what military objectives are, 2) what
"military advantage" means and what its boundaries are, and 3) how to balance this
against "incidental" harm to civilians.279
The definition of military objectives is guided by two requirements: (1) that
the proposed target "by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military actions;" 280 and (2) that the "total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive
military advantage."281
For the purpose of the first criterion, customary international law considers
legitimate military objectives to be combatants,2 82 civilians taking direct
participation in hostilities, 283 as well as physical objects that comport with the
above described general description. Because there may be ambiguity related to
the classification of buildings and other physical structures, which are generally
civilian in nature as military objectives may be, Additional Protocol I specifically
limited subjective interpretations, erring on the side of classifying such objects as
civilian. The pertinent article states, "[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is
normally dedicated to civilian purposes . . . is being used to make an effective

contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."284
The more subjective second prong of the military objective definition guides
the degree and nature of the military response necessary in relation to the
objective. This clause indicates that even when an object is identified as a military
objective, the means with which it is attacked and the hoped for outcome are not
277. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(iv) ("war crimes" include "[i]ntentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects. . . .")
278. Fenrick, supra note 273, at 545.
279. See id.
280. Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 52(2).
281. Id
282. See id. at art. 43; Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 3, 11
(Rules 1 and 3); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 632, para.

2002, n. 3 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
283. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 51(3); Customary International Humanitarian
Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 19 (Rule 6).
284. Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art. 52(3). In the recent history of significant armed
conflicts, this restriction appears to have been respected both in Serbia and Iraq, despite the presence of
voluntary human shields. Rewi Lyall, Voluntary Human Shields, DirectParticipationin Hostilitiesand
the InternationalHumanitarianLaw Obligations of States, 9 Melb. J. Int'l L. 313, section IV(B)(2008),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/MelbJIL/2008/1 1.html.
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unlimited,285 but rather must be tailored to the needs and exigencies "ruling at the
time." Furthermore, the requirement that the attack on the contemplated objective
give a "definite military advantage" means that "it is not legitimate to launch an
attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages."286
Additional Protocol I requires that the military advantage be "concrete and
direct," 28 7 indicating that military advantage should be evaluated with respect to
discrete battlefield decisions. The travaux preparatoiresof Additional Protocol I
interpreted "concrete and direct" to mean "substantial and relatively close" and
went on to state, "advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would
only appear in the long term should be disregarded."288 Although some
interpretations of military advantage posit that it need not focus on individual
"tactical gains" but can instead be seen as comprising the sum of military actions
in the "full context of a war strategy," 28 9 this perspective is far from being widely
accepted, and appears to contradict the plain language of the Additional Protocol
as well as the intentions of the drafters.
"Incidental" harm to civilians and civilian objects-the counter balance to
military advantage-poses a similar question as to whether harm should be
measured in terms of the immediate impact or the potential long-term effects of the
military action. While there is no definitive rule on this issue, the growing concern
and awareness of the long term effects of certain military actions on the civilian
population, especially those which harm the environment and basic civilian
infrastructures necessary for survival (e.g. water purifying plants, sewage
treatment, etc.), lends support to the position that "planners must consider the longterm, indirect effects on a civilian population," 2 9 0 instead of a myopic immediate
harm analysis. The only limit of this position is that a military strategist's liability
rests on a determination of being "a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information
available to him or her."2 9 1

285. See INTERNATIONAL COMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 282, at 625, para. 1979.
286. Id. at 636, para. 2024.
287. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 51(5)(b).
288. William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable Legal Standardsfor
Combat Activities, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 124 (2007).
289. Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons under
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, 101 (2000), (citing Air & Space Law, in THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S.

ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW

HANDBOOK 27-29 (Richard M. Whitaker, ed. & Scott R. Morris, rev. edit ed., 1997). This latter
perspective, however, does not appear to be strongly supported by international law. The travaux
preparatoiresof Additional Protocol I interpreted "concrete and direct" to mean "substantial and
relatively close" and went on to state, "advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would
only appear in the long term should be disregarded. . . ." Fenrick, supra note 288, at 124.
290. MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR
OPERATIONS
21 n.4
(2000), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph reports/
MR1175/MR1175 .chap2.pdf, cited in Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as
IndiscriminateWeapons under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, n. 62 (2000).
291. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, 1 58 (Dec. 5, 2003). See
also Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 331.
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C. Israel's use of disproportionateforce
Because of the proportionality principle's vague formulation of military
advantage, it creates a "lack of precision [which] operates in the interest of military
rather than that of civilians."292 However, in the assaults on Gaza, Israeli military
and political officials have frequently made explicit statements that in fact they
knowingly and purposely authorized disproportionate use of force, elevating it to
the level of military doctrine.
Months in advance of Operation Cast Lead, Gabriel Siboni, an Israeli army
colonel stated:
[C]hallenges [of Gaza] can be overcome by adopting the principle of a
disproportionate strike against the enemy's weak points as a primary
war effort, and operations to disable the enemy's missile launching
capabilities as a secondary war effort. With an outbreak of hostilities,
the IDF will need to act immediately, decisively, and with force that is
disproportionate to the enemy's actions and the threat it poses. Such a
response aims at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an
extent that will demand long and expensive reconstruction processes.
The strike must be carried out as quickly as possible, and must prioritize
damaging assets over seeking out each and every launcher. 293
This was dubbed the "Dahiya doctrine," referring to the Beirut suburb
flattened during Israel's offensive in Lebanon in 2006, an attack which Human
Rights Watch concluded was "both indiscriminate and disproportionate." 29 4 Israeli
Army Commander Gadi Eisenkot explained the doctrine in an October 2008
interview concerning possible future conflict in Gaza:
What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in
every village from which Israel is fired on . . . We will apply
disproportionateforce on it and cause great damage and destruction

there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are
military bases ... This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it
has been approved.295 (italics added)
Statements by Israeli leaders during the twenty-two day assault on the Gaza
Strip were consistent with the "Dahiya doctrine." Israeli Prime Minister Olmert
during a cabinet meeting in January 2009, vowed that there "will be a
disproportionate Israeli response to the fire on the citizens of Israel and its security

292. Gardam, supranote 271, at 407.
293. Gabriel Siboni, DisproportionateForce: Israel's Concept of Response in Light of the Second
Lebanon War, INSS PUBLICATIONS, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cal-21
&incat-&read=2222.
294. Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Sep. 5, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/05/why-they-died.
295. Joseph Nast, Israel Warns Hezbollah War Would Invite Destruction,REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2008,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE4923I020081003.
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forces."296 Foreign Affairs Minister, Tzipi Livni, was quoted as saying that the
offensive, "Operation Cast Lead," had "restored Israel's deterrence ... Hamas now
understands that when you fire on its citizens it responds by going wild-and this is
a good thing." 297 Commanding officer in the south of Israel, Yoav Galant, stated
that the IDF intended to "send Gaza decades into the past."298
The military advantage conferred to the Israeli military from many if not most
of the attacks is unclear. 29 9 There is serious doubt about whether Hamas' military
capacity was in fact significantly diminished by the Israeli offensive.300 More
pertinent though, is the comparison of the minimal and ineffective resistance301 of
Hamas fighters overall, and the ferocious military might with which it was met. In
this sense, whatever discrete military advantage was gained by these large-scale
attacks was dwarfed by the chaos and bloodshed that it meant for the civilian
population. Amnesty International field workers describe how they "were told that
Palestinian armed groups had fired rockets from nearby open spaces-but it was
hard to see how this could warrant the destruction of entire residential
neighbourhoods," citing specifically to al-Mughraqa where "a quarter of the town
was razed to the ground by Israeli forces." 302 Additionally, the order that the
Givati Shaked battalion received to "fire on anything that moves in Zeitoun,"303 a
neighborhood where dozens of civilians were killed, reveals, at least in some
military operations, a total disregard for balancing the possible military gains
against the harm caused to civilians.
While no armed force is under the obligations to expose themselves to
unnecessary risk of injury, "a willingness to accept some own-side casualties in
order to limit civilian casualties may indicate a greater desire to ensure compliance

296. Rockets hit Israel, Prime Minister Olmert Vows 'Disproportionate' Response, THE
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/ 4420172/=
Rockets-hit-Israel-Prime-Minister-Olmert-vows-disproportionate-response.html.
297. Kim Sengupta & Donald Macintyre, Israeli Cabinet Divided Over Fresh Gaza Surge, THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2009, at 20, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/israeli-cabinet-divided-over-fresh-gaza-surge-1332024.html.
298. Cook, supra note 198, at 2.
299. This is especially true during the ground offensive stage of the conflict, as Israeli officials
admitted that their "target bank" was nearly empty following the weeks of airstrikes. Amos Harel &
Avi Issacharoff, Israel's Aim in Gaza Is to Break Hamas Resistance, HAARETZ, Jan. 4, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1052336.htil; see also Amos Harel, Barak Ravid and Avi
Issacharoff In Response to Gaza Raids, Hamas Threatens to Assassinate Livni, Barak, HAARETZ, Dec.
29, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050681.html; Abraham Rabinovich, Hamas Appeals
for Ceasefire in Gaza, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 2, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.
com.au/story/0,25197,24864396-2703,00.html.
300. Ethan Bronner, Parsing Gains of Gaza War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 18, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/world/middleeast/19assess.html? r-3&hp=&pagewanted=all.
301. Much of the group's manpower remains, mostly because it made a point of fighting at a
distance - or not at all - whenever possible despite the fury of the Israeli advance and bombardment.
Id. Since the start of hostilities, three Israeli civilians have been killed, and ten Israeli soldiers including
three who died from "friendly fire." Id.
302. Widespread Destruction of Homes, supranote 210.
303. Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, supra note 230.
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with the principle of proportionality."304 As one soldier describes, "We knew
everything was booby-trapped, we knew that they would try to kidnap us and if
they did that was the end, we were finished . . . so we took no chances. We

pounded them with fire; they never had a chance."305 Unfortunately, neither did
many Palestinian civilians have a chance.
D. Deterrence and Disproportionality
As we have noted previously, 306one of Israel's apparent goals in launching its
massive attack on the Gaza Strip was to restore its "deterrent capacity." This
position has been summed up by a phrase regularly being used in Israel and among
officials: "the boss has lost it,"3 07 which one commentator describes as "calculated
rage."308 Is this a valid military gain or objective, as some have suggested, that can
be weighed in the proportionality calculus? At least one commentator, noted
military analyst Anthony Cordesman, believes so.3 0 9 We believe not. Terrorizing
1.5 million people so that Hamas, as well as other regional adversaries,3 10 "learns
its lesson" 311 is problematic legally and definitely morally as a "definite military
advantage." It smacks, if anything, as a form of "preventive war," which has failed
to gain broad acceptance as an accepted practice under international law.312
Though there is no requirement under the proportionality rule that damage to
both sides be equivalent, the catastrophic losses suffered by Palestinian civilians,
compared to dubiously classified military objectives and questionable military
advantage Israel received from these attacks, it is fair to conclude that
disproportionate force was clearly used in this conflict.
IX.

FAILuRE
UNITS

To

RESPECT AND PROTECT MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND MEDICAL

Reports emanating from Gaza suggest that Israeli forces violated special
international legal provisions concerning the protection of medical personnel and
units. "Medical personnel" have protected status under customary international

304. Fenrick, supra note 273, at 548.
305. Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, supra note 230.
306. Supra Introduction.
307. Bronner, supra note 300, at 1.
308. Id.
309. See generally ANTHONY CORDESMAN, THE" GAZA WAR": A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS (n. pub.)
67-68, available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza war.pdf.
310. See id.at 27, 31.
311. See ABC News (ABC television broadcast Jan. 4, 2009) (an interview by George
Stephanopoulos
with
Shimon
Peres,
President
of
Israel),
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=6573506&page=1: "We don't intend ... to crush Hamas,
but to crush terror. And Hamas needs a real and serious lesson. They are now getting it." See also
Donald Macintyre and Kim Sengupta, Gaza Sliced in Two by Israel's LandAssault, THE INDEPENDENT,
Jan. 5, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gaza-sliced-intwo-by-israels-land-assault-1225794.html.
312. Brian Angelo Lee, Preventive War, Deterrent Retaliation, and Retrospective
Disproportionality,2009 B.Y.U. L. REv. 253, 284 (2009).

88

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

law, a designation that is accepted by almost every nation. 1 The first paragraph of
Article 20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that "[p]ersons regularly and
solely engaged in the operation of and administration of civilian hospitals,
including the personnel engaged in the search for, removal, and transporting of and
caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm, and maternity cases, shall be
respected and protected." 314 This rule was further articulated in Article 15 of
Additional Protocol I, which states, "civilian medical personnel shall be respected
and protected." 1
The term "medical personnel" is defined in Article 8(c) of
Additional Protocol I.316 The definition recognizes both civilian and military
medical personnel, but limits the designation to individuals who exclusively
perform medical assignments.317 Article 8(c)(ii) mandates that all parties to a
conflict "recognize and authorize" the personnel of aid societies (i.e. the ICRC or
Red Crescent Societies). 318
Similarly, "medical units" have protected status under the rules of customary
international law. Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that,
"[c]ivilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm,
and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all
times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict." 319 These provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I are customary
international law binding on all nations.
A. Attacks on medicalpersonnel
There have been numerous reports by the ICRC and other aid and human
rights organizations that allege attacks upon medical personnel in the field.
Amnesty International alleged that medical personnel came under Israeli fire
repeatedly during the twenty-two day assault on the territory. Seven medical rescue
workers were killed and twenty wounded while transporting or attempting to
collect the dead or wounded in Gaza.320
On January 4, 2009, an ambulance arrived fifteen minutes after a missile
strike in Beit Lahiya. A few minutes later, the ambulance was hit with a tank shell
filled with flechettes, which killed one paramedic and seriously injured another.321
313. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International
HumanitarianLaw, (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/612?OpenDocument.
314. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 20.
315. Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 15.
316. Id. at art. 8(c).
317. Id.
318. Id. at art. 8(c)(ii).
319. This rule is further defined in Article 12(2) of Additional Protocol I, which states that this rule
"shall apply to civilian medical units, provided that they: (a) belong to one of the Parties to the conflict.
. ." or ". . . (b) are recognized and authorized by the competent authority of one of the Parties to the
conflict. . . ." Like medical personnel, the protections include but are not limited to the ICRC and other
recognized aid societies (i.e. PCRS) as well as those belonging to the parties themselves. Id. at art.
12(2).
320. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Attacks on Ambulance Workers in Gaza (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/ambulance-20090128.
321. Id.
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On the same day in Gaza City, three paramedics were killed by Israeli missile fire
as they walked through a small field to reach two wounded men nearby.322
Furthermore, ambulance crews could not reach the bodies of these aid workers for
days because they too were coming under Israeli fire as they approached.323 On
January 9, 2009, the ICRC reported that Israeli forces fired directly upon an aid
convoy.324 On January 12, 2009, several ambulances responded to the site of a sixstorey apartment building that had been hit with two missiles. 325 A doctor and
paramedic entered the building to collect the wounded. The doctor was killed when
an Israeli tank shell was fired into the building despite the fact that there were a
number of ambulances and other aid workers downstairs.326
These acts by the Israeli military appear on their face to violate international
legal norms. The consequences of these violations go beyond the danger and harm
to particular aid workers at a point in time. For example, in the days following the
January 9 incident, the ICRC conducted an investigation into the circumstances of
the incident and ordered their workers to remain within Gaza City. As a result, aid
workers could not gain access to wounded people in other areas. When medical
personnel are attacked, the ICRC and other aid organizations are forced to balance
the safety of their employees with their duty to care for the wounded.327
B. Attacks on medical units
During Israel's assault on the Gaza Strip many "medical units" came under
fire, were damaged, and destroyed. Reports from the territory indicate patients and
medical supplies suffered harm that will have both short and long term effects on
the territory.
Reports from the ICRC state that on one particular day, January 15, 2009,
there were four incidents where various "medical units" in the Gaza Strip came
under Israeli fire. There were two separate attacks on the PRCS compound where
the al-Quds hospital is located. In the first attack Israeli forces shelled the
compound and the al-Quds hospital sustained at least one direct hit. This caused a
fire to break out in the hospital, partially damaging the pharmacy.3 28 All of the
patients had to be moved to the ground floor for their safety.329 In a second attack,
the PCRS compound was shelled once again. Seven hundred people had to be
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Gaza: The Challenge of Reaching
Civilians in Need, Audio Interviews with Antoine Grand, the Head of the ICRC's Sub-Delegation in
Gaza and Said Shaath, a Palestinian ICRC Employee, (Jan. 11, 2009) [hereinafter ICRC audio
transcript] (audio transcript available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestineinterview-i 10109!OpenDocument).
325. Amnesty Int'l, supranote 320.
326. Id.
327. ICRC audio transcript, supranote 324.
328. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Wounded at Risk as Al-Quds
Hospital Is Hit (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-israel-news150109.
329. Id.
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evacuated from the compound, one hundred of them patients at the al-Quds
hospital who had to be moved to Shifa hospital. 330 In the third incident on that
same day, one of the two PRCS warehouses in Gaza was shelled and set ablaze,
causing damage to relief items inside.331 In a fourth incident, an UNRWA
compound was hit by Israeli forces.332 These reports again suggest severe breaches
of international law and warrant further investigation.
X.

FAILURES TO ALLOW FOR THE SEARCH, COLLECTION, EVACUATION,
TREATMENT OF THE DEAD AND WOUNDED

AND

International Law mandates that parties to a conflict must take all possible
measures to collect and evacuate the dead and the wounded and allow for
necessary medical care to those persons. Article 13 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention states that this duty applies to the whole population, military and
civilians alike. 333 Article 16 states that the wounded "shall be the object of
particular protection and respect," and that each party to a conflict must "facilitate
the steps taken to search for the killed and wounded."3 34 Article 17 to Additional
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 specifies that the parties may appeal
to organizations, i.e. ICRC and PRCS, to collect the wounded. 335 Similarly,
customary international law mandates that parties to an armed conflict search for
and collect the dead.3 36 These rules have been accepted into the law and practice of
nations through treaties as well as domestic law and military procedure.
Reports from the territory describe a number of incidents where these rules
were violated by Israel in its twenty-two day assault on Gaza. The number and the
severity of the violations have led al-Haq to question whether there has been an
Israeli policy of denying medical care arbitrarily.337 ICRC reports state that
coordinating with Israeli forces to gain access to wounded people was generally
difficult during this period.338 On January 7, 2009, Israel announced that there
would be a three hour cessation of hostilities each day to allow medics to get to
wounded people. 339 In response, the ICRC made a statement that this action was
not sufficient and aid workers needed to be able to assist people at all times, not
only during a three hour period each day. 340 The ICRC emphasized "the creation of

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 13.
334. Id. at art. 16.
335. Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 17.
336. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 406.
337. Press Release, Al-Haq, Impending Medical Relief in the Gaza Strip: Israel's War Crimes
Against the Injured (Jan. 17, 2009), http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=419.
338. See Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: ICRC Demands Urgent Access to
Wounded as Israeli Army Fails to Assist Wounded Palestinians (Jan. 8, 2009),
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-news-080109.
339. Press Release, Embassy of Isr., Cessation of IDF Activities in Gaza to Facilitate Humanitarian
Activities (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.israelemb.org/Operation%/o2oCast%2oLead/Website4.htm.
340. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Life-Saving Ambulances Must Be
Given Unrestricted Access to the Wounded (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/web/
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humanitarian corridors will in no way alter the fact that civilians living outside
them must also have access to humanitarian aid and medical care at all times." 341
One incident that suggests a glaring violation of international law relating to
the treatment of wounded people is in the ICRC report on the events that transpired
in the by now familiar al-Zeitouna neighborhood January 3-7, 2009. On January 3,
Palestinian families were taking shelter in the homes on that block on orders from
the Israeli military.342 That day, the neighborhood came under heavy shelling,
causing severe damage to persons and property. ICRC workers arrived to render
aid to those in need; however, the IDF refused to grant permission until January 7,
which resulted in worsened conditions and deaths of injured people. On that day,
limited access was allowed to medical aid workers. However, access to some
homes was denied. The IDF refused to remove dirt barriers preventing ambulances
from entering the area. Aid workers were forced to enter and search the area on
foot and were only able to evacuate people using a donkey cart.343
On January 6, 2009, in another incident, the UNRWA shelter for displaced
people in Jabaliya was attacked and forty-three people were killed and many others
injured.344 In addition to UNRWA efforts being affected, an ICRC employee
expressed concern over the attack, "we too had referred families who were seeking
safety to this particular shelter," he stated, "this is a very serious incident which
shows that people cannot be sure of finding safety anywhere right now."345
Another example of Israeli forces denying medical aid to wounded people
comes from the story on the Shurrab family on January 16, 2009.346 That day, a
father and two of his sons came under Israeli gunfire upon exiting their jeep fifty
meters from their home and all three were shot. One son died immediately. The
second son and his father were both badly injured. The soldiers who shot the
family stood by and continued to threaten the men if they moved or used the
phone. Eventually, however, the father was able to reach ICRC and a number of
NGOs by phone. These aid organizations attempted to arrange to render aid to the
family but Israeli forces denied clearance to the relief agencies for nearly 24 hours,
during which time the second son died as well (from the worsening of his injury,
two bullet wounds to the leg).3 47

eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/palestine-israel-news-080109?opendocument.
341. Operational Update, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Gaza: Access to
the Wounded Remains Top Priority (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng
/siteeng0.nsf/html/ palestine-update-060109.
342. Id.
343. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), supra note 338.
344. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), supra note 341.
345. Id.
346. Democracy Now!: Part II: PalestinianUS College Grad Loses 2 Brothers in Israeli Shooting;
Father Watched Son Bleed to Death After Israeli Troops Blocked Ambulances, (PBS television
broadcast Jan. 22, 2009) (video and transcript available at http://www.democracynow.org/
2009/1/22/part ii_palestinian us college grad).
347. Id.
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The actions of Israeli forces alleged in these reports indicate that there may
have been serious violations of international law. The firing upon medical
personnel and medical units, discussed above, makes the collection of and care of
the wounded difficult. Another violation comes from the failure to grant access to
the wounded once medical workers respond to a call for help or a massive attack.
XI. ILLEGAL USES OF WEAPONS

As stated above, attacking civilians with any weapon is categorically
prohibited under international law. Furthermore, with certain weapons that are
indiscriminate in nature or particularly dangerous to human life, international law
mandates that they only be used where there is no alternative and extra care is
taken to protect civilians from harm. Weapons that cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering are prohibited. Reports from the Gaza Strip during Israel's
assault suggest illegal uses of weapons in densely populated civilian areas and
against civilian targets. Other reports allege the use of deadly precision weapons
directly against civilian targets. These actions seem in direct violation of
international legal norms and must be investigated further.
A. Restrictions on the uses ofweapons
International legal principles governing the use of weapons have developed
with the goals of reducing the unnecessary suffering of all people in armed
conflicts and avoiding any unnecessary harm to civilians. Article 35(2) of
Additional Protocol I states, "it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles, and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering." 348 Adherence to this rule of customary international law is
the purpose of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). 349 The CCW consists of the
umbrella treaty and five annexed protocols. The convention itself is written in
general terms to prohibit weapons that are indiscriminate or cause unnecessary
suffering.350 Israel is a party to this convention.351
Article 2 of Protocol III to the CCW states that incendiary weapons may not
be used against civilians or civilian objects.352 Furthermore, it prohibits the use of
incendiary weapons against military targets located within a concentration of
civilians by method of air delivery or any other method, except when the military
objective is clearly separated from civilians and civilian objects. 353 Of 110 parties
to the CCW, 104 have signed on to Protocol III; however, Israel is not a
348. Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 35(2),.
349. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 1523, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter CCWJ.
350. U.N. Office of Geneva, The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C 1257180004BlB30?Open
Document#Top (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
351. CCW, supranote 349.
352. Id. at Protocol III, art. 2.
353. Id.
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signatory.354 Despite its decision not to sign on to Protocol III, Israel has chosen to
incorporate some of its internationally accepted legal restrictions on the use on
incendiary weapons.
B. Israel's use of White Phosphorous
White Phosphorous (WP) is a toxic chemical that is dispersed in artillery
shells, bombs, and rockets. 3 55 A WP shell contains over 100 felt filaments that
ignite on contact with air, drift to the ground and continue to bum.356 Burning WP
creates thick, white smoke.357 It may be used legally as a smoke screen to hide
troop movements. However, the explosion of a WP shell results in the
indiscriminate scattering of fragments,358 so it may not be used against human
beings or in densely populated areas where there is danger that people will be
injured by it. 3 59 This is because WP sparks fires that are difficult to extinguish and
causes very severe bums to human tissue (WP can bum flesh away to the bone, as
it does not stop burning upon contact with the skin).360
On January 21, 2009, the Israeli government admitted that its troops might
have used white prosperous in contravention of international law, despite the fact
that it was claimed up until that point that it was only used for legal purposes. 361
According to senior IDF officers quoted in Ha'aretz, there are two types of
phosphorus munitions that were used in Gaza. The first, are 155mm shells that
contained trace amounts of phosphorus. The second are 88mm and 120mm
standard phosphorus shells that are fired from mortars.362
An internal military inquiry will take place surrounding an incident that
occurred on January 17, 2009 when an Israeli paratroop brigade allegedly fired
twenty standard WP shells in a heavily built up area around Beit Lahiya, including
a UN school.3 63 Israel claims that this could have been caused by a failure of the
GPS that guides the mortars, however, this is the same justification put forth in
2006 for similar incidences in Gaza. 364 This incident is one of many that allege the
use of WP in civilian areas. This, and all others, require further investigation to
determine if these munitions were used in contravention of international law.

354. Id
355. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, AL-JAZEERA, Jan. 19, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.
net/news/middleeast/2009/01/200911916132228885.html.
356. Nicholas Blanford & Robert Marquand, Gaza: Israel Under Fire for Alleged White
Phosphorous Use, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2009/0114/p07s0l-wome.html.
357. Peter Beaumont, Israel Admits Troops May Have Used Phosphorus Shells in Gaza, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/21/gaza-phosphorus-shells.
358. Id
359. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supranote 355.
360. Id.
361. Beaumont, supranote 357.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id
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Many reports of white phosphorous use in civilian areas come from witnesses
who were present when the munitions were fired. Marc Garlasco, senior military
analyst for Human Rights Watch reported watching WP munitions exploding over
the Jabaliya refugee camp, one of the most crowded areas in Gaza, over the fiveday period between January 9 and 14, 2009.365 Other reports indicate that on
January 15, 2009, three shells containing WP hit a UN compound in Gaza city, 366
and on the same day, the al-Quds hospital in Gaza city was hit by a WP shell. 367
Other reports come from those who have witnessed the aftermath of the
attacks. While working in the territory during this period, Amnesty International
(AI) delegates found indisputable evidence of widespread use of WP in densely
populated areas in northern Gaza. Christopher Cobb-Smith, weapons expert for Al,
toured the area on January 19, 2009, with a four-person delegation. 3 68 They
discovered streets and alleyways littered with still-burning wedges of WP and the
remnants of the WP shells and canisters fired by the Israeli army. 369 Donatella
Rovera, Al researcher, says that the use of WP in civilian areas in Gaza is
undeniable. She reported that on January 20, 2009 there were still WP wedges
burning all over Gaza, specifically at the UN school and compound.370
Additionally, doctors in the territory have been reporting serious bum injuries
that they say are likely caused by VP munitions. These bums tend to deteriorate
over time, requiring skin grafts even though none would have been required based
on the initial presentation.371 WP bums may also cause liver and kidney problems.
Doctors are reporting that treating these injuries is difficult because it is difficult to
distinguish WP bums at first, and most doctors have never witnessed WP bums
before. 372 These factors make treating WP bums very difficult and increase the
risk of long-term harm or death of victims. Concern over this led Amnesty
International to call on the Israeli authorities to "disclose the weapons and
munitions used during the fighting in Gaza, citing that they, 'now know that white
phosphorous munitions were used in built-up civilian areas.' It was highlighted
that this information is critical373so that doctors can, 'be fully informed so that they
can provide life-saving care."'
The allegations of WP shells being fired at civilian targets indicate that there
may have been serious breaches of international law by Israeli forces in the Gaza
Strip. Reports from the territory, discussed above, show overwhelming evidence
365.
366.
367.
368.

Blanford & Marquand, supranote 356, at 7.
Beaumont, supranote 357.
Id.
Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supranote 355.

369. Id.
370. Beaumont, supranote 357.
371. Amira Haas, Gaza Burn Victims Exhibit Possible Signs of White Phosphorous Wounds,
HAARETZ, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1061720.html.
372. Id.
373. Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Situation
Report on the Humanitarian Situation in the Gaza Strip, Situation Report No. 16 (Jan. 23, 2009),
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/fd807e4666 1e3689852570d00069e918/f0b7dla3a8e7cfl9852575
52004f640e?OpenDocument.
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that these munitions were either used against civilian targets, or that they were
used without significant precaution, resulting in severe injury to civilians and
civilian objects. Furthermore, the types of injuries linked to WP use raise questions
about use of weapons that inflict superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering in
contravention of international law. These allegations warrant further investigation
as to whether or not international law was violated.
C. Israel's use offlechettes
Flechettes are 4cm-long metal darts that are pointed at the front and have four
fins at the rear.3 74 5000-8000 are packed into 120mm shells that are generally fired
out of tanks.375 When fired, the darts scatter over an area 300M wide by 100M
long. 376beivExperts believe tthey should never be used in built up civilian areas
because this is an anti-personnel weapon designed to penetrate dense vegetation.377
The use of flechette shells is not expressly prohibited by international law.378
However, as they are indiscriminate in nature, many consider their use restricted in
a densely populated area like Gaza. 379 B'Tselem has recorded that flechettes were
used in both Gaza and Lebanon numerous times in the past. 3 80 At present, there are
several reports alleging the use of flechettes in Gaza by Israeli forces during the
twenty-two day assault on the territory. One incident involving the use of
flechettes is mentioned above, in which an ambulance was hit with a tank shell
filled with flechettes, killing one paramedic and seriously injuring another.381 On
January 5, 2009, several flechette shells were fired on the main road in the town of
'Izbat Beit Hanoun.382 Two civilians were killed and several others were injured.383
On January 7, 2009, a flechette shell struck a home in the village of al-Mughraqua
killing a father and his two children.

384

At this time, there is strong evidence that

these indiscriminate weapons were used in populated civilian areas, constituting a
severe breach of international law. The international community should take action
to further investigate the use of flechettes in Gaza.
D. Allegations concerning Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME) and other
experimental weapons
Dense

Inert

Metal Explosives (DIME,

also known

as zamma or

374. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Israeli Army Used Flechettes Against Gaza Civilians (Jan. 27,
2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israeli-army-used-flechettes-against-gazacivilians-20090127.
375. Id.

376. Id
377. Id.
378. Jonathan Cook, Israeli Weaponry Under Scrutiny, THE NATIONAL, Jan.
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090112/FOREIGN/150565837.

379. Id.
380. Id.
381.
382.
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"mosquito" 385) are dispersed by shells that expel "a blade of charged tungsten dust
that bums and destroys everything within a four-meter radius."386 The pressure
wave created by the detonation of a DIME device moves from the ground up,
causing the amputation of the lower limbs and abdomen.387 The U.S. Air Force
developed DIME devices as precision weapons. They are designed for use in urban
areas because the explosions they create are highly lethal, but have a very limited
range of explosive force. 88 DIME devices contain radioactive materials that have
long-term effects on victims, including cancer.389
DIME devices are not an officially licensed weapons as they are still
experimental; therefore, they are not covered under any specific provisions of
international law that refer to specific weapons. 390 The use of DIME is governed
by international law that governs the use of weapons in general. These legal norms,
discussed above, state that the targeting of civilians is a violation of international
law as is the failure to take special care to limit harm to civilians and civilian
objects. Furthermore, as discussed above, it is a violation of international law to
use weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
Due to the nature of DIME devices as precision weapons, the incidences of
civilian casualties resulting from their use are alarming. Dr. Erik Fosse, a
Norwegian doctor working in the Al-Shifa hospital in northern Gaza, reports that
most of the patients he saw with injuries thought to be caused by these devices
were children.3 91 This indicates that the devices must have been detonated within
four meters of these children. 392
The use of DIME is somewhat difficult to detect; however, doctors working
in Gaza have learned that it is an indication that DIME devices are being used
where both legs are lost in an attack as opposed to one.393 Dr. Jan Brommundt of
Medecins du Monde noted greater incidences of these types of injuries in Khan
Younis during Israel's assault on the territory.39 Dr. Fosse noted a significant
increase in the number of double amputations at al-Shifa hospital as well. 395 He
suspected DIME devices because of the nature of the amputations and the large
amounts of flesh tom off of the lower bodies of victims. 396 Dr. Mads Glibert, a
Norwegian specialist working at al-Shifa hospital, also reported that the injuries he
had seen were consistent with DIME. He stated that the wounds from this weapon
are distinctive. It results in severed or melted limbs and internal abdominal
385. Interview by Rose Mishaan with Shabbir Wadee, M.D., in Gaza City, Gaza (Feb. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter Shabbir Wadee interview] (on file with author).
386. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supranote 355.
387. Id.
388. Blanford & Marquand, supranote 356, at 7.
389. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supranote 355.
390. Cook, supra note 378.
391. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supranote 355.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supra note 355.
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ruptures. No shrapnel is found on the body; only a dusting of metal particles
becomes visible upon autopsy. Similar injuries were witnessed when Israel
attacked Gaza in 2006, possibly caused by a prototype weapon similar to DIME.397
Other reports allege uses of new or experimental weapons based on neverbefore-seen injuries witnessed by doctors working in the Gaza Strip. Miri
Weingarten, spokesperson for Physicians for Human Rights, stated that physicians
suspect that Israel has been using a new weapon akin to DIME called kalanit
(anemone), which is a shell that shoots out hundreds of discs.3 98 Doctors have
reported removing these discs from patients' bodies and have noted that they cause
both bilateral and unilateral amputations and irregular cuts.3 99
Dr. Jan Brommundt, a German doctor working in Khan Younis, recently dealt
with never before seen abdominal injuries resulting from Israeli attacks on Gaza.
She explained that some patients presented with a slight pain that deteriorated to
"acute abdomen," like appendicitis, within one to five hours.400 When doctors tried
to perform an operation, they discovered dozens of lxi millimeter or 1x2
millimeter particles in the patient's organs.4 0 1 This type of injury cannot be treated
and most patients die from multi-organ failure and septicemia within twenty-four
hours.402 These injuries are most likely caused by an explosive shell that disperses
small particles that penetrate all of the bodies' internal organs. 403
In addition to reports of new and experimental munitions use in Gaza,
allegations of uranium use have surfaced as well. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has opened an investigation into the use of depleted uranium in
munitions used in Gaza.404 This type of uranium is added to weapons because it
allows them to penetrate armor more easily; however, dust left behind at blast sites
may be linked to cancer.405 Inquiry by a British newspaper found elevated levels of
radiation at Israeli missile craters.406
Suspicions surrounding the use of DIME and other experimental weapons in
Gaza, as well as allegations that depleted uranium weapons were used, demand
further investigation. The international community must exercise diligence in
determining precisely what these weapons are and why they were selected by
Israel for use in Gaza. First, it is important to know how these weapons function to
determine if they were properly selected for use on certain targets and to explain
the large number of civilian casualties resulting from them. Second, it is important

397. Cook, supra note 378.
398. Id.
399. Shabbir Wadee interview, supra note 385.
400. Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, supra note 355.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. UN to Probe Weapons Used in Gaza, AL-JAZEERA, Jan. 22, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.
net/news/middleeast/2009/01/2009121134641106186.html.
405. Id.
406. Cook, supra note 378.
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to determine their short and long-term effects, so that victims may be treated, if
they can be treated at all. Details in the reports thus far indicate that Israel may
have violated multiple provisions of international law by using these weapons,
including the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, using weapons that cause
superfluous harm or unnecessary suffering, using weapons that are indiscriminate
in nature, and failing to allow for the medical attention to the wounded required by
their condition.
XII.

THE BOTTOM LINE: ISRAEL'S TOLL OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION

The toll on the civilian population of Israel's apparently indiscriminate and
disproportional assault on the Gaza Strip has been nothing short of catastrophic.
UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon has described the aftermath of the attacks on
Gaza as "shocking and alarming. These are heartbreaking scenes."407 Antoine
Grand, head of the ICRC office in Gaza, described Gaza residents as "if they were
waking from a nightmare." 408 In a joint statement prepared by Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes and UN Special Coordinator for
the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry, the UN officials stated that "[t]he
mission was struck by the scale and urgency of the needs of the people of Gaza,
and the heavy and multi-faceted impact that this conflict has had on the civilian
population." 409 And the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator described that "it is
shocking that civilians suffered so disproportionately in this military operation."410
As of February 5, 2009, there are 1,440 Palestinians dead, 431 of them
children and 114 women. 411 The number of injured Gazans is at 5,380, 1,872 of
whom are children, and 800 women.412 These figures do not include people who
died due to lack of access to regular health care,413 or the injuries and death of the
approximately 3,700 women who went into labor during the hostilities.414 The
number of dead, however, may continue to rise as family members report deaths,
and people unaccounted for are dug out of the rubble.415

407. UN to Embark on HumanitarianAssessment in Post-Conflict Gaza, UN NEWS CENTRE, Jan.
21, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=29612&Cr-gaza&Crl.
408. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Massive Devastation Calls for Vast
Humanitarian Effort (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-update200109?OpenDocument.
409. Senior UN Officials Survey 'Shocking' Aftermath of Israeli Offensive in Gaza, UN NEWS
CENTRE, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=29630&Cr=gaza&Crl.
410. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), supranote 373.
411. Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Field
Update
on
Gaza
from
the
Humanitarian
Coordinator
(Jan.
27-29,
2009),
http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisis/admin/output/files/ocha optgaza humanitarian situation report 2
009 01 29 english.pdf.
412. Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Field
Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator (Feb. 3-5, 2009), http://www.ochaopt.org/
gazacrisis/admin/output/files/ocha optgaza humanitarian situation report 2009 02 05 english.pdf.
413. Id.
414. Press Release, U.N. Population Fund, Restoring Reproductive Health Services and Addressing
Post-Traumatic Stress in Gaza Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.unfpa.org/news/news.cfm?ID=1248.
415. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), supra note 410.
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The health situation is dire; pre-conflict health care was already deficient due
to the closures, and the massive amounts of injured and traumatized Gazans are left
with even fewer resources. The World Health Organization reports that "15 of
Gaza's 27 hospitals suffered damage, 9 [Ministry of Health] and 6 NGO hospitals,
among them Al-Wafa rehabilitation hospital, which is Gaza's only rehabilitation
hospital."4 16 Primary care clinics have also been subject to massive destruction.417
The agency UNFPA, in addition to rehabilitating and restoring health units and
launching a mental health initiative aimed at women and young people coping with
the aftermath of the war, must also reconstruct the "key primary care clinics and
five hospitals that were damaged in the incursion." 418
Access to potable water has been greatly diminished. One-fifth of the
population lacks direct access to drinking water,419 and though UNICEF has been
delivering water purification tablets, they only have enough for a fraction of the
Gaza population. 420 The Sheikh Ajleen sewage treatment plant, which processed
sewage for about 400,000 people, was severely damaged after being hit by Israeli
fire during the hostilities, causing raw sewage to pour into rivers, residential areas,
and the Mediterranean Sea,42 1 and posing serious health risks.422 UNICEF
estimates the damage to the water sector at $3.5 million.423
The full extent of damage to residential buildings is still unknown, but ICRC
will be providing bedding and other household supplies to around 80,000
people.424 ICRC delegate J6rome Giraud reports that "[t]he level of destruction is
absolutely overwhelming .

.

. Most people have not been able to move back to

their houses. Many checked on their homes, but then decided to return to the
UNRWA shelters. They had no other choice."425
With seven schools completely destroyed, dozens more damaged, and
significant losses of materials, classrooms are taking two to three shifts a day to
accommodate as many students as possible.426 Upon return to her school one
416. Press Release, World Health Org., Health Action in Crisis: Health Situation in Gaza (Feb. 4,
2009), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/wbgs/sitreps/gaza_4feb2009/en/index.html.
417. Id.
418. U.N. Population Fund, supranote 414.
419. Press Release, Relief Web, Gaza: Emergency Aid Alone is not Enough (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EDIS-7NJNSD?OpenDocument.
420. UN to Embark on HumanitarianAssessment in Post-ConflictGaza, supra note 407.
421. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, TV News Footage: Emergency Aid Alone
Cannot Rebuild Gaza (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/palestine-israeltvnews-230109.
422. Id.; Relief Web, supra note 419.
423. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), supra note 373.
424. Press Release, The Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Gaza: Massive Devastation Calls for Vast
Humanitarian Effort (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/palestine-update200109?OpenDocument.
425. Id.
426. Press Release, UNICEF, Back to School in Gaza, Children Welcome Chance to Resume
Normal Lives (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt 47592.html; McGirk, supra
note 204.
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student remarked, "I was shocked from the scenes that I saw-classrooms damaged,
windows broken, every comer in the school reminds us of the war."427
As a whole, Gaza's infrastructure and industrial sector have been devastated.
In Northern Gaza, households are receiving around six hours of power a day.428
Gaza's factory row was almost entirely wiped out in the bombings, and the UN
estimates total damages at $1.5 billion. 429 "Getting this infrastructure up and
running will require the unrestricted and constant flow of building materials and
other necessary items into the territory," explained Antoine Grand, head of the
ICRC office in Gaza.430
OCHA has announced that "only $63 million of the $117 million needed for
priority projects in Gaza has been committed or pledged so far."431 Though
humanitarian and financial help may be more forthcoming as the magnitude of the
damage becomes more widely known, Israel's unrestrained punishment of Gazan
civilian infrastructure may have served as a deterrent not only to its enemies, but
also as a deterrent to donors, who may be asking themselves, as Norway's Foreign
Minister put it, "[s]hall we give once more for the construction of something which
is being destroyed?" 43 2
XIII. HAMAs

AND ALLEGATIONS OF WAR CRIMES

While Israel has a special duty to the people of the effectively occupied
territory of Gaza under the laws of belligerent occupation,433 this does not release
Hamas from responsibility for its conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict.
Specifically, Hamas fighters may be held liable for war crimes for deliberately
targeting civilians and civilian objects, or employing weapons indiscriminately.
However, Israeli allegations that Hamas has employed Palestinian civilians as
"human shields" have not been substantiated.
As detailed above, the principle of distinction is one of the cornerstones of
International Humanitarian Law, the prohibition on purposefully targeting civilian
persons and objects being codified in every humanitarian legal instrument, court or
tribunal mandate, and universally accepted to be part of customary international
law.434 While civilians are not immune from attack, according to the principle of
proportionality and military advantage, they are never to be the object of an attack.
This principle is just as binding on non-state actors as it is on nation states.435

427. UNICEF, supranote 426.
428. Relief Web, supranote 419.
429. McGirk, supra note 204.
430. Relief Web, supranote 419.
431. UN to Embark on HumanitarianAssessment in Post-conflict Gaza, supra note 407.
432. Cook, supra note 198.
433. Geneva Convention IV, supranote 66, at arts. 2, 6.
434. The principal of distinction is one of the "cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting
the fabric of humanitarian law. . . ," as well as one of the "intrangressable principles of international
customary law." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, at
78-79 (July 8); Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 3, 36;
Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol II, supranote 126, at 3, 296.
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Since the start of hostilities, Hamas fighters have continued to fire missiles
aimed at civilian areas in southern Israel.436 Furthermore, on many occasions,
Hamas has stated that its aim is to target and terrorize the civilian population. 43 7
These acts, regardless of the actual damage inflicted,438 appear in serious breach439
of the laws and customs of war, and Hamas fighters could be held liable for a
variety of war crimes." 0
Military actions by Hamas against Israeli military objectives, 441 however, do
not constitute war crimes unless such military objectives are targeted along with
civilian ones in an indiscriminate manner,442 or the military advantage gained by
attacking Israeli military objects is outweighed by the harm caused to civilians.
The placement of military objectives close to or within civilian areas on the part of
the Israeli military 443 raises questions about whether some of the damage in parts
of southern Israel, 444 on which Hamas rockets landed, are considered unlawful
indiscriminate attacks.44

ENFORCEMENT 246 (2007).
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30, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1042031 .html; Curt Goering, A Day in Southern Israel,
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The Israeli government has alleged that Hamas fighters have committed war
crimes by using Palestinian civilians as "human shields."" 6 This accusation has
been used both as an indictment of Hamas's conduct during the ongoing hostilities,
as well as a defense for the high numbers of Palestinian civilian casualties and
civilian structural damage caused by the Israeli military assault." 7 However, the
use of Palestinian civilians and civilian objects as human shields by Hamas fighters
in the current conflict has been largely unsubstantiated and in some cases openly
refuted and disproven.
In order to establish that Hamas fighters are in fact using civilian areas and
persons as shields, it must be shown that Hamas militants' intent is to use those
areas or protected persons in order to immunize themselves from attack.448 As a
Human Rights Watch report explains, "[i]ndividuals responsible for shielding can
be prosecuted for war crimes; failing to fully minimize harm to civilians is not
considered a violation prosecutable as a war crime. To constitute shielding, there
needs to be a specific intent to use civilians to deter an attack." 4 49 While this
differentiation may seem more technical than moral or practical, the intent element
of the crime of human shielding is crucial; otherwise, any armed force that was
backed into a civilian area because of the flow of battle would be rendered
impotent to defend itself militarily under humanitarian law.
Many reported incidents of Hamas fighters using human shields do not
provide enough information about the incidents to be at all conclusive about
possible "human shielding." Most of the reports lack firsthand accounts of whether
or not civilians were present during incidents in which Hamas fighters were
located in civilian areas due to the complete ban of allowing journalists into the
Gaza Strip until weeks into the conflict. 45 0 Furthermore, there are tens of thousands
thought legitimately to be aimed at military objectives, would be considered indiscriminate because of
the lack of precision of the weapons used. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra
note 191, at 3, 25, 40-41 (Rules 1, 7, 12(b)); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66, at art. 3.
446. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas Use of Civilians as Human Shields
(Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Hamas
ExploitationCivilians Jan 2009.htm.
447. IsraelShatters Key Hamas Targets, SKYNEWS, Dec. 29, 2008, http://news.sky.com/skynews/
Home/World-News/Israel-Bombs-Gaza-Islamic-University-Shattering-Key-Hamas-Cultural-SymbolWhilst-Ground-Troops-Move/Article/200812415194709; Press Release, Isr. Def. Forces, IDF Targets
Hamas Government
Terrorist Infrastructure In The Gaza Strip (Dec. 27, 2008),
http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/opcast/op/press/2701.htrn.
448. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 340 (Rule 97). See also
Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii). DORMANN, supra note 263, at 344-45 (explaining
that the travaux prdparatoriesmake it clear that the mens rea requirement for the war crime of human
shielding is specific intent).
449. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING THE

2006 WAR VI(D) (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/05/why-they-died. See also
Lyall, supra note 284, at 316 (explaining that "liability does not attach to a breach of art. 58 amounting
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of Gazan residents who have been displaced from their homes because of Israeli
bombings and attacks,451 indicating that many civilian areas have been emptied of
their residents perhaps before Hamas fighters arrived. In assessing Hamas's
culpability, due attention must also be paid to the possibility that Hamas fighters
had been forced to retreat into densely populated areas in the face of an onslaught
from an overwhelmingly superior military force, merely in order to survive.452
A party to an armed conflict where the adversary employs the tactic of human
shielding is still bound by the fundamental humanitarian principle of distinction,
which specifies that civilians and non-military objectives may never be the
intended targets of military actions.453 Statements made by Israeli officials, such
as Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni who stated, "we cannot avoid completely
any kind of civilian casualties. But the responsibility for this lies on Hamas'
shoulders,"454 demonstrates a lack of understanding that liability for violations of
the principle of discrimination cannot be transferred to the other party even if
human shields are used.
Further investigation of Hamas's battlefield practices is no doubt due. But the
evidence that Hamas fighters exploited Palestinian civilians as human shields is, at
this point, scant. Rather, the accusation seems more likely a part of Israel's
calculated "spin" operation 45 5 that attempts to shift responsibility for civilian
deaths from Israel to Hamas.
XIV. LIABILITY AND

THE END

OF ISRAELI IMPUNITY

A. State Liability
Israel, under international law, is liable for its violations of its international

legal obligations. Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions (AP I) provides that "[a] Party to the conflict which violates the
provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be
liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by
451. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Field Update on Gaza from the
Humanitarian Coordinator, supranote 412.
452. Israeliforces Surround Gaza City, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, http://www.irishtimes.com/
newspaper/breaking/2009/0104/breakingl.htm; Israeli Forces Partially Surround Gaza City, Ehud
Barak Says, FRANCE 24, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.france24.com/en/20090104-clone-battles-rageisraeli-troops-push-deeper-gaza-; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
Situation Report from the Humanitarian Coordinator, Jan. 5, 2009 ("Israeli ground forces are currently
deployed around the large Palestinian population centres in the northern Gaza Strip (Gaza City, Beit
Hanoun, Beit Lahiya, and the Jabalia Refugee Camp), eastern Gaza Strip, between the Gaza
governorate and Middle Area, and in southeast Rafah."); IsraeliForces, Tanks Advance Bisecting Gaza,
CBSNEWS, Jan. 4, 2009, http://cbs5.com/national/israel.hamas.strikes.2.899569.html.
453. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 66 at art. 3; Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at art.
13(2); Additional Protocol I, supra note 226, at arts. 48, 51(4), 50(3), 51(8); Hague IV, supra note 47,
at art. 23(g); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at
78-79 (July 8); Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 3, 17, 37, 40
(Rules 1, 5, 11, 12(a) and (c)).
454. IsraelShatters Key Hamas Targets,supra note 447.
455. Ravid, supranote 7.
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persons forming part of its armed forces."456
Rules 149, 150 and 158 of ICRC study on customary international law (ICRC
study) provide for the customary rules for state responsibility.457 Rule 149 provides
that:
[a] State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law
attributable to it, including: (a) violations committed by its organs,
including its armed forces; (b) violations committed by persons or
entities it empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority;
(c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its
instructions, or under its direction or control; and (d) violations
committed by private persons or groups which it acknowledges and
adopts as its own conduct. 458
Rule 150 provides that responsible states are required to make reparations for
loss or injury caused. 459 Finally, Rule 158 imposes a duty to investigate and
prosecute war crimes committed by their own nationals or armed forces, or those
that occurred upon their territory.460
Further, Israel, in the Adolf Eichmann case, has recognized and affirmed the
principle of state responsibility. In Eichmann, the Israeli High Court stated that "it
is true that under international law Germany bears responsibility for all the crimes
that were committed as its own acts of State, including the crimes attributed to the
accused." 46 1 This recognition is made again in the Report on the Practice of Israel,
which states that Israel acknowledges and supports the view that states bear a
responsibility under international law, for all violations of the laws of war
perpetrated by them or by individuals under their responsibility.462
In the present situation, these rules of customary international law impose
upon Israel: (1) responsibility for actions taken by its officials and the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF); (2) a duty to make reparations for any injury or loss caused
to Gazans; and (3) a duty to investigate and prosecute any war crimes perpetrated
by its officials and IDF officers both in Israel and, as the occupying power, in
Gaza.
B. Individual CriminalLiability
Beyond state responsibility, under international criminal law, individuals can
be held accountable for actions taken which violate certain principles of
international humanitarian law and international human rights. Nuremberg
Principle One states that "[a]ny person who commits an act which constitutes a

456. Additional Protocol I, supranote 226, at art. 91.
457. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 530, 537, 607 (Rules
149, 150, 158).
458. Id. at 530 (Rule 149).
459. Id. at 537 (Rule 150).
460. Id. at 607 (Rule 158).
461. State of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jer. 1968).
462. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II, supra note 126, at 6.
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crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." 463
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg affirmed this principle where it
proclaimed that "individuals can be punished for violations of international law.
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities,
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced." 464
Under these norms, individual liability has been firmly established for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Further, liability can incur not only
for actual commission of a war crime, but also for "attempting to commit a war
crime, as well as for assisting in, facilitating, aiding or abetting the commission of
a war crime . . . [and] for planning or instigating the commission of a war

crime.

,,461

Rules 151 - 155 of the ICRC study provide the customary rules for individual
criminal liability.466 The same rules apply regardless of whether the crimes alleged
were perpetrated during an international or non-international armed conflict. The
rules provide for individual criminal liability for any war crime committed (Rule
151), command responsibility for crimes perpetrated pursuant to their orders (Rule
152), command responsibility for failure to prevent or punish with knowledge of a
war crime (Rule 153), and subordinate responsibility, where there is knowledge
that an act would be unlawful, regardless of the presence of a superior order (Rule
155).467 These rules are substantially the same as the basis for individual criminal
liability found in Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute),468 which is commonly accepted as a codification of
customary international criminal law at the time of enactment. 6 9

Thus, crimes

against humanity and war crimes, as defined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome
Statute, also form customary international law.470 In the present situation, Israeli
officials and IDF members could be charged with individual criminal liability for
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity for the operation in
Gaza.471

463. U.N. International Law Commission, Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized in the
Charter of the Niremberg Tribunaland in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle 1, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%/o20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.
464. U.N. International Military Tribunal, Judgment: Law of the Charter, Judgment of the
InternationalMilitary Tribunalfor the Trial of German Major War Criminals, (1951), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
465. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supranote 191, at 554.
466. Id. at 551, 556, 558, 563, 565 (Rules 151, 152, 153, 154, 155).
467. Id.
468. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 25.
469. ROBERT CRYER, ET. AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 126 (2007).

470. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supranote 17, at 24-25.
471. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Time for Accountability in Gaza and Southern Israel (Jan. 26,
2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-for-action/time-accountability-gaza-and-southern-israel.

106

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

The elements of crimes against humanity require that the act in question be
committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population with knowledge of the attack ... " Further, crimes against
humanity do not require a situation of armed conflict.473 During the recent attack
on Gaza, Israeli officials and IDF members could be held accountable for crimes
against humanity for, among others, collective punishment 474 and unlawful killing
of civilians 475 as discussed in section 7(1)(h), section 7(1)(a), and 7(1)(b).
War crimes include violations that are considered to be "[g]rave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions" 476 and those that constitute "[o]ther serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict . . .
The crimes
that appear to be most relevant for the present circumstances include, among
others: (1) willful killing; 478 (2) extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly; 479 (3) intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population not
taking part in hostilities or civilian objects; 48 0 (4) attacks against humanitarian
personnel and installations; 48 1 (5) attacks on buildings dedicated to religion or
education, hospitals, buildings, medical units or personnel using the emblems of
the Geneva Conventions; 48 2 (6) destruction or seizure of enemy property not for
military necessity; 48 3 (7) employing weapons or materials and methods of warfare
which can cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or weapons which are
inherently indiscriminate; 48 4 (8) utilizing human shield;4 85and (9) employing
intentional starvation by deprivation of objects indispensable for survival or willful
impeding of relief supplies. 48 6 The substance of these alleged crimes are discussed
in detail in previous sections.
C. Ending IsraeliImpunity: Venues for "Prosecution"
The recent events in Gaza have sparked an outcry in the international
community for criminal accountability for Israeli military and political leaders.487
Navanethem Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated to the
472. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 7.
473. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supranote 17, at 5.
474. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 7(1)(h).
475. Id. at art. 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b)
476. Id. at art. 8(2)(a).
477. Id. at art. 8(2)(b).
478. Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(i).
479. Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
480. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(i), (ii), & (iv).
481. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iii).
482. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ix), & (xxiv).
483. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xiii).
484. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
485. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
486. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
487. Amnesty Int'l, supranote 471; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Israel/Gaza: International
Investigation Essential (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/27/israelgazaintemational-investigation-essential.
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special session of the Human Rights Council on the situation in Gaza488 that:
[a]ccountability must be ensured for violations of international law. As a
first step, credible, independent, and transparent investigations must be
carried out to identify violations and establish responsibilities. Equally
crucial is upholding the right of victims to reparation. I remind this
Council that violations of international humanitarian law may constitute
war crimes for which individual criminal responsibility may be
invoked. 489
The Security Council, in Resolution 1674, reaffirmed the principle that the
elimination of a culture of impunity is important both to prevent future abuses and
make reparations for past abuses and violation:
... ending impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering
from conflict is to come to terms with past abuses committed against
civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses,
draws attention to the full range of justice and reconciliation
mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and
"mixed" criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation

commissions, and notes that such mechanisms can promote not only
individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also peace, truth,
90
reconciliation and the rights of the victims.4

In order to bring an end to the impunity generally afforded Israeli security and
defense forces, it is paramount to hold both the Israeli state and its individual
actors responsible for their international human rights law and international
humanitarian law violations for their recent operation in Gaza.
D. Special Tribunalpursuantto Security Council Chapter 7 powers
In the last sixteen years, the Security Council has exercised its Chapter 7
powers four times to create or assist with the creation of a special tribunal in an
attempt to give form and effect to international criminal justice. These actions have
resulted in the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 491 The
Security Council could, if it chose, establish a tribunal to investigate and try
alleged war crimes in the Gaza invasion.

488. Press Release, U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Statement of Ms. Navanethem Pillay,
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Ninth Special Session of the Human
Rights Council on The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Including the Recent Aggression of the Occupied Gaza Strip, (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.unhchr.ch/
huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/D78B7DAC697D3060C1257539003B5F3A?opendocument.

489. Id.
490. S.C. Res. 1674, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
491. See S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. S/REs/827, (May, 25, 1993); S.C. Res 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955, (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757, (May 30, 2007); S.C. Res 1315,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315, (Aug. 14, 2000).
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Yet any non-procedural decision taken by the Security Council will be subject
to the Article 27(3) veto power granted to the permanent members of the
Council.492 The United States, which has a long history of using its veto power on
Security Council resolutions related to Israel,493 would necessarily have to approve
of the creation of such a tribunal, which, given the past record seems unlikely.
Perhaps the recent change of administration in the United States will move towards
a change in U.S. policy in this area, but the new administration has made no
statement to indicate movement towards such a change.494
In requesting that the Secretary-General negotiate with the Government of
Sierra Leone, the Security Council recognized that "a credible system of justice
and accountability for the very serious crimes committed there would end impunity
and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration
and maintenance of peace . . ."495 A similar recognition is needed here in relation
to the Israeli operation in Gaza; the question is whether such a recognition will
ever be made.
E. The InternationalCriminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC), while arguably the ideal venue for
prosecutions on individual criminal liability, likely lacks jurisdiction over the
crimes committed in the present situation. Israel, as a non-signatory to the Rome
Statute,496 falls outside the general jurisdiction of the ICC, and as such, the ICC has
limited power to investigate and prosecute the possible war crimes perpetrated by
Israel from December 27, 2008 through the declaration of a ceasefire on January
18, 2009. This could only happen in three possible ways, all of which are unlikely
to result in actual ICC investigations and prosecutions.
First, Israel could ratify the Rome Statute and submit to the jurisdiction of the
ICC. But this in itself is insufficient because the ICC can only prosecute crimes
that occur after ratification of the treaty by the state party. As such, in the situation
where Israel submits to ICC jurisdiction, they would have to make a declaration
under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute accepting jurisdiction over the crimes in
question.497 Further, ratification looks to be unlikely. In June 2002, Israeli Ministry
of Foreign Affairs released their views on the ICC. 498 They expressed concerns that
492. U.N. Charter art. 27(3).
493. Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tablesand-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/subjects-of-un-security-council-vetoes.html (last visited Sept.
14, 2009). See also Barry James, Unlike U.S., France Uses Its Veto Power Sparingly, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/03/news/03iht-veto ed3 .html.
494. Richard Lister, Obama's Strategic Silence on Gaza, BBC NEWS, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7812498.stm,
495. U.N. Indep. Special Court, Council Asks Secretary-General, Sierra Leone To Negotiate
Agreement For Creation OfIndependent Special Court,U.N. Doc. SC/69 10 (Aug. 14, 2000).
496. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute (July 21, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties.
497. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 12.
498. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel and the International Criminal Court
(June 30, 2002), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Israel%/ 20and%/20the
o20lnternational%20Criminal o20Court.
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"the court will be subjected to political pressures and its impartiality will be
compromised." 499 Those concerns were found upon what the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs described to be: (1) a highly selective list of crimes; (2) the method of
judicial appointment, specifically the regional appointment structure which would
likely preclude the appointment of an Israeli judge; (3) the extensive powers of the
Office of the Prosecutor; and (4) a concern that the ICC statute attempted to
rewrite international law, in particular they were troubled by the inclusion of "the
transfer, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies" as a war crime.500 As none of the
provisions that concern Israel have changed since the release of this statement, 01
absent a re-evaluation by Israel, ratification does not look likely at this point.
Second, the situation could be referred by the Security Council to the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor for investigation pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome
Statute, which states that "[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes
appears to have been committed is referred to the prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.,, 502 This
situation is analogous to the discussion presented above on the exercise of Security
Council power under Chapter VII to create a special tribunal to investigate and
prosecute the crimes in Gaza. This is unlikely to happen due to a likely U.S. veto
of any attempts to take any actions of the sort.
Third, upon referral by a state to the Office of the Prosecutor, the prosecutor
can institute an investigation to ascertain if the situation falls within the jurisdiction
of the ICC.50 3 As of this writing, this option is currently being explored by the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor after they received over 210 appeals for investigation from

the Palestinian Authority, individuals and NGOs.504 On January 21, Ali Khashan,
justice minister for the Palestinian Authority, faxed a letter to the court recognizing
the court's jurisdiction over "acts committed in the territory of Palestine since 1
July 2002."'o On February 3, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC chief prosecutor, in a
change from his statement made in mid-January that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the situation,506 announced that the ICC would begin a preliminary analysis of
the allegations of war crimes in Gaza. 07

499. Id.
500. Id.
501. See generally Rome Statute, supranote 258.
502. Id. at art. 13.
503. Id. at art. 13 and 15.
504. Thijs Bouwknegt, ICC StartsAnalysis of Gaza War Crimes Allegations, RADIO NEDERLAND
WERELDOMROEP, Feb. 3, 2009, http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/
region/middleeast/090203-icc-gaza-war-crimes-redirected.
505. Sebastian Rotella, InternationalCourtMay Look at Recent Gaza Battle, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2009, at 4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/05/world/fg-court-palestinians5.
506. Thijs Bouwknegt, ICC Has No Jurisdiction over Gaza War Crimes Claims, RADIO
NEDERLAND WERELDOMROEP, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.mw.nl/international-justice/article/icc-hasno-jurisdiction-over-gaza-war-crimes-claims.
507. Bouwknegt, supranote 504.
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The first step in this process will be for Mr. Ocampo and the Office of the
Prosecutor to determine if the Palestinian Authority has the power to recognize the
jurisdiction of the court. This step faces two significant obstacles. First, the ICC
can only investigate cases of a nation that has accepted its jurisdiction, and as of
yet the Palestinian Authority has not been recognized by the international
community as a sovereign state. 08 The Palestinian Authority is claiming that as the
"de facto" state in Gaza, it has the power to recognize ICC jurisdiction. 509 Mr.
Kashan, the Palestinian Authority's justice minister stated, "[w]e have the
fundamentals of a state and we have met all conditions required from a state." 1 0
On this matter, Mr. Ocampo stated that "[i]t is the territorial state that has to make
a reference to the court. They are making an argument that the Palestinian
Authority is, in reality, that state."511 Further complicating matters is that after June
2007, the Palestinian Authority no longer holds power in Gaza, which also acts to
cast doubt on their ability to refer the situation to the ICC.512 The ICC, in its
relatively short tenure, has yet to make a decision on such a matter and has
promised careful consideration of the situation and all surrounding factors.513 Mr.
Ocampo has stated that "[e]ach legal area is complicated ... We move when we
are completely sure ... We will consider this carefully and thoroughly." 514
The path to ICC jurisdiction now has an opening due to the Office of the
Prosecutor's recent steps to explore the possibility of bringing the situation in Gaza
to the court. This path though is still fraught with obstacles and due to the lack of
ICC jurisprudence, difficult to predict.
F. Employing Universal Jurisdiction:Prosecutionin domesticjurisdictions
Rule 157 of the ICRC study finds a customary rule which grants states the
right to exercise "universal jurisdiction" over war crimes in their domestic
courts. 15 Over twenty nations have enacted legislation permitting the exercise of
jurisdiction in domestic courts for war crimes,516 and many more have enacted
legislation that allows universal jurisdiction of war crimes considered to be "grave
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions.
The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction, which is considered to be "a progressive restatement of international
law on the subject of universal jurisdiction," helps provide guidelines to the
application of universal jurisdiction by domestic courts. 518 Principle One states that
508. Rome Statute, supra note 258, at art. 11(2); Maev Kennedy and Rory McCarthy, Pope Calls
for 'Sovereign Palestinian Homeland,' THE GUARDIAN, May 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/ 2009/may/13/pope-bethelehem-palestinian-homeland.
509. Bouwknegt, supranote 504.
510. Rotella, supranote 505.
511. ICC looking at ways to prosecute Israeli officers, YNETNEwS, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3665413,00.html.
512. Rotella, supranote 505.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. I, supra note 191, at 604 (Rule 157).
516. Id. at 604 n.190-94.
517. Id. at 606-07, n. 206.
518. STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
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". . . universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the

crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction."5 19
Israel, in its decision in the Eichmann case has recognized and utilized the
principle of universal jurisdiction.
The abhorrent crimes defined under this Law are not crimes under
Israeli law alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind
and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offenses against the
law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium). Therefore, so far from
international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries with
respect to such crimes, international law is, in the absence of an
international court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of
every country to give effect to its criminal interdictionsand to bring the

criminals to trial.The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law
is universal. 520
The court then goes on to further set forth their rationale for individual
liability under universal jurisdiction.
It will be recalled that the reference here is to a group of acts committed
by members of the armed forces of the enemy which are contrary to the
"laws and customs of war." These acts are deemed to constitute in
essence international crimes, they involve the violation of the provisions
of customary international law . . . those crimes entail individual
criminal responsibility because they challenge the foundations of

internationalsociety andaffront the conscience of civilized nations.521

Further, Israeli recognition and fear of the possibility of the exercise of
universal jurisdiction by another domestic court in reaction to the Gaza operation
can be seen in the actions that have been taken by the Israeli government in the
days following the ceasefire. The Israeli cabinet has declared that it would grant
legal aid and support to IDF officers if they face liability for war crimes.522 Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert has been quoted to have said, "[t]he state of Israel will fully
back those who acted on its behalf . .. [t]he soldiers and commanders who were
sent on missions in Gaza must know that they are safe from various tribunals."523
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 -27 (2004).

519. Id. at 21.
520. Shofar FTP Archives, Adolf Eichmann Transcripts, http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/
e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/ftp.py?people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Judgment/Judgment-002
(last
visited Sept. 14, 2009) (emphasis added).
521. Shofar FTP Archives, Adolf Eichmann Transcripts, http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.py?people/e/
eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-07-03 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (emphasis
added).
522. Barak Ravid, Israel to Grant Legal Aid to IDF Troops Accused of Gaza War Crimes,
HAARETz, Jan. 25, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058509.html.
523. Israel to Fight Any War Crimes Charges, CBS NEWS, Jan. 26, 2009,

112

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

In fact, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz stated at the Jerusalem Center for
Ethics conference that "we are preparing for a wave of international lawsuits over
the operation in Gaza." 524 Further, IDF officers planning to travel out of the state
have been told to contact the Judge Advocate General's Office before leaving
Israel, 525 and the IDF censor has applied strict restrictions preventing the media
from identifying officers who participated in the Gaza Strip fighting and the
information about them that may be used in legal proceedings against them
abroad.526
These preceding actions taken by Israel illustrate the very real possibility that
another country could "exercise their obligations to conduct prompt, thorough,
independent and impartial criminal investigations"5 27 in the form of universal
jurisdiction.
G. InternationalCourt ofJustice Advisory Opinion
Article 65 (1) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute provides for
the ICJ to issue advisory decisions on any legal question by request of the UN
General Assembly, Security Council, or other authorized bodies.528 By design,
advisory decisions are non-binding.529
While an advisory opinion by the ICJ may result in an authoritative view of
the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the Gaza
operation, the utility of such an opinion is questionable. Israel has shown complete
disregard for the ICJ in the past, both by their failure to participate in the
proceedings and by their rejection of the final advisory opinion issued in the
proceedings concerning Israel's "separation" wall in the West Bank.530 This
disregard coupled with the non-binding nature of an advisory opinion casts doubt
upon effectiveness of an ICJ decision to actually end Israel's impunity.
H. InternationalCivil Society and boycotts, divestment, and sanctions
The end of apartheid stands as one of the crowning accomplishments of
the past century, but we would not have succeeded without the help of
international pressure- in particular the divestment movement of the

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/25/world/main4752239.shtml.
524. Aviad Glickman, Mazuz: IsraelBracingfor Slew of Lawsuits over Gaza op, YNETNEWS, Jan.
11, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3654464,00.html.
525. Tova Tzimuki, Travel Advisory Issued for Top IDF Officers, YNETNEwS, Jan. 19, 2009,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3658823,00.html.
526. Amos Harel, IDF CensorBans Naming Officers Involved in Gaza op, HAARETZ, Feb. 3, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057964.html.
527. The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
supranote 17, at 19.

528. U.N. Charter art. 65, para 1.
529. The Interpretation of Peace Treaties (First Phase), Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 71, (Mar. 30)
(stating that court opinions "of an advisory nature . . . [have] no binding force."). See also MOHAMED
SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL
ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 113-14 (2003).
530. GERNOT BIEHLER, PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (2008).
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1980s.531
-Archbishop Desmond Tutu
International civil society "prosecution" can help act where traditional forms
of international criminal prosecution have failed. Archbishop Tutu, recognized
with a Nobel Prize for his non-violent struggle to bring peace to South Africa,53 2 in
recognition of the important role that divestment and boycotts played in bringing
about the end of apartheid has stated that "[e]ventually, institutions pulled the
financial plug and the South African Government thought twice about its
policies."533 He then goes further to recommend a similar movement to end the
occupation of Palestine by Israel. 534 In July 2005, such a campaign was called for
by Palestinian non-govermmental organizations with the stated aim for "people of
conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment
initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid
era." 535
The boycott/divestment/sanctions (BDS) movement offers a powerful model
for those seeking justice in Israel/Palestine today. Israel depends on foreign trade
and is sensitive to international opinion, especially in the West, and therefore is
vulnerable from international civil society. When all other avenues are blocked,
and governments fail their responsibilities, citizens must assume responsibility to
ensure respect for international law.
XV. CONCLUSION

There is prima facie evidence that Israel has committed numerous and grave
violations of international law during its assault on the Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters,
too, appeared to have committed war crimes, although on a far lesser scale than
Israel. Further investigation is due in both cases, and if culpability is, indeed,
corroborated, the state of Israel and individuals on both sides must be held
accountable.
In this article, we prioritized Israeli offenses, for two reasons. First, the human
consequences of Israeli violations of international law during Operation Cast Lead
are multiples greater-taking just one measure, the number of lives claimed-100
times greater.536 We do not have figures for property damage caused by Hamas
rocket and mortar fire, but in light of the estimates of property damage in the Gaza

531. Desmond Tutu, Israel: Time to Divest, THIRD WORLD TRAVELER, Feb.
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.conIsrael/IsraelTimeToDivest.html.
532. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize 1984 (Oct. 5,
http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/aureates/1984/press.html.
533. Tutu, supranote 531.
534. Id.
535. Naomi Klein, Enough. It's Time for a Boycott, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 10,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/10/naomi-klein-boycott-israel.
536. Widespread Destruction of Homes, supra note 210; Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza
Orders, supranote 230.

2003,
1984),
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Attack

114

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

Strip,5 37 the differential in respect of that factor may be even greater.
Second, there is no chance that Hamas rocket fire or its other uses of violence
will alter international humanitarian law in any way. Hamas' illegal acts are
roundly and rightly condemned by the international community. Not so of Israel,
that, as we have seen, has consciously and assiduously tried to push the limits of
the law in manners that serve its short-term, military benefit. This campaign at the
margin, and sometimes beyond the margin, of international legality is dangerous,
both for Israel, and for all nations. A common sense measure of the value of a
principle of international humanitarian law is whether one would countenance its
application to one's own country, or to one's own forces in battle. We do not want
another power "knocking on the roofs" of our civilians, nor warning them to
evacuate a city so as to transform it into a free-fire zone.
Israel's capacity to trample international humanitarian law in its current state
is a function of two factors: its overwhelming military superiority as against any
combination of its neighbors; and the cocoon of impunity in which it has been
enwrapped-largely due to the diplomatic cover provided it by the United States.
The United States government has exercised its veto power in the United Nations
Security Council forty-two times-over half the vetoes it has employed since the
birth of the United Nations-to spare Israel censure for its actions.538 In the recent
fighting in Gaza, a Security Council resolution for a ceasefire was delayed in part
out of concern over a probable U.S. veto, permitting Israel to extend its operation
into several weeks.53 9 Meanwhile, U.S. President Obama, as a candidate, affirmed
support for a military aid package for Israel of $3 billion per year for ten years.540
It is true, of course, that customary international law is formed by the actual
practice of states. But there is a difference between assent to the practices of a
particular state, and acceptance that its actions were lawful, on the one hand, and
sullen acquiescence to what the majority of the world's nations resent, but are
powerless to resist, on the other hand. The former represents the natural and
healthy evolution of international law, and the latter, the ancient and discredited
principle that "might makes right." The stature of international law as a whole is
jeopardized by one nation operating in open defiance of its strictures. For the sake
of all nations, and most of all, for the good of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples,
Israel's impunity must end.

537. McGirk, supra note 204.
538. See
Global
Policy

Forum,

Subjects

of

UN

Security

Council

Vetoes,

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/subjectsof-un-security-council-vetoes.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
539. UN Security Council Fails to Agree over Gaza Ceasefire, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Jan. 4, 2009,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/function/0,,12215 cid 3920320,00.html?maca en-en nr-1893-xml-atom.
540. Obama to Increase Aid to Israel, PRESS TV, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.presstv.ir/detail
.aspx?id= 71409&sectionid=3510203.

"LIKE SNOW [FALLING] ON A BRANCH...":
INTERNATIONAL LAW INFLUENCES ON DEATH PENALTY
DECISIONS AND DEBATES IN THE UNITED STATES
RUSSELL G. MURPHY* AND ERIC J. CARLSON*

"[C]apital punishment is unlikely to be undone for any one reason. Like snow
on a branch, it is not any single flake that makes the branch break, but rather the
collective weight of many flakes accumulating over time."'
INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia2
prohibiting the execution of severely mentally retarded individuals, significant
changes have occurred in American capital punishment law. Important restrictions
have been imposed on the types of crimes and criminals that are subject to the
death penalty. At the same time, the Court has refused to give effect to the
judgment of an international human rights tribunal ordering the United States to
review death sentences of Mexican nationals because of international law
violations, 3 and has declined to invalidate the primary method, the three drug lethal
"cocktail," used to execute prisoners. 4 Yet, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court
narrowly held that the death penalty could not be constitutionally extended to nonhomicide child rape. This Article explores how these decisions have been
significantly, but unevenly, influenced by international law, foreign court decisions
and global political actions, and the effect of Supreme Court case law on the death
penalty debate in the United States.
Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law. The author wishes to thank former
Law School
Dean Alfred Aman for his steady support of this project. My Staff Assistant, Andrea Shannon Curley,
provided patient, sustained and totally expert assistance at every stage of the preparation of the Article.
It is dedicated to the one person whose continuing inspiration has made all of my professional
accomplishments possible, my beloved wife Professor Kate Nace Day. [This Article originates from a
lecture delivered on May 14, 2008, at Lund University, Lund Sweden. The lecture is available at
http://wwwjushumanis.org/Expert Seminars/documents/Executing Capital Punishment.doc. A full
text version of the lecture is also published, with footnotes, as Executing the Death Penalty:
InternationalLaw Influences on United States Supreme Court Decision-MakingIn CapitalPunishment
Cases, 32 SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REv. 599 (2009).
" Eric J. Carlson is a 2009 graduate of Suffolk University Law School.
1. Richard C. Dieter, InternationalInfluence on the Death Penalty in the United States, 80
FOREIGN SERV. J. 31 (2003).
2. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that capital punishment of the
mentally retarded is cruel and unusual and prohibited by 8th amendment).
3. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008).
4. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008).
5. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).
*
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Part I of this Article provides a description of the basic Eighth Amendment
principles that govern the constitutionality of capital punishment law. Parts II and
III set forth foundational information on death penalty practices in the United
States and the global community, and identify specific provisions of international
law that prohibit or restrict capital punishment. Part IV describes the public debate
among Justices of the Court over the propriety of reliance on international law in
U.S. constitutional decision-making. Part V provides examples of international
law and foreign court decisions that have directly influenced opinions of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices in death penalty cases. The Article concludes with
commentary on ways in which international law can continue to impact American
capital punishment policies and practices.
PART I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Thirty-five states and the federal government have legislatively enacted
capital punishment laws.6 These laws are subject to judicial review under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."7

Starting with Furman v. Georgia8 and the Greggv. Georgia line of cases, the
United States Supreme Court established clear, if not somewhat broad and general,
rules for determining when a death penalty law is valid under the Eighth
Amendment. Initially, capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional.10 The
death penalty is a constitutional criminal sentence so long as:
1. It is not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner."

Death

penalty statues must contain clear and precise standards that narrow the

range of crimes and criminals eligible for capital punishment to only the
"worst of the worst" and prevent discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, sexual orientation, or other impermissible factor. 12

6. Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.
(DPIC),
Facts About
the
Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009)
[hereinafter DPIC Facts]. Historical statistical information on the death penalty is reported by DPIC in
Fact Sheets as noted above. Id. Statistical information for the current year is continuously updated;
however, DPIC does not maintain an archive of prior Fact Sheets. See Death Penalty Information
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). Third party internet storage
facilities, such as Internet Archive, maintain archived reports, but these services are not supported by
DPIC. See generally id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); see
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
10. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (discussing per se constitutionality of capital punishment).
11. See Furman,408 U.S. at 294-95 (discussing arbitrary and capricious application).
12. See Furman,408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing constitutional death penalty
standards); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 242, 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). In addition, the
Woodson/Lockett line of cases requires focus on the "character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense . . . ." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
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2. It "advances" a legitimate "penalogical justification," by achieving
one of the sentencing goals of the U.S. criminal justice system:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.13 A Supreme
Court Justice's personal answer to this question-what does the death
penalty accomplish in terms of justifications for criminal punishment14
may be considered in deciding this issue.
3. It is consistent with the "evolving standards of decency" recognized
by a "maturing society" and respects the "human dignity" that is at the
core of the Eighth Amendment. 5
The Amendment requires
proportionality between the crime committed and the sentence of death.
As noted above, only the "worst of the worst" criminals, the most
culpable and blameworthy, can be sentenced to death. 16 A court must

(1976); Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (noting some
death sentences are so arbitrary as to make the sentence "freakish"). "Difficulties in administering the
penalty to ensure against its arbitrary and capricious application require adherence to a rule reserving its
use, at this stage of evolving standards and in cases of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take
the life of the victim." Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008). "[T]he death penalty must
be reserved for the 'worst of the worst."' Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
13. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002) (discussing death penalty justifications);
Baze v. Reese, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring); Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (analyzing
death penalty rationales). The original rationale for the death penalty was limited to retribution and
deterrence. However, Justice Stevens has recently referred to incapacitation in Baze and Justice
Kennedy introduced rehabilitation in Kennedy. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to incapacitation rationale); Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (discussing rehabilitation rationale);
see also Erik Eckholm, U.S. Shifting PrisonFocus To Re-entry Into Society, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/washington/08reentry.html (noting President Bush
would sign Second Chance Act "making rehabilitation a central goal of the federal justice system.");
The Second Chance Act of 2007, H.R. 1593, 110th Cong. (2008) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); see also Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need
For FederalExpungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (discussing Second Chance
Act).
14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (discussing use of Justice's own judgment).
"The Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. (quoting Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). When assessing the effectiveness of advancing
penalogical goals the Court considers its "own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose." Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650. "Although the
judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to
judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on ... [an accomplice to
felony murder]." Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
15. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (originating "evolving standards" concept);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (referring expressly to preserving "human dignity" as central purpose of Eighth
Amendment). The Court has never repudiated the statement in Trop that the broad purpose of the
Eighth Amendment is to respect and preserve "the dignity of man." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976).
16. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (discussing proportionality of
death penalty). "Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category
of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution."' Id. "The Court explained in Atkins and Roper that the Eighth Amendment's protection
against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments flows from the basic 'precept of justice that
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find a "national consensus" in contemporary American society in
support of a particular death penalty practice.17 Whether there is such a
consensus is measured, first, by examining "objective" or "democratic"
evidence of public understandings in the form of legislative
enactments.' 8 A court will look at the number of states (or the federal
government) following a challenged practice and the "trends" in the
United States.19 Some Justices have also been willing to consider
opinion polls and the views of national and international organizations.20
As with sentencing goals, individual Justices can make their own
personal judgments about what evolving standards of decency tolerate
or require.2'
Until recently, these constitutional principles had been applied in a way that
led to a complex, multi-layered, highly technical body of substantive and
procedural law which has both promoted imposition of the death penalty and made
it extremely difficult to execute a death row prisoner. Yet, prior to the Court's
2007-2008 Term, perceptible changes had occurred, nationally and internationally,
that suggested a retreat from the aggressive use of capital punishment.22
punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."' Kennedy, 128 S. Ct.
at 2649 (citations omitted) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). "Evolving
standards . . . must . . . respect . . . the dignity of the person."

Id.

"Gregg instructs that capital

punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two
distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes." Id. at
2661.
17. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (discussing need for "national consensus"). "The evidence of
national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the
evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death penalty for the
mentally retarded." Id. at 564.
18. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2642 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 563). The Court
is guided by "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice with respect to executions." Id.
19. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 563-65 (2005) (noting death penalty trends). "The number of States
that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile offenders . . . is smaller than the number of States
that abandoned capital punishment for the mentally retarded . .. ; yet we think the same consistency of
direction of change has been demonstrated." Id. at 564-66. A national consensus can also be
demonstrated in the states without a formal prohibition because the practice of executing juveniles and
the mentally retarded is infrequent. Id. at 564-65. Since 1989, only five states have executed offenders
known to have an IQ under 70 and only six states have executed prisoners for crimes committed as
juveniles. Id. at 564. Furthermore, in the past 10 years, only Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia have
done so. Id. at 565.
20. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657 (discussing the use of execution statistics as evidence of
societal acceptance); see also Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n. 21 ("[P]olling data shows a
widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the
mentally retarded is wrong.").
21. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ., joint
opinion) (discussing death penalty and sentencing goals); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(comparing the role of judiciary, juries and legislature in death penalty cases); supra note 14 and
accompanying text (discussing judgment of Justices).
22. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963 2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-19 (2007); see also ALAN W. CLARK & LAURELYN
WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO
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PART II. A NATIONAL TREND AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY?
The Court's three most important recent substantive death penalty opinions,
Kennedy v. Louisiana,23 Roper v. Simmons, 24 and Atkins v. Virginia2 strongly
emphasized trends in capital punishment practices applying "evolving standards of
decency" under the Eighth Amendment. Two things were clear about such trends
at the mid-point of 2008. American death penalty policies are continually
subjected to intense, sustained, and widespread criticism. 26 And, reliance on
capital punishment as the ultimate criminal sanction has steadily declined during
the last decade.27 These realities led Justice John Paul Stevens to conclude that the
death penalty represents "the pointless and needless extinction of life," produces
"only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes," and
should be abandoned by state and federal governments. 21 Justice Kennedy
matched the power of these words in another opinion observing that, "[w]hen the
law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing
the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint."29
Basic criticisms of state execution in the United States are easily catalogued.
There is still no generally accepted evidence that the death penalty deters murder
or other extremely violent crime. 30
Decision-making in capital cases is

THE DEATH PENALTY 11-13 (Northeastern Univ. Press 2008).
23. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
24. See Roper v. Simmons, 553 U.S. 551 (2005).
25. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
26. See discussion infra Part IV (describing debate among Supreme Court Justices and recent
history of death penalty litigation at Supreme Court).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 42-53 and accompanying text (illustrating reduction in
reliance on capital punishment and death sentences).
28. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
29. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008).
30. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1547 (evaluating deterrence as an effective justification of capital
punishment). "The legitimacy of deterrence as an acceptable justification for the death penalty is ...
questionable, at best." Id. "Despite 30 years of empirical research in the area, there remains no reliable
statistical evidence that capital punishment in fact deters potential offenders. In the absence of such
evidence, deterrence cannot serve as a sufficient penological justification for this uniquely severe and
irrevocable punishment." Id. (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Death and DeterrenceRedux:
Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006)
(discussing the numerous technical and conceptual errors of current deterrence studies); John J.
Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58
STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005) (criticizing research methodologies and questioning results); see also Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Deterring Murder: A Reply, 58 STAN. L. REV. 847 (2005) (discussing
moral commitments behind deterrence in the death penalty debate); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital
Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 751 (2005) (criticizing Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule's argument that because deterrence is
supported by empirical evidence, the death penalty is morally permissible); cf Adam Liptak, Does the
Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 11 (discussing the debate
surrounding deterrence and the death penalty); Robert Tanner, Studies Say Death Penalty Deters Crime,
WASH. POST, June 11, 2007 (reporting that empirical studies show the death penalty to be a deterrent to
crime); DPIC, Experts From Both Sides Say Data Does Not Support A Deterrent Effect From The
Death Penalty, posted June 30, 2008, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/experts-both-sides-
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unavoidably arbitrary, from the initial prosecutorial choice to seek the death
penalty, to judge and jury sentencing. 31 Racial and ethnic discrimination permeate
the system. 32 The catharsis of retribution is widely rejected. 33 Decades often pass
say-data-does-not-support-deterrent-effect-death-penalty (referencing Cass Sunstein & Justin Wolfers,
WASH. POST, June 30, 2008); but see H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row:
Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. L. & EcoN. 453 (2003);
Roy Adler & Michael Summers, Capital Punishment Works, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2007, at A13
(asserting deterrent effect of death penalty).
31. DPIC, Arbitrariness, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrariness (last visited Feb. 23,
2009). DPIC has documented evidence of arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty in such areas as
geography, race, representation, jury mistakes, and gender. Id. A recent example includes an editorial
in the Virginian-Pilot highlighting arbitrary application of the death penalty. See DPIC, EDITORIAL:
Imperfections Abound with Death Penalty, THE VA.-PILOT, Nov. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/editorial-imperfections-abound-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 23,
2009);
PilotOnline.com, Imperfections Abound with Death Penalty, Nov. 7, 2008,
http://hamptonroads.conV2008/11/imperfections-abound-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); see
also ROMY GANSCHOW, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, DEATH BY
GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION INCALIFORNIA (Elise
Banducci,
Jeff
Gillenkirk
&
Natasha
Minsker
eds.
ACLU),
available
at
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminaljustice/death_penalty/death bygeography/death bygeography.
pdf. "California's death penalty has become so arbitrary that the county border, not the facts of the
case, determines who is sentenced to execution and who is simply sentenced to die in prison." Id. at 1.
The report indicates that residents of Alameda County are nearly eight times more likely to be given a
death sentence than residents of similar demographics of nearby Santa Clara County. Id. In New York,
upstate counties represent approximately 65% of capital prosecutions, despite representing only 20% of
the state's homicides. See NEW YORK STATE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
NEW YORK STATE: STATISTICS FROM EIGHT YEARS OF REPRESENTATION, 1995-2003 (Capital Defender
Office 2003). Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court released a report that found there is "unsettling
statistical evidence indicating that cases involving killers of white victims are more likely to progress to
a penalty phase than cases involving killers of African-American victims." Hon. David S. Baime,
Report to the Supreme Court, Systemic Proportionality Review Project: 2000-2001 Term 2-3 (2001).
32. See DPIC, supra note 31 (discussing death penalty arbitrariness and discrimination); see also
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEATH BY DISCRIMINATION - THE

CONTINUING ROLE OF RACE IN CAPITAL CASES (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/AMR51/046/2003/en/bd8584ef-d712-1ldd-bocc-1f0860013475/amr510462003en.pdf.
Between 1976 and 1999, blacks and whites were murdered at a nearly equal pace. Id. at 1. Despite the
racial equality among victims, eighty percent of people executed since 1977 were convicted of
murdering white victims. Id. at 5. Similar discriminatory results have been found in cases with victims
of high socio-economic status. See BALDUS, D.C., ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF
NEBRASKA CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASES (1973-1999): A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS (Neb. Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 2001). "[S]ince 1973
defendants whose victims have high socio-economic status have faced a significantly higher risk of
advancing to a penalty trial and receiving a death sentence. Defendants with low SES victims have
faced a substantially reduced risk of advancing to a penalty trial and of being sentenced to death." Id. at
22; see also Symposium, Racial discrimination and the death penalty in the post-Furman era: An
Empiricaland Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 1638
(1998); Symposium, Race, Crime and the Constitution: Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital
Murder Trials: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001).
33. See The DeathPenalty in New York: To Examine the Future of CapitalPunishment in New
York State: HearingBefore the Assemb. Standing Comm. on Codes, Assemb. Standing Comm. on the
Judiciary,and Assemb. Standing Comm. on Correction,2004 Leg., 108th Sess. (N.Y. 2004), available
at http://nysl.nysed.gov/Archimages/75782.PDF [hereinafter 2004 New York Public Hearing]
(statements of Bill Pelke and Kate Lowenstein). "[T]he death penalty has absolutely nothing at all to do
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before an execution takes place 34 and the brutalization it represents perpetuates the
pain caused by the original acts of the executed prisoner. 35 Victims' families,
individually and through organizations, vehemently deny the "closure" that
execution is presumed to achieve.36 Life in prison without parole accomplishes the
same incapacitation as capital punishment. Prosecuting a death penalty case is

with [] healing . . . in fact it just continues that cycle of violence and it creates more murder victim
family members." Id. at 164 (quoting Pelke). "The death penalty does not honor our murdered family
members.... It feeds our feelings of revenge, anger and hatred and holds out to us an illusionary form
of healing and what we are told will be closure. By now I hope you all know not to offer closure to a
victim's family members. There is no closure." Id. at 171-72 (quoting Lowenstein).
34. The "death row phenomenon" refers to the fact that in the United States, appeals of death
sentences often take decades or more to be finally resolved. It has been argued that this phenomenon is
itself an independent violation of the Eighth Amendment. In Knight v. Florida,Justice Thomas stated,
"I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures
and then complain when his execution is delayed." Knight, 120 S. Ct. 459, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). "[I]n most cases raising this novel claim, the delay in carrying out the prisoner's execution
stems from this Court's Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence ...
Id. "Inmates have argued that
general prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. U.S. courts have decided these cases
differently, but no court has held that the general conditions on death row constitute cruel and unusual
punishment." Florencio J. Yuzon, Conditions and Circumstances of Living on Death Row-Violative of
IndividualRights and FundamentalFreedoms?: Divergent Trends of JudicialReview in Evaluatingthe
'Death Row Phenomenon,' 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 39, 62-63 (1996) (citations omitted).
"Condemned death row inmates rarely succeed at challenging their conditions on death row as cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 63. "In People v. Chessman, . . .the defendant was convicted of seventeen
felonies including first degree robbery and kidnapping and was sentenced to death. Chessman spent
eleven years in San Quentin prison awaiting his execution. On appeal, Chessman argued that the length
of his confinement constituted 'cruel and unusual punishment.' Although conceding that 'it [was] ...
in fact unusual that a man should be detained for more than 11 years pending execution of sentence of
death and . . . that mental suffering attends such detention,' the court found that California had not
violated Chessman's Eighth Amendment rights." Id at 69 (citations omitted). "Other recent case law
indicates that courts will not find an Eighth Amendment violation where the inmate abuses the appeals
process, thereby prolonging his time on death row." Id. at 70.
35. See 2004 New York Public Hearing,supranote 33 (discussing victim family testimony).
36. Id. at 172.
37. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While incapacitation may have
been a legitimate rationale in 1976, the recent rise in statues providing for life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole demonstrates that incapacitation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient justification
for the death penalty."). Footnote 10 of this concurring opinion points out that as of the writing of
Baze, forty-eight states had "some form of life imprisonment without parole. . . ." Id. at n. 10. See also
A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119
HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1841-44 (2006) (discussing increase in life without parole statutes); Andrew
Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Prosecutors Using New Life Without Parole Option, AKRON BEACON J., June 23,
2008, available at http://www.moabolition.org/docs/Archives/OH6-08.doc (documenting use of life
without parole as sentencing option). Public Defender Tim Young stated "Ifyou can come to a life
without parole option without having to go through that cost [of a death penalty trial at over $100,000
per initial trial] and it satisfies the public's need for safety and punishment, then that makes a real
reasonable outcome for everyone involved." Id. A 2005 law in Ohio allows prosecutors to seek a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole without first seeking the death penalty. Id. Even a state
like Texas has recently provided the alternative of life without parole to seeking the death penalty in
certain cases. Id. In part because of the new Ohio law, the number of death penalty indictments sought
statewide dropped 32% from 2004 to 2007. Id.
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vastly more expensive than bringing a non-capital charge.38 Overlaying, and
probably overshadowing, these flaws in the system is the profound presence of
innocence. A steady stream of exonerations of death row inmates has obliterated
the illusion of certainty of guilt that most Americans insist must exist to justify
capital punishment.39
Perhaps because of these many problems, data from the Death Penalty
Information Center suggests a retreat from the death penalty over the past decade
that seems to accelerate each year. Both numbers of executions and death
sentences imposed in the United States have steadily declined. In 1999 executions
peaked at 98.40 Between 2005 and 2007, executions totaled 60, 53, and 42
respectively. 41 Prior to the 2008 moratorium on executions imposed by the U.S.
Supreme Court during the pendency of Baze v. Reese and a decision on the "lethal
cocktail" method of execution, 13 death sentences were carried out.42 Since the
Court's approval of that method in April, 2008, 9 additional executions were
carried out as of mid-July, 2008.43

38. See DPIC, Costs of the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty
(last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (discussing high costs of capital punishment); see also JOHN ROMAN ET AL.,
URBAN INSTITUTE, JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND

(2008), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/CostsDPMaryland.pdf. The average cost of death
penalty prosecution in Maryland is $1.9 to $3 million dollars more than a non-capital punishment
prosecution. Id. at 2. Total cost for 5 executions since 1978 was $186 million or $37.2 million per
execution. Id. at 3. See also NATASHA MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF
SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (Claire Cooper & Elise Banducci, eds., American Civil Liberties
Union),
available
at
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal justice/death_penalty/the hidden
death tax.pdf (reporting death penalty costs). California's capital trials cost $1.1 million more than
non-capital trials, and the state spends $117 million more per year to prosecute death penalty cases
rather than seeking life without parole. Id. at 1-2.
39. See
DPIC,
Innocence:
List
of
Those
Freed From
Death
Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row
(listing
130
individuals
exonerated since 1973). DPIC estimates that 130 death row inmates in 26 states have been exonerated.
Id. This figure amounts to an approximate innocence rate of 1 out of 10 death sentences imposed. Id.
See generally ALAN W. CLARKE & LAURELYN WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO THE DEATH PENALTY 113-33 (Northeastern Univ.
Press 2007) (providing comprehensive discussion of innocence cases). The Court has yet to
acknowledge that an innocent death row inmate has been executed. See RICHARD C. DEITER, DPIC,
INNOCENCE AND CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY (DPIC 2004), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-crisis-american-death-penalty (reporting on innocence
in death penalty cases). See also DPIC, infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing public opinion
regarding death penalty and innocence).
40. See DPIC Facts, supra note 6 (detailing death penalty executions by year).
4 1. Id
42. See DPIC, The Death Penalty in 2007: Year End Report 3 (2007), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2007YearEnd.pdf [hereinafter DPIC Year End Report 2007] (noting
"profound effect" of Baze in temporarily placing all executions on hold). Executions were on hold in
seven states, including Illinois, New Jersey, New York, California, Delaware, Maryland, and Nebraska.
DPIC, Death Penalty in Flux (2007), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-flux (last updated
Jan. 22, 2009). The DPIC reports that executions have resumed in the United States and that 24
additional executions were carried out in 2008, totaling 37. See DPIC, Facts about the DeathPenalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (documenting executions by year).
43. See DPIC, Executions Since Supreme Court's Upholding of Lethal Injections,

2009

INT'L LAW INFLUENCES ON DEATH PENALTY

123

A similar pattern is seen in numbers of death sentences imposed. For the
three years covering 2005 through 2007, these sentences fell from 138 to 121 to
115 .44 Preliminary figures for 2008 have further decreased to 111.45 The current
death row population still remains high at approximately 3300.46 Death sentencing
and execution continue to be heavily concentrated in the Southern parts of the
United States. Texas dominates these statistics with over 60% of all executions in
2007 occurring in that state.47
Many states are backing away from capital punishment. Most compelling is
the State of New Jersey's legislative abolishment of the death penalty in 2007.48
This followed New York's refusal, in 2005 and 2006, to restore capital punishment
in the state after procedural provisions of its law were struck down by the New
York Court of Appeals on state constitutional grounds. 49 Abolitionist efforts in
several states made progress at the legislature level but did not result in signed
laws.5 Numerous states have formed commissions to study death practices in
those states with a view towards restriction or repeal.5 1 These trends are
counterbalanced by the relatively aggressive use of the death penalty by the United
States Government, especially in the area of terrorism. 12
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-supreme-courts-upholding-lethal-injection (last visited Sept. 26,
2009) (documenting executions by year).
44. See DPIC, Facts about the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
FactSheet.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id. As of January 1, 2008, there were a total of 3,309 inmates on death row in the United
States. Id.
47. Id. For example, in 2008, out of the total of 37 executions in the United States, 35 were
carried out in Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Kentucky.
Id.
48. See DPIC Year End Report 2007, supra note 42, at 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3 (2007)
(abolishing death penalty by amendment).
49. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 357-58. (N.Y. 2004) (holding that the "deadlock
instruction" provision of the New York death penalty statute is unconstitutional under New York's
constitution); see generally, Russell G. Murphy, People v. Cahill: Domestic Violence and the Death
Penalty Debate in New York, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 1029 (2005) (analyzing New York death penalty
law).
50. See DPIC Year End Report 2007, supra note 42 (discussing abolitionist efforts in Nebraska,
New Mexico, Montana, Colorado and Maryland).
51. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT

119-25 (2008) (describing California's broken and dysfunctional capital punishment system);
MARYLAND

COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,

FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(2008); H.R. 520, 161st Leg. (Nh. 2009) (establishing commission to study death penalty in New
Hampshire).
52. Federal law provides for capital punishment in at least 40 separate statutes and approximately
55 federal inmates are presently on death row.
See DPIC, The Federal Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty; see also William Glaberson, U.S. Presents
Charges Against 6 in Sept. 11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008 (noting U.S. seeking death penalty
against Guantanamo detainees in military commission trials); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), S. Res. 735, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted);

124

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

Public opinion is exceedingly important in determining the direction of death
penalty law in America. It is often said that Justices of the Supreme Court read the
newspapers-and opinion polls-just like every other citizen! These polls show
that support for capital punishment is holding steady but beginning to shift. A
2007 Gallup poll showed that approximately 69% of Americans supported the
death penalty in the abstract.53 However, when given a choice between death and
life in prison without parole, 48% chose life in prison to 47% for capital
punishment.54 Only 38% of those polled thought that the death penalty was a
deterrent to murder or other serious crimes. Significantly, the highly publicized
exoneration of numbers of capital criminals, and the growing sense that it is highly
likely that innocent prisoners have been executed, is rapidly eroding support for
the death penalty. As many as 60% of a polled group said that evidence of
wrongful convictions lessened their support for, or strengthened their opposition
to, capital punishment.56
Innocence is the magnet that draws together all of the other criticisms of the
death penalty. Since 1973 and the restoration of capital punishment in the United
States, the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) estimates that approximately
130 prisoners in 26 states have been released from death row because of evidence
of their innocence. The grounds for these exonerations differ from case to case
DNA evidence (a small percentage of cases); proof of police (coerced confessions)
or prosecutorial (suppression of evidence) misconduct; confessions by the real
killer; and ineffective assistance of counsel.58 From 2000 through 2007 these

USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, S. Res. 2271, 109th Cong.
(2006) (enacted) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of
2005, H.R. 3060, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced June 24, 2005).
53. GALLUP,
2007
GALLUP
POLL:
DEATH
PENALTY
(2007),
available at
http://www.gallup.conVpoll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx; RICHARD C. DIETER, A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE:
AMERICANS' DOUBTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (Death Penalty Info. Ctr. 2007).
54. Id.
55. DPIC Year End Report 2007, supranote 42, at 3. This is based on a poll conducted by RT
Strategies and sponsored by DPIC. Id.
56. Id.
57. See DPIC, Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-anddeath-penalty (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Innocence and the Death Penalty] (discussing
innocence issue and the death penalty).
58. See
DPIC,
DPIC Summary:
The
Innocence Protection Act
of 2004,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1322 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (summarizing Innocence
Protection Act of 2004); see also RICHARD C. DIETER, INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN
DEATH PENALTY (Death Penalty Info. Ctr. 2004) [hereinafter Innocence and the Crisis Report]
(discussing innocence, exonerations, and death penalty). The story of Ryan Matthews provides an
excellent example. At age 17, Matthews was arrested for the murder of a convenience store owner.
Matthews' court-appointed attorney was ill prepared for the case, especially with regard to the DNA
evidence and testing that was required. Despite not fitting the description of the assailant provided by
witnesses and several hours of jury deadlock, the judge ordered additional deliberations until a verdict
was reached. A single hour later, Matthews was convicted and later sentenced to death. After four
years on death row, Matthews' attorneys properly retested the DNA evidence, excluding Matthews, and
discovered evidence previously suppressed by the prosecution. Matthews was officially exonerated in
August 2004. See Innocence and the Crisis Report, supra(providing examples of exonerations).

INT'L LAW INFLUENCES ON DEATH PENALTY

2009

125

exonerations have increased to an average of slightly more than 5 per year.59 It is
understandable, then, that long-time supporters of capital punishment are changing
their opinions.
These profound misgivings in the United States over the death penalty mirror
an established international rejection of capital punishment. 60 When diverse
nations and communities come together to condemn a government practice like the
death penalty, policy makers are compelled to recognize the trends. It is in this
environment that international law influences on U.S. Supreme Court death penalty
decisions become more understandable.
PART III. TIE

INTERNATIONAL SCENE (AND THE ISOLATION OF THE UNITED

STATES)

Part I of this article noted that the Supreme Court has acknowledged in many
decisions that individual Justices may make their own personal assessments of
what "evolving standards of decency" require under the Eighth Amendment and
whether a particular form of capital punishment significantly advances any of the
"penalogical justifications" for the death penalty.61
The flexibility, and
subjectivity, of such judgments make it possible for international law, foreign court
decisions, and global political activity to influence a Justice's decision in a death
penalty case. International law is strongly anti-death penalty, as illustrated by the
following summary of the status of capital punishment world-wide.
The most universally accepted international condemnation of the death
penalty comes from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and its Second Optional Protocol. 62 They provide:
ICCPR (1976) Part III Article 6 (1) Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life. (2) In countries that have not
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time
of the commission of the crime .

.

. (5) Sentence of death shall not be

imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. Article 10 (1) All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.63
Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR (1991) Article 1 (1) No one within
the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed.

59. Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 58.
60. See infra notes 63-93 and accompanying text (discussing international death penalty trends).
61. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (discussing judicial discretion in death penalty
decisions).
62. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights art. 6, entered into force Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil &
Political Rights, Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR].
63. ICCPR, supranote 62, at art. 6.
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(2) Each State party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the
death penalty within its jurisdiction. 4
Similar restrictions can be found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child,65 The American Convention on Human Rights,66 and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child.67 Especially important is Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1985).
Considering that the evolution that has occurred in several member
States of the Council of Europe expresses a general tendency in favour
of abolition of the death penalty. Article 1. The death penalty shall be
abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.
Article 2. A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in
respect of acts committed in time or war or of imminent threat of war. .
68

Pursuant to these various provisions, much of the world has freed itself from
the burdens and costs, moral and material, of capital punishment. Based on data
from the Death Penalty Information Center, at the beginning of 2008 an estimated
135 countries had abolished the death penalty either in law or practice. 69 By
comparison, 59 still retained capital punishment. 70 Because the European Union
conditions membership on banning the death penalty,71 and based on the fact that

64. Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supranote 62, art. 1.
65. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456
(1989) [hereinafter CRC].
66. American Convention on Human Rights art. O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, art. 4, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (July 18, 1978).
67. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art 5, entered intoforce Nov. 29, 1999,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49.
68. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S./114 (Mar. 1, 1985); see also Protocol No. 13 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 187 (Jan. 7,
2003). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was
the first legally binding international treaty to ban capital punishment in all circumstances and without
exceptions and is currently ratified by 41 countries. Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Ratification
of InternationalTreaties, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/ratification-of-international-treaties
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
69. See DPIC, The Death Penalty: An InternationalPerspective, Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Feb. 25,
2009);
see also, Amnesty
International,
Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Feb. 25,
2009).
70. Amnesty International, supra note 69. On June 16, 2008, the Council of the European Union
issued a statement reaffirming its goal of "working towards universal abolition of the death penalty"
and identified that goal as an "integral objective of the EU's human rights policy" Press Release,
President Dimitrij Rupel, General Affairs and External Relations for the Council of the European Union
(June 16, 2008). The statement lauded the vote of the UN General Assembly that called for a
moratorium on executions world-wide and noted that abolition "contributes to the enhancement of
human dignity and the progressive development of human rights." Id.
71. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 66, at 12; see also European Commission
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all 46 nations of the Council of Europe have stopped executions (40 member
countries ratified Protocol No. 6),72 Europe (with the exception of Belarus) is now
a no-execution zone covering 800 million people. 73
At the present time, approximately 27,500 prisoners are on death row
worldwide.74 For the past few years, the top executing countries were China, Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United States.75 Other active practitioners of
capital punishment included Sudan, Yemen, Vietnam, Mongolia, Jordan and
Singapore.76 In 2006, there were 1591 executions, down 25% from 2005." For
2007, executions decreased an additional 22% to 1252.' During the same year, a
minimum of 3347 death sentences were imposed as compared to 3861 for 2006.79
Obviously, these figures are only estimates, but they suggest a global trend away
from the death penalty.
Other international developments in 2007 reinforce this view. Rwanda voted
to abolish the death penalty;o France amended its constitution to ban capital
punishment;" the Third World Congress Against the Death Penalty was held in
Paris;8 2 and the EU and Council of Europe observed the "European Day Against
the Death Penalty."83 Of critical importance, in an unprecedented act of unity on
the issue, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a
global moratorium on executions.84 The vote was 104 in favor, 52 opposed, and 29
abstaining." The United States voted "no." The resolution commits signatory
countries to: (1) progressively restrict the use of the death penalty and reduce the
number of offences for which it may be imposed; (2) establish a moratorium on

on External Relations, EU Policy on the Death Penalty, www.ec.europa.eu/external _relations/
human rights/adp/index.htm#pol (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
72. CLARKE & WHITT, supranote 39, at 7.
73. Id.
74. Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions in 2007, http://www.
amnesty.org /en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2007 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
75. DPIC, The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, Executions Around the World,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-intemational-perspective (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
76. Id.
77. DPIC, International News and Developments: 2007, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/node/2256 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
78. DPIC, International: Amnesty International Reports Worldwide Drop in Executions,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2354 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
79. Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions in 2007,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2007 (last visited Mar. 2,
2009); Amnesty International, Death Penalty: Death Sentences and Executions in 2006,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/004/2007/en/dom-ACT500042007en.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2009).
80. DPIC, InternationalNews and Developments: 2007, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Italian Premier Romano Prodi called for a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty:
we shall perform a great political act through the adoption of this resolution. It will demonstrate that
humankind isn't capable of making progress only in science but also in the field of ethics." Id.
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executions in each country with a view to abolishing the death penalty worldwide;
and (3) not reintroduce capital punishment once it is abolished.86
The action of the United States in voting not to join much of the civilized
world in eliminating capital punishment is representative of its approach to
numerous human rights issues. On the death penalty alone, the United States
steadfastly refused to join the ban on executing juveniles imposed by the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 7 It took a reservation to the ICCPR
protecting its right to continue executions" and declined to sign the Second
Optional Protocol.8 9 America refused to accept the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court 90 and withdrew from the jurisdiction of one of the most important
human rights tribunals in the world, the International Court of Justice. 91 The
United States has shown nothing but disdain for the human rights concerns of the
world community by unilaterally deciding to go to war in Iraq, allowing the use of
torture at Guantanamo Bay, seeking the death penalty for terrorists like Khalid
Sheik Mohammed who were "waterboarded," narrowly reading the Geneva
Convention and exhibiting isolationist "cowboy diplomacy."92 The Supreme
Court's recent 5 to 4 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, granting habeas corpus
rights to Guantanamo detainees, highlights America's continuing isolation on
human rights issues. 93

86. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for
Moratorium on Death Penalty, U.N. Doc. GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 2008) (discussing resolution placing
moratorium on death penalty).
87. CRC, supra note 65, art. 37. The United States has never ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child and refused to recognize its ban on the death penalty for
juveniles. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying note 64; ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 6(5) (prohibiting capital
punishment for anyone under 18 at the time of offense). The ICCPR is signed and ratified by the
United States subject to a reservation regarding Article 6(5). United Nations Treaty Collection, Status
of Treaties, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United States Declarations and
Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-4&chapter4& lang=en#EndDec.
89. Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supranote 62; United Nations Treaty Collections, Status
of Treaties, Participantsto the Second OptionalProtocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-12&chapter-4&lang=en.
90. See Peter Malanczuk, The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the
Consequences of Leaving the U.S. Behind, 11 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 77 (2000) (evaluating U.S. rejection
of International Criminal Court).
91. Letter from Condoleezza Rice to the United Nations Secretary General (Mar. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.discourse.net/archives/2005/03/us-announces-withdrawal-from-consular
convention.html (stating that "the United States of America . . . hereby withdraws from . . ." the
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes arising under the Vienna
Convention and that, as a result, "the United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol") [hereinafter U.S. Withdrawal Letter]; see
Charles Lane, U.S. QuitsPact Used in CapitalCases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at AO1.
92. See Stephanie Bellier, Unilateraland MultilateralPreventive Self-Defense, 58 ME. L. REV 508
(2006); Lord Hacking, The Rule of Law Papers, 43 INT'L LAW 3 (2009); Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute
Prohibitionof Torture andNecessary andAppropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL U. L. REV. 1535 (2009).
93. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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Today, the commands of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Articles 3 and 5, that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of
the person" and "[n]o one shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment

. . ."

have greater meaning than when the Declaration was adopted in

1948.94 Except in the United States!
PART IV. THE JUSTICES DEBATE

International law can influence American policy on capital punishment only
to the extent that it is weighed, considered, and utilized by policy-makers at all
levels. Part V of this Article firmly demonstrates that international law has had a
direct and substantial impact on death penalty decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. 95 A full understanding of the opinions behind those decisions is
aided by an examination of a fascinating and very public debate that has been
occurring among Justices of the Court over the permissibility and propriety of
relying on international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation. The "winner" of
this debate will greatly affect the direction of American death penalty law for years
to come.
The constitutional principles that govern Eighth Amendment death penalty
analysis frame this Justices debate. A significant group on the Supreme Court has
accepted the notion that Justices can, and must, make their own independent
personal determinations of what "evolving standards of decency" in a "maturing
society" require in constitutional terms. 96 The Court must make the same
assessment on whether a particular form of capital punishment "advances one of
the penological justifications" for the death penalty.97 While consistently
acknowledging that international law is not "binding" on the Court, 98 public
statements by at least four Justices reveal an openness to looking at world opinion
and policy when deciding Eighth Amendment death penalty cases. 99 Two other
Justices have made it equally clear that they passionately reject such an
approach. 100 The debate is, then, fundamentally over the proper role of a Supreme
Court Justice and appropriate theories of constitutional interpretation.101

94. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 3-5, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
95. See infra Part V (discussing international law's impact on U.S. Supreme Court cases).
96. See supratext accompanying note 17 (outlining Eighth Amendment judicial discretion).
97. See supratext accompanying note 21 (discussing judicial discretion in death penalty law).
98. See infra text accompanying note 119 (noting international law not binding on Supreme Court
constitutional cases).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 107, 117, 118, 119, 129, 130, 132, 133, 138, 139, 143,
144 (citing use of international law).
100. See infra notes 103, 121-23, 131, 136-36, 142, 162-62 and accompanying text (discussing
views of Justices Scalia and Thomas on inappropriateness of citing to international law). Chief Justice
Roberts seems to share these attitudes. "[In] [f]oreign Law, you can find anything you want. If you
don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or
wherever. . .. [L]ooking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out
your friends. You can find them. They're there. And that actually expands the discretion of the judge.
It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the authority of
precedent--because they're finding precedent in foreign law--and use that to determine the meaning of
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The views of Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, and John Paul Stevens can be found in books, magazines, law review
articles, speeches, public forums, and, of course, individual opinions. This group
loosely shares a decision-making methodology that can be called "organic
evolutionism" - a belief that the United States Constitution is a living, growing
document, whose broad language was intended by its Framers to adapt to changing
and unforeseeable social and political conditions in the United StateS. 102 Their
outspoken opponents, Justices Anton Scalia and Clarence Thomas, are
"originalists" or "strict constructionists" who believe that Justices are bound by the
literal text of constitutional provisions supplemented only by the understandings
and intentions of the Founding Fathers at the time of ratification. 103 Their
positions are found in similar sources.
Unusual insights into the thinking and philosophies of these Justices were
provided in a 2005 public discussion between Justices Breyer and Scalia at
American University's Washington College of Law. Their debate, published as
"The Relevance of Foreign Law Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Anton Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer,"1 04
the Constitution. And I think that's a misuse of precedent, not a correct use of precedent." See Court in
Transition; 'IBelieve That No One Is Above the Law Under Our System', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at
A26 (listing excerpts from Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on the nomination of Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr.) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings]; 151 Cong. Rec. S10.172 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2005)
(statement of Justice Roberts during testimony at confirmation hearing).
101. Some have termed this a debate over "constitutional comparativism." This concept considers
justifications for using foreign and international law in terms of philosophies of judging, theories of
constitutional interpretation (originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and pragmatism), and political
sovereignty (whether use of international law removes courts from our system of "self-government
founded on democracy and popular sovereignty"). Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S.
Constitution, 131 POL'Y REV. 33 (2005); See Roger Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005).
102. See Lisa K. Parshall, Embracingthe Living Constitution:Justice Anthony M Kennedy's Move
Away from a Conservative Methodology of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25, 29
(2007) (characterizing the Constitution as living document). The "Living Constitution" is a metaphor
for an organic view of the Constitution as a document that is always evolving in meaning and adapting
to contemporary values and practices. Id. at 29. The "Living Constitution" approach to interpretation
allows judges to "go beyond ... the four corners of the document." Id. (quoting JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980)).
103. See generally JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTON SCALIA: A

HAMILTONIAN ON THE SUPREME COURT (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006) (referring to
proponents of this school as originalists or strict constructionalists); see also Vicki C. Jackson, MultiValenced ConstitutionalInterpretation and ConstitutionalComparisons: An Essay in Honor of Mark
Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599 (2008) (describing originalist view). Originalist interpretation is
focused on "the text of the written Constitution as it was understood at the moment of adoption or
amendment, or on atextual but specific-in-time 'constitutional moments."' Vicki C. Jackson, MultiValenced ConstitutionalInterpretation and ConstitutionalComparisons: An Essay in Honor of Mark
Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 606, 606 (2008). Originalism is also defended as necessary to
constrain judges from acting on their own preferences by tying their hands, interpretively, to the
original understanding of the Constitution's text. Id. at 608. "[O]riginalist interpretation is a highly
plausible if not a necessary means of promoting democratic legitimacy." Id.
104. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005)
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symbolizes a much broader controversy over judicial functioning that has been part
of American political conversation for some time and that reemerged in the 2008
presidential election campaign.10 5
This Article urges in its Conclusion that the issue of capital punishment
should have been forced into the 2008 elections. 106 The views of a new President
have great potential to affect the decisions of state legislatures and Congress on
future capital punishment policies. The alternative is that, without political action,
the difficult and emotional issues raised by capital prosecutions will continue to be
decided by the Supreme Court. In this context, the subjective beliefs of the
Justices set forth below, about the importance of international law, foreign court
decisions, and world opinion in death penalty and related constitutional cases, will
be critical to the Court's decisions.
A good starting point for this analysis is a speech given by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in 2006 to South African judges and lawyers. In it she observed:
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United
States in grappling with hard [constitutional] questions ... [is in line
with the view that] the US Constitution [is] a document essentially
frozen in time as of the date of its ratification. I am not a partisan of that
view. US jurists honour the Framers' intent "to create a more perfect
Union," . . . if they read the Constitution as belonging to a global 21st
century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century understandings.107

[hereinafter A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer]; see Anderson, supra note 101, at n. 8
(warning Breyer and Scalia discussion was "informal and unscripted" and ought not to be
"overinterpreted"). The unusually public nature of the Justices' remarks and the consistency of their
comments with their decisions and reasoning in actual cases suggest that their statements should be
given very significant weight. Anderson acknowledges that the discussion provided a "remarkable
window into the thinking of the two justices .....
Anderson, supra note 101. See also ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (West 2008);
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005);
CHARLES WYZANSKI, WHEREAS--A JUDGE'S PREMISES: ESSAYS IN JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE LAW

(1965).
105. Presidential Candidates Obama and McCain took traditional partisan positions on judicial
appointments. Obama was seen as promoting an activist judicial philosophy. See ABA Bias; WH
Confirms Judicial Activism Pledge, COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE BLOG, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.committeeforjustice.com/blog/2009/03/aba-bias-wh-confirms-judicial-activism.html
(discussing Obama's views on judicial appointments). Obama remarked that 'the critical ingredient [in
a judicial nominee] is supplied by what is in the judge's heart . . . .' Id. Federal judges must have 'the
empathy, to recognize what it's like to be a young teenage mom [or] poor, or African American, or gay,
or disabled, or old.' Id. McCain supported the strict constructionist point of view. See Klaus Marre,
McCain Lambastes JudicialActivism, THE HILL, May 6, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/
1322-mccain-lambastes-judicial-activism (outlining McCain's position on judicial activism). 'I will
look for people in the cast of John Roberts, Samuel Alito, and my friend the late William Rehnquistjurists ... who know their own minds, and know the law, and know the difference. . . .' Id. Nominees
must 'understand that there are clear limits to the scope of judicial power, and clear limits to the scope
of federal power.' Id.
106. See infra note 259 and accompanying text (calling for death penalty to be primary issue in
2008 presidential campaign).
107. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "ADecent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a
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Historically, Justice Anthony Kennedy has been a strong adherent of Justice
Ginsburg's approach and an outspoken proponent of using foreign and
international law as an aid in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. He wrote majority
opinions in two cases, Lawrence v. Texas108 and Roper v. Simmons, 109 which relied
on international law.
Attorney Jeffrey Toobin, author of the best-selling book about the Supreme
Court, THE NINE,110 and well-known CNN legal commentator, gave some
context to these decisions in his September 2005 New Yorker magazine article
Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passionfor ForeignLaw Could Change the
Supreme Court.111 Attorney Toobin's article illustrates nicely how a Justice's
personal experiences can contribute to an internationally-based human rights
jurisprudence.
Mr. Toobin points out that Justice Kennedy worked as an oil rigger in Canada
when he was a teenager, studied at the London School of Economics in college,
became licensed to practice law in Mexico, and served while a judge as the
supervisor of American Territorial Courts in the South Pacific. 112 This assignment
led to extensive travel to Guam, Palau, Saipan, American Samoa, Australia, New
Zealand and Japan.113 Importantly, Justice Kennedy has regularly lived in
Salzburg, Austria, beginning in the summer of 1990, in order to teach in the
McGeorge University (School of Law) summer program at the University of
Salzburg. 114 He has lectured to judges and lawyers in China under the auspices of
the American Bar Association."' He, together with other Justices of the Court,
meets with his counterparts from England and Canada.1 16
Drawing on this experience, Justice Kennedy is said to believe that in
"invoking foreign law the United States Supreme Court sends an implicit message
to the rest of the democratic world that our society shares its values." 17 In
Kennedy's words:
"If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt our idea of freedom, it
does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that other
nations and other peoples can define and interpret freedom in a way

Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64(3) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 575, 585 (2005).
[hereinafter "ADecent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind"].
108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
109. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
110. JEFFREY TOOBIN,

THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT

(Doubleday 2007).
111. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passionfor ForeignLaw Could Change
the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/
2005/09/12/050912fa fact.
112. Id.
113. Id.

114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id.
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that's at least instructive to us ... 118We [the Court] have to be aware of
what's going on in the world. Of course, it's not binding on us, but we
can't pretend that it doesn't exist. Today, no lawyer would think of not
telling us how courts around the world have approached the same
question. 119
Although neither Justice Ginsburg nor Justice Kennedy was a participant in
the American University discussion, Justice Scalia, the Court's most recognized
conservative, responded to them through his criticism of Justice Breyer's
willingness to rely on international law in his opinions. 120 Justice Scalia stated, "I
do not use foreign law in the interpretation of the United States Constitution ... If
you told the framers . . . we're to be just like Europe, they would have been
appalled." 121 Later in the debate Justice Scalia observed:
[M]y theory of what to do when interpreting the American Constitution
is to try to understand what it meant, [how it] was understood by ...
society ... when it was adopted. And I don't think it has changed since
then . . . If you have that philosophy . . . foreign law is irrelevant with

one exception: old English law-because phrases like 'due process'. . .
were taken from English law.... 122
Justice Scalia continued:
Justice Breyer [and Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy by inference] [do
not] .

.

. have my approach.

[They apply] the principle .

.

. that the

Constitution is not static. It doesn't mean what the people voted for
when it was ratified. Rather, it changes from era to era to comport with
. . . 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.'

I detest that phrase, because . . . societies don't

always mature. Sometimes they rot. 123
For now at least, Justice Scalia is stuck with this "evolving standards" test.
As a result, when deciding death penalty cases he will only use:
The standards of decency of American society-. . . not the standards of

decency of other countries that don't have our background, that don't
have our culture, that don't have our moral views. Of what conceivable
value as indicative of American standards of decency would foreign law
be?....
... The only way in which it makes sense to use foreign law is if you
have a third approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, to wit: 'I
as a judge am not looking for the original meaning of the Constitution,

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 123-26, 133, 136,138-39, 142, 144, and accompanying text (detailing Scalia's
comments regarding international law).
121. A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer, supranote 104, at 521.
122. Id. at 525.
123. Id.
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nor for the current standards of decency of American society; I'm
looking for what is the best answer to this social question in my
judgment as an intelligent person. And for that purpose I take into
account the views of other judges, throughout the world.' 12 4
Such an approach is, to Justice Scalia, totally wrong, and perhaps
impeachable.
Justice Breyer's approach to constitutional interpretation and the use of
international materials is more flexible and practical. "You look around to what's
cited, [and] what's cited is what the lawyers tend to think is useful," 125 and that
often includes foreign law.
In terms of citing foreign law in death penalty cases, Justice Breyer was very
specific in the American University discussion. "Nothing in Blackstone, nothing
in Bracton, nothing even in the law books of King Arthur, says that a judge, in
deciding what constitutes 'cruel and unusual punishment,' must confine his review
to the United States alone or to the United States plus Great Britain."l 26 Referring
to his dissent from the denial of certiorari review in Moore v. Nebraska1 27 and
Knight v. Florida,128 cases involving the so-called "death row phenomenon" that
argued that decades-long confinement of death row prisoners prior to their
executions constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Breyer made
several basic points:
Breyer: I referred to a decision by the Supreme Court of India [Signh v.
State of Punjab] and one by the Supreme Court of Canada [Kindler v.
Minister ofJustice]. I referred to certain United Nations determinations

... I referred to decisions that went the other way as well. I may have
made what one might call a tactical error in referring to a case from
Zimbabwe [Catholic Commission v. Attorney General]-not the human
rights capital of the world ... [But r]eaching out to those other nations,
reading their decisions, seems useful, even though they cannot
determine the outcome of a question that arises under the American
Constitution. 129
Justice Thomas-disagreeing with me-wrote his own brief opinion
arguing that I could not find American precedent supporting my view,
so I must have looked to Zimbabwe out of desperation. He had a certain
point. [Laughter.] But still, with all the uncertainties involved, I would
rather have the judge read pertinent foreign cases while understanding
that the foreign cases are not controlling. I would rather have the judge
treat those cases cautiously, using them with care, than simply to ignore

124. Id. at 526.
125. Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, FREE REPUBLIC, Jan. 13,
2005, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts.
126. A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer, supranote 104, at 527.
127. Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999).
128. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999).
129. A Conversation Between Scalia and Breyer, supranote 104, at 528.
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them. I would rather hope that judges will exercise proper control,
taking the cases for what they are worth, than have an absolute rule that
says judges may never look at foreign decisions. The fact that I cannot
find any absolute legal prohibition [to doing this]-not even in the laws
of King Arthur-gives me cause for hope. 13 0
The debate continued:
Scalia: [Y]ou can say every other country of the world thinks that
holding somebody for twelve years under sentence of death is cruel and
unusual, but you don't know that these other countries don't have
habeas corpus systems which allow repeated applications to state and
federal court, so that the reason it takes twelve years here is because the
convicted murderer himself continues to file appeals that are
continuously rejected.
In England, before they abolished the death penalty-and by the way,
every public opinion poll in England suggests that the people would like
to retain it, but maybe the judges and lawyers and law students feel
differently about it-before they abolished the death penalty, whenever
it was pronounced the judge pronouncing it would don a little skullcap.
When you saw him reach for the skullcap you knew he was about to
pronounce a sentence of death. And that sentence would be carried out
within two weeks. So that's the reason twelve years seems extraordinary
to them. It's extraordinary because we've been so sensitive to the
problem of an erroneous execution that we allow repeated habeas corpus
applications. I just don't think it's comparable. It's just not fair to
compare the two.
But most of all, what does the opinion of a wise Zimbabwe judge or a
wise member of a House of Lords law committee [Soering v. House of
Lords]-what does that have to do with what Americans believe? It is
irrelevant unless you really think it's been given to you to make this
moral judgment, a very difficult moral judgment. And so in making it
for yourself and for the whole country, you consult whatever authorities
you want. Unless you have that philosophy, I don't see how it's relevant
at all.131
Breyer: Well, it's relevant in the sense I described. A similar kind
of person, a judge, with similar training, tries to apply a similar
document with similar language ('cruel and unusual punishment' or the
like), in a society that is somewhat similarly democratic and protective
of basic human rights. England is not the moon, nor is India. Neither is a
question of 'cruel and unusual punishment' an arcane matter of contract
law where differences in legal systems are more likely to make a major
difference. In fact, ironically in those more specifically legal areas-

130. Id.
131. Id. at 529.
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areas where results are more likely tied to the details of a different legal
environment-references to foreign decisions are likely to prove less
controversial. Indeed, we frequently look at foreign law in such cases,
i.e., technical cases. If in a 'cruel and unusual punishment' case the fact
that everyone in the world thinks one thing is at least worth finding out .
. .(then that is worth looking at). And, if my having the legal power to
do so adds some uncertainty to the law, I believe the legal system can
adjust. That is because the law is filled with uncertainty. Its answers in
difficult cases can rarely be deduced only by means of legal logic from
clear legal rules and a history book. Were the latter possible, I would be
more tempted to agree with your view that a system without reference to
foreign law would better control subjective judicial tendencies. But it is
not.132
Continuing with the discussion outside the death penalty area, Justice Breyer
cited a First Amendment case involving campaign finance laws and noted that,
again, foreign law was referred to in the briefs:
Breyer: Well, consider [the Bowman case in England]. . . Mrs.
Bowman, I believe, favored the right to life. She is a citizen of Great
Britain. She wished to contribute a small amount of money in the days
prior to an election to print literature that would identify pro-life (or prochoice) candidates. And the British law prohibited the making of that
contribution so close to the election date. The European Court of Human
Rights considered her claim that Britain's [campaign contribution] law
violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by the European

Convention of Human Rights. Does that issue not sound familiar? One
argument in Mrs. Bowman's favor was that it was unreasonable to
prohibit her contribution while permitting newspapers to say about the
same thing whenever they wished. Does that argument not sound
familiar?
Why is it unreasonable for me to be curious about how the European
Court dealt with [free speech] arguments. I am not bound by what the
Court said. But why can I not look at it? Why should I not be able, in
133
my opinion, to refer to what the Court said?
Scalia: Look, I'm not preventing you from reading these cases. 1 3 4
13 5
Breyer: Well, isn't that exactly [Laughter.]

Scalia: I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity! Just don't put it in
36
your opinions! [Laughter.]1

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Scalia used the area of abortion rights to illustrate his approach:
On the question of abortion, as an originalist, I would look at the text of
the Constitution, which says nothing about the subject either way. You
know, both sides would like me to resolve it constitutionally, to say that
the Constitution requires the states to permit abortion, or requires the
states to prohibit it. I look at the text; it says nothing about it. And I look
at 200 years of history; nobody ever thought it said anything about it.
That's the end of the question for me. What good would reading
Canadian opinions do, unless it was my job to be the moral arbiter,
which I don't accept?
I regard the Constitution as having set a floor to what American society
can democratically do. That floor says nothing about abortion. It's not
the job of the Constitution to change things by judicial decree; change is
brought about by democratic legislation. Abortion has been prohibited.
You want to change that? American society thinks that's a terrible
result? Fine. Persuade each other about that, and eliminate the laws
against abortion.
I have no problem with change. It's just that I do not regard the
Constitution as being the instrument of change by letting judges read
Canadian cases and say, 'Yeah, it would be a good idea not to have any
restrictions on abortion.' That's not the way we do things in a
democracy. Persuade your fellow citizens and repeal the laws. Why
should the Supreme Court decide that question? 1 3 7

As the discussion continued, focus shifted to judicial functioning and the
influence of foreign and international law:
Breyer: The last questioner implicitly ask[ed] how I go about my daily
work. My daily job is reading and writing....
What do I read? Contrary to the impressions of some, I do not read the
edicts of Colbert. I read briefs. Those briefs frequently explain law
with which I was not previously familiar, for example Louisiana
property law, highly relevant to interpreting an ERISA provision, which
the California State Bar Association explained beautifully in an amicus

brief.
Those briefs will have to explain foreign law too, and ever more so.
That is because foreign law comes before us ever more frequently in
discovery cases, antitrust cases, EPA cases, NAFTA cases. We shall
have to learn something about foreign law to decide those cases
properly. And the lawyers will have to explain it, separating the more
important from the less important information. If there are important
interesting, and relevant matters of foreign law, the lawyers will point
them out.

137. Id. at 535-36.
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Perhaps I should add something relevant to the more 'newsworthy'
cases, involving capital punishment and the like. No judge believes that
he or she is there to advance a political point of view in respect to such
cases. No judge believes that he or she is there to advance an
ideological point of view. If I find that I reach a result simply because I
think it 'morally good,' then I am not doing my job. I do not mean I am
there to foment evil. [Laughter.] I am there to follow the law. That is
what we all think.
Moreover, each of us applies a framework that can be similarly
described in general terms. We look to a document's text; we consider
history; we consider tradition; we consider precedent; we search for the
value or purpose that underlies the legal text; and we want to know the
consequences of our decision, consequences viewed through the prism
of the value or purpose that underlies the [legal] text. But we do not
necessarily give the same weight to each of these factors. Some of us,
over time, tend to place greater importance on some factors than others.
The differences are differences of emphasis. And it is important not to
overstate them. From your point of view as a law student or even as a
professor or judge or practitioner, the similarities are more important
than the differences. 138

Breyer: I believe that I am interpreting the Constitution of the United
States. If, for example, a foreign court, in a particular decision, had
shown that a particular interpretation of similar language in a similar
document had had an adverse effect on free expression, to read that
decision might help me to apply the American Constitution. That is
what is at issue. To what extent will learning what happens in other
courts help a judge apply the Constitution of the United States. As I
have said, in today's world where similar relevant experience becomes
more and more common we are more likely to learn from other
countries. I doubt that Franklin or Hamilton or Jefferson or Madison or
even George Washington would have thought we cannot learn anything
139
of value from abroad.
140
Scalia: Can I respond to that?

Anderson: Please.141
Scalia: You know, it's a Constitution that contains phrases of great
generality such as due process of law. Now if you're following an
originalist approach, you ask, what did the framers believe constituted
due process of law? And if I find something there I don't like, that's too

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id.

INT'L LAW INFLUENCES ON DEATH PENALTY

2009

139

bad; I am chained. Because of my theory of the Constitution, that's what
due process was and that's what it is today, unless you amend the
Constitution. Whereas if you believe 'due process of law' is an
invitation for intelligent judges and lawyers and law students to imagine
what they consider to be due process and consult foreign judges, then,
indeed, you do not know what you're saying when you swear to uphold
and defend the Constitution of the United States. It morphs. It

changes. 142
Breyer: I do not often put references to foreign materials in my
opinions. I do so occasionally when I believe that a reference will help
lawyers, specialists, or the public at large better understand the issue or
the views expressed in my opinions. If the foreign materials have had a
significant impact on my thinking, they may belong in the opinion
because an opinion should be transparent. It should reflect my actual
thinking. 143
The debate ended with Justice Breyer concluding:
[The centralizing principle about all exercises of power is that

all] power has to flow from the people and the people must
maintain checks on its exercise. That is a good thing.
That principle, of course, . . . does not prevent me from

sometimes looking at foreign opinions [and international law]
44
and on occasion even citing them.1

Justice Scalia added: "I think it's fine to conclude on something that we
undoubtedly agree upon" and the audience laughed. 145
This controversy is not some intellectual or academic exercise. In her speech
in South Africa, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that after Roper v.
Simmons was decided in March of 2005, the Marshal of the Supreme Court
advised her and Justice O'Connor of the following web posting:
Okay commandoes, here is your first patriotic assignment . . . an easy

one. Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor have publicly
stated that they use [foreign] laws and rulings to decide how to rule on
American cases.
This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom . . . If

you are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those
two justices will not live another week. 146

142. Id.
143. Id. at 540.
144. Id. at 541

145. Id.
146. "ADecent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind," supra note 107, at 582.
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Justice John Paul Stevens and Chief Justice John Roberts have not directly
entered this debate. However, the Chief Justice made his views on the use of
foreign law materials quite clear during his confirmation hearings:
[In] [floreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't find it
in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or
Japan or Indonesia or wherever ... [L]ooking at foreign law for support
is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can
find them. They're there. And that actually expands the discretion of
the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal
preferences, cloak them with the authority of precedent-because
they're finding precedent in foreign law-and use that to determine the
meaning of the Constitution. And I think that's a misuse of precedent,
not a correct use of precedent. 147

Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia1 48 and, in
striking down the death penalty for crimes committed by the mentally retarded,
cited in a footnote "the world community['s]" disapproval of such practices as
support for the Court's decision. 14 9 In a speech to the American Bar Association in
August of 2005,150 Justice Stevens broadly attacked America's capital punishment
system without expressly referring to international law.1 51 It is possible that Justice
Stevens has moved past the controversy over using international law by concluding
in Baze v. Reese that the death penalty causes the "needless extinction of life,"
makes only "marginal contributions" to the public good, cannot be justified on the
traditional grounds offered to support it, and should therefore be legislatively

abolished.15 2
This description of the Justices debate can conclude with another quotation
from Justice Ginsburg. To her, "respect for 'the Opinions of [Human]kind"'
requires recognition of all rights that are "accepted as an integral part of human
freedom. . . " around the world. She said:
I ... believe [the U.S. Supreme Court] will continue to accord "a decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind" as a matter of comity and in a
spirit of humility. Comity, because projects vital to our well being combating international terrorism is a prime example - require trust and
cooperation of nations the world over. And humility because, in Justice

147. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 100, at A26 (discussing Justice Robert's comments during
confirmation hearings).
148. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
149. Id. at 316 n.21.

150. Justice John Paul Stevens, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the American Bar Association,
Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html.
151. See generally James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens and
the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1607 (2006) (examining Justice Stevens' death

penalty and criminal law jurisprudence, not mentioning or relying on international or foreign law).
152. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1550 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
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O'Connor's words: "Other legal systems continue to innovate, to
experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems that
arise each day, from which we can learn and benefit." 53
PART V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS
The basic premise of this Article is that international law and foreign court
decisions have significantly influenced U.S. Supreme Court decision-making in
death penalty cases. The Justices debate outlined in Part IV is one manifestation of
this reality. The examples that follow provide further evidence that Supreme Court
Justices rely on international law as persuasive authority and use it to support their
conclusions in real cases.
A very early illustration of the Court's reliance on international law is Trop v.
Dulles. 154 In 1958, a plurality of the Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishments" clause to embrace, as its basic concept, "nothing
less than the dignity of man" as measured by "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing [U.S.] society."155 In ruling that stripping a war
time deserter of American citizenship was an invalid punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, the Court noted that "civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime."156
The 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia confronted the issue of whether Georgia
could execute a prisoner convicted of raping a 16 year old "woman." 117 Justice
White, speaking for the Court, recognized in a footnote that "it is thus not
irrelevant ... that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue."158 The Court
followed international practice and prohibited Georgia from executing Coker.
Over 20 years later, in 1999, one of the Court's most aggressive proponents of
consideration of international law, Justice Stephen Breyer, relied extensively on
the laws, court decisions, and practices of nations, in dissenting from the denial of
Court review of a death sentence that raised the issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of prisoners who had spent over 19 years1 59
and 24 years 16 0 on death row. This is the so called "death row phenomenon" claim
that making a death row prisoner wait decades or more before the carrying out of a
death sentence is, by itself, unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
According to Breyer:

153. "ADecent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind," supra note 107, at 591.
154. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100, 103 (1958).
155. Id. at 100-01.
156. Id. at 102.
157. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
158. Id. at 596 n. 10.
159. Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999). The defendant had spent 19 years and 4
months on death row. Id.
160. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999). The defendant had spent 24 years and 6 months
on death row. Id.

142

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 38:1

A growing number of courts outside the United States-courts that
accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty-have held that
lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate
execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel. In Pratt v. Attorney
General of Jamaica . . . for example, the Privy Council considered
whether Jamaica lawfully could execute two prisoners held for 14 years
after sentencing. The Council noted that Jamaican law authorized the
death penalty and that the United Nations Committee on Human Rights
has written that "'capital punishment is not per se unlawful under the
[Human Rights] Covenant."' But the Privy Council concluded that it
was an "inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over a
long extended period of time," and the delay of 14 years was
"shocking," It held that the delay (and presumptively any delay of more
than five years) was "'inhuman or degrading punishment or other
treatment' forbidden by Jamaica's Constitution unless "due entirely to
the fault of the accused."
The Supreme Court of India has held that an appellate court, which
itself has authority to sentence, must take account of delay when
deciding whether to impose a death penalty. Sher Singh v. State of
Punjab,A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465. A condemned prisoner may ask whether
it is "just and fair" to permit execution in instances of "[p]rolonged
delay." The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, after surveying holdings of
many foreign courts, concluded that delays of five and six years were
"inordinate" and constituted "'torture or . . . inhuman or degrading
punishment or other such treatment."' Catholic Commissionfor Justice
and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, [1993] 1 Zimb. L.R. 239,
240, 269(S) (Aug. 4, 1999) .

.

. And the European Court of Human

Rights, interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights, noted
the convention did not forbid capital punishment. But, in the court's
view, the convention nonetheless prohibited the United Kingdom from
extraditing a potential defendant to the Commonwealth of Virginia-in
large part because the 6- to 8-year delay that typically accompanied a
death sentence amounts to "cruel, inhuman, [or] degrading treatment or
punishment" forbidden by the convention. Soering v. United Kingdom,
11 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser.A), pp.439, 478, & T 111 (1989).
Not all foreign authority reaches the same conclusion. The Supreme
Court of Canada, for example, held that Canadian constitutional
standards, though roughly similar to those of the European Convention
on Human Rights, did not bar extradition to the United States of a
defendant facing the death penalty. Kindler v. Minister of Justice,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 838 (joint opinion). And the United Nations
Human Rights Committee has written that a delay of 10 years does not
necessarily violate roughly similar standards set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Views adopted by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, 44th Sess., Mar. 30, 1992, Inre: Barrett v.
Jamaica (Nos. 270/1988 and 271/1988) § 8.4. Given the closeness of
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the Canadian Court's decision (4 to 3) and language that the United
Nations Human Rights Committee used to describe the 10-year delay
("disturbingly long"), one cannot be certain what position those bodies
would take in respect to delays of 19 and 24 years.
Obviously this foreign authority does not bind us. After all, we are
interpreting a "Constitution for the United States of America."
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868, n.4, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101
L.Ed.2d 702 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). And indeed, after
Soering, the United States Senate insisted on reservations to language
imposing similar standards in various human rights treaties, specifying,
for example, that the language in question did not "restrict or prohibit
the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the ...
Constitution of the United States, including any constitutional period of
confinement prior to the imposition of the death penalty." 136 Cong.
Rec. 36192-36199 (1990) (U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
Nonetheless, the treaty reservations say nothing about whether a
particular "period of confinement" is "constitutional." And this Court
has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which
foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances. In doing
so, the Court has found particularly instructive opinions of former
Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition

that also underlies our own Eighth Amendment. Thompson v.
Oklahoma, supra, at 380-831, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (opinion of STEVENS, J.)
(considering practices of Anglo-American nations regarding executing
juveniles); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-797, n.22, 102 S.Ct.
3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (noting that the doctrine of felony murder
has been eliminated or restricted in England, India, Canada, and a
"number of other Commonwealth countries"); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 596, n.10, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (observing
that only 3 of 60 nations surveyed in 1965 retained the death penalty for
rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d
630 (1958) (noting that only 2 of 84 countries surveyed imposed
denationalization as a penalty for desertion). See also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, n. 8, and 718-719, n. 16, 117 S.Ct.
2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (surveying other nations' laws regarding
assisted suicide); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584, n.25,
and 588, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (considering English
practice concerning police interrogation of suspects); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183-189, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881) (referring to the
practices of Parliament in determining whether the House of
Representatives has the power to hold a witness in contempt).
Willingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is
not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a "decent respect
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to the opinions of mankind."
In these cases, the foreign courts I have mentioned have considered
roughly comparable questions under roughly comparable legal
standards. Each court has held or assumed that those standards permit
application of the death penalty itself. Consequently, I believe their
views are useful even though not binding.
Further, the force of the major countervailing argument is diminished in
these two cases. That argument (as set out by the Human Rights
Commission) recognizes that there must be an "element of delay
between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and the exhaustion
of available remedies." Barrett, supra, § 8.4. It claims that "even
prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial regime on death
row cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely availing himself
of appellate remedies." Ibid. As the Canadian Supreme Court noted, "a
defendant is never forced to undergo the full appeal procedure, but the
vast majority choose to do so. It would be ironic if delay caused by the
appellant's taking advantage of the full and generous avenue of the
appeals available to him should be viewed as a violation of fundamental
justice." Kindler, supra, at 838; see also Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d
1473, 1491-1492 (C.A.9 1990).161
Justice Clarence Thomas, the spiritual ally of Justice Scalia, agreed that the
Court should not hear the appeal in these cases and ridiculed Justice Breyer's
references to foreign court decisions.
I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the
American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for the
proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his
execution is delayed. Indeed, were there any such support in our own
jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to
rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of
2
Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council. 16
In a follow-up footnote Justice Thomas wrote:
In support of his claim, petitioner Knight cites Blackstone, who
remarked that "a delayed execution 'affects the minds of the spectators
rather as a terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of
transgression."' Pet. for Cert. in No. 98-9741, p. 15 (quoting 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *397). Blackstone was speaking of the
effect speedy execution would have on deterring crime: "[P]unishment
should follow the crime as early as possible; that the prospect of
gratification or advantage, which tempts a man to commit the crime,

161. Knight, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment." Ibid. In this
regard, Blackstone observed that "throughout the kingdom, by statute 25
Geo. II. c. 37. it is enacted that, in case of murder, the judge shall in his
sentence direct execution to be performed on the next day but one after
sentence passed." Ibid. I have no doubt that such a system, if
reenacted, would have the deterrent effect that Justice BREYER finds
lacking in the current system, but I am equally confident that such a
procedure would find little support from this Court. 163
The modem era of the Supreme Court using international law begins with two
cases from the 2002-2003 term of the Court, Atkins v. Virginia1 64 and Lawrence v.
TexaS. 165
Justice John Paul Stevens, in Atkins, found a national and international
consensus against the execution of murderers who were severely mentally retarded
at the time of their crimes. He stated in a footnote that "within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."1 66
Lawrence v. Texas dealt with the non-Eighth Amendment issue of whether the
liberty protected by the Constitution's due process clauses protected the right of
same-sex adults to engage in voluntary intimate sexual activity (sodomy), free
from criminal sanctions. 167 In finding such a right, a Court majority joined Justice
Anthony Kennedy's opinion that, for the first time, placed international law at the
center-not in a footnote-of the Court's reasoning. 168 The Court's decision was,
in effect, that Lawrence's claim was consistent with American values that are
shared with much of western civilization, that many "nations have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to
engage in intimate, consensual conduct. [And that t]he right .

.

. [sought] in this

case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries." 169 And, as many would like to see happen with the Furman and Gregg
line of cases, the Court used international law to overturn one of its prior decisions,
Bowers v. Hardwick,170 that had upheld the constitutionality of laws criminalizing
adult homosexual sex.
Justice Kennedy's words ring powerfully today:
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger [in Bowers] to the
history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an
163. Id. at n. 1.
164. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding capital punishment of mentally
retarded individuals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
165. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
166. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
167. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
168. Id. at 562, 568, 572-73.
169. Id. at 576-77.
170. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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opposite direction. A committee advising the British Parliament
recommended in 1957 repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct.
The Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual
Offences and Prostitution (1963). Parliament enacted the substance of
those recommendations 10 years later. Sexual Offences Act 1967, §1.
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided
the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to
Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland
alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in
consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade
him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home had
been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that
the laws [of Northern Ireland] proscribing the conduct were invalid
under the European Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) & 52. Authoritative in all countries
that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations
now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim
put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers
have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has
followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom. See P. G. &

JH.v.

United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98,

& T 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988). Other nations,
too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected
right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.
See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. The right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
17 1
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.

Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence dissent, fired the first loud shot in what is
shown in Part IV of this Article to be an open war among the Justices over the
legitimacy of relying on foreign legal authorities. He protested:
The Bowers majority opinion never relied on "values we share with a
wider civilization," but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on
the ground that such a right was not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,"' 478 U.S., at 193-194, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (emphasis
added). Bowers' rational-basis holding is likewise devoid of any

reliance on the views of a "wider civilization," see id., at 196, 106 S.Ct.

171. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
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2841. The Court's discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of
course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on
sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however,
since "this Court . .. should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions
on Americans." Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n., 123 S.Ct. 470, 154
L.Ed.2d 359 (2002) (THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).172
Prior to the cases presented in the 2007-2008 Term, the most recent
substantive holding on the meaning of "cruel and unusual" in the death penalty
context came in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.173 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper
found it unconstitutional in all cases to execute murderers who were under the age
of 18 at the time of their crime. In a speech at Cambridge University, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg had this to say about Roper: "Roper v. Simmons presents perhaps
the fullest expressions to date on the propriety and utility of looking to 'opinions of
[human]kind' [in giving meaning to the broad language of our Constitution]."l74
Justice Kennedy's opinion cited extensively to world legal opinion on the
juvenile death penalty, as follows:
Petitioner [the state of Virginia] cannot show national consensus in
favor of capital punishment for juveniles but still resists the conclusion
that any consensus exists against it. Petitioner supports this position
with, in particular, the observation that when the Senate ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), it did so
subject to the President's proposed reservation regarding Article 6(5) of
that treaty, which prohibits capital punishment for juveniles. This
reservation at best provides only faint support for petitioner's argument.
First, the reservation was passed in 1992; since then, five States have
abandoned capital punishment for juveniles. Second, Congress
considered the issue when enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act in
1994, and determined that the death penalty should not extend to
juveniles. The reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides
minimal evidence that there is not now a national consensus against
juvenile executions.

Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate [and
unconstitutional] punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation
in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.
This reality does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the
time of the Court's decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws

172. Id. at 598.
173. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (citation omitted).
174. "ADecent Respect to the Opinions of[Human]kind," supra note 107, at 590.
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of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishments .... "
As respondent [Atkins] and a number of amici emphasize, Article 37 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every
country in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia,
contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes
committed by juveniles under 18. No ratifying country has entered a
reservation to the provision prohibiting the execution of juvenile
offenders. Parallel prohibitions are contained in other significant
international

covenants.

See ICCPR, Art. 6(5);

. . . American

Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Art. 4(5)
[prohibiting capital punishment for anyone under 18 at the time of
offense]; ... African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
Art. 5(3) ....

Respondent and his amici have submitted, and petitioner does not
contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have
executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since
then each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for
juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. In sum, it is fair to
say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its
face against the juvenile death penalty.

It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large
part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of
young people may often be a factor in the crime. The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.
Over time, from one generation to the next, the Constitution has come to
earn the high respect and even, as Madison dared to hope, the veneration
of the American people. The document sets forth, and rests upon,
innovative principles original to the American experience, such as
federalism; a proven balance in political mechanisms through separation
of powers; specific guarantees for the accused in criminal cases; and
broad provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve human
dignity. These doctrines and guarantees are central to the American
experience and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and
national identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution,
then, is because we know it to be our own. It does not lessen our fidelity
to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
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peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within
our own heritage of freedom.175
Not everything at the U.S. Supreme Court level is positive from the
abolitionist perspective. Two of the three substantive death penalty cases on the
Court's 2007-2008 docket, Medellin v. Texasl76 and Baze v. Reese,i17 resulted in
rulings in favor of the death penalty.
Medellin v. Texas is an example of the American government ignoring
international law when it feels that to do so is in the country's best interest. The
United States has taken reservations to major international treaties, disclaiming any
provisions excluded by the reservation;178 withdrawn from the jurisdiction of
international tribunals (e.g., International Court of Justice1 79); for many years
offered a deaf ear to world-wide objections to the execution of juveniles that
ultimately led to Roper v. Simmons)8 o and completely ignored consistent state
violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."' Regarding the
Vienna Convention, many had hoped that Medellin would remedy this violation of
international law. The Court's March 25, 2008 decision was, therefore, a major

disappointment. 18 2
Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention requires states and the federal
government to advise foreign nationals in U.S. custody on criminal charges of their
right of access to their country's embassy and its officials.183 Plainly, legal advice
from those officials is often crucial to a fair trial for these defendants. Medellin
and other Mexican nationals were not given these rights. Medellin tried to remedy
this violation of the Convention in Texas and lost based on state procedural rules.
During the pendency of Medellin's federal habeas case, Mexico sued the United
States in the International Court of Justice which ordered the United States to
review Medellin's conviction and sentence based on the violations of Article

175. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567, 575-78 (citations omitted).
176. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); see also Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008)
(denying Medellin's second application for writ of habeas corpus).
177. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008).
178. The most notorious reservation may be the U.S. reservation to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights expressly, "reserve[ing] the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person ..... United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United States Declarationsand Reservations,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-4&chapter-4&lang=en#
EndDec.
179. See Letter of March 7, 2005, supra note 91 (noting U.S. withdrawal from I.C.J. jurisdiction);
see also supratext accompanying note 93.
180. The United States has never ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
and refused to recognize its ban on the death penalty for juveniles. See Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supranote 65 (citing U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child).
181. See CLARKE & WHITT, supra note 22, at 54-59 (discussing U.S. noncompliance with Vienna
Convention).
182. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1348 (2008).
183. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820.
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36(1)(b). 184 President Bush accepted the ICJ's judgment and ordered Texas to
comply. 185 Texas refused. 186 When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court it
ruled that the Vienna Convention was not "self-executing" and required Congress
to pass further legislation before the ICJ judgment, or any ICJ ruling, could
become enforceable American law.18 7 As a result, the judgment in the Medellin
case bound only the United States and not individual states. President Bush's
order was thus also unenforceable because the ICJ order did not constitute valid
federal law for purposes of the Supremacy Clause.1 8 8
Medellin could be read, first, as an example of international law having no
direct influence on American death penalty practices. The Supreme Court's
technical decision determined that a judgment and order of the International Court
of Justice against the United States, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States),18 9 was not enforceable against the State of
Texas.190 In so doing, the Court decided a question of U.S. domestic lawwhether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 91 and its Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputesl92 were self-executing for
purposes of enforcement of national law under the Supremacy Clause 93 -with
some reference to international law-the Vienna Convention and its Protocol, the
184. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).
185. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Attorney Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Bush Memorandum]. President Bush determined that the United States would "discharge
its inter-national obligations . . .by having State courts give effect to the [Avena] decision." Id.
186. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W. 3d 315, 352 (2006).
187. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356-62 (2008). A treaty like the Vienna Convention is
clearly a binding international commitment. It does not, however, become binding domestic U.S. law
unless it is "self-executing" in the sense that it was ratified with the express intention or purpose of
becoming law automatically enforceable within the United States, meaning the treaty must convey the
intention to be self-executing and be ratified on that basis. In the Court's judgment, that was not the
case with ratification of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, Congress needed to pass legislation in
order to enforce the ICJjudgment, which it had not done. "If ICJ judgments were instead regarded as
automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately and directly binding on state and
federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." Id. The Court took the view that ICJ decisions are
not automatically enforceable as U.S. domestic law because of the enforcement structure established by
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. Id. Article 94(2) provides an option of noncompliance with ICJ
judgments, allowing political branches to determine whether and how to comply with ICJ decisions.
Noncompliance with an ICJjudgment through the exercise of a Security Council veto has always been
regarded as a viable option by the Executive and Senate after consideration of the U.N. Charter,
Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute. A "self-executing" judgment would deprive a government of this
option, leading the Court to decide that "there is no reason to believe that the President and Senate
signed up for such a result." Id.
188. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W. 3d at 352.
189. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).
190. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
191. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820.
192. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, art. I., Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488.
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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UN Charter, 194 and the originating statute for the ICJ195-but no direct reliance on
it. The underlying policy concern in the case was respect for international law and,
on that point, the result is at least disappointing, particularly for the death row
inmate parties to the case whose executions will proceed to scheduling. 196
International law did have a tangential influence on the majority decision.
Chief Justice John Roberts' opinion cited the practice of 47 nations that had signed
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, and decisions of the 171 countries
that are parties to the Convention, in refusing to treat an International Court of
Justice judgment as self-executing or automatically binding domestic law. 197 "The
lack of any basis for supposing that any other country would treat ICJ judgments as
directly enforceable as a matter of their domestic law strongly suggests that the
treaty should not be so viewed in our courts."1 98 The Court seemed to say "see, we
are just doing what other countries do."
A curious thing about the Medellin decision is that part of the U.S.
government, the President, aggressively undertook to meet the international
obligations imposed by the ICJ judgment. In doing so, he identified important
U.S. interests such as insuring reciprocal compliance with the Vienna Convention,
protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating U.S.
commitment to the role of international law. 199 The President's Memorandum was
a good faith attempt to comply with the ICJ order by bringing pressure on Texas
and other states to support the nation in its efforts to respect and follow
international law. Yet, the Court felt no "separation of powers" 200 constraints and
blocked that effort.

194. U.N. Charter art. 94.
195. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945) [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
196. Based on the March 2008 Supreme Court ruling in Medellin, Texas scheduled Medellin's
execution for August 5, 2008. In response, in June of 2008, Mexico filed with the ICJ a "Request for
Interpretation of Judgment" in the Avena case in which it characterized the actions of President Bush,
the State of Texas, and the Supreme Court as a "fundamental dispute" over the scope and effect of the
Avena judgment. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (July 16,
2008) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14637.pdf. It pointed out that no "review and
reconsideration" of Medellin's death sentence had occurred, as required by Avena, and asked the ICJ to
reaffirm the international law obligations of the United States. Id. at 2-4. On July 16, the ICJ ordered
the United States to 'take all measures necessary to ensure that Messrs. Jos6 Ernesto Medellin Rojas ...
[and the other Mexican nationals subject to the Avena judgment] are not executed pending judgment on
the Request for interpretation submitted by [Mexico] . . . " or judgment on the provision of review and
reconsideration required by the March judgment. Id. at 1. On August 6, 2008, Texas executed Medellin
without any further review of his case. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexican National Executed in Texas,
THE WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at A6.
197. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363. The point is that the Court's approach mirrors that of many
countries in relying on post-ratification understandings of the effect of the Convention and the reach of
ICJjurisdiction.
198. Id.
199. Bush Memorandum, supranote 185.
200. See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1369.
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Justice Breyer entered his usual vigorous dissent to the Court's reasoning.
Brief references to the practices of other nations were made (to Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Mexico) 201 but, ultimately, Justice Breyer would have read the
relevant treaties and conventions in a practical way so as to preserve a "workable
dispute resolution"202 procedure that functions effectively by using the Supremacy
Clause to bind states like Texas to an ICJ "compulsory" jurisdictional2 03 judgment.
He observed, "[i]n a world where commerce, trade, and travel have become even
more international ... [refusing enforcement of the Avena judgment] is a step in
the wrong direction." 204 Without self-execution, this treaty and many, many,
others are rendered "useless." 205 Justice Breyer noted the position taken by the
State Department at the time the Consular Relations Convention was ratified that
the "Convention is considered entirely self-executive and does not require any
implementing or complementing legislation" 206 and the view of the Executive
Branch that other "indistinguishable" provisions of the Convention were "selfexecuting."207 Justice Breyer concluded by noting that "today's holdings make it
more difficult to enforce the judgments of international tribunals, ... [and] weaken
... [the] rule of law for which our Constitution stands."208 His point was driven
home when, subsequent to the Court's Medellin decision, the United States
withdrew from the Optional Protocol and the jurisdiction of the ICJ on matters
involving access to consulates.209
The problems created by Medellin for Americans travelling abroad are
obvious. Why should other countries comply with their Vienna Convention
consular obligations when the United States does not? The situation is comparable
to the problems American adherence to the death penalty creates for extraditing
murderers and terrorists. Dozens of countries now refuse to extradite criminals to
the United States without "assurances" that the death penalty will not be sought
after extradition.210 Obstacles to extradition and outrage over denial of Vienna
201. Id. at 1381, 1386-87 (Breyer J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1389.
203. Id. at 1383, 1389.
204. Id. at 1389.
205. Id. at 1384.
206. Id. at 1386.
207. Id.; see also Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566) 2006 WL 271823, p. 14, n.2.
208. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1391. An amicus brief from "International Court of Justice Experts"
urged the Court to find the treaties self executing. See Brief for International Court of Justice Experts
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008), (No. 06-984), 2007
WL 1886207. One of the arguments made was that the essential purpose of the Supremacy Clause was,
and is, to make treaties binding on the States, in order to protect fundamental national powers in foreign
affairs as conferred by Articles I, II and III of the Constitution. Id. at 8-10. The majority is "hunting
the snark"!? See LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK (BookSurge Classics 2004)
(1876). Carroll described the "snark" as a creature that could not be described or was "unimaginable."
The unknown or mysterious creature that children could not see, find, or understand. Id.
209. See U.S. Withdrawal Letter, supra note 91 (discussing U.S. withdrawal from Optional
Protocol).
210. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1;
Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
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Convention rights raise a most compelling question-does America's continuing
commitment to capital punishment as a state policy justify the damage done to our
national security, our reputation in the international community, and our ability to
protect our citizens outside the United States?
Baze v. Reese, 211 decided on April 16, 2008, signaled a return to active
execution of death row prisoners in the United States. 212 Only two Justices,
Ginsburg and Souter, dissented from the Court's holding Kentucky's "lethal
cocktail" injection method of executing prisoners did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 13 International law played no major part in the decision, and
probably could not have. But, Justices Alito and Stevens did manage to slip into
the Court's analysis approving references to the practice of the Royal Dutch
Society for the Advancement of Pharmacy of using the same drugs used for
executions in Kentucky to carry out assisted suicides in Holland.214 This may be
contrasted with the fact that the Baze ruling permits use of a drug-pancuronioum
bromide-that veterinarians are prohibited from using in euthanizing animals in
many states! 2 15 In any case, after Baze, it appears that the legal fight over capital
punishment will continue to be over expansion of the death penalty, as illustrated
by Kennedy, rather than over Justice Steven's conclusion, stated in his concurrence
to Baze, that the death penalty is no longer supportable in law or policy and should
therefore be abolished.216
The third and last substantive capital punishment case before the Court in
2007-2008, was Kennedy v. Louisiana.217 The case involved reconsideration of
Coker v. Georgiawith reference to a Louisiana law that made rape of a child under
the age of 12 a capital crime. 218 Patrick Kennedy, a 43-year-old black man, was
convicted in a Louisiana state court of raping his eight year old step-daughter.
Under Louisiana law, aggravated rape, defined at the time as sexual relations with
a child under the age of 12,219 was a capital crime and Kennedy was sentenced to

Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K.-N.Ir., March 31, 2003, Treaty Series No. 13 (2007), available at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7382/7382.pdf; United States v. Bums, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 (Can.); Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1989); The
United Nations Human Rights Committee, Judge v. Canada: Views of the Human Rights Committee
under the Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Aug. 13, 2003); ICCPR, supranote 62, art. 6; Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex.,
May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059; Mohamed v. Presidentof South Africa 2001 (3) S.A. 893(CC) at 16-17
(S.Afr.); State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 49-61, 451 (S. Afr.). All consider prohibiting
extradition to the United States without formal assurances that criminal proceedings will not result in a
death sentence.
211. Baze v. Reese, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
212. See supratext accompanying notes 44, 86, 88 (discussing moratoria on executions).
213. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
214. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1535.
215. Id. at 1524.
216. See supra, text accompanying note 28 (Stevens J., concurring) (calling capital punishment
"the pointless and needless extinction of life").
217. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
218. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (1998).
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death. He appealed this sentence through state courts and lost.220 He then
appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court arguing that his sentence constituted "cruel
and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 221
and that, as a result, he could not constitutionally be put to death. As Justices
Breyer and Kennedy asked them to do, lawyers for Petitioner Kennedy cited in
their brief updated evidence on international practice on this subject as follows:
International norms reinforce the unacceptability of imposing capital
punishment for child rape. This Court noted in Coker that only three out
of 60 "major nations in the world" allowed the death penalty for any
kind of rape in which death did not result. 433 U.S. at 596 n. 10.
Today, no Western nation authorizes the death penalty for any kind of
rape. Only a sliver of the countries admitted to the United Nations does
so, the most prominent being China, a country that also allows capital
punishment for tax evasion and other economic and nonviolent offenses.
See Br. Amici Curiae of Leading British Law Associations et al.; Peter
D. Nestor, When the Price Is Too High: Rethinking China'sDeterrence
Strategyfor Robbery, 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 525, 538 (2007). The
handful of other countries that Louisiana seeks to have the United States
join in authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide rape include
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which authorize such punishment for reasons
rooted at least partly in the subjugation of women.222
Petitioners elaborated on the issue of subjugating women with the following
footnote:
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Jordan, all of
which allow the death penalty for rape, appear to derive their criminal
codes from Shari'a, which also subjects individuals to the death penalty
for blasphemy, apostasy, adultery, prostitution and homosexuality. See,
e.g., Gay Nigerians Face Sharia Death, BBC News, Aug. 10, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/6940061.stm.
In some countries,
under Shari'a, survivors of rape are themselves subjected to significant

corporal punishment. See, e.g., Rape Case Calls Saudi Legal System
Into Question, MSNBC, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc. msn.com/id/
15836746; Dan Isaacs, Court in Nigeria Spares Woman from Stoning,
Daily Telegraph, Mar. 26, 2002, at 4.223
Since Coker, the United States also has become a signatory to the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Article 4(2) of which
provides that the death penalty "shall not be extended to crimes to which
it does not presently apply." ACHR: Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica, Art.

220. Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 793 (La. 2007).
221. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 U.S. 2641 (2008).
222. Brief for the Petitioner at 36-37, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-343),
2008 WL 466093.

223. Id. at 37.
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4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146 (entered into force July 19,
1978) (cited in Roper, 543 U.S. at 576).

Thus, not only does

Louisiana's death penalty for child rape isolate it on both the national
and world stages, but it is at odds with an international treaty.224
When the Kennedy case was argued before the Court on April 16 of 2008,
international law continued to be relevant and important to the appellate process.
This was driven home by questions from two Justices and comments by counsel.
First, as the Petitioner's lawyer tried to argue that the Court had limited
capital punishment to aggravated murder, and that child rape did not rise to a level
of seriousness comparable to murder, Justice Kennedy interrupted to ask "[w]hat
about treason? . . . Even the countries of Europe which have joined the European
Convention on Human Rights ...

make an exception ...

for treason. You can

slaughter your fellow citizens [in these countries], but if you offend the State you
can be put to death." 225 Counsel conceded that treason is regarded in the United
States and around the world as equivalent in seriousness to murder but argued that
this had no bearing on a state's right to expand application of its death penalty
beyond murder because the offense is against the safety and security of the state
itself.226

Later, Justice Stevens, referring to the briefs, suggested that there was a "sort
of correspondence" between international law and our "evolving standards of
decency," and asked how the international trend against expanding capital
punishment applied to the case. 227 Counsel for Louisiana responded by seemingly
denying such a trend and asserting that approximately 28 countries "permit the
death penalty for rape."228 She argued further that "there are no treaties" in
229
existence that would prevent the United States from executing child rapists.
National consensus, then, continued to have an international reference point.
Finally, later in the argument, counsel for Texas asserted that the international
law arguments made in Petitioner Kennedy's brief, quoted above, made the same
types of unacceptable arguments that had been made in Medellin.
He
characterized those arguments as suggesting "that this Court has no ability to
determine that . . . [certain crimes are] subject to the death penalty." 23 0 Counsel
found the assertions of one amicus brief 31 to be even more outrageous by arguing,
in effect, that "the United States is foreclosed from ever doing this [punishing the
rape of a child with the death penalty because of a treaty the United States has not
224. Id. at 37-38.
225. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (No. 07-343) (2008 WL
1741235) [hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript].
226. Id. at 21-26.
227. Id. at 41-42.
228. Id. at 42.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 53.
231. Id. at 54; see Brief of Leading British Law Associations, Scholars, Queen's Counsel, and
Former Law Lords as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Patrick Kennedy, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641
(2008) (No. 07-343), 2008 WL 706791.
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ratified, the American Convention on Human Rights and] because other nations
have made [contrary] determinations" 232 to those made by states like Louisiana.
According to counsel, such a view of American power should not prevail before
the Court. 233
These arguments firmly demonstrate that lawyers have learned the lesson
taught by the Justice Kennedy block on the Court - international law matters in
Eighth Amendment cases.
Kennedy v. Louisiana was especially important because of the nature of the
issue presented. As a matter of decisional law, the Court had not allowed capital
punishment outside of the crime of murder. The Court's decision, on June 25,
2008, preserved that rule by invalidating the Louisiana child rape death penalty.234
The recent trend towards restriction of capital punishment in the United States, and
the concomitant respect accorded world opinion against the death penalty, were
sustained by the decision, even though no direct references were made to
international or foreign law.235
Structurally, the Kennedy decision, written by Justice Kennedy, followed the
traditional approach utilized in Atkins and Roper of looking broadly for a national
consensus for or against executing child rapists and then bringing the Court's own
judgment to bear on whether this practice conforms to evolving standards of
decency.236
Looking at existing objective evidence of consensus, the majority was forced
to conclude that neither existing legislation-based practices nor national trends
supported the Louisiana approach. Only 6 states, including Louisiana, imposed the
death penalty for child rape.23 ' Congress excluded child rape from death penalty

232. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 225, at 54.
233. Id. at 53-54.
234. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646. In an unusual procedural development, the Court invited the
submission of new briefs by the parties to Kennedy on a petition for rehearing filed by the U.S. Solicitor
General's Office. See Order 07-343 entered on September 8, 2008; Supplement Brief for Respondent in
Support of Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (No. 07-343), 2008 WL 4359580
[hereinafter Supplemental Brief for Respondent]. The petition was based on the omission from the
original briefs in the case of any reference to a 2007 Executive Order authorizing the death penalty for
rape of a child under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See Supplement Brief for Respondent at 12; Exec. Order No. 13,447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56, 179 (Sept. 28, 2007). The Court sought input on whether
the omission required rehearing of the case on the question of whether the majority was correct in
concluding that there is a national consensus against the death penalty for child rapists. See Order 07343 entered on September 8, 2008.
235. Surprisingly, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion made only one cursory and general reference
to international law. He noted that evolving standards of decency have historically been measured by
"norms that 'currently prevail"' in society. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 311 (2002)). These norms take into consideration "'historical development[s] .... legislative
judgments, internationalopinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made."' Kennedy, 128 S. Ct.
at 2650 (citing Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982)) (emphasis added).
236. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005); see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
237. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651. The six states that imposed death penalty for child rape were
Louisiana, Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Id.
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crimes under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, even though the federal death
penalty does apply to some non-homicide offenses. 238 Kennedy would have been
the first death row inmate to be executed for rape since 1964.239 The Court
concluded that, not only was there no emerging consensus in favor of the death
penalty for child rapists, the evidence showed "an opinion against it." 240
In terms of the Court's independent judgment of the challenged practice,
Justice Kennedy emphasized the historic focus of Eighth Amendment analysis on
"evolving standards of decency" and the restraint and moderation they require in
applying the death penalty. As applied to child rapists, "the death penalty should
not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken." 24 1 The "moral
depravity and . .. injury to the person and to the public [present in child rape do
not compare to those caused by intentional murder.]" 24 2 The ugliness of child rape
may prejudice jurors and "overwhelm a decent person's judgment" leading to
arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing; retribution would come at the expense
of the (young) victims of child rape (who would be forced to relive the experience
often and over a long period of time).24 3 These cases involve delicate questions of
reliability of evidence; and, applying the death penalty could deter reporting of
child rape. The majority's strongest, and broadest, reason for limiting capital
punishment to the crime of murder of individual citizens was captured in this
statement: "[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into
brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint." 2 44
Is there a majority on the Court that will move towards the views of Justice
Stevens?
CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens's powerful conclusion in his Baze concurring opinion, that
fundamental flaws in American death penalty law now require states to
legislatively abolish it, 245 may trigger new efforts to initiate a direct constitutional
challenge to Furmanv. Georgia246 and its rule that the death penalty is accepted by
American society and can be constitutionally imposed.247 These efforts can draw
on the existence of new and important restrictions on the death penalty established
by the U.S. Supreme Court and based in part on international law and world

238. H.R. Con. Res. 3355, 103rd Cong. (1994) (enacted).
239. Bill Mears, Rape a Child, Pay with Your Life, Louisiana Argues, CNN.coM, Apr. 15, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/15/rape.execution/index.html.
240. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653.
241. Id. at 2659.
242. Id. at 2660.
243. Id. at 2660-61.
244. Id. at 2650.
245. Baze v. Rees, 128 U.S. 1520, 1546-48 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
246. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
247. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242, 249-250 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting death penalty would
be cruel and unusual if discriminatory, arbitrary or disproportionately applied); Id. at 309-10 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (finding wanton application death sentence cruel and unusual in violation of Eight
Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168 (1976) (holding imposition of death penalty not per
se cruel and unusual punishment).
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opinion. Four Justices on the Court are now on record as welcoming further
challenges based on foreign law and international practice.248 Nonetheless, it is
still extremely difficult to imagine that Furman v. Georgia, and its rule that state
execution is constitutional, will be rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court any time
soon.
Therefore, as encouraged by Justice Breyer's statements at American
University,249 lawyers in the United States, must, at all court levels, continue to use
international law, foreign court decisions, and global political actions (such as the
global moratorium vote at the United Nations) to litigate for more limits on the
death penalty. The Court's decisions in Medellin, Baze, and Kennedy clearly
indicate that future litigation will focus on restrictions and restraints on capital
punishment rather than the Stevens abolitionist position. Accordingly, anti-death
penalty strategies must focus on capital punishment practices that are ripe for
challenge: execution of the mentally ill; 25 0 the continuing and acute problems of
racial discrimination unsuccessfully attacked in McCleskey v. Kemp; 25 1 the "death
row phenomenon" blocked from review in Knight v. Florida;252 or documented
shortcomings in jury selection and jury deliberation processes.253
Most
importantly, innocence-based exonerations 254 should be aggressively cited to make
the case that the pervasive risk of error in capital cases compels adoption of the
international position that the death penalty must be eliminated or severely
restricted.
The death penalty debate is ultimately a political rather than legal debate.
When international forums are available, they must be used to publicize and
condemn death penalty abuses.

During the recent summer Olympics, why was

there not a firestorm of criticism over China's use of the death penalty equal to that
over political repression in Tibet or the treatment of the families whose children
were killed by the devastating Sichuan earthquake? 25 5 American credibility in
foreign and international affairs continues to be compromised by its presence on
the shortlist of world executioners.
The death machine of state execution could be shut down-quickly-by
legislative action. On the basis of cost alone, state legislatures should recognize
that the number one issue for Americans in 2008 and 2009-the troubled
economy-requires elimination of the multi-million dollar capital punishment

248. Those are Justices Stevens, Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg. See supra Part IV; supra text
accompanying note 214. The views of recently appointed Justice Sonia Sotomayor are unclear.
249. See supraPart IV (highlighting debate between Justices Breyer and Scalia).
250. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding capital punishment of mentally ill
prohibited by 8th amendment).
251. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
252. See supranote 34 (discussing "death row phenomenon").
253. See supranote 31 (discussing arbitrariness in jury selection and deliberation).
254. See supranotes 39, 56-59 and accompanying text (detailing death penalty innocence and
exonerations).
255. PD Online Forum, NGO Plays a Big Role in China Quake Relief PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
June 10, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91420/6426815.html.
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system. 256 How can any political leader justify capital punishment when studies
show that executions are vastly more expensive than the sentence of life in prison
without parole (LWOP). 257Similarly, if, for whatever reason, Congress passed an
omnibus bill comprehensively eliminating the death penalty as a sentence for all
federal crimes (or at least limiting it to direct acts of terrorism) and substituting
LWOP in its place, the death penalty universe in the United States could change
very quickly.258
The death penalty must be made a more visible issue in American political
debate. At the very end of the 2008 Presidential campaign, neither candidate had
made a substantial critical statement about capital punishment or the personal,
political, and financial harm it causes.259 In the future, will President Obama
256. The current economic crisis is forcing states to reconsider the death penalty for cost reasons.
Emanuella Grinberg, Budget Concerns Force States to Reconsider the Death Penalty, CNN.COM, Mar.
25, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/03/02/economy.death.penalty/index.html.
257. See supra note 38 (evaluating costs of death penalty). The Death Penalty Information Center
website provides extensive information on the financial costs, state by state, of the American death
penalty system. DPIC, Costs of the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-deathpenalty (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). These studies support two generalizations: state budgets are
severely burdened by the costs of capital cases; and, it is extraordinarily more expensive to prosecute a
death penalty case through to execution than it is to seek the penalty of life in prison without parole.
For example, in California, the additional cost of confining an inmate to death row, as compared to a
life sentence without possibility of parole, is $90,000 per inmate, per year, totaling approximately $63.3
million per year. California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Report and
Recommendations on the Administration of the Death Penalty in California, S. Res. 44, 2003-04 Reg.
Sess., at 69-70 (Cal. 2004), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-dp-official.html. In New Mexico,
prosecutors agreed to drop its pursuit of the death penalty against two defendants because the state
legislature did not have the necessary money for the defendant's representation in the capital defense
system. Adrianne Appel, Court Says, 'Pay Up-Or Let Live!', IPS News Service, April 23, 2008,
available at http://www.fadp.org/news/2008042404/.
258. On March 19, 2009, Senator Russell Feingold (D-W) introduced S. 650, the Federal Death
Penalty Abolition Act of 2009. The bill would effectively eliminate the death penalty as a sentence for
violations of federal criminal law. The Federal Death Penalty Abolition Act of 2009, S. 650, 111th
Cong. (as introduced by Senator Russell Feingold, in the Senate, Mar. 19, 2009).
259. After the Kennedy v. Louisiana decision was issued on June 25, 2008, both Presidential
candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, issued statements criticizing the Court's ruling. These
comments appear to be their first on the subject of the death penalty during the 2008 campaign.
Democratic Senator Obama said "I think that the rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous
crime, and if a state makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances, the death
penalty is at least potentially applicable that that does not violate our Constitution." Joan Biskupic,
Justices Reject Death Penalty for Child Rapists, USA Today, June 26, 2008, at 4A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-06-25-scotus-child-rape N.htm.
On this general
subject, he went on, "I have said repeatedly that I think that the death penalty should be applied in very
narrow circumstances for the most egregious of crimes." Id. The Republican candidate, Senator John
McCain, called the decision "an assault on law enforcement's efforts to punish these heinous felons for
the most despicable crime. That there is a judge anywhere in America who does not believe that the
rape of a child represents the most heinous of crimes, which is deserving of the most serious of
punishments, is profoundly disturbing." Jame Oliphant, Supreme Court bans death penalty for child
rape, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/26/nation/nascotus26. The Republican candidate, John McCain, criticized the Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons
in a speech about the future of the federal judiciary given on May 6, 2008; "Sometimes the expressed
will of the voters is disregarded by federal judges, as in a 2005 case concerning an aggravated murder in
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extend his message of "change" to this basic human rights issue? Will politicians
continue to exploit the death penalty for votes? Will the issue remain outside
public consciousness? Lawyers, law professors, law students, and political
activists should force the debate over capital punishment into national political
discussions. World leaders can and should do so as well.
As a final matter, one can hope to see in the coming years more abolitionist
decisions like State v. Makwanyane2 60 in South Africa and Minister of Justice v.
Burns261 in Canada. The opinions of judges in these and similar cases around the
world serve as a conscience for Americans. When foreign courts such as these
comprehensively set forth the practical, legal, and moral problems created by
modem death penalty laws they make it easier for judges in the United States to
respond positively to court challenges to American forms of capital punishment.
Court decisions like these can insure that international law will continue to matter
in U.S. constitutional interpretation. And, they can continue to weigh down the
branches of American death penalty law until they break.

the state of Missouri. As you might recall, the case inspired a Supreme Court opinion that left posterity
with a lengthy discourse on international law, the constitutions of other nations, the meaning of life, and
'evolving standards of decency'. These meditations were in the tradition of 'penumbras,' 'emanations,'
and other airy constructs the Court has employed over the years as poor substitutes for clear and
rigorous constitutional reasoning." Jeffrey Toobin, Comment, In McCain's Court, THE NEW YORKER,
May 26, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/05/26/080526 taco talk
toobin.
260. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 49-61, 451 (S. Afr.); see generally Mark S.
Kende, The Constitutionalityof the Death Penalty: South Africa as a Model for the United States, 38
GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 209 (2006) (advocating South Africa's death penalty stance should serve as
paradigm).
261. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7 (Can.).

DISSECTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMPLIANCE:
AN UNFINISHED ODYSSEY
RODA MUSHKAT*

Rule conformity in the global arena, a non-traditional subject with distinct
behavioral underpinnings, has evolved into one of the most extensively and
intensively researched subjects in the field of contemporary internationallaw.
What started as a strictly American enterprise is now a broader undertaking
spanning both sides of the Atlantic. A selective examination of an array of
competing theories in light of the features and experience of the Sino-British Joint
Declarationregarding the future of Hong Kong suggests that a further widening
beyond the Western core of the world system may yield valuable substantive and
methodologicalinsights.
I. INTRODUCTION

The academic discipline of international law has traditionally been concerned
with the emergence, via custom-based and treaty-based channels, of international
rules. In parallel to this predominantly descriptive endeavor, systematic efforts
have been carried out to interpret and evaluate the end-products of the normcreation process. Analytical schemes of an explanatory nature, particularly ones of
the elaborate variety, have not featured prominently on the research agenda, which
has displayed modest theoretical orientation.
Historical accounts, factual
assessment, rule determination, philosophical exploration and value judgment have
largely shaped the evolution of this field of inquiry. Theory-building, as
commonly conceived,' has mostly been relegated to the periphery, albeit not
marginalized to a point of being overlooked altogether.
International legal scholars following the traditional path have tended to blur
the distinction between "what is" and "what ought to be." This has not manifested
itself in a symmetrical fashion in that these two concepts have not been subject to
equally critical examination. Prevailing realities have routinely been scrutinized in
light of established prescriptive yardsticks-indeed, at times even novel ones-but
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the standards assumed to govern State action have seldom been juxtaposed with
patterns of behavior witnessed in concrete international settings. It has often been
posited, whether explicitly or implicitly, that general rule acceptance is tantamount
to faithful rule observance, or that "what ought to be" (in the broadly empirical, if
not strictly normative, sense of the term) effectively translates into "what is" in
typical circumstances. 2
This analytical disposition cannot be said to be flagrantly at variance with
global policy trends and well-ingrained, discipline-specific fundamental postulates.
After all, legalization, productive or otherwise, of international exchanges appears
to be underway. The corollary is that "[a]cross many issue-areas, the use of law to
structure world politics seems to be increasing."3 By the same token, rightly or
wrongly, law and prescribed behavior are inevitably intertwined at the conceptual
level, at least in legal contexts, even if the empirical basis of the relationship may
prove tenuous in practice. Law and prescribed behavior may be viewed as
interchangeable by legal researchers, but not social scientists, because their work is
heavily geared towards producing adherence to rules. That is not the case
elsewhere in the academic domain.4
Prevailing realities may be adjusted or, alternatively, held constant for
analytical purposes, in order to accomplish legitimate discipline-specific
objectives. This is not however an inherently open-ended process in that, at some
stage, they need to be incorporated into the conceptual framework for, otherwise,
the mismatch between "what is" and "what ought to be" may materially impede
scholarly progress. The fact is that prescribed State behavior commonly diverges
from international law and that this phenomenon must be both duly acknowledged

and methodically explained. Indeed, the empirical dichotomy between rules and
adherence/non-adherence persistently witnessed in the global arena has provoked a
strong response on the part of researchers in the field of international law (and,
naturally, international relations). Substantial intellectual resources have thus been
channelled in recent years into the study of State compliance, a move akin to a
paradigm shift in terms of the deep theoretical re-orientation observed.'
In the rapidly expanding literature on the subject, compliance is broadly
defined as "a state of conformity or identity between an actor's behavior and a
specified rule."6 Some authors include motives in their analytical schemes,
2. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw, International Relations and
Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,

2002).
3. Id
4. See id.
5. See id. at 544, 548, 552; William C. Bradford, InternationalLegal Compliance: An Annotated
Bibliography, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 379, 379-83 (2004) [hereinafter Bradford,
Bibliography]; William C. Bradford, InternationalLegal Compliance: Surveying the Field, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 495, 495-98 (2005) [hereinafter Bradford, Surveying].
6. Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 539. See also Roger Fisher, Improving Compliance with
International Law 105 (1981); Ronald B. Mitchell, International Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental
Policy and Treaty Compliance 31 (1994).
7. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 539. See also Friedrich V. Kratchowil, Rules,
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drawing a distinction between compliance induced by negative-style tactics (e.g.,
fear of punishment) and more positive/subtle attitudinal techniques (e.g.,
inculcation of norms via formal or informal educational socialization).7 Yet, this is
not the dominant practice and, for the most part, the issue of causality is addressed
separately. Compliance is also generally not equated with implementation, where
implementation is defined as the process of converting commitments into action
and legal system effectiveness. This is because rule effectiveness may persist in
the face of low compliance and high compliance may coincide with ineffective
standards .
The scholarly work undertaken in this field is wide in scope and conceptually
intricate. At the same time, it is still evolving and branching out in different
directions. This may be viewed as a healthy development at this early juncture,
and taking stock of divergent theoretical trends in an organized fashion may be
more appropriate than attempting a thorough synthesis.9 The purpose of this paper
is even more modest. It accepts analytical fluidity and diversity as inevitable
features of an extended learning process and the socio-political complexity towards
which the endeavor is directed. It nevertheless critically examines some of the
crucial assumptions underlying the principal conceptual schemes that have
emerged and selectively pinpoints tangible gaps in the academic writings on
international legal compliance (the two objectives converge, partially or fully, in
concrete settings).
The Sino-British Joint Declaration (officially known as the Joint Declaration
of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong

Kong) will serve as a source of empirical illustrations in this context, albeit
eclectically so. The choice of this particular case reflects the fact that it does not
fall into the over-represented but not-comprehensive American and European
categories. It is a way of stretching the boundaries of the population from which
students of international law and international relations typically choose their
samples when seeking to buttress theoretical assertions. The Sino-British Joint
Declaration also possesses somewhat different attributes from those displayed by
legal regimes commonly explored in compliance-oriented research, without
constituting a distant outlier. It has also been adequately researched by both

Norms, and Decisions on the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations
and Domestic Affairs 96 (1989); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106
Yale L. J. 2599, 2632-34 (1997).
8. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 539. See also The Implementation and
Effectiveness of International Legal Commitments: Theory and Practice 661 (David G. Victor et al.
eds., 1998).
9. See, e.g., Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 545; Bradford, Bibliography, supra note 5;
Bradford, Surveying, supranote 5.
10. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, U.K. P.R.C., Dec. 19, 1984, H.K.L.I.I. 2301 available at http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/2301/.
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lawyers and social scientists. This paper, however, does not focus on the SinoBritish Joint Declaration as such.
Before proceeding to survey briefly the relevant theoretical literature, it
should be emphasized that the Sino-British Joint Declaration is not a statement of
policy intent but a genuine international treaty. The status of such a mechanism is
not affected by its title (Declaration) or the (declaratory) method embraced by the
parties (the two governments in question) entering into an accord. By the same
token, the Sino-British Joint Declaration readily meets the definitional criteria
necessary to qualify as an international treaty." Last but not least, the two
signatories went to considerable lengths to signal that they consider the agreement
(including its Annexes) as an instrument giving rise to binding rights and
obligations (e.g., by registering it with the United Nations in accordance with
article 102 of the UN Charter). 12
The issue of effectiveness doubtless poses an analytical and practical
challenge. No sanctions may be invoked in the event the provisions of the accord
are violated. To make matters worse, no means of dispute settlement are available
and access to the International Court of Justice is realistically precluded (due to the
non-acceptance by the PRC of the compulsory jurisdiction of the institution). This
is a potentially problematic configuration, hinging on the goodwill exhibited by the
parties (or, to be exact, one of them) in changing circumstances over a long period
of time.13 As indicated earlier, however, compliance and effectiveness need not be
highly correlated. Strong adherence to poorly-structured legal regimes, and the
opposite pattern, is not rare socio-political phenomena.
II. SEARCH FOR THEORETICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

Cross-fertilization between international law and sister disciplines has varied
over time and from one specific area of academic inquiry to another. A certain
degree of openness to external influences has nevertheless prevailed throughout its
intellectual evolution and this has manifested itself in the handling of the topics
dissected. Compliance has consistently been at the high end of the ever-widening
historical range. From inception (to the extent that it may be identified with any
precision), the study of the subject has borne traces of a coherent
interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary orientation. The impact of major schools of
thought shaping the development of the social sciences (particularly, but not
exclusively, international relations) has been apparent, whether or not explicitly
acknowledged. This includes realism, liberalism, structuralism, public/rational
choice and constructivism.
The frequent crossing of established scholarly boundaries may account for the
methodological consciousness displayed, another salient characteristic of the work
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, 1 1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(defining a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law").
12. See RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, Two INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE
CASE OF HONG KONG 140-41 (1997).

13. See id.
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on international legal compliance. There is a definite awareness of the formal side
of concept utilization that may need to be brought into play when seeking to
impose an intellectual structure on complex socio-political reality. Relevant
concepts (compliance and others) are generally delineated with considerable care,
effectively combined into clusters, clearly linked and allowed to vary. This effort
extends beyond generating ad hoc explanations into the realm of theory building
(unusually for lawyers, it is a largely deductive, as distinct from an inductive,
undertaking). 14
Certain features of this methodological thrust should be highlighted at the
outset. Concepts are multilevel in nature. At the basic level, their fundamental
essence is captured. At the secondary level, their principal dimensions are
identified. At the data/indicator level, they are measured and operationalized."
Students of international legal compliance function predominantly at the first two
levels. For the most part, they are engaged in qualitative rather than quantitative
research. The corollary is (although it does not automatically follow) that they
belong not to the operationalizing tradition of methodological inquiry, but to its
ontological counterpart (the latter aims at producing clusters of concepts that
portray the key facets of the social world and aspires to enhance the understanding
of social phenomena). 16
Nor are the attempts at theory building/testing uniformly geared towards
determining causality. This is often the case, yet there are ample exceptions to the
rule. The ontological perspective tends to exhibit a functionalist bias. Within this
framework, greater emphasis thus tends to be placed on functions that must be
performed for conditions (such as compliance) to be satisfied than on causes (e.g.,
democracies cannot operate effectively unless competitive elections are held,
without causality being implied).1 7 Consequently, the theories may pertain to the
interrelationships of the secondary-level dimensions, employ functionalist
terminology and eschew causal attribution. Perhaps more importantly, this is not a
purely theoretical exercise. The ultimate goal is to bolster compliance with
acceptable or desirable norms rather than merely provide better behavioral insight.
While there had been some notable previous contributions, the foundations
for the systematic analysis of international legal compliance were arguably laid by
Henkin in his seminal treatise on the interplay between law and politics in the
global arena, which was originally published in 1969 and appeared in an expanded
form in 1979.18 He posed a number of theoretically pivotal questions which have
subsequently loomed large on the scholarly and policy agendas, particularly the
former: "Do nations comply with international law? When do they comply? Why
do they observe law? Why do they violate it? Compliance apart, has international
law any other significance in shaping their conduct? And is it 'law,' or is it
14. See DAVID DE VAUS, RESEARCH DESIGN IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 5-7 (2001).
15. See GARY GOERTZ, SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A USER'S GUIDE 6 (2006).
16. See NORMAN BLAIKIE, DESIGNING SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE LOGIC OF ANTICIPATION 130-36
(2000).
17. See GOERTZ, supranote 15, at 13-16.
18. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 88-99 (2d ed. 1979).
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'politics'?"1 9 He also expressed a preference for widespread (and peaceful)
adherence to prevailing international legal norms and tentatively suggested
strategies via which this state of affairs could be pursued.20
Henkin offered a distinctly sanguine assessment of State attitudes towards
international law claiming that, appearances to the contrary, compliance was
surprisingly common, albeit not universal. 2 1 He opted to explain this pattern in
both typically self-interest-centered (accorded close attention by proponents of the
realist and public choice paradigms) and seemingly broader sociological terms
(featuring prominently in liberal and constructivist writings). 22 States are assumed
to employ a cost-benefit calculus when confronting compliance issues, but it is not
a simple balancing act. The scale is weighted heavily towards the benefit side of
the equation and the likely costs of adhering to the legal status quo--or,
alternatively, the potential gains from flouting it--must be very substantial to
prompt rule-defying behavior.23
Moreover, self-interest is not the sole relevant factor on the positive (or, for
that matter, negative) side of the ledger. States seek to maximize reputation abroad
and minimize external censure. They also realize the advantages of international
cooperation as an antidote to the anarchical Hobbesian state of nature and
appreciate friendship with other States. Such accounts are seldom embraced by
realists, who are inclined to focus on concrete economic and military benefits, but
these accounts are not necessarily incompatible with public choice-style theoretical
propositions.
Sociological explanations, whether rooted in international or
domestic dynamics, often bear the imprint of constructivist thinking (e.g.,
"[a]ttitudes toward international law reflect a nation's constitution, its laws and
institutions, its history and traditions, its values and 'style'"). 2 4
With the possible exception of realism, virtually all the analytical approaches
referred to above incorporate institutional elements into their conceptual structures.
Constructivism does not stand out in this respect. It is thus interesting to note that
Henkin ventured relatively far in implicitly embracing what would amount today
to full-fledged institutionalism. At several junctures in his book, he attributed
compliance, or lack thereof, to institutional influences, and in an elaborate fashion.
According to him, for example, "[i]n more complicated ways, accepted
international arrangements .

.

. launch their own bureaucracy with vested interests

in compliance, their own resistances to violation and to interference and

19. Id. at 5.
20. See id. at 313-39.
21. See id. at 46-48.
22. See id. at 49-87.
23. See id.at 49-50, 54.
24. Id. at 61. See also James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A
Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52, 57-58 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002); Duncan Snidal, Rational Choice and InternationalRelations, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 73; Emanuel Adler, Constructivism and International Relations, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 96 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
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frustration."25 The European community agreements are a case in point "because
they have been accepted in member countries and enmeshed in national
institutions; there are national bureaucrats whose job it is to assure that the
agreements are carried out; powerful domestic groups have strong interests in
maintaining these agreements."26
Such wide-ranging factors should also be taken into account in designing
mechanisms to enhance international legal compliance. Gains accruing and costs
incurred in the process ought to be maximized and minimized, respectively (e.g.,
via positive and negative reinforcement). The means employed to this end may
have to be radical in nature (e.g., "[t]hat will require a willingness by older and
wealthier nations to give serious consideration to the aspirations of the 'New
Economic Order,' to help satisfy the legitimate aspirations of newer and poorer
countries for quicker development and favorable trade").27 International law and
the institutions underpinning it need to be solidified, and substantial resources must
be channelled through both global and domestic channels towards improving the
psychological climate impinging on compliance. Again, unconventional strategies
may have to be resorted to for this purpose (e.g., "[n]ations with special interest in
and avowed dedication to order have special responsibility: it is time that such
nations take an affirmative lead in demonstrating the importance of law to
international stability").28
Henkin's sweeping descriptive, explanatory and normative survey of State
practice vis-A-vis legal benchmarks was sufficiently comprehensive and diversified
to capture the principal dimensions of international legal compliance and to
provide a sound theoretical foundation for exploring the subject within a nuanced
but coherent framework. It has proved challenging, however, to maintain a degree
of analytical cohesion in the face of intense centrifugal pressures and loose
integration has given way to marked fragmentation. Some researchers have
decided to shift the emphasis back to the cost-benefit calculus whose significance
Henkin sought to reduce (echoing arguments found in the realist and public choice
literature, particularly the latter). Others have chosen to follow his liberal and
(tentatively) constructivist path, yet in an exclusive fashion.
Among the latter, Franck was the first to paint, in an elaborately methodical
fashion, a decidedly positive picture of State behavior in the norm-constrained
global arena. While acknowledging exceptions to the overall pattern, he noted,
like Henkin, that the propensity to conform is a salient characteristic of an
essentially autonomous adaptation in that decentralized setting. Thus: "In the
international system, rules usually are not enforced yet they are mostly obeyed.
Lacking support from a coercive power comparable to that which provides backing
for the laws of a nation, the rules of the international community nevertheless elicit

25.
26.
27.
28.

HENKIN, supranote 18, at 61.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318.
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much compliance on the part of sovereign states." 29 This observation, it should be
emphasized, applies to "both the weak and, more remarkably, the strong
[players]." 30
The seemingly compelling proposition that "nations obey rules of the
community of states because they thereby manifest their membership in that
community, which, in turn, validates their statehood"31 is discarded as overly
narrow to be embraced as a versatile explanatory tool. Contractarian formulations,
grounded in the assumption that State adherence to international norms is the
product of the equivalent of a social compact whose purpose is to forge a nonanarchic collective order even if it entails some dilution of sovereign power, are
also deemed to be limited in scope.32 Instead, analogies are sought with domestic
scenarios where compliance manifests itself even in the absence of supporting
coercive mechanisms (which are either lacking altogether or weak in the global
arena).
Such configurations are explored by legal philosophers who typically ascribe
habitual obedience to governance which is underpinned by factors other than
dominant power (e.g., fairness, justice and integrity for Dworkin and discursive
validation in the case of Habermas).33 Their work, which often revolves around
process-focused/procedural and outcome-oriented/substantive values, may
arguably serve as a basis for arriving at an understanding of the determinants of
rule conformity at the international level, consistently and without resorting to
utilitarian constructs. Franck invoked the notion of legitimacy--and its variant,
legitimation--to this end. He effectively defined it as "a property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those

addressed normatively."34
Legitimacy does not crystallize in a social vacuum.
Legitimacy can only be accorded to rules and institutions, or to claims
of right and obligation, in the circumstance of an existing community. It
is only by reference to a community's evolving standards of what
constitutes right process that it is possible to assert meaningfully that a
law, or an executive order, or a court's judgment, or a citizen's claim on
a compatriot, or a government's claim on a citizen, is legitimate.
The corollary is that, when it is contended that a rule or its application is
legitimate, the implications are twofold: "[T]hat it is a rule made or applied in
accordance with right process, and therefore that it ought to promote voluntary
compliance by those to whom it is addressed. It is deserving of validation."36 The

29. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 8.
See id.
See id.at 15.
Id. at 16.

35. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995).

36. Id.
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next logical step is to suggest that "[i]nternational law, even more than any
individual state's legal system, needs this element of voluntary compliance
because of relative paucity of modes of compulsion."37
The notion of the right process was articulated in concrete terms, rather than
just introduced abstractly, by Franck. Four meta rules, or rules about rules,
provide the normative foundation in this respect: "(1) [T]hat states are sovereign
and equal; (2) that their sovereignty can only be restricted by consent; (3) that
consent binds; and (4) that states, in joining the international community, are
bound by the ground rules of community."3 8 The granting of consent is not
necessarily an ongoing and wide-ranging undertaking, which inevitably would
render the entire fagade unworkable: "Once a state joins the community of states
(today an inescapable incidence of statehood) the basic rules of the community and
of its legitimate exercise of community authority apply to the individual state
regardless of whether consent has been specifically expressed."39
In a rather innovative manner, by the analytical standards of the day, Franck
additionally offered a set of well-delineated indicators of legitimacy (albeit without
operationalizing them). They include determinacy ("the ability of a text to convey
a clear message"), 40 symbolic validation (which communicates authority, as
distinct from meaning; "[a] rule is symbolically validated when it has attributes,
often in the form of cues, which signal its significant part in the overall system of
social order"), 41 coherence ("[a] rule is coherent when its application treats like
cases alike and when the rule relates in a principled fashion to other rules of the
same system") 42 and adherence ("the vertical nexus between a single primary rule
of obligation . . . and a pyramid of secondary rules governing the creation,

interpretation, and application of such rules by the community").43

Perceptions (the constructivist element) of legitimacy are the principal
independent variable impinging on international legal compliance (the dependent
variable) in Franck's explanatory scheme. The distinction between the analytical
and normative dimensions occasionally becomes blurred, however. They interact,
typically in a synergistic fashion, with perceptions of equity/justice, combining to
form a broader/composite variable subsumed under the term fairness (or,
ultimately, perceptions of fairness)." It could thus be said that perceived fairness
is the source of the compliance pull which accounts for the reassuring empirical
patterns of State behavior that Franck highlighted. Somehow, his seminal
contribution to international legal theory building in this particular domain has
been almost exclusively associated with the narrower, yet still powerful, concept of
(perceived) legitimacy and the normative framework in which it is embedded.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 41.
See id.at 47.
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The moral underpinnings, both procedural and substantive, of international
legal rules cannot be assumed to be self-evident. They presumably need to be
recognized as such by players in the global arena and incorporated into their
decision apparatus. Otherwise, the practical ramifications of the entire explanatory
edifice would be distinctly limited. This issue has not been addressed explicitly by
Franck, but it features prominently in the complementary writings of transnational
legal process theorists, most notably Koh. 5 In a quintessentially constructivist
manner, they argue that compliance with international norms is the product of
interactive learning which culminates in the internalization of prescribed standards
of external behavior.
Participation in the transnational legal process helps constitute the
identity of a state as one that obeys the law, but what is critical is the
interaction,not the label that purports to identify a state as liberal or not.
In part, actors obey international law as a result of repeated interaction
with other governmental and nongovernmental actors in the
international system. 46
To elaborate further:
As transnational actors interact, they create patterns of behavior and
generate norms of external conduct which they in turn internalize. Lawabiding states internalize international law by incorporating it into their
domestic legal and political structures, through executive action,
legislation, and judicial decisions which take account of and incorporate
international norms . . . Moreover, domestic decision-making becomes

"enmeshed" with international legal norms, as institutional
arrangements for the making and maintenance of an international
commitment become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes. It is through this repeated process of interaction and
internalization that international law acquires its "stickiness," that
nation-states acquire their identity, and that nations define promoting the
rule of international law as part of their national self-interest. 47
Transnational legal processes have attracted considerable scholarly attention
and have been extensively explored in recent years. An interesting feature of the
endeavor has been the emphasis placed on the role played by transnational
epistemic communities in propagating and sustaining international legal norms.
Such entities consist of strategically positioned individuals and groups that are
firmly committed to upholding prescribed external standards of behavior within
and across key issue areas. They vary in their international orientation and
cohesion (members often have a domestic base and obligations as well), but
transnational legal process theorists view them as generally effective over time in

45. See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-86 (1994);
Koh, supranote 7, at 2604, 2609, 2659.
46. Koh, supranote 45, at 203.
47. Id. at 204. See also Alexander Wendt, ConstructingInternationalPolitics, 20 INT'L SEC. 71,
71-81 (1995).
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diffusing ideas across national boundaries through a combination of formal and
informal strategies.48
State propensity to adhere scrupulously to external commitments in most
circumstances is an equally salient characteristic of the managerial model, put forth
by Chayes. 49 This empirical pattern is believed to be underpinned by three crucial
factors: efficiency, interests and norms. Decisions should not be regarded as free
goods as they consume substantial organizational resources whose supply is
severely constrained. To minimize transaction costs incurred in repeatedly
confronting complex choices (such as whether to comply or not to comply), or to
maximize efficiency, it is generally sensible to follow the established path and
conform to authoritative rules, other things being equal ("standard economic
analysis argues against the continuous recalculation of costs and benefits in the
absence of convincing evidence that circumstances have changed since the original
decision").5 o
Interests exert a similar influence. After all, an international accord is an
essentially consensual device. It has no solid foundation without prior consent of
the relevant parties. The corollary is that it is reasonable to posit that their interests
were served by assuming the obligation in the first place ("the process by which
international agreements are formulated and concluded is designed to ensure that
the final result will represent, to some degree, an accommodation of the interests of
the negotiating states")." The slow progression towards the final destination, the
multiplicity of inputs from a wide range of institutional sources (both domestic and
international) and the proliferation of checks and balances (particularly in
democratic/pluralistic settings) tends to bring about a high degree of convergence

between individual interests and the collective outcome.52
The impact attributed to norms does not diverge materially from that
portrayed by transnational legal process theorists. Constructivist-style social
leaming predisposes people at all levels (including group, state and the like) to
obey the law. The existence of a binding legal commitment, "for most actors in
most situations, translates into a presumption of compliance, in the absence of
strong countervailing circumstances." 53 Illustrations are offered from a variety of
milieus, formal and informal, macro and micro. Pertinently, in this context, a
fundamental norm of international law, pacta sunt servanda, treaties are to be
48. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORK IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1-4 (1998); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The

Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943, 946-47 (1998); Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of InternationalCooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future
of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 80-81 (2002); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER 41-45 (2004); Paul Schiff Berman, A PluralistApproach to InternationalLaw, 32 YALE J. INT'L
L. 301, 303-10 (2007).
49. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22 (1995).

50.
5 1.
52.
53.

Id. at 4.
Id.
See id. at 4-7.
Id. at 8.
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obeyed, is invoked for that purpose.54 It is also asserted, in a familiar fashion, that
in many countries such moral imperatives "become part of the law of the land.
Thus a provision contained in an agreement to which a state has formally assented
entails a legal obligation to obey and is presumptively a guide to action."5 5 For
example:
Even in the stark, high politics of the Cuban missile crisis, State
Department officials argued that the United States could not lawfully
react unilaterally, since the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba did
not amount to an "armed attack" sufficient to trigger the right of selfdefense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It followed that use of
force in response to the missiles would be lawful only if approved by
the Organization of American States (OAS). Though it would be
foolish to contend that this legal position determined President
Kennedy's decision, there is little doubt that the asserted need for
advance OAS authorization for any use of force contributed to the
mosaic of argumentation that led to the decision to respond initially by
means of the quarantine rather than with an air strike.56

Non-adherence to external standards of behavior by players in the global
arena (primarily States, but no longer exclusively so, following the refinements
introduced by transnational legal process theorists) is duly acknowledged by the
proponents of the managerial model. It is nevertheless not viewed as the dominant

empirical pattern and, perhaps more importantly, is not ascribed to realist-type
premeditated designs rooted in cold utilitarian logic. Rather, the failure to comply,
at times on a worrisome scale, stems from the ambiguity of the law/norms (as

Franck previously noted, "[1]anguage is unable to capture meaning with precision";
even formal statements of legal rules, such as treaties, thus "frequently do not
provide determinate answers to specific disputed questions")57 and inadequate
(principally State) capacity to conform to normative international precepts/to
implement external legal obligations.
This is thought to be a universal
phenomenon, but one closely correlated with the level of economic development.
The policy corollary is that managerial strategies to ensure compliance with
international law are generally superior to those geared towards enforcement
through the deployment of hard power in one form or another (i.e., economic or
military resources, or a combination of the two). The former include a host of soft
variants such as measures to enhance transparency, promote dispute settlement in a
flexible fashion (via institutional mechanisms extending beyond formal
international adjudication), determined capacity building, and the judicious use of
persuasion. The latter is supposed to underpin the entire behavior modification
architecture and convert it into "a broader process of 'jawboning' - the effort to

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
See id.at 13-15.
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persuade the miscreant to change its ways - [this being] the characteristic method
by which international regimes seek to induce compliance."59
Not all scholars favorably disposed towards the liberal and constructivist
analytical perspectives depict an equally favorable picture of actor/State adaptation
to external norms. Those who harbor doubts, or discern significant divergences
between the reality and the ideal, often endeavor to shrink the space to which their
generalizations apply. Rather than aim to produce observations which are to all
intents and purposes universally valid, they draw distinctions between segments of
the global arena where a high degree of international legal compliance is
apparently common and others where the record is more ambiguous. The most
widely embraced dichotomy is that between the affluent liberal democracies, with
a long tradition of the rule of law and an elaborate institutional fagade to support it,
and the economically poorer countries whose socio-political structures rest on less
solid foundations.60
The intellectual optimism often displayed by legal researchers, including
those with substantial practical experience, does not seem to be contagious in that
it is seldom reflected in views held by scholars in related fields of academic
inquiry ("[i]f states' respect for international law is surprising or puzzling to
eminent professors of the subject, it is probably more so to many political
scientists").61 The latter, particularly students of international relations, tend to
style themselves as hard-nosed realists rather than starry-eyed idealists. Within
their utilitarian framework, States "seek to maintain position, wealth, and power in
an uncertain world by acquiring, retaining, and wielding power-resources that
enable them to achieve multiple purposes."62 They do not adapt to external norms
in a constrained fashion but, instead, employ them opportunistically as instruments
to attain their interests. International law/legal compliance may be viewed through
such an instrumentalist (as distinct from normative) optic. 63
Realist leanings are not the preserve of political scientists. Instrumentalist
skepticism has crept into law schools, notably in the United States, where it is
posing a challenge to the notions of genuine cooperation, pluralism and rule
conformity espoused by researchers inspired by a liberal/constructivist vision of
the world order. It has found a solid base in Chicago (perhaps a more appropriate
habitat for methodological individualism of the public choice variety) and has
spread to other large academic centers such as Berkeley and Harvard. Legal
realism restores the State to a position of prominence in the conceptual structure 64

59. Id. at 25.
60. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World ofLiberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503, 503-08 (1995); Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACcoRDs 21, 23-24, 37-39 (Edith Brown Weiss ed.,
American Society of International Law 1997).
61. Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw: Two Optics, 38 HARv.
INTL L.J. 487, 487 (1997).
62. Id. at 487-88.
63. See id. at 487-502.
64. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2005).
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(having been dethroned by transnational legal process theorists) and it may thus be
65
portrayed as a nationalist perspective.65 In an instrumentalist vein, the State is also
believed to be strongly driven by its interests, or preferences about outcomes. 66
Similarly, it follows this path in accordance with rationalist precepts.67 The
implications for rule conformity are scarcely favorable:
Even on the assumption that citizens and leaders have a preference for
international law compliance, preferences for this good must be
compared to preferences for other goods. State preferences for
compliance with international law will thus depend on what citizens and
leaders are willing to pay in terms of the other things that they care
about, such as security or economic growth. We think that citizens and
leaders care about these latter goods more intensely than they do about
international law compliance; that preferences for international law
compliance tend to depend on whether such compliance will bring
security, economic growth, and related goods; and that citizens and
leaders are willing to forgo international law compliance when such
compliance comes at the cost of these other goods.68
Approaches bearing the hallmarks of public choice reasoning veer in the same
overall direction. Indeed, the sole material difference manifests itself in less
emphasis on the State as the principal unit of analysis. The rule conformity
observed by (among others) managerial theorists is attributed to a selection bias
stemming from an excessive focus on international legal instruments which require

relevant parties to make merely negligible adjustments in the course of action that
they would have followed in the absence of the external constraints. This, in turn,
has its roots in the endogeneity problem which is the product of deliberate choices
by the players in question that are geared towards realizing such a comfortable
outcome:
Just as orchestras will usually avoid music that they cannot play fairly
well, states will rarely spend a great deal of time and effort negotiating
agreements that will continually be violated. This inevitably places
limitations on the inferences we can make from compliance data alone.
As in the case of the orchestra's mistakes, we do not know what a high
69
compliance rate really implies.
The depth of cooperation is the analytical device employed to express
formally the idea that rule conformity is a function of the shift potentially induced
by an international legal instrument from a behavioral pattern favored by actors in
the global arena ("it is most useful to think of [such a vehicle's] depth of

65. See Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up InternationalLaw Making: Reflections on the New Haven
School ofInternationalLaw, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 393, 394, 396 (2007).
66. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supranote 64, at 6-7.
67. See id. at 7-10.
68. Id. at 9.
69. George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation?,50 INT'L. ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
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cooperation as the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would
have done in its absence").7 0 Lack of depth may be conducive to compliance, but
this in itself does not possess significant policy ramifications. In situations where
rule conformity necessitates substantial adjustment on the part of the players
involved, or ones characterized by depth of cooperation, enforcement is a more
effective tool than the kind of soft remedies typically prescribed by managerial
theorists (whose generalizations do not exhibit the breadth and realism of their
enforcement counterparts).
Rationalist conceptual frameworks at times assume a higher degree of rule
conformity than suggested above and are not always rigidly wedded to the notion
of hard enforcement. Where this is the case, liberal and constructivist visions of
world order are still deemed to be analytically inadequate and not fully
representative in the behavioral sense of the term, but the relevance of international
law in its different shapes is not discarded lightly and is not attributed exclusively
to traditional-style sanctions. Actor reputation, or its loss due to non-adherence to
external standards, is a salient feature of such frameworks since, "[i]n the absence
of other enforcement mechanisms,

. .

. a state's commitment is only as strong as its

,,72

reputation.
Indeed, "[w]hen entering into an international commitment, a
country offers its reputation for living up to its commitments as a form of
collateral." 73 In accounting for this phenomenon, it is thus essential to recognize
that:
[A] decision to violate international law will increase today's payoff but
reduce tomorrow's. This explains not only why nations comply with
international law despite the weakness of existing enforcement
mechanisms, but also why they sometimes choose to violate the law.

The existence of a reputational effect impacts country incentives, but in
some instances that impact will be insufficient to alter country behavior.
So, unlike some existing theories of international law, this model
reconciles the claim that international law affects behavior with the fact
that the law is not always followed.74

70. Id.
71. See id. at 383-98. See also George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of
InternationalRegime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465,
482-87 (2000).
72. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1849 (2002).
73. Id
74. Id See also Jutta Brunne, A Fine Balance: Facilitationand Enforcement in the Design of a
Compliance Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 223, 235 (2000); Peter H. Huang,
InternationalEnvironmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 256-57
(2002); Andrew T. Guzman, The Design ofInternationalAgreements,16 EUR. J. INT'L L 579, 582, 589,
606 (2005); MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 110,

162 (2005); Markus Burgstaller, Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theory of Compliance with
InternationalLaw, 76 NoRDic. J. INT'L L. 39, 61 (2007).
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III. LESSONS FROM THE ORIENT

The academic literature on rule conformity in the global arena has expanded
substantially in the past fifty years or so and its post-1980s growth has been rather
spectacular. This has been a dynamically dialectical process characterized by the
emergence (ultimately proliferation) of different theoretical strands and their
critically constructive interaction with each other. No great coherence, let alone
effective synthesis, has been achieved, but a truly rich tapestry of loosely-woven
insights has been produced and may be readily accessed for either scholarly or
practical purposes. This entire conceptual fagade however rests on distinctly
narrow cultural/geographical foundations, both analytically and empirically, in that
its construction has been an almost exclusively American/European affair. Ideas
from other sources and patterns observed elsewhere have been largely overlooked.
There is arguably a need to incorporate modes of thinking (perhaps in a
constructivist fashion) and experiences (again, not invariably imbued with
seemingly objective meanings) originating in socio-political settings other than the
Northern/Western core of the world system. An examination of the Sino-British
Joint Declaration, in its implementation phase, even if undertaken selectively and
tentatively, may constitute a modest, yet useful, step in that challenging direction.
A much larger sample of cases will have to be explored in order to turn this into a
viable research exercise extending over various cultural/geographical domains and
time periods, but as a starting point that particular configuration possesses certain
interesting features. This applies to the nature of the international legal instrument
at issue, modus operandi of the parties involved and the intricate relationships
among them.

China, the pivot underpinning that delicate equation, has displayed
remarkable economic vibrancy since embarking on economic liberalization in
1978. It nevertheless does not qualify as an affluent country by any common
technical standard (including per-capita income estimates relying on purchasingpower-parity criteria). More importantly, it definitely cannot be portrayed as a
liberal democracy. In recent years, tangible progress has been witnessed in the
socio-political realm. The organs of the State have been functioning in an
increasingly less arbitrary manner and a climate of relative tolerance has gradually
developed (albeit more in the broadly social than strictly political sphere). An
institutional structure based on the rule of man has given way to one reflecting a
rule by law (but not necessarily a rule of law) and cautious efforts have been made
to promote grassroots participation (village elections being a notable example).75
Political reform remains a small-scale enterprise however and the cumulative
effects thus far have been rather modest. Indeed, it has been controversially
argued that the balance between authoritarian and liberal-democratic practices has
not shifted unambiguously in favor of the latter. Dahl's notion of polyarchy has
been invoked for this purpose. According to him, a polity evolves along two
75. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule of Law and
China's Future, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 229, 240-45 (2005); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA
MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? 20,239 (2007).
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principal dimensions: participation and contestation. 76 While the former relates to
the issue of who is included among the political classes, contestation determines
what constitutes the essence of politics: the nature and limits of political
competition.
A country may move towards polyarchy along either axis,
sometimes by choice and sometimes because of factors (external, internal or a
combination of the two) beyond its control.
Yet, in a country where the ruling elite maintains a firm grip on the polity, no
palpable movement may take place. It has been asserted (although, again,
controversially so) that this may be the case in China, given that participation has
apparently been frozen at the level of village elections for more than a decade and
contestation, which was tentatively in evidence during the early reform period,
seems to have been nipped in the bud. 79 The corollary possibly is that, the measure
of benevolence and self-restraint exhibited by the power-holders notwithstanding,
in some crucial respects China today resembles to a greater extent Dahl's closed
hegemony than an evolving polyarchy and that it is not inappropriate to equate the
absence of elite contestation with the end-of-politics syndrome.o
This may be an excessively one-sided verdict and a more nuanced picture is
often painted by Sinologists.81 Be that as it may, prevailing Chinese socio-political
realities are seldom portrayed in liberal-democratic terms. Rather, expressions
such as market-preserving authoritarianism, soft authoritarianism (as distinct from
the hard variant practiced under Mao Zedong) and authoritarian pluralism are
typically employed to capture the essence of the current mode of governance. 82
Such depictions are indicative of regime performance that does not correspond in
any meaningful way to Dahl-style two-dimensional polyarchy or a full-fledged
liberal democracy. The question thus inevitably arises whether this constitutes
fertile ground for examining issues relating to rule conformity, in the international
as well as domestic context.
Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this question is by no
means in the negative. A substantial body of detailed case studies, firmly anchored
in relevant facets of the law, does not exist at the present juncture. A broad survey
of Chinese international legal compliance in diverse fields such as arms control,
environmental protection, human rights and trade has nevertheless been produced
recently and it does not at all suggest that China consistently plays by its own
rules. The record is scarcely perfect and it may vary from one issue-area to
another, as well as over time. Yet, it possibly qualifies as adequate, even
respectable, at least insofar as this particular study is concerned. On that basis,
76. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 33-40 (1971).
77. See id
78. See id. See also Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship:
Noncooperative Transitionsin the Postcommunist World, 54 WORLD POL. 212, 238-39 (2002).
79. See Bruce Gilley, The "EndofPolitics"in Beiing,51 CHINA. J. 115, 116 (2004).
80. See id.
81. See generally PEERENBOOM, supranote 75.
82. Mushkat & Mushkat, supranote 75, at 242-45.
83. See GERALD CHAN, CHINA'S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: TRADE, ARMS CONTROL,
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there may be no compelling reason to confine research focused on international
legal compliance to liberal democracies alone, although it may well be desirable to
treat the nature of the political system as a factor in the equation (i.e., as an
intervening variable).84
The literature on the subject also highlights the impact of attributes of the
instrument (predominantly treaties, but not to the exclusion of customary norms)
on rule conformity. One distinction commonly emphasized is that between hard
law and its soft counterpart (i.e., commitments made by actors in the global arena
which, strictly speaking, are not legally binding). The latter is generally assumed
to be a real phenomenon and an inherently positive one (as soft law is preferable to
alternatives other than a hard legal architecture)." This sophisticated notion poses
conceptual and empirical difficulties yet, to the extent that it is an integral part of
the international law agenda, there are ramifications for rule conformity. They
need not however be addressed here since, as pointed out earlier, the Sino-British
Joint Declaration falls into the hard category.
A more pertinent analytical distinction is that between high and low politics.
Some international legal commitments may have potentially greater repercussions
on the pursuit of national interests than others (high versus low). Compliance is
believed to be less likely in such circumstances because more is at stake for the
players involved (the costs of rule conformity may be prohibitively lofty).8 6 Yet,
as the strategic context in this case vividly illustrates, the idea is easier to handle at
the conceptual than operational level. In practice, one confronts a situation
characterized by a proliferation of shades of grey and the proposition may not be

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS (Series on Contemporary China Vol. 3, World
Scientific 2005). See also ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS
OF COMPLIANCE (1999) [hereinafter KENT, LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE]; IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN GERMANY AND CHINA (Zhengua Tao & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., Kluwer Law
International 2001); ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND
GLOBAL SECURITY 221-28 (2007) [hereinafter KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE].

84. See generally Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and InternationalSoft Law: Why Do Countries
Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 647 (2002) (examining the economic and institutional
determinants of why countries comply with international soft law).
85. See generally Haas, supra note 60. See also Guzman, supra note 72, at 1879-81; Guzman,
supra note 74, 591-94, 610; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

SYSTEM 100, 100-114 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hardand Soft
Law in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 423, 434-50 (2000); ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE
CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-29 (2007).
86. See Downs et al., supra note 69; Harold K. Jacobson, Conceptual, Methodological and
Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying Compliance, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 569, 570-71 (1998); John
Norton Moore, EnhancingCompliance with InternationalLaw: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
881, 887, 916-17 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International
Institutionsand TerritorialDisputes, 46 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 842-45 (2002); Ryan Goodman &
Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1784-85 (2003);
Steven R. Ratner, Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human Dignity in Times of Crisis: On the
Possibilitiesfor Meaningful Self-Restraint, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES INL. 82, 82-109 (2004); Claire
R. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 303, 347, 354-55 (2005).
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readily testable. The examples found in the literature are typically too clear-cut
(e.g., national security versus environmental protection) to be entirely illuminating.
It is debatable whether the Sino-British Joint Declaration belongs to the
domain of high politics. There is a possibility here of positive and negative
spillovers having far-reaching implications for China's domestic political stability
(as seen during the 1976 Tiananmen Incident and on several occasions
subsequently), unification prospects with Taiwan, territorial integrity in general,
smooth functioning of the Chinese economy and politico-economic relations with
the Western world. Many other facets of this international legal instrument are
strategically less significant. This is a complex balancing act, and not necessarily
one representing an unusual constellation of forces. Because of its intricate nature,
one would probably not choose it for purely theoretical illustration purposes, but
that does not detract from its empirical relevance.
The preoccupation with the high-low politics dichotomy (it may be an uneven
continuum) is understandable, but perhaps not entirely productive. The SinoBritish Joint Declaration possesses attributes which receive little attention in the
academic literature, possibly due to their technical (as distinct from strategic)
character yet merit systematic consideration. It is a bilateral instrument with no
effective mechanisms for monitoring, verification, adjudication and enforcement.
More importantly, and this qualifies as a strategic factor, the power relationship
between the two signatories is distinctly unequal in this specific context
(paradoxically so, in light of the historical backdrop) and the incentive structures
on both sides diverge markedly. That is by no means an unusual phenomenon in a
global environment traditionally featuring substantial imbalances of power (at
times of the hegemonic/stabilizing variety) and widespread conflicts of interest
(which need not preclude close inter-party cooperation).
The Sino-British Joint Declaration is also an instrument intended to provide a
broad governance framework for a long period of time (half a century) in a highly
dynamic politico-economic setting. The combination of breadth (in terms of
scope) and length (with reference to time) may have impinged on its evolution
during the design and implementation phases. International accords may extend
over a short period of time, constitute a long-term commitment, or be open-ended
in nature. By the same token, they may be one-dimensional, moderately diverse,
or genuinely multi-dimensional. Any combination of these two variables (scope
and duration), in turn, may influence materially the propensity to adhere to the
provisions of the agreement, other things being equal. The position on the highlow politics continuum may not always be the decisive factor.
The issue of breadth/diversity does not loom sufficiently large in academic
writings on rule conformity. The Sino-British Joint Declaration is a multidimensional instrument par excellence. It pertains to virtually all sub-systems of
the Hong Kong institutional infrastructure: cultural, economic, legal, political and
social. 7 It is fundamentally different from the significantly less complex (in this

87. See MUSHKAT, supra note 12, at 195-214.
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respect) agreements typically dissected by students of international legal
compliance. This does not necessarily render it a distant outlier and thus
unrepresentative of the genre. Such instruments do not just vary widely across
issue areas (e.g., national security versus environmental protection) but often also
within them.
If that is the case, the phenomenon reinforces the argument that international
legal compliance must be considered as a scalar rather than binary variable.
Moreover, given the potential for behavioral differences along the multidimensional prescriptive spectrum covered by the instrument, it should be treated
as a weighted variable, regardless of whether it is approached from a quantitative
or qualitative angle. An equally germane inference in this context is that
breadth/diversity has implications for the choice of the explanatory mode relied
upon for purposes of elucidation. A number of permutations are possible here, but
ultimately the analyst is likely to opt either for a causal framework or a functional
one (both of which could be loosely--as distinct from rigorously-delineated).
While dissection of the law is a predominantly qualitative enterprise, students
of rule conformity tend to embrace causal explanations. There is no dearth of
functional assertions, yet they are often conveyed implicitly rather than explicitly,
and seldom in an elaborate and organized fashion. Functional conceptual
structures may enhance understanding in circumstances where multidimensionality manifests itself on a meaningful scale. In such a setting, it is
desirable to decompose the instrument/problem into its constituent parts, examine
methodically the interconnections and draw the appropriate conclusions. Even
natural scientists (at least in fields such as biology) do not shun functional forms of

reasoning and frequently employ simple qualitative/soft
morphological analysis)" to this end.

techniques (e.g.,

In the case of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, it is commonly contended
that China has been far more inclined to fulfill its obligations vis-a-vis post-1997
Hong Kong in the economic than political domain. Quintessentially capitalist
institutions and practices have been left entirely intact.89 Indeed, close and
productive ties have been forged between Hong Kong's business elite and the
ruling class on the mainland (whose power base is in the upper echelons of the
Communist Party, State organs and large public enterprises). 90 By contrast, China
may have been less willing to grant the ultra-capitalist enclave a high degree of
political autonomy and support local efforts to lay a solid foundation for a

88. See generally KENNETH D. BAILEY, TYPOLOGIES AND TAXONOMIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES (1994) (discussing various classification techniques, their advantages
and disadvantages, and how these techniques can improve research).
89. See TONY LATTER, HANDS ON OR HANDS OFF? THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF EcoNOMIC
POLICY IN HONG KONG 10 (2007).
90. See LEO F. GOODSTADT, UNEASY PARTNERS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND
PRIVATE PROFIT IN HONG KONG 97-117 (Hong Kong University Press 2005) (examining how the
Colonial British relied on a special relationship with the Hong Kong business elite to rule Hong Kong,
and how this relationship survived the transition from British to Chinese rule).
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genuinely representative form of government. 91 Be that as it may, it has not been
possible in practice to decouple wholly the political dimension from the economic
one, and impulses emanating from the business sector have impinged on
developments elsewhere, resulting in de facto patterns of compliance that cannot
be explained fully in strictly causal (as distinct from functional) terms. 92
In some instances, ascertaining the degree of international legal compliance
does not pose an insurmountable challenge because of the availability of effective
qualitative adjudication mechanisms or relevant quantitative yardsticks (the latter
have been relied upon in inferential processes even in research areas seemingly not
amenable to scientific exploration such as human rights). 93 The Sino-British Joint
Declaration is not alone in not falling into this category. Neither of those two
paths can be comfortably followed in seeking to determine whether (from a binary
perspective), or to what extent (from a scalar viewpoint), China has acted in
accordance with broad, diverse, and elastic provisions of that complex document.
Inevitably, opinions differ, particularly if the assessment exercise is geared towards
producing a categorical (i.e., binary type) statement, and generating an implicitly
or explicitly weighted scalar configuration may be just marginally less demanding.
This gives rise to thorny methodological problems such as reliability and
validity. Unlike in the experimental sciences (with partial exception of medicine),
the empirical accumulation of theoretical knowledge in law is based principally on
single (as distinct from multiple) case studies. Scholars often approach rule
conformity from fundamentally different analytical angles and arrive at
conclusions that bear the imprint of the conceptual paradigm from which they draw
inspiration. Allegations of selection bias and subjective construction are common.

91. See generally YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION
OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 493-500 (Hong Kong University Press 1997); Ian

Holliday, Ma Ngok & Ray Yep, A High Degree of Autonomy? Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, 1997-2002, 73 POL. Q. 455, 455-464 (2002); Lo SHIu-HING, GOVERNING HONG KONG:
LEGITIMACY, COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL DECAY (2001) [hereinafter Lo SHIu-HING,
GOVERNING HONG KONG]; Phil C. W. Chan, Hong Kong's PoliticalAutonomy and Its Continuing
Struggle for Universal Suffrage, SING. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 285, 285-311 (2006); Yash Ghai, The Legal
Foundations of Hong Kong's Autonomy: Building on Sand, 29 ASIA PAC. J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3-28
(2007); CARINE LAI & CHRISTINE LOH, FROM NOWHERE TO NOWHERE: A REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, HONG KONG 1997-2007 (2007); Sonny Lo, The PoliticalCultures of

Hong Kong and Mainland China: Democratisation,Patrimonialism and Pluralism in the 2007 Chief
Executive Election, 29 ASIA PAC. J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 101, 101-28 (2007) [hereinafter Sonny Lo,

PoliticalCulture]; Sonny S. H. Lo, The Mainlandization of Hong Kong: A Triumph of Convergence
over Divergence with Mainland China, in THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN THE
FIRST DECADE 179-231 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng ed., City University of Hong Kong Press 2008) [hereinafter
Sonny Lo, Mainlandization]; SONNY SHu -HING Lo, THE DYNAMICS OF BEIJING-HONG KONG
RELATIONS: A MODEL FOR TAIWAN? (2008) [hereinafter SONNY SHIU-HING LO, DYNAMICS].
92. See generally Sonny Lo, Mainlandization, supra note 91; MING SING, HONG KONG'S
TORTUOUS DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004); HONG KONG POLITICAL SCIENCE
ASSOCIATION, CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG POLITICS: GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-1997 ERA (Lam
Wai-man et al. eds., Hong Kong University Press 2007); MA NGOK, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN
HONG KONG: STATE, POLITICAL SOCIETY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2007).

93. See Gauthier de Beco, Human Rights Indicators for Assessing State Compliance with
InternationalHuman Rights, 77 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L. 23-49 (2008).
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The adversarial nature of the argument-making process cannot in itself induce
convergence in the absence of authoritative adjudication/conflict resolution. There
is no magic wand to narrow significantly the gap separating those positioned at the
polar ends of the opinion spectrum regarding China and Hong Kong.
Reliability and validity are pivotal issues in empirical research. The former
refers to consistency or dependency. It implies that projects repeated under
identical or closely similar conditions must yield equivalent or roughly the same
results. Validity relates to truthfulness or how well an idea about reality
corresponds to actual reality. Where measurement is a realistic objective (i.e., in
quantitative research), it concerns the match between a construct, or the way an
analyst captures an idea in a conceptual definition, and a measure.94 There is no
reason why scholars dissecting compliance in contexts such as the Sino-British
Joint Declaration should not be held systematically accountable for the reliability
and validity of their (at times idiosyncratic) fact-finding endeavours.
Reliability and validity are positivist notions, but they are not inconsistent
with constructivist postulates.
Nor are they the exclusive preserve of
quantitatively-oriented researchers. Various tools have been proposed to render
them feasible goals in qualitative settings. They include triangulation in its various
shapes, participant feedback (where appropriate), peer review or debriefing,
negative case sampling, reflexivity or neutrality, pattern matching and audit trail. 95
A simple procedure such as negative case sampling (which involves the
examination - and, if necessary, presentation - of cases contrary to one's
expectations) or reflexivity/neutrality (which assumes the form of a transparent
review of hypotheses, methods and findings that is deliberately structured in a
critical fashion) may lend considerable credibility to the project.96
Beyond such technical quibbles, the implementation of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration exposes inherent limitations of the entire range of theoretical
perspectives on rule conformity in the global arena. The world political
architecture, as seen from Beijing, must be a different construct from the liberal
international order underpinned by a Franck-type sense of legitimacy derived from
perceptions of procedural and substantive justice. It may have more in common
with the patterns of uneven development portrayed by modem world system
theorists (who highlight inequalities between an economic core, semi-periphery,

94. See generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
ASSESSMENT (1979) (explaining how social scientists determine the reliability and validity of empirical
research measurements).
95. See generally R. Burke Johnson, Examining the Validity Structure of Qualitative Research,
118 EDUC. 282, 282-90 (1997);
ISADORE NEWMAN & CAROLYN R. BENZ, QUALITATIVEQUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: EXPLORING THE INTERACTIVE CONTINUUM 18-19 (1999);
Jeasik Cho & Allen Trent, Validity in QualitativeResearch Revisited, 6 QUALITATIVE RES. 319, 319-40

(2006).
96. See generally Johnson, supra note 94; NEWMAN & BENZ, supra note 94; Cho & Trent, supra
note 94.
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and periphery) 97 and their dependency counterparts 98 but perhaps no longer those
depicted by exponents of Marxist-Leninist thought.99
Hong Kong is a product of British imperial practices illustrating that liberal
and illiberal policies may be pursued simultaneously. During the so-called free
trade era of the mid-nineteenth century, European States were subject to
reciprocity treaties freely negotiated between contracting parties. This contrasted
starkly with the open-door treaties imposed on the East. Moreover, while
European countries were given sufficient leeway to industrialize through a
modicum of tariff protection (designed to shield infant industries), Eastern
economies were compelled to move in an unimpeded fashion to free trade or
equivalent. 100 This coincided with a passive military posture on the part of Britain
vis-A-vis its European neighbors, yet frequent recourse to violence in the East. 101
The imposition of unequal treaties was not merely a manifestation of a onesided (and thus illiberal) strategy of economic containment but also a concerted
effort to bring about cultural conversion. The psychological damage which this
inflicted is believed to be greater than the material harm.102 It assumed the form of
a widespread affront to Eastern sovereignty and cultural autonomy. The Opium
Wars, with Hong Kong at the epicenter, created a wedge for Britain to engineer a
dilution of China's sense of identity.103 The treaties which facilitated the
undertaking were labelled unequal for three reasons. First, they were imposed
unilaterally and reinforced by military power. 104 Second, they were dictated solely
on Western terms.105 Third, they symbolized the humiliation and injustice suffered
by the vanquished party.106
Two imperial practices proved particularly unsettling from a cultural
perspective. Notably, Chinese sovereignty was severely undermined by the
application at gunpoint of the principle of extraterritoriality - the notion that all
foreign residents, rather than just foreign diplomats, living in China should be
subject to their own Western laws. 107 A number of concessions were established
97. See DAVID N. BALAAM & MICHAEL VESETH, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
EcoNOMY 72 (1996).
98. See id. at 73-74.
99. See generally id. at 67-69. See also Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalLaw, World Order, and
Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 816-17 (1990); Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in
Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 81, 127 (1991); William J. Aceves, Critical

Jurisprudence and InternationalLegal Scholarship:A Study of Equitable Distribution,39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 299-300, 340 (2001); CHINA MItVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245-47, 263-64 (2004);
John A.C. Conybeare, Efficiency,

Entitlements, and Diservingness: Perspectives on InternationalDistributiveJustice, 14 REV. OF INT'L
POL. EcoN 389, 389-411 (2007).
100. JOHN M. HOBSON, THE EASTERN ORIGINS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 260 (2004).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 260-61.
104. Id. at 261.
105. Id. At 261-62.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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for that purpose. Underlying this problematic policy was the perception that China
was not a civilized society and consequently was not deemed to be sovereign (and
equal).
In addition, the Chinese were pressured into accepting foreign
administrators as heads of key bureaucratic agencies (e.g., postal services).10 8
It is a moot point whether such distant historical experiences, however
traumatic, are necessarily an integral part of the collective psyche of a nation,
particularly an economically and politically resurgent one, and impinge in a
concrete fashion on foreign policymaking and implementation. Interestingly,
leading constructivists emphasize discontinuity and epochs, rather than pathdependence and persistence, in the study of macro history. 109 On the other hand,
prominent ethno-symbolists highlight the importance of the reinvention and
representation of long-established cultural relationships, group ties, myths,
symbols, as well as memories, in the intricate (yet meaningful) process of
collective identity formation and (hence) action.110
A wide ranging survey of the contemporary China scene lends broad support
to ethno-symbolic postulates. While the role of other factors (which may propel
the country towards cooperation with the core of the world system and thus rule
conformity) is not overlooked by the author, he concludes that the Chinese
experience with unequal treaties continues (far more so than elsewhere; e.g., Japan
and Turkey) to exert a marked influence on grassroots and policy perceptions of
the global politico-economic order and the role played by international law in
sustaining it (e.g., China was the first nation to challenge the validity of its treaties
with foreign countries)."' This ambivalence reflects itself in the attitude towards
the Sino-British Joint Declaration, a treaty which restores sovereign authority but

dilutes it at the same time. 112
It is equally difficult to reconcile Chinese realities with visions of
transnational legal process. Rapid post-1978 economic expansion has not paved
the way for a corresponding increase in external activism. China may be inching
in that direction, by virtue of its growing affluence and size (as well as
moderation), but this is a deliberately protracted process. There is no solid
evidence to indicate that it is firmly engaged in interactive learning in the global

108. Id. See generally EILEEN H. TAMURA ET AL., CHINA: UNDERSTANDING ITS PASt 109-22
(1997); PETER WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN AND HONG
KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES (1998) (discussing the British law and administrative system in Hong
Kong's New Territories); Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of
Informal Empire, in INTERROGATING THE TREATY: ESSAYS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TREATIES
43, 43-80 (Matthew Craven & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005); DONG WANG,
CHINA'S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (2005) (studying the linguistic
development and uses of the expression 'unequal treaties,' and arguing that the Chinese nationalists use
the phrase to strengthen party authority as well as preserve national independence, unity, and
development).
109. DONG WANG, supranote 108, at 2.
110. Id.
111. Dong Wang, The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China, 76 PAC. AFF. 399, 399-401
(2003).
112. See MUSHKAT, supra note 12, at 10.
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arena and that it is thus being decisively socialized to comply with international
rules. There is also no reason to infer that involvement in transnational epistemic
communities and enmeshment at home are having a material impact on foreign
policy making and implementation. 113 If they do, the handling of the Sino-British
Joint Declaration, an almost exclusively domestic affair (Hong Kong being an
element, even if a semi-autonomous one, in the domestic equation) since 1997, is a
notable exception to the norm.
The assumption, explicit or implicit, that rule-focused leaming in the global
arena is an orderly phenomenon also needs to be critically examined. Changeinducing catalysts may originate from different sources and assume a variety of
forms. By the same token, responses to them are not uniform in nature. A
distinction may thus be drawn between changes which are slow or fast (speed of
change) and those which are incremental or fundamental (mode of change). A
typology based on these distinctions yields four categories of change: gradual
typical, gradual atypical, rapid normal and rapid atypical. 114 Fast movement along
an unfamiliar path (e.g., in the form crisis-engendered systematic perturbations)
may prove disruptive and produce undesirable effects."
Post-1997 semi-autonomous Hong Kong provides ample illustrations.
Perhaps the most telling is the rather brief but highly intense episode that revolved
around (indirect) Chinese efforts to implement national security legislation
(intended to be passed under Article 23 of the Basic Law) in the territory. The aim
was to introduce the crimes of subversion and secession, and to grant the local
government extensive powers to ban non-mainstream groups.1 16 As such, the
initiative was widely perceived by the community as an act fundamentally at

variance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration (the spirit, if not the letter,
possibly both).117 The blueprint triggered a decidedly adverse reaction at the
grassroots level and was withdrawn unceremoniously."
The experience, while
involving interactive leaming (albeit largely confined to the domestic arena), can
scarcely be portrayed as being meaningfully constructive.
The gap between premises underlying the managerial model and the workings
of the international legal architecture designed to ensure the re-absorption of Hong

113. See JUDITH F. KORNBERG, JOHN R. FAUST, CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS: POLICIES, PROCESSES,
PROSPECTS (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that China seeks a foreign policy with minimum international
obligations but considerable internal independence).
114. See Robert F. Durant & Paul F. Diehl, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy: Lessonsfrom
the U.S. ForeignPolicy Arena, 9 J. PUB. POL'Y 179, 196-205 (1989).
115. See Paul A. Sabatier, An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of
Policy-OrientedLearning Therein, 21 POL'Y SCI. 129, 148-49 (1988).
116. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA Art. 23.

117. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Hong Kong: Article 23 Legislation - the Potential
for Abuse (Dec. 9, 2002) available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA19/004/2002/en.
118. Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of the Constitutional Conflict in
Hong Kong, 11 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REv. 756, 769 (2004); Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong's Spring of
Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the National Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: HONG KONG'S ARTICLE 23 UNDER SCRUTINY 13, 49 (Fu Hualing et al.,

2005).
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Kong into nominally socialist China without disturbing the politico-economic
status quo in the territory is equally large. The notion of ambiguity as outlined by
proponents of the model is of course fraught with considerable analytical
difficulties, most of which are of limited relevance here. Suffice it to say, in this
context that there are mechanisms for reducing ambiguity and that both normdriven and rational-type players may respond to the challenge in a manner that
minimizes divergences from a compliance-consistent trajectory, if they so desire.
There is nothing to prevent the Chinese side in this particular instance from taking
through
the
established
transparency
either
steps
to
enhance
legislative/policy/quasi-judicial or alternative institutional channels (at least with
respect to the Basic Law, the constitutional vehicle embodying concretely the
broad ideas built into the Sino-British Joint Declaration).1 19
It is apparent that the international legal instrument singled out here falls
squarely into the ambiguous category. 120 This need not however be attributed to an
overly loose conception of the appropriate ends-means configuration in the
circumstances (although substantial differences between the parties involved in the
design process and the adversarial climate prevailing at the time may have been a
contributing factor), leaving ample scope for conflicting interpretations and
departures from the envisaged blueprint. Rather, ambiguity may have been
deliberately rendered a feature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in order to
enable the relevant parties to adapt effectively to structural shifts in the internal
and external politico-economic environment over an extended period of time.
Even from a narrow Hong Kong perspective, a balance had presumably to be
struck between the imperatives of coherence and flexibility.
Perhaps more importantly, from a theoretical viewpoint, this case again
exposes the cultural limitations of Western perceptions of the ideal attributes of a
legal instrument. A high degree of clarity is regarded favorably and pervasive
ambiguity is deemed to be inherently problematic. Lawmakers in China tend to
adopt a fundamentally different stance. A modicum of ambiguity may thus be
considered as a factor enhancing the quality of the governance structure rather than
detracting from it. 12 1 This is a constructivist-style interpretation of a culturallyingrained action mode, not an endorsement of one response to ambiguity or
another. 122
Another conceptual pillar underpinning the managerial model--capacity
constraints--also sheds little light on rule conformity in the present context. It is
evident that any divergences between international legal commitments and
corresponding practices here, whether on the Chinese or Hong Kong side (with the
United Kingdom effectively relegated to the position of a passive observer), are
not the result of a technical skill shortfall, which could be addressed by third

119. See YASH GHAI, CONSTITUTIONAL, supranote 91, at 212-15.
120. See MUSHKAT, supra note 12, at 145.
121. XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 91-92 (2000).

122. See id.at 153-71.
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parties possessing higher-level expertise. This may well be an issue meriting
selective attention in China, but not in respect to the Sino-British Joint Declaration
and not necessarily in the form envisaged by proponents of the managerial model.
The model may need to be broadened to encompass adequately institutional (as
distinct from technical) capacity.
Sinologists have addressed the capacity question in considerable detail. They
have focused predominantly on institutional fragmentation (often the product of
administrative decentralization, or poorly conceived devolution of power from the
central government to the provinces) as the root cause of policy disarray/paralysis.
At certain critical junctures in some strategic domains (e.g., population control),
the political center in Beijing has been able to mobilize resources decisively,
neutralize pockets of resistance and follow a coherent course. This has by no
means been invariably the pattern observed, however. 123 Be that as it may, the lack
of institutional cohesion, rather than technical deficiencies, has typically posed the
principal challenge in such circumstances. As pointed out, there is no compelling
reason to believe that capacity constraints in any shape materially hamper Chinese
movement on the Sino-British Joint Declaration front. Interestingly, that may not
be the case on the Hong Kong side, despite the territory's lofty status as a global
metropolis. 124 Again, technical impediments are not the relevant issue. Nor do the
difficulties lie in instrument-specific restrictions that circumscribe the room for
maneuver of the local authorities. 125
Rather, post-1997 Hong Kong has
experienced institutional fragmentation of its own and subtle changes in its
political culture. It has been argued that this has impinged adversely on its
potential as a partner, albeit a junior one, in the implementation of the Sino-British

Joint Declaration.12 6
A closer fit may be identified between realist propositions and the behavioral
trends observed in this context. An examination, within a game-theoretical
framework, of Sino-British negotiations which culminated in a bilateral accord
regarding the future of Hong Kong lends support to that assertion. The author
123. See generally, WANG SHAOGUANG & Hu ANGANG, THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN CRISIS: STATE
CAPACITY AND TAX REFORM (2001); Jonathan Schwartz, The Impact ofState Capacity on Enforcement
of EnvironmentalPolicies: The Case of China, 12 J. ENV'T & DEv. 50 (2003); Shaoguang Wang, The
Problem of State Weakness, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 36 (2003); Dali L. Yang, Population Control and State
Coercion in China, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 43 (2003); HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND
NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004);

Shaoguang Wang, Regulating Death at Coalmines: Changing Modes of Governance in China, 15 J.
CONTEMP. P. R. C. 1 (2006); Tim Wright, State Capacity in Contemporary China: Closing the Pits and
Reducing Coal Production, 16 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 173 (2007); Jonathan Schwartz & R. Gregory
Evans, Causes of Effective Policy Implementation: China'sPublic Response to SARS, 16 J. CONTEMP.
P. R. C. 195 (2007).
124. DAVID R. MEYER, HONG KONG AS A GLOBAL METROPOLIS passim (2000).

125. See Zeng Huaqun, Hong Kong's Autonomy: Concept, Developments and Characteristics,1
CHINA INT'L J. 313, 318 (2003); Zeng Huaqun, Unprecedented InternationalStatus: Theoretical and
PracticalAspects of the HKSAR's ExternalAutonomy, 9 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 275, 292-97
(2008).
126. Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong's Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-FacetedAppraisal,55
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 945, 960-61 (2006).
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demonstrated that China may have devised and executed a well-defined and
tightly-structured multi-step strategy that allowed it to achieve its goals in an
efficient fashion (and outmaneuver the United Kingdom in the process). 127 No
research of this type has been undertaken subsequently but, if it were possible to
extrapolate beyond that particular phase in Hong Kong's evolution from a British
colony into a special administrative region of the PRC, realist perspectives would
receive further reinforcement.
Unfortunately, extrapolation cannot be the sole tool relied upon for this
purpose and the paucity of germane empirical inquiries militates against easy
generalizations. By the same token, the stylized (i.e., abstract) nature of realist
models implies that there may be a risk of oversimplifying a complex picture,
leading to a loss of potentially valuable information. Two specific questions may
thus have to be addressed. First, is it legitimate to embrace the nationalist
assumption that the State is always the critical variable in the compliance equation
or should one reach across the analytical divide and incorporate elements of the
pluralist vision espoused by transnational legal process theorists, at least
selectively by accepting the notion of domestic inter-group competition in the
policy process? Second, is it appropriate to posit that strategic decision-makers are
driven exclusively by cost-benefit calculations, even if the aim is merely to
generate illuminating insights?
Public choice versions of the rationalist model discard the assumption of State
centrality and homogeneity. In writings on rule conformity in the global arena
however other actors somehow recede into the background and the State reemerges as the principal unit of analysis, blurring a key distinction between the

realist and public choice schools. A notable exception to the norm is a study
illustrating incisively that international legal agreements have distinct domestic
distributional consequences and that domestic constituencies take active steps to
magnify or lessen them. The upshot is a flow of autonomous influences from
multiple sources and in a variety of directions. The State is not necessarily able to
regulate effectively this flow, a phenomenon which inevitably has ramifications for
national compliance. 128
In the period leading up to the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, there were
two scholarly attempts to predict the fate of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
employing a public choice-type conceptual framework. A number of salient
domestic groups were identified in China (centralizers, decentralizers, bureaucratic
conservatives, entrepreneurial reformers, the military, etc) and their interests vis-Avis Hong Kong were determined. The relative power of the groups to shape policy
outcomes was then assessed and conclusions were drawn regarding likely Chinese
fulfillment of obligations towards the territory. 129 The subject was not revisited by
127. See Ma Ngok, The Sino-British Dispute over Hong Kong: A Game Theory Interpretation,7
ASIAN SuRv. 738, 742-44 (1997).

128. See, e.g., Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT'L ORG.
363, 372-74 (2005).
129. See, e.g., BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA, FORECASTING
POLITICAL EVENTS: THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 105-33 (1985) (predicting the political ramifications
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the authors after 1997, but to the extent that such an approach possesses sound
empirical underpinnings, 130 the studies serve as a useful reminder that the heavy
realist emphasis on the State is not entirely productive.
When it comes to the question whether policymakers in China seek
coherently and consistently to maximize benefits and minimize costs (as they
perceive them, presumably for the nation), one confronts a genuine embarrassment
of (analytical) riches. Even for the years when the country seemingly experienced
a hard form of one-person rule, and was to all intents and purposes closed to the
outside world, several alternative explanatory constructs were developed by
Sinologists (e.g., the Yan'an round-table model, the two-policy-lines struggle
model, the structural functional model, the Maoist-revolutionary model, and the
generational model). 13 1 The reform era has naturally witnessed a greater
proliferation of competing theoretical accounts (e.g., the structural model, the
normative model, the Mao-in-command/paramount leader model, the factional
model, the bureaucratic model, the tendency model, the new generational model
and the interest group model). 132
A team of prominent students of Chinese politics has managed to reduce the
cognitive diversity significantly by consolidating the divergent constructs into
merely two key categories: (1) those focusing on reasoned debates over substantive
issues by policymakers (which bear the hallmarks of the rationalist model), and (2)
those highlighting the individual/factional struggle for power among contending
members of the ruling elite (the power model). 13 3 However, to complicate matters
slightly, it has introduced its own version of the bureaucratic model (which links
policy outcomes to bureaucratic structures) 134 and, at a later juncture, yet another
(fragmented authoritarianism) model. The latter posits that political authority in
China is fragmented and disjointed. Strategic decisions are thus characterized by
complex bargaining and multi-directional maneuvering. 135

of Chinese administration of Hong Kong); BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN
RABUSHKA, RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG (1996) (updating the predictions set out in the authors' 1985
book).
130. For a partial evaluation of this approach, see Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political

Economy of InternationalLegal Compliance: Pre-1997 Predictions and Post-1997 Realities in Hong
Kong 10 U. C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 229, 231-35 (2004); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat,

InternationalLaw and Game Theory: A Marriage of Convenience or StrangeBedfellows, 2 N. Z. Y. B.
INT'L L. 101, 109-13 (2005).
131. LUCIAN PYE, THE DYNAMICS OF CHINESE POLITICS 41-46 (1981); HUANG JIANRONG, THE
APPLICABILITY OF POLICY-MAKING THEORIES IN POST-MAO CHINA 59-62 (1999).

132. See Harry Harding, Competing Models of the Chinese Communist Policy Process: Toward a
Sorting andEvaluation,20 ISSUES & STUDIES 13, 13-18 (1984). See also HUANG JIANRONG, supranote
131.
133. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS,
STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 58-60 (1988); HUANG JIANRONG, supranote 131, at 61. See also Avery

Goldstein, ExplainingPolitics in the People's Republic of China: The StructuralAlternative, 22 COMP.
POL. 301, 315-17 (1990).
134. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supranote 133, at 402-03.

135. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The "FragmentedAuthoritarianism" Model and Its
Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1, 6-7, 12
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Individual/factional fragmentation has diminished in recent years as a result
of growing bureaucratization/institutionalization. It nevertheless remains a salient
feature of Chinese policy making. 136 While empirical evidence is sparse, it is
reasonable to assume that post-1997 Hong Kong is not insulated from such
pressures. 137 Unlike its realist counterpart, the public choice version of rationalism
may accommodate fragmentation and disjointedness, provided the participants in
the game endeavor to maximize utility in a determined and systematic fashion.
That said, individual rationality may not always prevail in these circumstances and,
even when it does, collective rationality may be impaired. This, in turn, may
impinge on national compliance.
It is not certain whether, or to what extent, reputational costs are part of the
equation. As Simmons has noted, countries vary in their sensitivity in that
respect. 13 8 Interestingly, China may not be oblivious to the reputational
implications of rule conformity.139 On the other hand, its record suggests that the
sensitivity displayed may be issue dependent. 14 0 Post-1997 Hong Kong is
expected to be managed within the international legal framework provided by the
Sino-British Joint Declaration, but this is an anomalous situation from a Chinese
perspective, because the territory's status is deemed to be a domestic question, in
the final analysis. That may lead to a greater willingness to sacrifice reputation
than in other policy domains. Theory-building efforts should arguably reflect such
variations.
A related observation may be appropriate in this context. Proponents of the
public choice model contend that policymakers in the political marketplace are
myopic.14 1 If this is the case, there may be discontinuities in the decision-making

process detrimental to the orderly acquisition of State reputation over time.
Individual/factional fragmentation, coupled with disjointedness, which apparently
persists to one degree or another in China, may certainly be viewed as a
characteristic of the institutional environment not conducive to a concerted and
methodical pursuit of reputation-oriented strategies in the political arena. There
may be countervailing forces at work and differences across the issue spectrum,
yet this is another matter which possibly merits further analytical attention.
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137. See generally Lo SHIU-HING, GOVERNING HONG KONG, supra note 91; Sonny Lo, Political
Culture, supranote 91; Sonny Lo, Mainlandization,supra note 91; SoNNY SHIU-HING Lo, Dynamics,
supra note 91; "ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS" IN CRISIS: HONG KONG'S TRANSFORMATION SINCE
THE HANDOVER (Wong Yiu-chung ed., 2004).
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InternationalMonetaryAffairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819 (2000); Beth A. Simmons, Money and
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V. CONCLUSION

The study of compliance has emerged as one of the most dynamic and vibrant
sub-fields in international law. The conceptual and empirically-based exchanges
between legalization theorists, who discern patterns of rule conformity in the
global arena, and their sceptical critics, who employ an instrumentalist optic, have
been illuminating and productive. Useful attempts have also been made to narrow
the gap between the two perspectives. 142 The systematic exploration of the subject
was initially an exclusively American affair, but it is now dissected carefully on
the other side of the Atlantic. Indeed, some of the most comprehensive and
rigorous work in this area is presently being carried out in Europe.143
Thus far, no experiences and insights from other parts of the world have been
incorporated into the analytical fagade. 144 A degree of exclusivity prevails in that
virtually the entire theoretical structure rests on narrow Western foundations. A
cultural/geographical broadening of the scope of inquiry might prove to be
beneficial, even if impeded by a lack of relevant data and limited access to crucial
sources of information.
A tentative juxtaposition of American/European
conceptual formulations and Chinese/Eastern realities suggests that this may be a
worthwhile undertaking. The latter do not necessarily call the former into
question, but they suggest that certain substantive and methodological issues may
need to be addressed from additional, perhaps even fundamentally different,
angles.

142. See Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 592-93 (2002); David H. Moore,
A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879, 881-83 (2003); Teall
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ofInternationalLaw, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 492 (2005).
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STATE (Michael Ziurn and Christian Joerges eds., 2005).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2003, the genocide in Darfur, Sudan has claimed the lives of over
400,000 civilians, according to estimates provided by U.N. officials.1 However,
this is a number that has been hotly disputed by those on all sides of the conflict.
Genocide itself, the deliberate and systematic destruction of an ethnic, religious,
racial, political, or cultural group 2, is a consistently controversial topic, one that
often leads to questions over whether the violence was indeed coordinated or
random, whether the killing was discriminatorily motivated or simply arbitrary,
whether the death toll was grossly overestimated or underestimated. In 2004,
Secretary of State Colin Powell reviewed a study of several hundred interviews of
Darfur refugees, leading him to testify before the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that genocide indeed occurred and may still be occurring in
Darfur. This testimony, however, was met with a surprisingly reticent response
by the United States and an explicit denial of any genocide by the Sudanese
government, the United Nations, and other associated organizations.
To understand the reasons behind the violence that has transpired in Darfur,
one must examine both the incidents that have occurred as well as the racial
aspects of the conflict. Darfur is a region in western Sudan, the large northeastern
African country that serves as home to both Arab groups as well as to Black

. University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Juris Doctorate expected May 2010, Managing Editor of
the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. A special note of thanks to my parents, Donald and
Luz, for their guidance and suggestions for this note as well as every other area of my scholastic life.
Another mention of gratitude to Professor Ved Nanda, not only for recommending this excellent book
for review, but for his unwavering support of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy over
the last thirty-nine years.
1. UN NEWS SERVICE, Annan Welcomes Extension ofAfrican Union Mission in Darfur, Sept. 21,
2006, http://huwu.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=19948&Cr-sudan&Crl=.
2. Robert K. Hitchkock and Tara M. Twedt, Physical and Cultural Genocide of Indigenous
Peoples, in A CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: CRITICAL ESSAYS AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 350 (Samuel

Totten & William S. Parsons eds., 2008).
3. United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Address to United States Senate Foreign
Relations Committee: The Crisis in Darfur (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://www.usmission.ch/press2004/0910CrisisinDarfur.htrn.
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African groups. In recent years, the Sudanese state has employed various "ArabIslamic supremacist and demonizing policies that pit Arabs and Blacks against one
another in an 'us' and 'them' kind of conflict." 4 In a sub-Saharan region where
resources are extremely limited, growing competition for land and basic necessities
has only furthered this divergence between the groups of Arab nomadic herders
and Black African farmers. The central Sudanese government has accused the
Fur, Jebal, Masalit, and Zaghwa African tribes of promoting rebellious actions and
violence. Yet this same government is founded upon Arab-Islamic principles that
dehumanize Black ethnic groups and has consequently supported violent action
against them by the Janjaweed, an Arab militia group that is supported, funded,
and directed by the Sudanese government.6 The Janjaweed has been at the center
of the Darfur crisis, leading a series of calculated and atrocious attacks against the
Black ethnic groups of Darfur since 2003. Through the accounts of many
surviving refugees, it is obvious that villages were destroyed, thousands of people
were brutally murdered, and many women were raped by the racially-motivated
actions of the Janjaweed and other joint attacks involving the Sudanese
government. This is not simply a war over strict economics; the actions of the
Janjaweed and the Sudanese government have clearly established it as genocidal
victimization of Black African groups in Darfur. Despite the high level of media
exposure and strength of the response by civil society, however, both the United
States and the rest of the world have been surprisingly slow in acknowledging and
responding to this horrific genocide that has been occurring since 2003.
In Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, sociologists John Hagan and Wenona
Rymond-Richmond (the authors) focus on three central questions: (1) why is the
United States so ambivalent about genocide?; (2) why do so many scholars
deemphasize racial aspects of genocide?; and (3) how can the science of
criminology advance understanding and protection against genocide? This book
note examines all three questions in relation to the recent genocide in Darfur.
II.THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS GENOCIDE

Much of the information that the authors use to establish their claims is based
on the very same account on which Colin Powell based his testimony when
addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-the 2004 report titled
Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.9 This report was established from a survey of
1,136 Darfur refugees who fled to neighboring Chad during the aftermath of the
initial violence, and included tables, maps, charts, and pictures derived from those

4. JOHN HAGAN & WENONA RYMOND-RICHMOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 5

(2009).
5. Id.
6. Column Lynch, Rights Group Says Sudan's Government Aided Militias, WASH. POST, July 20,
2004, at Al2. See also HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supranote 4, at 221.
7. HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supranote 4, at 1.

8. Id. at introduction.
9. U.S. Department of State, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur, Human Rights, and Labor and
Bureau ofIntelligence andResearch, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (2004).

INT'L CRIMINAL LAW INTHE 2lsT CENTURY

2009

195

interviews. 10 In Chapter 5, Eyewitnessing Genocide, and Chapter 1, Darfur Crime
Scenes, the authors evaluated the validity and reliability of this report by
performing their own interviews and cross-checking overlapping eyewitness
accounts to confirm the incidents. All refugee interviews provided a "genocidal
trove of evidence."" Between maps of locations of mass graves, descriptions of
weapons, and names of dead and raped victims as well as Janjaweed militia
leaders, the interviews frequently confirmed the atrocities to a stunningly detailed
degree. 12
Using the interviews in the Documenting Atrocities report, Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond were able to identify five key elements fostering or causing a
genocidal pattern. Many of the refugees confirmed that tension between Arabs and
Blacks had been on the rise before the Sudanese government began to actively
encourage and support violence against Blacks. Many refugees also noted that the
govermment specifically armed the Arab Janjaweed militias with weapons and
horses, leading many to conclude that "the government does not want Blacks to
live in Darfur because they give Arabs weapons to attack us."13 A third element
was the accounts of the Sudanese government bombing the Darfur villagesaircraft and helicopter attacks that could last days, weeks, and even months.
Fourth, most of the refugees described carefully planned joint ground attacks, often
coordinated with the bombing assaults that were specifically focused towards
mechanically killing only Black villagers. 14 Ultimately, these efforts sought to
"root out" the Black ethnicity from the future population. Those that were not
killed faced starvation as they had lost all their possessions and feared returning to
their villages. Finally, refugees often described racial epithets being shouted by
the Janjaweed that explicitly targeted only Black ethnic groups." To Colin
Powell, these five elements collectively corroborated the "specific intent of the
perpetrators to destroy 'a group in whole or in part,' the words of the [Genocide]

Convention.16
So how, the authors ask, could the United States remain indecisive to these
genocidal atrocities in the face of this massive amount of evidence? Despite
Powell's urging of the international community to prevent and suppress acts of
genocide, the United States remained very restrained after the issuance of the U.S.
Department of State's report. Secretary Powell requested more African Union
troops, and President Bush called for a UN investigation into the crimes in Darfur.
Other than making these two high-profile overtures to the international
community, the United States did little other than offer humanitarian health
assistance. According to the authors, the United States' ambivalence can be

10. HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supranote 4, at 79.
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directly attributed to the U.S. government's use of so-called "flip-flop diplomacy"
when considering the survey evidence of Darfur refugees.
The authors explain in Chapter 5, Flip-Floppingon Darfur, that the United
States' flip-flop diplomacy was the outcome of a complex and confusing political
situation.1 7 Initially, the United States estimated the mortality rate in Darfur from
the U.S. Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS), an American survey plan that
randomly chose a starting point in each camp or settlement, and from there
selected every tenth dwelling unit for interview." This resulted in the final 1,136
sampled households, which were used as a generally accurate basis for the final
estimation of mortality. 19 This was not the only survey conducted, however. The
World Health Organization (WHO) conducted its own survey based on studies in
the internal displacement camps in Darfur to measure the mortality rate. The two
surveys, however, proved to be very different. Health organizations, especially in
a poverty-stricken area such as Darfur, "focus on immediate and ongoing
challenges of disease and malnutrition," and are "less concerned with past violence
that leads to displaced persons to flee camps in the first place." 20 The WHO
estimate only provided an accurate mortality estimate for those deaths related to
the health problems within the refugee camps, but did not collect mortality data
relating to deaths resulting from the many attacks that occurred before the actual
displacement. Thus, the WHO estimate, the estimate used by the United Nations
and other international organizations, dramatically underestimated the true
mortality rate of Darfur.
Inexplicably, the U.S. State Department eventually started to shift its focus
from its own ADS study estimates to the WHO studies that ultimately

underreported violent deaths and produced a lower estimate of mortality in Darfur.
Major news organizations followed suit and started to report these "tens of
thousands" estimates instead of the likely more accurate "hundreds of thousands"
figures. 2 1 Why did this happen? The authors explain the United States' flipflopping as a result of the U.S. government's desire to ensure a relationship with
Sudan. At this time, one of the United States' main goals was to secure Sudan's
cooperation in the war on terror. In fact, the U.S. State Department privately met
with Sudanese government intelligence chief, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh,
to discuss the degree of Sudan's possible assistance with the United States during
the exact time that U.S. newspapers started publishing the lower mortality
estimates similar to WHO's estimates.22 President Bush thereafter did not mention
the Darfur genocide for a period of more than four months in 2005, and the
government adopted new and lower mortality estimates based on new surveys that
questionably relied heavily on unreferenced sources.23
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While Gosh himself had been previously linked by Congress to the Sudanese
military attacks on Darfur, the authors point out that it is more than likely that the
newly reduced mortality estimates and suspended references to the Darfur
genocide were part of the cooperative agreement between the United States and
Sudan.24 As the authors state in Chapter 5, "Washington bureaucrats turned a blind
eye towards the policy of the authorities in [Sudan], mainly in the hope of securing
their support for American goals in the Middle East."25
III. SCHOLARS' DEEMPHASIZING OF THE RACIAL ASPECTS OF GENOCIDE

Beginning in Chapter 1, Darfur Crime Scenes, the authors also question why
many scholars dismiss the racial aspects of conflict as a precursor to genocide
when, they argue, racial issues were key to understanding the nature and extent of
the violence in Darfur. 26 In fact, then-U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights
Louise Arbour was hesitant to charge Sudanese officials with the genocide in the
International Criminal Court, claiming that "[t]he difference between genocide and
crimes against humanity such as extermination, murder, rape, torture, and
persecution is merely a matter of whether it was intended to target a specific ethnic
group for elimination." 27 Th other words, the United Nations initially refused to
make the claim of genocide because they argued that the genocidal intent was
missing "as far as the central government authorities are concerned." 28 The
authors, however, disagree and claim that a government's collective elements of
racial targeting or racial intent can ultimately lead to genocidal intent, especially
when found in conjunction with other material motivations.
In Chapter 6, The Rolling Genocide, and Chapter 7, The Racial Spark, the
authors successfully link the idea of collective racial intent and behaviors to the
basic concepts of genocide. 29 According to Article II of the Genocide Convention,
genocide can refer to: (1) killing members of a group, (2) causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group, (3) deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, (4) imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group, and (5) forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group. 30 Any of these five acts can be considered
genocide if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, religious, or racialgroup.31 The authors point out that the actions
of the Janjaweed and Arab government are all variants of the five acts of genocide,
and that the elements of racial intent can easily be blended within the common

24. Id.
25. Id, quoting John Burton, Development and Cultural Genocide in the Sudan, 29 J. MODERN
AFR. STUD. 511, 520 (1991).
26. Id. at 1.
27. Anne Richardson, Sudan Must Be Told to Stop Darfur Crimes, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2007, at 1.
28. CBC News, Sudan's Mass Killing's Not Genocide: UN Report, CBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2005/02/01/newdarfur-reportO50201 html.
29. HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supranote 4, at 137, 161.

30. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Jan. 12, 1951,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
31. Genocide Convention art. 2, Jan. 12, 1951, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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intent of genocide-after all, intent is a necessary element of both racist targeting
and genocide. Additionally, as previously described, conflicts between competing
groups for resources can escalate into extreme violence when coupled with the
incitement of racial animosity. Competition for natural resources had existed in
Darfur for quite some time; it is unlikely that the group acrimony escalated to
genocide only due to the desire of acquiring more economic goods or land. These
cases of extreme violence needed something more, such as collective racial
animosity, to bring it to the point of genocide.
But what causes this extreme racial divide? The authors point out that the
Sudanese government, through manipulative tactics and unfair policies, actively
strove to foster a sense of collective racial hatred against the Blacks among the
various non-Black ethnic groups.32 Identities in Darfur were often confusing; most
groups practiced Islam, held similar economic statuses, and often overlapped in
skin tones.33 Only when a clear racial classification was imposed by the
government did a more severe stigmatization of the Blacks develop among the
non-Black ethnic groups. This happened when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir
consistently singled out all the Black ethnic groups of Darfur as "Zourga," a
derogatory racial slur for Black ethnic group members.34 As the authors point out,
"[e]thnic group identities tend to be plural, whereas racial identity tends to be
binary, and ethnic identities tend to be developed by the groups themselves,
whereas racial group identity is often imposed by others."35 By using this
dehumanizing term in a public forum and hinting that they wanted to end the
history of these Black groups, the government effectively brought the separation of
groups and discrimination to a new level, setting the scene for genocide.
This racial animosity was fostered before the violence began and continued
through the genocide.
Racial slurs directed towards dehumanizing and
exterminating Black ethnic groups were constantly shouted during the attacks.
Black women were specifically targeted for violent rape, and many Black people,
including women and children, were brutally murdered while being assailed with
harsh and derogatory racial slurs. When these kinds of racial epithets are unleashed
upon a group during extreme violent acts, "the violence earns the adjective
genocidal."36 It is obvious that the government's use of racial discrimination was a
central focus to "organizing the targeting of killings, rapes, displacement, and
destruction of these groups," 3 7 and it is an aspect of any conflict that should be
considered in all future incidents of genocide.
Unfortunately, at the time of this writing the prosecutors in the Darfur
genocide have still not clearly differentiated the meanings of ethnicity and race in
the crisis. While this would appear to be a classic case of ethnic targeting, the
prosecutors have failed to mention or show the "explicitness or extensiveness of
32. HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supranote 4, at 5.
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the government's use of race" to carry out their plans.38
IV. How

CRIMINOLOGY CAN ADVANCE
AGAINST GENOCIDE

UNDERSTANDING

AND PROTECTION

In Chapter 2, The Crime of Crimes, and Chapter 3, While Criminology Slept,
the authors stress that international criminal law must make several changes
concerning the way we study and approach genocide.39 While past incidents of
genocide have often been covered by war crimes tribunals and other international
policies, many of the basic ideas of criminology have been ignored or
underutilized in this realm. Why has the field of criminology avoided genocide for
so long? After all, the genocide in Darfur was a readily evident common criminal
conspiracy and enterprise designed with a common purpose. By studying the
situation that occurred in Darfur, scholars of the science of criminology should be
able to recognize and respond to future genocidal events in a more proficient and
organized manner.
The authors specifically note that the methods of determining the scale of
atrocities must become more accurate and uniform.40 While humanitarian groups
such as WHO often provide important data regarding illness and nutritional needs
associated with genocide, these figures are inadequate for determining the true
mortality rate of genocide. 41 Rather, the authors emphasize that the United States'
original ADS approach, the crime victimization approach, is much more accurate
in analyzing the number of deaths in a community.42 In fact, the authors take this
one step further. Towards the end of Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, the
authors include an appendix offering genocidal statistics on Darfur. By using a
complex hierarchal linear model of statistics, the authors use their already arguably
more representative estimates to account for the non-independence of observations
within settlements and allow for the simultaneous estimation of mortality for those
within settlements versus those between settlements.43 Essentially, the authors'
use of statistics allows them to attain the most accurate inferences and patterns of
genocidal behavior while also comparing the frequency of various genocidal
actions against each other. In a crime such as genocide where sheer numbers are
central to establishing the scale of the crisis and projecting the consequent degree
of outside help that it might receive, it is critically important that the most accurate
and reliable methods are used to attain the estimates.
The authors also note that the criminology of genocide should "demonstrate
and explain the role of state-led and organized intentions in driving the fanatical
fury and frenzy of genocidal killing and rape."44 In the instance of Darfur, the
govermment capitalized upon the already desperate rivalry between the African

38.
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farmers and Arab herdsmen caused by harsh environmental conditions. By
fostering an atmosphere of racial enmity in order to kill and destroy the lives of the
Black ethnic groups, the Sudanese government simply manipulated and
exacerbated feelings that had existed long before the genocide occurred.45 The
Arabs of Darfur essentially became pawns in the vicious governmental Islamic
ideology that dehumanized Black African groups. The authors emphasize that
future criminologists must be able to recognize aspects of state-led policies and
actions involving war and crime that bear the actus reus and mens rea of genocidal
crimes.
Finally, in Chapter 9, Global Shadows, the authors call attention to the fact
that the international public must be more knowledgeable and aware of the
elements of genocide for genocide criminology to succeed.46 While Darfur might
seem far away, we must hope that the institutions of international criminal law can
"see common themes as well as differences" 47 between Darfur and their own
communities, and strive to "narrow the distance between the troubled settings of
the [Global] North and [Global] South." 48 In other words, we must learn all we
can about the horrible atrocities in Darfur. For the first time in history, surveys,
narratives, and extensive interviews were conducted during an ongoing genocide.49
This valuable evidence and the methods used to acquire it must be used to promote
public awareness concerning the composition and consequences of a genocide such
as that in Darfur. The lack of action on the part of the United Nations and the
United States shows that even large organizations may exhibit a lack of willingness
to intervene.
This new knowledge must be used to increase all world
communities' "collective efficacy" in monitoring and controlling crime
victimization."'
V. CONCLUSION

As Darfur and the Crime of Genocide went to press in February 2009,
Prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo of the International Criminal Court requested
that the court issue arrest warrants charging Sudan president al-Bashir with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.5 1 And yet, even in light of the
large amount of evidence documenting these atrocities, there was still strong
opposition to the genocide charge from the United Nations, the United States, and
even the Prosecutor's own office. 52 Ultimately, Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo was
45. Id.
46. Id. at 193.
47. HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supranote 4, at 217.
48. Id. at 218.
49. Id. at 220.
50. Id. at 219.
51. Xan Rice, Sudanese president Bashirfaces Darfur arrest warrant,THE GUARDIAN, March 4,
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/04/darfur-sudan-bashir-arrest.
52. HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 4, at xxi. While the United Nations still remains
opposed to the genocide charge, the organization has admitted that it might have initially
underestimated the Darfur death toll by more than fifty percent. CNN NEWS, U.N.: 100,000 More
Dead in Darfur than Anticipated, April 22, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/
04/22/darfur.holmes/index.html?eref-rss topstories.
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convinced by the very same kind of evidence presented in this book that the
Sudanese government, led by al-Bashir, strategically coordinated a series of attacks
with the intention of genocidal group destruction. For those clamoring for
immediate justice, however, a trial occurring soon seems remote as Sudan rejects
the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction.53 Nonetheless, this charge is not all
for naught. Scholars point out that al-Bashir will most likely not be able to travel
to western countries without facing arrest, thus hampering his travelling ability and
effectively imprisoning him in his own country and those countries strongly allied
with Sudan permanently.54
Based on what we have seen in Darfur, authors John Hagan and Wenona
Rymond-Richmond make a convincing argument that the development of genocide
criminology is much needed and noticeably overdue. However, it is important to
note that the authors are not the first to draw the connection between genocide and
criminology; other publications have previously discussed the subject, albeit to a
lesser degree of detail.
While other works have only briefly touched upon the
connection between criminology and genocide, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
discuss this relationship more extensively, distinctively examining the benefits of
criminology in this area and how the international community can specifically
utilize the various areas of this science to aid future genocidal studies. Thus, it is
not fair to say that criminologists have effectively ignored or failed to apply their
analytical frameworks to the crime of genocide in the past; rather, it is more
accurate to say that previous authors have failed to apply criminology to genocide
as thoroughly and in as great of detail as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond have done
so in their book. Furthermore, it seems that the authors have spearheaded a recent
interest towards this subject-the June 2009 issue of International Criminal

53. Peter Walker and James Sturcke, Darfur Genocide Chargesfor Sudanese PresidentOmar alBashir, THE GUARDIAN, July 14, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/14/
sudan.warcrimesl?gusrc=rss&feed-worldnews.
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with Sudan, as evidenced by his short visits to Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Eritrea, and Ethiopia
in March 2009, and Nigeria in October 2009. A Waltz with Bashir, TIME, April 13, 2009, at 12; Press
Release, Amnesty Int'l, Al-Bashir Visit to Egypt is a Missed Opportunity to Enforce Justice, (Mar. 25,
2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/al-bashir-visit-egypt-missed-opportunityenforce-justice-20090325; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Nigerian Government Must Arrest Sudanese
President during Visit (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/nigeriangovernment-must-arrest-sudanese-president-during-visit-20091023.
Amnesty International has
subsequently criticized the failure of host countries to honor the ICC warrant and arrest al-Bashir. Press
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JusticeReview has devoted an entire, seven-article issue specifically to genocide in
the context of criminology.56
There are good reasons for this recent discussion of the subject. Criminology
can explain the social mechanisms that led to the events in Darfur, and can offer
important evidence for the legal and political processes that are intended to assign
accountability for such criminal acts. More accurate methods of calculating
empirical evidence such as mortality rate as well as increased public awareness of
how state-led organizations can manipulate others to commit atrocities can only
help organizations such as the International Criminal Court learn more about
genocide and how to approach it in the future. By acknowledging and anticipating
issues such as racial motivations, state-driven influence, and possible flip-flopping
of other nations' policies, the science of criminology can be developed to not only
halt ongoing incidents of genocidal violence, punishing those where needed, but
also to deflect or obviate incipient problems.
Unfortunately, this desired improvement in criminology will have come too
late for many of the people of Darfur. The prospect of restoring the Fur, Jebal,
Masalit, and Zaghwa tribes seems extremely distant at this time, and the violence,
while subsided, continues on to this day. The surviving Darfur tribes have lost
nearly all of their possessions, are understandably terrified to return to their former
villages, and are only surviving due to food provided by international humanitarian
organizations.
For all our previous mistakes, authors John Hagan and Wenona
Rymond-Richmond have explained in Darfur and the Crime of Genocide how the
knowledge and experience gained from the Darfur genocide can help us recognize
and prevent atrocities like these in the future. It is now up to us and the world of
international law to make sure that their time and efforts were not wasted.
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192 (2009); Catrien Bijleveld, Aafke Morssinkhof, and Alette Smeulers, Counting the Countless: Rape
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